The inherence heuristic is too broad as a theoretical notion. The authors are at risk of applying their own heuristic in supporting itself. Nonetheless the article provides useful insight into the ways in which people overestimate the coherence and completeness of their understanding of the world.

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By (...) revealing the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

With a few yet increasing number of exceptions, the cognitive sciences enthusiastically endorsed the idea that there are basic facial expressions of emotions that are created by specific configurations of facial muscles. We review evidence that suggests an inherent role for context in emotion perception. Context does not merely change emotion perception at the edges; it leads to radical categorical changes. The reviewed findings suggest that configurations of facial muscles are inherently ambiguous, and they call for a different approach towards (...) the understanding of facial expressions of emotions. Prices of sticking with the modal view, and advantages of an expanded view, are succinctly reviewed. (shrink)

The behavior of two-dimensional coupled map lattices is studied with respect to the global stabilization of unstable local fixed points without external control. It is numerically shown under which circumstances such inherent global stabilization can be achieved for both synchronous and asynchronous updating. Two necessary conditions for inherent global stabilization are derived analytically.

We give a general method for constructing lattices L whose equational theories are inherently nonfinitely based. This means that the equational class generated by L is locally finite and that L belongs to no locally finite finitely axiomatizable equational class. We also provide an example of a lattice which fails to be inherently nonfinitely based but whose equational theory is not finitely axiomatizable.

This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the distinctive features of quantum statistics are exclusively determined by the nature of the properties it describes. In particular, all statistically relevant properties of identical quantum particles in many-particle systems are conjectured to be irreducible, ‘inherent’ properties only belonging to the whole system. This allows one to explain quantum statistics without endorsing the ‘Received View’ that particles are non-individuals, or postulating that quantum systems obey peculiar probability distributions, or assuming that there are primitive (...) restrictions on the range of states accessible to such systems. With this, the need for an unambiguously metaphysical explanation of certain physical facts is acknowledged and satisfied. (shrink)

Over the last few years a resurgence of Newtonian studies has led to a deeper understanding of several aspects of his Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica. Besides the new translation of Newton's masterpiece, these contributions touched on his mathematical style, investigative method, experimental endeavors, and conceptual systematization of key notions in mechanics and the science of motion (I. Newton, The `Principia'. A new translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman assisted by Julia Budenz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), hereafter (...) New translation. Readers can find a useful bibliography on Newton in I.B. Cohen and G. Smith, eds, The Cambridge Companion to Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, hereafter Cambridge Companion), 465–80.). With regard to the last topic, recent works have identified two notions where Newton's choices look unclear and scholarly opinion is divided. These notions are materiae vis insita or vis inertiae, namely the inherent force of matter or force of inertia, and vis centrifuga or centrifugal force. It is my conviction that the two notions became inter-related in Newton's thought starting from the time of composition of the Principia and that a new look at them will simultaneously clarify matters about both. Newton's beliefs about the nature of centrifugal force did not affect his calculations of planetary and cometary orbits in the Principia, but they are none the less of considerable intellectual interest.After a brief introduction on Huygens and the early Newton, Sect. 2 focuses on Newton's views in the Principia and its preliminary manuscripts. Section 3 presents a summarized account of Leibniz's views, which are necessary for understanding Newton's criticism of them. This is the subject of Sect. 4, where we find his views most fully spelled out. (shrink)

The article explains the nature of the immanent cause in Spinoza. It shows that immanent causation is a distinct genus of efficient causation, i.e., an efficient cause whose effect inheres in the cause.

In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza's and Descartes‟s discussion of error, that beliefs are affirmations of the content of imagination that is not false in itself, only in relation to the object. This interpretation is an improvement both on the winning ideas reading and on the interpretation reading of beliefs. Contrary to the winning ideas reading it is able to explain belief revision concerning the same representation. Also, it does not need the assumption that I (...) misinterpret my otherwise correct ideas as the interpretation reading would have it. In the first section I will provide a brief overview of the notion of inherence and its role in Spinoza‟s discussion of the status of finite minds. Then by examining the relation between Spinoza‟s and Descartes‟ distinction of representations and attitudes, I show that affirmation can be identified with beliefs in Spinoza. Next, I will take a closer look at the identification of intellect and will and argue that Spinoza's identification of the two is based on the fact that Spinoza sees both as the active aspect of the mind. After that, I analyze Spinoza‟s comments on the different scopes of will and intellect, and argue that beliefs are affirmations of the imaginative content of the idea. Finally, through Spinoza‟s example of the utterance of mathematical error, I present my solution to the problem of inherence of false beliefs. (shrink)

During much of the past century, it was widely believed that phonemes--the human speech sounds that constitute words--have no inherent semantic meaning, and that the relationship between a combination of phonemes (a word) and its referent is simply arbitrary. Although recent work has challenged this picture by revealing psychological associations between certain phonemes and particular semantic contents, the precise mechanisms underlying these associations have not been fully elucidated. Here we provide novel evidence that certain phonemes have an inherent, non-arbitrary emotional (...) quality. Moreover, we show that the perceived emotional valence of certain phoneme combinations depends on a specific acoustic feature--namely, the dynamic shift within the phonemes' first two frequency components. These data suggest a phoneme-relevant acoustic property influencing the communication of emotion in humans, and provide further evidence against previously held assumptions regarding the structure of human language. This finding has potential applications for a variety of social, educational, clinical, and marketing contexts. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest a new interpretation of the relations of inherence, causation and conception in Spinoza. I discuss the views of Don Garrett on this issue and argue against Della Rocca's recent suggestion that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception. I argue that Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and that Della Rocca's suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment (...) to Spinoza 's system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system. -/- In the first part of the paper, I present the considerations and arguments that motivated Don Garrett's and Della Rocca's interpretations. In the second part, I present and examine several problems that result from Della Rocca's reading. In the third and final part, I present my own view on the relation among inherence, causation, and conception; offer a new interpretation of the conceived through relation in Spinoza ; and finally, defend and justify the presence of bifurcations at the very center of Spinoza 's system. (shrink)

본고에서 필자는 근대적 형식으로 재탄생할 경우 비극이 갖추어야 할 개방성의 근원으로서 비극의 태생적 혼종성에 관하여 논하였다. 이는 『비극의 탄생』에서 고대 그리스 비극에 대한 니체의 낭만주의적 서사에 대한 비판적 독해를 요구한다. 비극에 대한 낭만주의적 서사는 예술의 순연성과 이론적 학문성 간의 양립 불가능한 대립에 기초해 있다. 하지만, 『비극의 탄생』의 모체가 된 두 강연(“그리스 악극”, “소크라테스와 비극”)에 대한 주의 깊은 독해를 통해 본고는 이러한 낭만주의적 대립 서사 아래 숨겨져 있는 예술성과 논리성, 서정성과 서사성 간의 혼종 관계가 비극의 태생적 조건임을 밝히고자 하였다. 나아가, 비극의 (...) 이러한 태생적 혼종성은 비극 형식 자체의 비극성을 내포한다는 점을 규명하고자 하였다. 마지막으로, 비극의 태생적 혼종성과 본래적 비극성은 이렇게 재정식화된 비극 예술의 형식이 개방성을 근본 특징으로 하는 근대 문화에 적합한 것임을 시사한다. (shrink)

Paul W. Taylor has defended a life-centered ethics that considers the inherent worth of all living things to be the same. l examine reasons for ascribing inherent worth to all living beings, but argue that there can be various levels of inherent worth. Differences in capacities among types of life are used to justify such levels. I argue that once levels of inherent worth are distinguished, it becomes reasonable torestrict rights to human beings.

The idea of the multiverse, likely difficult to prove in traditional scientific ways, may be bolstered by two arguments from the field of logic. This article, contextualized by the metaphorical, non-logical approaches to the multiverse and situating itself within the history of astronomy, explicates these two arguments from logic. The first argument relates to the implicit illogical vanity in the assumption that our presently-known universe is special. In other words, it may be somewhat logical to embrace the history of deanthropomorphism (...) more fully in the light of the Big Bang and the theory of cosmic inflation. The second argument suggests resolution to the long-standing philosophical and logical mysteries associated with the anthropic principle, as well as the attendant use of Ockham’s razor as a logical tool. The problem of evidence and falsifiability is briefly implicated, as well as some consequences for apologetics. (shrink)

This article examines the doctrine of the categories in Boethius’ theological tractates. While, in his commentaries on Aristotle’s works, Boethius claims that accidents are in the substance-subject, in the opuscula sacra he emphasizes on the concept of relation.

Alstin, Zac Euthanasia, which is defined as the intentional killing of another human being, is compared with the established categories of killing in self-defence or as a foreseeable consequence of medical treatment.

A representationalist about qualia takes qualitative states to be aspects of the intentional content of sensory or sensory-like representations. When you experience the redness of an apple, they say, your visual system is merely representing that there is a red surface at such-and-such a place in front of you. And when you experience a red afterimage, your visual system is representing something similar . Your sensory state does not literally have an intrinsic quality of phenomenal redness, just as you do (...) not have a hairy mental state when you occurrently believe that Santa Claus is hairy. Judging by the literature, it is quite plausible to claim that the nature of occurrent beliefs is exhausted by their representational characteristics.1 Why is it that this “pure representation” ploy is so much less plausible in the case of sensory states? Typically, the reason given is that belief states are not qualitative while sensory states are, as revealed by introspection. Qualitativity, it is further maintained, cannot be purely representational – this is the intuition the representationalist must fight. In this paper I want to focus on a feature of sensory states, distinct from but related to their qualitativity, that encourages the anti-representationalist to object to the representational thesis. I shall call this feature “inhereness.” Instances of sensory. (shrink)

This chapter highlights a well-known problem for defenders of transubstantiation: namely, the apparent impossibility of supposing that accidents can be separated from their substance. It begins by arguing that Aquinas’s account of accidents, in which the truth-making function of accidents relative to their substances is understood in terms of the existence of such accidents, is highly susceptible to this kind of objection. The next section considers Giles of Rome’s attempts to overcome this worry, most specifically by distinguishing the existence of (...) an accident from its truth-making function, both of which are described. Giles maintains that the existence of an accident is to be identified with the existence of its substance. According to Scotus, this means that Giles is scarcely better off than Aquinas in defending himself against the worry about separated accidents, since a separated accident needs its own existence and, Scotus avers, there is no way for an accident to gain existence when separated. Scotus agrees with Giles that the truth-making function of accidents is to be distinguished from their existence, and holds that accidents, even when united to their substances, have their own proper existence. Overall, the tale is one of the increasing hypostatization of accidents in the light of pressures from Eucharistic doctrine. (shrink)

Spinoza’s philosophy is bold and rich in challenges to our “common-sense intuitions”, and insofar as it provides powerful arguments to motivate these challenges, I believe that we cannot ask for more. Bold and well-argued philosophy has the indispensable virtue of being able to unsettle and try us, to move us to reconsider what seems natural and obvious, and possibly even to change our most basic beliefs. Indeed, for those who seek to test – rather than confirm - their old and (...) well-fortified intuitions, Spinoza is nothing short of a living spring. My deep support for rigorous, counter-intuitive philosophy notwithstanding, a considerable part of the current paper will be dedicated to an examination and critique of one of the boldest and most fascinating readings of Spinoza of the past few years. In his recent piece, “Rationalism Run Amok: Representation and the Reality of Emotions in Spinoza,” and in his outstanding new book, Michael Della Rocca suggests a strict identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conception in Spinoza (Della Rocca develops this view partly in response to a position recently articulated by Don Garret). In order to see the striking implications of this claim, one need only realize that, according to Della Rocca, Spinoza holds that insofar as the sun is the (partial) cause of some states of the sunflower, the sunflower (partly) inheres in the sun. Furthermore, insofar as my great-great-grandparents caused me, I inhere in them (though we never co-existed at the same time). The mere oddity of Della Rocca’s claim will play only a limited role, if any, in my discussion below. Della Rocca provides important and interesting arguments to the effect that if we are to accept Spinoza’s radical version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (henceforth, PSR), we should bite the bullet and accept the odd implications of Spinoza’s alleged view. While I have nothing but admiration for this willingness to read Spinoza in an allegedly consistent and uncompromising manner, I do think that Della Rocca’s argument that a strict endorsement of the PSR leads necessarily to the identification of the relations of inherence, causation and conception is wrong. I will argue that (1) Spinoza never endorsed this identity, and (2) that Della Rocca’s suggestion could not be considered as a legitimate reconstruction or friendly amendment to Spinoza’s system because it creates several severe and irresolvable problems in the system, and for that reason (and not because the threefold identity contravenes common sense) it should be rejected. In the rest of the paper I rely on my analysis of the relations of inherence, causation, and conception, and suggest a new interpretation of core issues in Spinoza’s metaphysics, and particularly of the conceived through and in another relations and the nature of the substance/modes opposition. Against Della Rocca’s claim that the bifurcation of efficient causation (into causation which is, and is not, accompanied by inherence) constitutes an illegitimate brute fact, I will argue that the bifurcation of causation in Spinoza is paralleled by a bifurcation of conception and that the two relations are grounded in the foundational bifurcation of existence into substance and modes. If we are to recognize the reality of modes in Spinoza, we must also acknowledge the bifurcations that result from the bifurcation of existence into substance and modes. (shrink)

The ‘inherent transgression’ refers to the notion that the very emergence of a certain ‘value’ which serves as a point of ideological identification relies on its transgression, on some mode of taking a distance from it. Ideology depends upon the ‘gap’ that the symbolic order produces between itself and the subject as an effect of bringing the latter into being as a subject of language. Since there is no direct, unmediated relationship between the subject and the authentic, true value, the (...) problem of ‘belief takes on vital importance. But the very separation between belief and knowledge requires that the’ true believer’ must always be someone else. The ‘Lacanian’ decentred subject has to live out the authenticity of his being or her jouissance through the Other. The problem, then, is how to sustain the fiction of the Other, the Other who believes and is worthy of belief. Belief in the Other never goes away but returns in the more excessive, threatening form of nameless powers ‘pulling the strings’, leaving the subject vulnerable to another paranoiac impostor looking to confirm the truth of the conspiracy in his or her own ‘transgressive’ image. (shrink)

For more than a decade, activists, scholars, journalists, and politicians of various stripes have been discussing and decrying mass incarceration. This collection of voices has mostly focused on contingent features of the phenomenon. Critics mention racial disparities, poor prison conditions, and spiraling costs. Some critics have alleged broader problems: they have called for an end to all incarceration, even all punishment. Lost in this conversation is a focus on what is inherently wrong with mass incarceration specifically. This essay fills that (...) void and supplies an answer, drawing on the early modern English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. On the Hobbesian account developed here, mass incarceration is always wrong because it is always inconsistent with having a free society. (shrink)

Standard accounts hold that regularities of behavior must be arbitrary to constitute a convention. Yet, there is growing consensus that conventionality is a graded phenomenon, and that conventions can be more or less natural. I develop an account of natural conventions that distinguishes two basic dimensions of conventional naturalness: a probabilistic dimension and an inherent one. A convention is probabilistically natural if it is likely to emerge in a population of agents, and inherently natural if its content is a regularity (...) that scores high on relevant measures for naturalness. I motivate the proposal on conceptual grounds and then showcase its descriptive benefits by discussing two case studies in language: the tendency towards word-length optimality and the prevalence of shape opacity in spoken language vocabularies. (shrink)

It is sometimes suggested that the physician should offer the patient “just the facts,” preferably in a “value-free manner,” explain the different options, and then leave it to the patient to make the choice. This paper explores the extent to which this adviser model is realistic. The clinical decision process and the various components of clinical reasoning are discussed, and a distinction is made between the biological, empirical, empathic/hermeneutic and ethical components. The discussion is based on the ethical norms of (...) the public health services in the Nordic countries, and the problems are illustrated by a clinical example. It is concluded that the adviser model is unrealistic. Patient information is important, but the complexity of clinical reasoning makes it impossible to separate facts and value judgments. It is claimed that there is an inherent element of paternalism in clinical decision-making and that clinical practice presupposes a mutual trust between physician and patient. (shrink)

Children adopt an inherence-based view of some social categories, viewing certain social categories as reflecting the inherent features of their members. Thinking of social categories in these terms contributes to prejudice and intergroup conflict. Thus, understanding what leads children to apply inherence-based views to particular categories could provide new direction for efforts to reduce these negative social phenomena.

There are two problems with Cimpian & Salomon’s (C&S’s) claim that an innate inherence heuristic is part of our cognitive makeup. First, some of their examples of inherent features do not seem to accord with the authors’ own definition of inherence. Second, rather than posit an inherence heuristic to explain why humans rely more heavily on inherent features, it may be more parsimonious to do so on the basis of aspects of the world itself and our relationship (...) to it. (shrink)

For many years a debate has raged over what constitutes futile medical care, if patients have a right to demand what doctors label as futile, and whether physicians should be obliged to provide treatments that they think are inappropriate. More recently, the argument has shifted away from the difficult project of definitions, to outlining institutional policies and procedures that take a measured and patient-by-patient approach to deciding if an existing or desired intervention is futile. The prototype is the Texas Advance (...) Directives Act, but similar procedures have been widely implemented both with and without the protection of the law. While this method has much to recommend it, there are inherent moral flaws that have not received as much discussion as warranted. Because these strategies adopt a semblance of procedural justice, it is assumed that the outcomes of such proceedings will be both correct and fair. In this paper, I argue that there are three main irremediable defects in the policy approach: there is the potential for arbitrary decision-making about futility in specific cases; there are structural, pre-ordained consequences for ethnic minorities who would be disproportionately affected by the use of these procedures; and the use of rationing justifications to support the use of these policies. These flaws detract so much from any benefit that could be derived that they make such strategies more harmful than helpful. (shrink)

Dignity is often invoked as the basis of human rights. The precise relation between dignity and human rights remains objectionably obscure, however, and many appeals to dignity seem little more than hand-waving, as critics have pointed out. This vagueness is potentially damning for contemporary human rights accounts, as it calls into question whether dignity can truly serve as the foundation of human rights. In order to defend the view that human rights are grounded in human dignity, this paper presents a (...) novel analysis of dignity that elucidates how human rights can be derived from dignity. Arguing that neither contingent nor inherent conceptions of dignity can, on their own, account for human rights, it develops a conceptualisation of dignity that combines inherent and contingent features in a coherent fashion. This, in turn, is shown to provide us with the means to explain how human rights are both grounded in and protective of dignity. Showing that the inherent features of dignity always generate a claim to the contingent features of dignity, the paper demonstrates that human rights derive directly from the inherent features of dignity, whilst what they protect are the contingent features of dignity. The paper closes with a discussion of the advantages of conceptualising dignity in the manner proposed, explicating the connection between dignity and nobility. (shrink)

In the traditional understanding, human dignity is often portrayed as a «final», «inherent», and «absolute» value. If human dignity as the core of the status of a human being did indeed have thos characteristics, this would yield a severe limitation for obligations that stem from the moral status of non-human animals, plants, eco systems and other entities discussed in environmental ethics; for obligations that arise from human dignity standardly take priority over the duties toward entities with non-human moral status. Yet, (...) many theorists of human dignity nowadays have given up the traditional picture in favour of a more «contingent» understanding of human dignity that abandons one or more of its traditional characteristics.In this paper, I argue that to the contrary, we have good reasons to think that the three characteristics of human dignity just mentioned can indeed be attributed to a value that deserves the name «human dignity». In a first part, I argue for a specific understanding of the three value characteristics under consideration. After these preliminaries, I show in a second part that given such an understanding, we have ample evidence that we can indeed say that human dignity is an inherent, absolute and final value; and also that these three characteristics are properties of a single value. (shrink)

In Chapter Seven of The Case for Animal Rights’ Tom Regan propounds and analyzes a concept of inherent value. He then argues that all humans and animals that satisfy what he calls the “subject-of-a-life criterion” have this kind of value and have it equally. In Chapter Eight of the book Regan draws a close connection between an individual’s having inherent value and its being a bearer of moral rights. I shall examine each of these points in turn in the first (...) two sections of this paper. The third and last section will discuss some aspects of the relation between duties and rights. Although my investigations raise certain criticisms of Regan’s views I do not wish to give the impression that his book as a whole is unworthy of serious attention. On the contrary, it seems to me that the book presents the most convincing and best-argued position yet published on the moral duties humans have to animals. What is more, many parts of the book make significant advances on a broad range of more traditional problems in normative ethics, including those that concern human relationships alone. (shrink)

The present paper describes an ”ontological square’ mapping possible ways of combining the domains and converse domains of the relations of inherence and denomination. In the context of expounding and extending medieval appropriations of elements drawn from Aristotle’s Categories for theological purposes, the paper uses this square to examine different ways of defining Substance-terms and Accident-terms by reference to inherence and denomination within the constraints imposed by the doctrine of the Trinity. These different approaches are related to particular (...) texts of thinkers including Bonaventure and Gilbert of Poitiers. (shrink)

Alfred Mele's deflationary account of self-deception has frequently been criticised for being unable to explain the “tension” inherent in self-deception. These critics maintain that rival theories can better account for this tension, such as theories which suppose self-deceivers to have contradictory beliefs. However, there are two ways in which the tension idea has been understood. In this article, it is argued that on one such understanding, Mele's deflationism can account for this tension better than its rivals, but only if we (...) reconceptualize the self-deceiver's attitude in terms of unwarranted degrees of conviction rather than unwarranted belief. This new way of viewing the self-deceiver's attitude will be informed by observations on experimental work done on the biasing influence of desire on belief, which suggests that self-deceivers don’t manage to fully convince themselves of what they want to be true. On another way in which this tension has been understood, this account would not manage so well, since on this understanding the self-deceiver is best interpreted as knowing, but wishing to avoid, the truth. However, it is argued that we are under no obligation to account for this since it is a characteristic of a different phenomenon than self-deception, namely, escapism. (shrink)

The primary theoretical focus of this paper is on Free Choice uses of any, in particular on two phenomena that have remained largely unstudied. One involves the ability of any phrases to occur in affirmative episodic statements when aided by suitable noun modifiers. The other involves the difference between modals of necessity and possibility with respect to licensing of any. The central thesis advanced here is that FC any is a universal determiner whose domain of quantification is not a set (...) of particular individuals but the set of possible individuals of the relevant kind. In a theory of genericity utilizing situations, an any phrase can be seen as having a universal quantifier binding the situation variable of the common noun. This inherent genericity is argued to be at the heart of the intuition that any statements support counterfactual inferences and do not involve existential commitments. A conflict in presuppositions is shown to account for the incompatibility of unmodified any phrases in affirmative episodic statements and the crucial role played by modification in ameliorating this clash is explicated. In the case of modals of necessity, the interaction between the universal force of any and the particular modal base is shown to be crucial. In view of these facts it is argued that FC any is not directly licensed by modal or generic operators as generally assumed but that its felicitous use is sensitive to the pragmatics of epistemic modality. Turning to its polarity sensitive uses, language internal as well as crosslinguistic evidence is presented to distinguish it from FC any in having the existential quantificational force typical of indefinites. The paper concludes by suggesting that the common tie between them is that they both occur in statements that apply to a class of entities, rather than to particular members of the class. (shrink)

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes , human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, (...) understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect. (shrink)

It has been suggested that human organs should be bought and sold on a regulated market as any other material property belonging to an individual. This would have the advantage of both addressing the grave shortage of organs available for transplantation and respecting the freedom of individuals to choose to do whatever they want with their body parts. The old arguments against such a market in human organs are, therefore, being brought back into question.The article examines the different arguments both (...) in favour and against the sale of human organs. It concludes that the body and any of its elements is a full expression of the whole person. As such, they cannot have a price if the individual is to retain his or her full inherent dignity and if society is to retain and protect this very important concept. (shrink)

The essays in this book offer an in-depth exploration of value theory. Portions examine the theoretical foundations of values and valuation exploring the rational groundwork for judgments. Other aspects, appealing to value distinctions of inherent, intrinsic, and instrumental, bring to light matters of aesthetic, social political, ethical, and ontological issues.