RESUMEN: Aplicando una metodología hermenéutica intertextual, el artículo ofrece un análisis de diferentes momentos en la articulación del humanismo poscolonial, sistematizando los nexos conceptuales entre las propuestas de Fanon / Bhabha y Bhabha / Said. El artículo interpreta el humanismo poscolonial como una epistemología crítica que permite dilucidar los mecanismos de violencia cultural y epistémica inherentes a los proyectos y a las narrativas etno-nacionalistas, y plantea la posibilidad de un horizonte de ciudadanía intercultural en el contexto presente de crisis de (...) la Unión Europea posBrexit.ABSTRACT: This article offers an analysis of different moments in the articulation of postcolonial humanism through a systematization of conceptual nexus among the proposals of Fanon / Bhabha and Bhabha / Said, the article highlights the contemporary dimensions of postcolonial humanism. By doing intertextual hermeneutic analysis, the article interprets postcolonial humanism as a critical epistemology that elucidates the mechanisms of cultural and epistemic violence inherent to ethno-nationalist narratives and strategies, in the current context of postBrexit EU crisis.PALABRAS CLAVE: interculturalidad; etno-nacionalismo; humanismo poscolonial; democracia; derechos universalesKEYWORDS: interculturality; ethno-nationalism; postcolonial humanism; democracy; universal rights. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present a renewed reading of ethical-normative debates on recognition of cultural differences, by interrogating the initiatives that have constituted the international minority rights framework. The article is divided into three sections: 1. The first section approaches an introductory definition of minority rights. 2. The second section presents the philosophical reading of Charles Taylor on minority rights, within the ethical framework of his communitarian conception of freedom and individual development. 3. The third section presents (...) the philosophical reading of Bhabha on minority rights, within the ethical framework of his humanistic critique to the political construction of cultural differences. (shrink)

La génesis del humanismo en la UNESCO -- Maneras de pensar y hacer las paces -- El multiculturalismo revisitado desde la crítica poscolonial -- Las (des)ilusiones del pueblo : hegemonías, resistencias y nacionalismos -- El nuevo humanismo y la filosofía para la paz.

ABSTRACT Critiques leveled at epistemic decolonization call for a reorientation in theories of colonialism. The colonial imagination, a rhetorical tool that normalizes a sensible order of dispossession and appropriation, can be a reoriented site of contestation. By imagining an identity whose only means of relating is through opposition, the colonial imagination renders identities that inhabit a state of solitude. Two letters from Hernán Cortés to King Carlos V of Spain show how this colonial imagining aims to normalize dispossession and appropriation (...) of the relations Originary peoples have with lands, waters, airs, and other-than-human relatives. Considering this argument, rhetorical studies needs to readjust its analytical timeframe beyond the times of settler-colonial nation-states and colonization. (shrink)

A comienzos de la década de los 80, el filósofo Gilles Deleuze aplicó la teoría de la imagen de Bergson expuesta en Materia y Memoria (1896) a la imagen cinematográfica con la intención de desarrollar nuevas herramientas conceptuales que, a través de un análisis de la historia del cine, permitieran poder delinear mejor tanto la relación cognoscitiva más allá de los presupuestos de sujeto-objeto, como una teoría de la comunicación pre-verbal no estructuralizada fonéticamente que superara definitivamente la concepción lacaniana del (...) lenguaje. Si bien dichos análisis pueden ser vistos también como el establecimiento de unos principios alternativos a las teorías del montaje tanto de Vertov como de Eizenshtéin, el interés primario de nuestro paper se centrará en la redefinición de las categorías espacio-temporales que conlleva esta nueva teoría del cine esgrimida por Deleuze. Concretamente analizaremos cómo la nueva tecnología cinematográfica, especialmente en su desarrollo europeo de la segunda postguerra (Godard, Fellini, Syberberg, Tarkovski) supone una comprensión temporal por completo ajena a cualquier comprensión de causalidad lineal, teleológica o no, de corte cronológico. En su lugar, el cine en tanto que medio de comunicación propio del mundo metropolitano contemporáneo emplea unas categorías temporales más cercanas a conceptos como “acontecimiento” o “haecceitas”, que en algunos puntos lo acercan a la concepción del tiempo desarrollada por Walter Benjamin, pero que por otro lo relacionan directamente con formas aiónicas del mismo ya estudiadas por Deleuze en la década de los 60, y aplicadas al estudio del dadaísmo en la de los 70. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics seems to portray nature as nonseparable, in the sense that it allows spatiotemporally separated entities to have states that cannot be fully specified without reference to each other. This is often said to implicate some form of “holism.” We aim to clarify what this means, and why this seems plausible. Our core idea is that the best explanation for nonseparability is a “common ground” explanation, which casts nonseparable entities in a holistic light, as scattered reflections of a more (...) unified underlying reality. (shrink)

J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world? Ismael is an original and creative thinker who tries to understand our problematic concepts about the self and how they are related to our use of (...) language in particular. (shrink)

A reading is given of Curie''s Principle that the symmetry of a cause is always preserved its effects. The truth of the principle is demonstrated and its importance, under the proposed reading, is defended.As far as I see, all a priori statements in physics have their origin in symmetry. (Weyl, Symmetry, p. 126).

: I’m going to generalize the points that L.A. Paul makes in her Transformative Experience and push them in a somewhat different direction. I will begin by talking about transformative experience in a generic sense and say how ubiquitous it is. Then I’ll distinguish that from the strict, specialized sense of transformative experience that Paul identifies. I will say why Paul’s focus on the strict and specialized sense allows her to arrive at a strong conclusion, but bypasses the more interesting (...) lessons which concern the importance of de se imagination and the possibilities for educating it. Keywords: Transformative Experience; Laurie A. Paul; Imagination; Decision Esperienza, trasformazione, immaginazione Riassunto: Intendo generalizzare le questioni sollevate da L.A. Paul nel suo Trasformative Experience, spingendole in una direzione differente. Inizierò parlando dell’esperienza trasformativa in senso generico, illustrando quanto questa sia diffusa. Quindi distinguerò questo senso generico di esperienza trasformativa da quello più ristretto identificato da Paul. Illustrerò poi le ragioni per cui la messa a fuoco di questo senso ristretto e specifico da parte di Paul le consente di giungere a conclusioni forti, evitando però i compiti più interessanti che riguardano l’importanza dell’immaginazione de se e le possibilità di educarla. Parole chiave: Esperienza trasformativa; Laurie A. Paul; Immaginazione; Decisione. (shrink)

I propose, in the context of Everett interpretations of quantum mechanics, a way of understanding how there can be genuine uncertainty about the future notwithstanding that the universe is governed by known, deterministic dynamical laws, and notwithstanding that there is no ignorance about initial conditions, nor anything in the universe whose evolution is not itself governed by the known dynamical laws. The proposal allows us to draw some lessons about the relationship between chance and determinism, and to dispel one source (...) of the tendency among Everettians to introduce consciousness as a primitive element into physical description. (shrink)

In 1687 Isaac Newton ushered in a new scientific era in which laws of nature could be used to predict the movements of matter with almost perfect precision. Newton's physics also posed a profound challenge to our self-understanding, however, for the very same laws that keep airplanes in the air and rivers flowing downhill tell us that it is in principle possible to predict what each of us will do every second of our entire lives, given the early conditions of (...) the universe. Can it really be that even while you toss and turn late at night in the throes of an important decision and it seems like the scales of fate hang in the balance, that your decision is a foregone conclusion? Can it really be that everything you have done and everything you ever will do is determined by facts that were in place long before you were born? This problem is one of the staples of philosophical discussion. It is discussed by everyone from freshman in their first philosophy class, to theoretical physicists in bars after conferences. And yet there is no topic that remains more unsettling, and less well understood. If you want to get behind the façade, past the bare statement of determinism, and really try to understand what physics is telling us in its own terms, read this book. The problem of free will raises all kinds of questions. What does it mean to make a decision, and what does it mean to say that our actions are determined? What are laws of nature? What are causes? What sorts of things are we, when viewed through the lenses of physics, and how do we fit into the natural order? Ismael provides a deeply informed account of what physics tells us about ourselves. The result is a vision that is abstract, alien, illuminating, and-Ismael argues-affirmative of most of what we all believe about our own freedom. Written in a jargon-free style, How Physics Makes Us Free provides an accessible and innovative take on a central question of human existence. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the worry that the existence of causal antecedents to your choices means that you are causally compelled to act as you do. It begins with the folk notion of cause, leads the reader through recent developments in the scientific understanding of causal concepts, and argues that those developments undermine the threat from causal antecedents. The discussion is then used as a model for a kind of naturalistic metaphysics that takes its lead from science, letting everyday concepts be (...) shaped and transformed by scientific developments. (shrink)

J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world?

Quantum mechanics is, at least at first glance and at least in part, a mathematical machine for predicting the behaviors of microscopic particles — or, at least, of the measuring instruments we use to explore those behaviors — and in that capacity, it is spectacularly successful: in terms of power and precision, head and shoulders above any theory we have ever had. Mathematically, the theory is well understood; we know what its parts are, how they are put together, and why, (...) in the mechanical sense (i.e., in a sense that can be answered by describing the internal grinding of gear against gear), the whole thing performs the way it does, how the information that gets fed in at one end is converted into what comes out the other. The question of what kind of a world it describes, however, is controversial; there is very little agreement, among physicists and among philosophers, about what the world is like according to quantum mechanics. Minimally interpreted, the theory describes a set of facts about the way the microscopic world impinges on the macroscopic one, how it affects our measuring instruments, described in everyday language or the language of classical mechanics. Disagreement centers on the question of what a microscopic world, which affects our apparatuses in the prescribed manner, is, or even could be, like intrinsically ; or how those apparatuses could themselves be built out of microscopic parts of the sort the theory describes.[1.. (shrink)

First para: Before the 17th century, there was not much discussion, and little uniformity in conception, of natural laws. The rise of science in 17th century, Newton’s mathematization of physics, and the provision of strict, deterministic laws that applied equally to the heavens and to the terrestrial realm had a profound impact in transforming the philosophical imagination. A philosophical conception of physical law built on the example of Newtonian Mechanics became quickly entrenched. Between the 17th and 20th centuries, there was (...) a great deal of philosophical interest in probabilities, but probabilities were mostly regarded as having something to do with the management of opinion, not as having a fundamental role in science. Probabilities made their first appearance in an evidently ineliminable way in the laws of a fundamental theory with the advent of quantum mechanics. Quantum probabilities have come to be called ‘chances’ in the philosophical literature, and their interpretation has been one of the central problems in philosophy of science now for almost a century. There continue to be hold-outs that insist that there must be an underlying probability-free replacement for quantum mechanics and Bohmians have had some success in formulating a deterministic alternative to quantum mechanics, but most physicists accept that the probabilistic character of the quantum mechanical laws is likely to be retained in any successor theory. While physics has adjusted itself comfortably to the existence of ineliminably probabilistic laws, philosophy has not managed arrive at a stable interpretation of quantum probability. The difficulty is that there are a number of constraints that an interpretation of chance must satisfy, constraints that appear to be partially definitive of the concept and it proves to be extraordinarily difficult to meet them simultaneously. (shrink)

The role of probability is one of the most contested issues in the interpretation of contemporary physics. In this paper, I’ll be reevaluating some widely held assumptions about where and how probabilities arise. Larry Sklar voices the conventional wisdom about probability in classical physics in a piece in the Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, when he writes that “Statistical mechanics was the first foundational physical theory in which probabilistic concepts and probabilistic explanation played a fundamental role.” And the conventional wisdom (...) about quantum probabilities is that they are basic, not reducible to the types of probabilities we see in statistical mechanics. In the first section of this paper, I’ll argue that in fact classical physics was steeped in probability long before statistical mechanics came on the scene, specifically, that an objective measure over phase space is an indispensable component of any informative physical theory. In the next section, I’ll argue that this objective measure is the fundamental form of physical probability and that quantum probabilities can be defined in terms of it. In the last, I’ll raise some questions about the metaphysical status of the fundamental measure. (shrink)

Dennett argues that the decentralized view of human cognitive organization finding increasing support in parts of cognitive science undermines talk of an inner self. On his view, the causal underpinnings of behavior are distributed across a collection of autonomous subsystems operating without any centralized supervision. Selves are fictions contrived to simplify description and facilitate prediction of behavior with no real correlate inside the mind. Dennett often uses an analogy with termite colonies whose behavior looks organized and purposeful to the external (...) eye, but which is actually the emergent product of uncoordinated activity of separate components marching to the beat of their individual drums. I examine the cognitive organization of a system steering by an internal model of self and environment, and argue that it provides a model that lies between the image of mind as termite colony and a naïve Cartesianism that views the self as inner substance. (shrink)

The preponderance of female stereotypes in various films has become intense. Regardless of film genre, its effect on media-saturated culture has become somehow profound. This has become a concern to many people especially to feminists. Hence, this film study is conducted to explore how the female lead characters are stereotyped in films particularly in select official James Bond 007 films. During the analysis, the researcher utilizes an adapted film analysis rubric. The results show that: 1) the leading female characters in (...) the three films analyzed are portrayed mainly as objects of Bond’s sexual desire while he establishes and maintains a chauvinistic role all throughout each film; 2) Bond engages in dualistic relationships with the lead female characters when he uses them to satisfy his own desires for a woman as a means to an end (as particularly exemplified and portrayed in the character of Countess Lisl in For Your Eyes Only); 3) the treatment of some female stereotypes in the three films analyzed is consistent, e.g. a particular stereotype of a lead female character as object of sexual desire is sustained all throughout the film. The study, therefore, concludes that the lead female characters in the select films are generally portrayed in oppressive stereotypes. Keywords: Mass Communication, lead female character, female stereotypes, James Bond007, descriptive design (qualitative film analysis), Philippines. (shrink)

Nuestra pretensión en este artículo es modesta: nos proponemos únicamente poner de relieve el doble sentido de los términos "idea" y "sensación" en la filosofía de los siglos XVII y XVIII. Como es sabido, ambos términos constituyen, respectivamente, el núcleo esencial del racionalismo y el empirismo. La idea para el primero y la sensación para el segundo se erigen ciertamente en piezas gnoseológicas clave sin las cuales ni uno ni otro podrían ser cabalmente comprendidos.

Huw Price has argued that on an interventionist account of cause the distinction is perspectival, and the claim prompted some interesting responses from interventionists and in particular an exchange with Woodward that raises questions about what it means to say that one or another structure is perspectival. I’ll introduce his reasons for claiming that the distinction between cause and effect on an interventionist account is perspectival. Then I’ll introduce a distinction between different ways in which a class of concepts can (...) be said to depend on facts about their users. Three importantly different forms of dependence will emerge from the discussion: Pragmatic dependence on us: truth conditions for x-beliefs can be given by a function f \ of more fundamental physical structures making no explicit reference to human agents. But there are any other number of functions ) ontologically on a par with x and what explains the distinguished role f plays in our practical and epistemic lives are facts about us. Implicit relativization: truth conditions for x-beliefs are relative to agent or context; the context supplies the value of a hidden parameter that determines the truth of x-beliefs. Indexicals: like implicit relativization except that the surface syntax contains a term whose semantic value is context-dependent. I suggest that Price’s insights are best understood in the first way. This will draw a crucial disanalogy with his central examples of perspectival concepts, but it will refine the thesis in a way that is more faithful to what his arguments show. The refined thesis will also support generalization to other concepts, and clarify the foundations of the quite distinctive research program that Price has been developing for a number of years. (shrink)

In a famous passage drawing implications from determinism, Laplace introduced the image an intelligence who knew the positions and momenta of all of the particles of which the universe is composed, and asserted that in a deterministic universe such an intelligence would be able to predict everything that happens over its entire history. It is not, however, difficult to establish the physical possibility of a counterpredictive device, i.e., a device designed to act counter to any revealed prediction of its behavior. (...) What would happen if a Laplacean intelligence were put into communication with such a device and forced to reveal its prediction of what the device would do on some occasion? On the one hand, it seems that the Laplacean Intelligence should be able to predict the device's behavior. On the other hand, it seems like that device should be able to act counter to the prediction. An examination of the puzzle leads to clarification of what determinism does entail, with some insights about various other things along the way. (shrink)

This book presents a detailed fieldwork-based study of the ancient Indian religion of Jainism. Drawing on field research in northern Gujarat and on the study of both ancient Sanskrit and Prakrit and modern vernacular Jain religious literature, John Cort provides a rounded portrait of the religion as it is practiced today.

The intuitive difference between a system that choreographs the motion of its parts in the service of goals of its own formulation and a system composed of a collection of parts doing their own thing without coordination has been shaken by now familiar examples of self-organization. There is a broad and growing presumption in parts of philosophy and across the sciences that the appearance of centralized information-processing and control in the service of system-wide goals is mere appearance, i.e., an explanatory (...) heuristic we have evolved to predict behavior, but one that will eventually get swept away in the advancing tide of self-organization. I argue that there is a distinction of central importance here, and that no adequate science of complex systems can dispense with it. (shrink)

This paper examines evolutionary ontologies from Darwin’s work to the genesis and maturation of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, followed by the onset of the more inclusive framework of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. We show how, in an attempt to unify different biological fields under evolutionary principles, the first synthetic theory of evolution progressively disregarded the relevance of organismic-level properties and processes. Yet, failure to reduce the systemic nature and ecological dynamics of the organism (including properties of agency and organization) to (...) that framework raises some important drawbacks. In particular, the two fundamental dimensions of developmental and ecological dynamics were largely neglected. These are the ones that highlight the relational properties of organisms and lead to recent views in, respectively, Evo-Devo and Niche Construction Theory. On this account, we argue that these two aspects illuminate how, while the Modern Synthesis became increasingly reductionist and monistic, the Extended Synthesis is currently being constituted by a pluralistic array of models capable of accommodating different ontological levels, among which that of organisms stands out due to its flexibility and potential inclusiveness. (shrink)

There’s a long history of discussion of probability in philosophy, but objective chance separated itself off and came into its own as a topic with the advent of a physical theory - quantum mechanics - in which chances play a central, and apparently ineliminable, role. In 1980 David Lewis wrote a paper pointing out that a very broad class of accounts of the nature of chance apparently lead to a contradiction when combined with a principle that expresses the role of (...) chance in guiding belief. There is still no settled agreement on the proper response to the Lewis problem. At the time he wrote the article, Lewis despaired of a solution, but, although he never achieved one that satisfied him completely, by 1994, due to work primarily by Thau and Hall, he had come to think the problem could be disarmed if we fudged a little on the meaning of ‘chance’. I’ll say more about this below. What I’m going to suggest, however, is that the qualification is unnecessary. The problem depends on an assumption that should be rejected, viz., that using information about chance to guide credence requires one to conditionalize on the theory of chance that one is using. I’m going to propose a general recipe for using information about chance to guide belief that does not require conditionalization on a theory of chance at any stage. Lewis’ problem doesn’t arise in this setting. (shrink)

The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of inexplicably correlated events. (...) I argue against the received wisdom. I can find nothing in them that argues against the possibility (even, the probability) of time travel. (shrink)

It is well known that the formal system developed by Frege in Begriffsschrift is based upon the distinction between function and argument—as opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and predicate. Almost all of the modern commentaries on Frege's work suggest a semantic interpretation of this distinction, and identify it with the ontological structure of function and object, upon which Grundgesetze is based. Those commentaries agree that the system proposed by Frege in Begriffsschrift has some gaps, but it is taken (...) as an essentially correct formal system for second-order logic: the first one in the history of logic. However, there is strong textual evidence that such an interpretation should be rejected. This evidence shows that the nature of the distinction between function and argument is stated by Frege in a significantly different way: it applies only to expressions and not to entities. The formal system based on this distinction is tremendously flexible and is suitable for making explicit the logical structure of contents as well as of deductive chains. We put forward a new reconstruction of the function-argument scheme and the quantification theory in Begriffsschrift. After that, we discuss the usual semantic interpretation of Begriffsschrift and show its inconsistencies with a rigorous reading of the text. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind tend to take it for granted that causal relations are part of the mind-independent, objective fabric of the physical world. In fact, their status has been hotly contested since Russell famously observed that the closest thing to causal relations in physics are timesymmetric dynamical laws relating global time slices of world-history. 1 These bear a distant relationship to the local, asymmetric relations that form the core of the folk notion of cause. Nancy Cartwright, in an influential response, (...) agreed about the absence of causal relations from physics, but argued that Russell’s position was not viable because agents choosing among potential actions need specifically causal information to distinguish effective from ineffective strategies for bringing about ends. 2 Causal beliefs play an ineliminable role in practical deliberation In recent years, there has been a great deal of progress in understanding the relationship between causal concepts and the dynamical laws that appear in advanced physics, together with a proliferation of new tools for representing and discovering causal structure. (shrink)

Ayahuasca is a psychoactive substance from the Amazon rainforest regions of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil. Although its use originated among indigenous tribes in the Amazon basin, it has become increasingly popularized in Western society through the transnational markets of spirituality and religiosity driven by globalization, Postmodernity, and new forms of religious practice. In this paper, we will overview the arrival of ayahuasca in Uruguay by way of four different groups. We will then focus on one of these groups, a (...) holistic alternative therapies center, influenced by Peruvian shamanic traditions in the design of its ceremonies. Last we will introduce a “distributed cognition” model to explain ayahuasca rituals as a system of activity. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Humean analyses do not provide content‐preserving reductions and non‐trivial accounts of the reference. It introduces a distinction between structure in the realm of Being and structure in the representations of Being. The chapter argues that there are good reasons not to expect content‐preserving reductions of the modal to the non‐modal at the level of content, or useful mappings of content‐level structures into structures at the level of Being. In the rest of the chapter, the author deals (...) with the relationship between content‐level structure and structure at the level of Being. The debate between the Humean and non‐Humean should be reconceived as a debate about whether non‐Humean facts play a substantive role in the story of how beliefs about laws and chances are formed and used. (shrink)

The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned. I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part (...) of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers. (shrink)

Nuestra intención en este artículo es exponer la concepción berkeleyana entorno al tan debatido problema de la filosofía de la modernidad que concierne a la relación, conocimiento y exterioridad. Éste constituye, en efecto, núcleo esencial de las filosofías de autores tan representativos de la época como Locke, Hume, Condillac y el propio Berkeley, entre otros. No obstante, la singularidad del planteamiento berkeleyano al respecto es tal, que bien merece por nuestra parte una reflexión antenta y por separado. Además, la influencia (...) que su aportación peculiar ejerció sobre determinados filósofos, como, por ejemplo, Condillac y Kant, y a través de ellos sobre buena parte de la filosofía posterior fue de tal índole, que sin el cabal conocimiento de ella no podría entenderse la relevancia y significación del idealismo gnoseológico en sus diferentes tipos y modalidades. En una primera sección, meramente introductoria, acometemos la exposición de la metafísica de Berkeley, destacándose sobre todo su teoría del inmaterialismo ; con ello se pretende subrayar en principio el carácter peculiar que forzosamente habrá de presentar su concepción de lo externo. El tratamiento de ésta constituye propiamente el contenido de la segunda sección, en la que, además de la identificación entre contenido sensible y realidad y de la apelación a la instancia divina como garante último de ésta, se destaca el papel preponderante que desempeña el sentido del tacto en el proceso de aprehensión de la exterioridad. (shrink)