Critics and champions alike have fussed and fretted for well over fifty years about whether Russell’s treatment is compatible with certain alleged acceptable uses of incomplete definite descriptions,[2] where a description (the F( is incomplete just in case more than one object satisfies its nominal F, as in (1).

Slightly modified version, as it appeared in Striegnitz, K. et al. Special Issue: The Language Sections of the ESSLLI-01 Student Session, Human Language Technology Theses. 2002.

We investigate incomplete symbols, i.e. definite descriptions with scope-operators. Russell famously introduced definite descriptions by contextual definitions; in this article definite descriptions are introduced by rules in a specific calculus that is very well suited for proof-theoretic investigations. That is to say, the phrase ‘incomplete symbols’ is formally interpreted as to the existence of an elimination procedure. The last section offers semantical tools for interpreting the phrase ‘no meaning in isolation’ in a (...) formal way. (shrink)

The implicit content associated with incomplete definite descriptions is contributed in the form of definite descriptions of situations. A definite description of this kind is contributed by a small structure in the syntax, which is interpreted, in general terms, as ‘the situation that bears R to s’.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss two phenomena related to the semantics of definite descriptions: that of incomplete uses of descriptions, and that of the underdetermination of referential uses of descriptions. The Russellian theorist has a way of accounting for incomplete uses of descriptions by appealing to an account of quantifier domain restriction, such as the one proposed in Stanley and Szabó (2000a). But, I argue, the Russellian is not the only (...) one in a position to appeal to such an account of incomplete uses of descriptions. Proponents of other theories, such as the Fregean, which does not treat descriptions as quantifiers, might benefit from this account of domain restriction. In the second part of the paper I discuss referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions. Relative to such uses, Wettstein (1981) and others have argued that the Russellian theory faces a problem of underdetermination of semantic content. Neale (2004) has replied to this objection showing why it does not pose a threat to the Russellian theory. Again, I argue that not only the Russellian, but also the Fregean can subscribe to Neale’s (2004) suggestion. (shrink)

Despite its enormous popularity, Russell’s theory of definite descriptions has received various criticisms. Two of the most important objections against this theory are those arising from the Argument from Incompleteness and the Argument from Donnellan’s Distinction. According to the former although a speaker may say something true by assertively uttering a sentence containing an incomplete description , on the Russellian analysis such a sentence expresses a false proposition; so, Russell’s theory cannot adequately deal with such sentences. According (...) to the latter objection a descriptive sentence is actually ambiguous—it expresses a general proposition when the description contained in it is used attributively, and a singular proposition when the description in question is used referentially; Russell’s theory is inadequate as it fails to capture this ambiguity and offers an analysis according to which a descriptive sentence expresses only a general proposition. These objections are examined in the present dissertation. It is shown here that these objections arise from: (i) ignoring the distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the assertions made by using it, (ii) the failure to distinguish between the semantic meaning of a sentence and the pragmatic meaning with which it is used on a particular occasion. To make the distinction mentioned in (i), a significant part of Scott Soames’ theory concerning meaning and assertions has been adopted in this dissertation; and, to make the distinction mentioned in (ii), a test, namely the cancellability test, and two Distinguishing Criteria, namely DC-1 and DC-2, have been developed here. It has been argued here that if we properly make the relevant distinctions, then we will find that: (a) the phenomenon cited by the Argument from Incompleteness can be well explained keeping the Russellian analysis of descriptive sentences intact, (b) the phenomenon arising from the Argument from Donnellan’s Distinction raises an issue of pragmatics and is irrelevant to Russell’s semantic analysis of descriptive sentences. So, none of the above criticisms poses a genuine threat to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions; his theory actually provides, to a large extent, a correct semantic analysis of descriptive sentences. (shrink)

Although Russell’s theory of definite descriptions is highlyappreciated in the area of philosophy of language, it has faced some objections from different angles. One of the major objections is known as the objection arising from incomplete definite descriptions. According to this objection, a speaker by his/her utterance of a sentence containing an incomplete definite description often succeeds in saying something true despite the fact that such a sentence always expresses a false proposition. This (...) particular objection against Russell’s theory arises because of an ignorance concerning the distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the assertion made by a speaker by using that sentence in a particular context. To address this distinction between meaning and assertion Scott Soames’ theory concerning the connection between meaning and assertion has been adopted. With the help of this theory, it has been shown that the problem arising from incomplete definite descriptions does not pose a genuine threat to Russell’s theory. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#73-74; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2023 P 317-336. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a defence of a Russellian analysis of the referential uses of incomplete (mis)descriptions, in a contextual setting. With regard to the debate between a unificationist and an ambiguity approach to the formal treatment of definite descriptions (introduction), I will support the former against the latter. In 1. I explain what I mean by "essentially" incomplete descriptions: incomplete descriptions are context dependent descriptions. In 2. I examine one (...) of the best versions of the unificationist “explicit” approach given by Buchanan and Ostertag. I then show that this proposal seems unable to treat the normal uses of misdescriptions. I then accept the challenge of treating misdescriptions as a key to solving the problem of context dependent descriptions. In 3. I briefly discuss Michael Devitt’s and Joseph Almog’s treatments of referential descriptions, showing that they find it difficult to explain misdescriptions. In 4. I suggest an alternative approach to DD as contextuals, under a normative epistemic stance. Definite descriptions express (i) what a speaker should have in mind in using certain words in a certain context and (ii) what a normal speaker is justified in saying in a context, given a common basic knowledge of the lexicon. In 5. I define a procedure running on contextual parameters (partiality, perspective and approximation) as a means of representing the role of pragmatics as a filter for semantic interpretation. In 6. I defend my procedural approach against possible objections concerning the problem of the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics, relying on the distinction between semantics and theory of meaning. (shrink)

Standard attempts to defend Russell's Theory of Descriptions against the problem posed by incomplete descriptions, are discussed and dismissed as inadequate. It is then suggested that one such attempt, one which exploits the notion of a contextually delimited domain of quantification, may be applicable to incomplete quantifier expressions which are typically treated as quantificational: expressions of the form AllF's, NoF's, SomeF's, Exactly eightF's, etc. In this way, one is able to retain the plausible claim that such (...) expressions ought to receive their usual quantificational analyses. The conclusion tentatively drawn is that perhaps definite descriptions arenot amenable to a (Russellian) quantificational analysis. (shrink)

This paper offers a unified, quantificational treatment of incomplete descriptions like ‘the table’. An incomplete quantified expression like ‘every bottle’ (as in “Every bottle is empty”) can feature in true utterances despite the fact that the world contains nonempty bottles. Positing a contextual restriction on the bottles being talked about is a straightforward solution. It is argued that the same strategy can be extended to incomplete definite descriptions across the board. ncorporating the contextual restrictions (...) into semantics involves meeting a complex array of desiderata, yet the apparently simpler pragmatic alternative faces severe problems and is therefore a nonstarter. (shrink)

In “On Referring” Peter Strawson pointed out that incomplete descriptions pose a problem for Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions. Howard Wettstein and Michael Devitt appealed to incomplete descriptions to argue, first, that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions fails, and second, that Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction has semantic bite. Stephen Neale has defended Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions against Wettstein’s and Devitt’s objections. In this paper, my aim is twofold. First, I rebut (...) Neale’s objections to Wettstein’s and Devitt’s argument and argue that Neale’s attempt to provide an account of referential descriptions within a Russellian framework fails. Second, contra Devitt and Wettstein, I argue that the problem posed by incomplete descriptions shows that Donnellan was right in believing that referential descriptions refer even if the definite description fits nothing. (shrink)

A common objection to Russell's theory of descriptions concerns incomplete definite descriptions: uses of (for example) ‘the book is overdue’ in contexts where there is clearly more than one book. Many contemporary Russellians hold that such utterances will invariably convey a contextually determined complete proposition, for example, that the book in your briefcase is overdue. But according to the objection this gets things wrong: typically, when a speaker utters such a sentence, no facts about the context (...) or the speaker's communicative intentions single out a particular description-theoretic proposition as the proposition expressed. However, this is an objection only if it is assumed that successful linguistic communication requires the hearer to identify a proposition uniquely intended by the speaker. We argue that this assumption is mistaken. On our view, no proposition, descriptive or referential, is uniquely intended in such a context; thus, no proposition can nor need be identified as the proposition expressed. One significant upshot is that, once the aforementioned assumption is rejected, incompleteness no longer poses a threat to Russell's theory of descriptions. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss contextualism, a philosophical position that some pragmatists have endorsed as a result of the philosophical reflection on pragmatics as a science. In particular, we challenge, from the results on phrasal pragmatics, the contextualist approach on incomplete definite descriptions and referential metonymy according to which optional pragmatic processes of interpretation are required (an optional pragmatic process of recovering unarticulated constituents for incompleteness and an optional pragmatic process of transfer for metonymy). By contrast, we (...) argue from the standpoint of phrasal pragmatics that what is descriptively referred to depends, in both cases, on truth-conditionally mandatory pragmatic processes of recovery of unarticulated constituents. (shrink)

Russell urged that some phrases having no meaning in isolation could nonetheless, Contribute to the meaning of sentences in which they occur. In the case of definite descriptive phrases, A proof is offered. It is argued that russell's proof is valid, Contrary to some commentators. Proper understanding of the notion of "incomplete symbol" plays a key role in the assessment of the argument, As well as in full appreciation of the radical departure of russell's analysis from "surface" grammar.

People often speak loosely, uttering sentences that are plainly false on their most strict interpretation. In understanding such speakers, we face a problem of underdetermination: there is often no unique interpretation that captures what they meant. Focusing on the case of incomplete definite descriptions, this paper suggests that speakers often mean bundles of propositions. When a speaker means a bundle, their audience can know what they mean by deriving any one of its members. Rather than posing a (...) problem for the interpretation of loose talk, the underdetermination of a uniquely correct interpretation allows for various ways in which the audience can grasp the speaker’s meaning. (shrink)

Early in Principia Mathematica Russell presents an argument that "‘the author of Waverley’ means nothing", an argument that he calls a "definite proof". He generalizes it to claim that definite descriptions are incomplete symbols having meaning only in sentential context. This Principia "proof" went largely unnoticed until Russell reaffirmed a near-identical "proof" in his philosophical autobiography nearly 50 years later. The "proof" is important, not only because it grounds our understanding of incomplete symbols in the (...) Principia programme, but also because failure to understand it fully has been a source of much unjustified criticism of Russell to the effect that he was wedded to a naive theory of meaning and prone to carelessness and confusion in his philosophy of logic and language generally. In my paper, I (1) defend Russell’s "proof" against attacks from several sources over the last half century, (2) examine the implications of the "proof" for understanding Russell’s treatment of class symbols in Principia, and (3) see how the Principia notion of incomplete symbol was carried forward into Russell’s conception of philosophical analysis as it developed in his logical atomist period after 1910. (shrink)

One of the most important insights that Russell had in presenting his philosophy of language was his view of singular definite descriptions. Russell held that singular phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so’ should not be viewed as names, but rather incomplete symbols which can be said to have meaning only in a context. We should not represent the sentence The inventor of bifocals is bald.as a simple subject-predicate sentence of the form ‘Fa.’ but rather as a complex (...) existential sentence. According to Russell we should analyze as There is a unique x such that x invented bifocals and x is bald.Moreover, if Russell's analysis is correct then the proposition expressed by will be true in a given circumstance provided that there is a unique inventor of bifocals who is bald in that circumstance. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to elucidate Russell’s construction of spatial points, which is to be <br>considered as a paradigmatic case of the "logical constructions" that played a central role in his epistemology and theory of science. Comparing it with parallel endeavours carried out by Carnap and Stone it is argued that Russell’s construction is best understood as a structural representation. It is shown that Russell’s and Carnap’s representational constructions may be considered as incomplete and sketchy harbingers (...) of Stone’s representation theorems. The representational program inaugurated by Stone’s theorems was one of the success stories of 20th century’s mathematics. This suggests that representational constructions à la Stone could also be important for epistemology and philosophy of science. More specifically it is argued that the issues proposed by Russellian definite descriptions, logical constructions, and structural representations still have a place on the agenda of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science. Finally, the representational interpretation of Russell’s logical constructivism is used to shed some new light on the recently vigorously discussed topic of his structural realism. (shrink)

In his paper, “Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (But Not the Ones You Expect)” (Mind 104, (1995)), Stephen Schiffer presents a powerful argument against anyone who accepts a Russellian account of definite descriptions (including incomplete descriptions) and who also accepts a direct referential account of indexicals. On the one hand, the most plausible version of the Theory of Descriptions, namely, the Hidden-Indexical Theory of Descriptions, entails that a speaker who uses an (...) incomplete description, “the F”, referentially means some description-theoretic, object-independent proposition by an utterance of a sentence of the form, “The F is G”. On the other hand, since speaker meaning supervenes on one’s psychological states, what holds for referential uses of incomplete descriptions must also hold for referential uses of indexicals and demonstatives. In other words, speakers who produce literal, referential, indexical utterances of the form, “" is G” also mean some description-theoretic proposition by their utterances. Furthermore, the Russellian has no non-arbitrary reason for preferring a direct referential account of indexicals, which he should accept, to a rival, incompatible account which treats indexicals as disguised descriptions. In my paper, I argue that the Russellian does have such a reason: the rival account cannot explain all the relevant speaker meaning facts that the direct reference theory can. I conclude the paper by defending the Russellian view that, in producing a referential utterance of “the F is G”, a speaker can mean a description-theoretic proposition and, in addition, mean an object-dependent proposition involving the speaker’s referent. (shrink)

This critical notice of Stephen Neale's "Descriptions", (MIT Press, 1990) summarizes the content of the book and presents several objections to its arguments, as well as praising Neale for showing just how close the linguistic notion of L F is to the analytic philosopher's notion of "logical form". It is claimed that Neale's use of generalized quantifiers to represent definite descriptions from Russell's account by which descriptions are "incomplete symbols". I also argue that his assessment (...) of the Quine/Smullyan exchange about "Necessarily the number of the planets is greater than seven" is incorrect. (shrink)

One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates (...) in all of their occurrences; they are predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description: a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence for this. The definite article is sometimes pronounced with names in the singular: ‘The Ivan we all love doesn't feel well’. Sloat proposed a disjunctive generalization of when the definite article must be pronounced with a singular name. This essay shows that by slightly revising Sloat's generalization, we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false. This essay shows that Predicativism does not have this consequence by showing that incomplete definite descriptions in general and incomplete denuded descriptions, such as ‘Øthe Ivan’, in particular are rigid designators. (shrink)

1. ExpositionRichard Sharvy's ‘A more general theory of definite descriptions’ was published in 1980. Its aim was to replace Russell's paradigm by " a general theory of definite descriptions, of which definite mass descriptions, definite plural descriptions, and Russellian definite singular count descriptions are species. … We have an account of the generic ‘the’ along these same lines. " By now his theory has attained the status of a new paradigm. (...) Even a casual trawl of the literature throws up over a score of citations and endorsements, and no rebuttals of its central contention that the primary use of ‘the’ is to indicate totality . We shall argue that it is wrong for mass description, wrong for singular description, wrong for plural description and wrong for generic ‘the’. Sharvy would have approved: his obituary says that his car displayed the slogan ‘Subvert the Dominant Paradigm’.He follows Russell in treating descriptions as incomplete symbols, but nothing in his paper turns on this aspect of it, and we can bypass the issue by considering them in the context of complete sentences. Where Russell translates F into the predicate calculus as Formula Sharvy translates it as Formula Here ≤ is supposed to stand for some or other species of part of relation. His other governing idea is of a predicate's being cumulative. G is cumulative if any number of things that satisfy G have a sum, i.e. a least upper bound with respect to ≤ which also satisfies G. The meanings of ≤, sum and cumulativity vary according to the different kinds of description, which we take in the order in which Sharvy presents them. Meanwhile, we note that he originally defined ‘sum’ to mean simply the l.u.b. , but subsequently redefined …. (shrink)

Some contemporary semantic views defend an asymmetry thesis concerning defi-nite descriptions and indexicals. Semantically, indexicals are devices of singular refer-ence; they contribute objects to the contents of the speech acts made with utterances including them. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, are generalized quantifiers, behaving roughly the way Russell envisaged in “On Denoting”. The asymmetry thesis depends on the existence of a sufficiently clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics, because indexicals and descriptions are often used in (...) ways that apparently contradict the asymmetry thesis; the semantics/pragmatics distinction is invoked to see behind the appearances. The paper critically examines arguments by Schiffer against the asymmetry thesis, based on referential uses of incomplete descriptions. (shrink)

In this introduction I start by presenting and examining the main positions on the current debate concerning the semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. As is known, the debate in question has started off with Russell's proposal, which has been initially criticized by both Strawson and Donnellan. Nowadays, waters are divided on this issue: some philosophers, representing the so-called univocality approach, defend Russell's original analysis, according to which all definite descriptions are quantificational expressions, whereas there (...) are others who, following Strawson´s and Donnellan´s objections, consider that at least some descriptions are genuine singular terms and hence have referential meanings. Among the defendants of the last approach, known as the ambiguity theory, we can find Michael Devitt. In the second part of the paper, I then survey Devitt's stance on some traditional arguments for the ambiguity theory -mainly, the arguments from misdescription, incompleteness, opacity, and anaphora-, and finally I consider the new ones that he has put forward in favor of the existence of referential descriptions: the argument from regularity, the one based on the comparison with demonstratives, and the argument based on weak rigidity. En esta introducción comienzo por presentar y analizar las distintas posiciones que caracterizan el debate actual en torno al análisis semántico de las oraciones que contienen descripciones definidas. Como es sabido, tal debate se origina a partir de la propuesta de Russell, la cual fue inicialmente objetada por Strawson y por Donnellan. En la actualidad las aguas están divididas: algunos filósofos, representantes del aquí llamado enfoque de la univocidad, defienden el análisis russelliano, según el cual todas las descripciones son susceptibles de ser analizadas como expresiones cuantificacionales ; otros, por el contrario, haciéndose eco de las objeciones anteriores, consideran que algunas descripciones son términos singulares genuinos y, en tanto tales, expresiones referenciales. Entre los defensores más conspicuos de este enfoque, conocido como teoría de la ambigüedad, se encuentra Michael Devitt. En la segunda parte de esta introducción, resumo la posición de Devitt respecto de los argumentos tradicionales a favor del enfoque de la ambigüedad -fundamentalmente, los argumentos basados en las descripciones fallidas, las descripciones incompletas, los casos de opacidad y los de anáfora-, y luego presento y analizo los nuevos argumentos por él ofrecidos, a saber, el argumento basado en el uso regular, aquél basado en la comparación con los demostrativos y el que se vale de la noción de rigidez débil. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the Neandertal bones 1856, the extremely old, fragmentary fossil remains of hundreds of man-like bodies have been discovered in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even the oldest ones - usually the most incomplete - look man-like and „un-apish", even to a layman, if compared with a modem apish and human correlate. Sometimes, in the vicinity of these remains, primitive stone tools or the evidence of their production have been found. At present, it seems absolutely certain — (...) within the limits of our present physical and biological knowledge - that at least four million years ago, in Africa, some creatures resembling modern man were living, and that at least two and half million years ago, in Africa, stone tools were produced. In contrast with the firm, scientifically-arguable belief that all modem human tribes - however different they are - belong to a single species, in paleoanthropology an equally firm scientific belief is maintained that the extinct man-like forms belong to several different, „presapient", „prehuman'', more ape-like species. (shrink)

Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker (...) can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise. (shrink)

The origins of these essays -- Introduction -- Presupposition -- A projection problem for speaker presupposition -- Language and linguistic competence -- Linguistics and psychology -- Semantics and psychology -- Semantics and semantic competence -- The necessity argument -- Truth, meaning, and understanding -- Truth and meaning in perspective -- Semantics and pragmatics -- Naming and asserting -- The gap between meaning and assertion : why what we literally say often differs from what our words literally mean -- Drawing the (...) line between meaning and implicaturem and relating both to assertion -- Descriptions -- Incomplete definite descriptions -- Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction -- Why incomplete descriptions don't refute Russell's theory of descriptions -- Meaning and use : lessons for legal interpretation -- Interpreting legal texts : what is and what is not special about the law. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion of forgiveness has mainly focused on cases in which victims and offenders are known to each other. But it commonly happens that a victim brings an offender under a definite description but does not know to which individual this applies. I explore some of the conceptual and moral issues raised by the phenomenon of forgiveness in circumstances in which identification is incomplete, tentative or even mistaken. Among the conclusions reached are that correct and precise identification of (...) the offending individual is not essential for forgiveness to take place; that an offender can, under certain strict conditions, be said to be forgiven by proxy where the victim has misidentified the offender and ‘forgiven’ the wrong person; and that proxy forgiveness of this sort is not subject to the objections commonly levelled against ‘proxy’ or ‘third-party forgiveness.’. (shrink)

An utterance of a sentence involving an incomplete (definite) description, ‘the F’, where the context—even taking the speaker’s intentions into account—does not determine a unique F, would be unintelligible. But an utterance (in the same context) of the corresponding Russellian paraphrase would not be unintelligible. So I urged in ‘A Strawsonian objection to Russell’s theory of descriptions’ (ANALYSIS 53, 1993, pp. 209-12). I compared an utterance of (1) The table is covered with books. with an utterance of (...) (1)’s Russellian paraphrase.. (shrink)

Examines the work of Bertrand Russell. It looks at Russell's idea that true sentences stand for facts and the philosophical and formal details of his Theory of Facts and Theory of Descriptions, both of which Neale describes as being poorly understood to this day. The six sections of the chapter are: Facts and their Parts; Representing Russellian Facts; The Theory of Descriptions; Abbreviation; Scope; Quantification and Notation. An appendix to the book looks further at Russell's definition of (...) class='Hi'>descriptions as incomplete symbols. (shrink)

An integrated view concerning the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics is obtained by systematic confrontation of the Kolmogorov formulation of the abstract theory of probabilities, with the quantum mechanical representationand its factual counterparts. Because these factual counterparts possess a peculiar spacetime structure stemming from the operations by which the observer produces the studied states (operations of state preparation) and the qualifications of these (operations of measurement), the approach brings forth “probability trees,” complex constructs with treelike spacetime support.Though it is strictly (...) entailed by confrontation with the abstract theory of probabilities as it now stands, the construct of a quantum mechanical probability treetransgresses this theory. It indicates the possibility of an extended abstract theory of probabilities including explicit representations of the cognitive operations involved in the probabilistic descriptions. So quantum mechanics appears to be neither a “normal” probabilistic theory nor an “abnormal” one, but a pioneering particular realization of afuture extended abstract theory of probabilities.The consequences of the integrated perception of the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics are developed constructively. The current identifications of spectral decompositions, with superpositions of states, are removed. Then: (a) Inside the frontiers of the purely operational-observational orthodox formalism, operators of state preparation and the calculus with these are defined consistently with the definition and the calculus of quantum mechanical operators representing measurable dynamical quantities. This permits to grasp the physical meaning of superselection rules. Furthermore, a complement to the quantum theory of measurements is obtained. These prolongations of the orthodox formalism bring forth a “probabilistic incompleteness” of the quantum theory. (b) Beyond quantum mechanics as it now stands, a model is outlined that removes this probabilistic incompleteness, “the [particle + medium] individual model,”microscopic by certain aspects andcosmic by others.Globally, the approach draws attention upon the possibility and the interest of a general representation of the descriptions of any kind founded upon the explicit specification of the epistemic operations—with their spacetime features—by which the observer, who always is involved, produces the objects to be qualified and the qualifications of these. (shrink)

Arguments against the Russellian theory of definite descriptions based on cases that involve failures of uniqueness are a recurrent theme in the relevant literature. In this paper, I discuss a number of such arguments, from Strawson (1950), Ramachandran (1993) and Szabo (2005). I argue that the Russellian has resources to account for these data by deploying a variety of mechanisms of quantifier domain restrictions. Finally, I present a case that is more problematic for the Russellian. While the previous (...) cases all involve referential uses of descriptions (or some variations of such uses), the most effective objection to the uniqueness condition draws on genuine attributive uses. (shrink)

In this article, I first analyze and assess the epistemological and semantic status of canonical value-range equations in the formal language of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. I subsequently scrutinize the relation between (a) his informal, metalinguistic stipulation in Grundgesetze I, Section 3, and (b) its formal counterpart, which is Basic Law V. One point I argue for is that the stipulation in Section 3 was designed not only to fix the references of value-range names, but that it was probably also (...) intended to play a regulative role with an eye to Basic Law V. I further intend to shed new light on the status of Frege’s identification of the truth-values with their unit classes in Grundgesetze I, Section 10 and determine its place and importance in his overall logicist project. In a subsequent section, I first discuss the hypothetical extendability of the logical system of Grundgesetze. In what follows, I analyze the incompleteness of that system—were it not inconsistent and hence trivially complete—by focusing on the role of the definite description operator and the axiom governing it (= Basic Law VI) as well as on the role of the application operator. The latter is defined by means of the former. I further comment on the redundancy of an axiom that could be designed to supplement Basic Law VI by incorporating the second clause of Frege’s two-part elucidation of the description operator. I argue that although it seems likely that Basic Law VI could have been shown to be dispensable in Grundgesetze, Frege would probably have been reluctant to dispense with it, despite his commitment to axiomatic parsimony. In my view, the reason is that he considers it essential that every primitive function-name of his formal language be governed and grounded by a basic law that is tailored to the nature and the role of the primitive name occurring at a key point in the law. Toward the end of the article, I propose solutions to two problems with Frege’s use of “=” in the concept-script sentences that result from his definitions involving the replacement of the double stroke of definition with the judgment-stroke. I conclude the article with a summary of the main results that I have achieved. (shrink)

Recently, an orthodox Russellian tenet has come under fire from within. In particular, some Russellians now argue that definite descriptions don’t semantically encode uniqueness. Instead, Reformed Russellians, as I call them, hold that definite descriptions are truth-theoretically identical to indefinite ones. On this approach, a definite description’s uniqueness reading becomes a matter of pragmatics, not semantics. These reforms, we’re told, provide both empirical and methodological benefits over and above the prevailing orthodoxy. As I argue, however, (...) the Russellian Reformation contains serious flaws. Indeed, it is Orthodox Russellianism that remains a superior choice, both empirically and conceptually. (shrink)

An investigation into events in philosophy of mind. Chapter 1 outlines positions in philosophy of mind in terms of events. Chapter 2 argues that events are property exemplifications by a particular at a time. The type/token distinction is shown to be ambiguous between theories of events and it is argued that since sets are causally inert, events should not be identified with sets. Chapter 3 argues that event expressions are definite descriptions that mediately refer to events. Because they (...) refer to events via the property the event exemplifies, event expressions are intensional fragments of language and events are intensionally individuated. Alternative theories of events--those that identify them with particulars and those that identify them with sets--are unacceptable. Chapter 4 argues that the former is unacceptable because its individuation conditions are circular. Attempts to remedy circularity fail. Chapter 5 argues that the latter is unacceptable because it is too loose-grained. A sustained criticism of properties is provided which, if successful, entails that set-theoretic events are the only acceptable events. ;Hence, properties are problematic. Chapter 6 discusses these problems. I argue, inter alia, that the best logic for properties is second-order, that incompleteness of second-order theories is not a serious problem and that intensionality is pervasive in science and theories of causality. Chapter 7 introduces a distinction between internal and external semantics, permitting rejection of possible-worlds reduction of properties and acceptance of possible worlds semantics for properties. An intensional and second-order theory of property individuation is outlined and applied to the case of property exemplification events. Conditions for event identity and distinctness are specified. Chapter 8 deploys the theory of event individuation in philosophy of mind. I argue that mental events are not identical to, do not reduce to, and do not strongly supervene on physical events. Unfortunately, pending discovery of causal relations with physical events or some relation in virtue of which those causal relations obtain, they are also potentially as inert as sets. Conciliatory strategies are suggested to thwart the loss of our minds. (shrink)

Alexius Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie is subject to a formal semantic paradox. The theory of defective objects originally developed by Meinong in response to Ernst Mally's paradox about self-referential thought is rejected as a general solution to paradox in the object theory. The intentionality thesis is also refuted by the counter-example of the unapprehended mountain. It is argued that despite these difficulties, an object theory is required in order to make intuitively correct sense of ontological commitment. ;A version of Meinong's theory is (...) formalized. The logic has non-standard truth value semantics and an objectual interpretation of quantifiers for a domain of existent and non-existent objects. Theories of intentional, referential, and extensional identity are offered, together with two theories of definite description, lambda abstraction, eight systems of alethic modal logic, and formal metatheory. The logic avoids the incompleteness and undecidability limitations of Godel and Church, and all logical, semantic, and set theoretical paradoxes, without type theory or Tarskian hierarchy of metalanguages. It is naively complete and mechanically decidable. ;Wittgenstein's private language argument is refuted as an obstacle to defining private mental objects in the logic. The argument is shown to be valid, but unsound. The object theory logic may therefore provide a mixed or impure private language, and its domain may contain private mental objects as well as ordinary public and non-existent objects. This means that it constitutes an object theory logic of intention, and can be used to represent the logical structure of intentional and specifically phenomenological philosophical theories that require the intelligible designation of private mental objects. ;Appendices include Henkin-type consistency, completeness, and compactness proofs ; criticism of Kazimierz Twardowski's arguments for the distinction between content and object in phenomenological psychology; translation of and commentary on Mally's essay, "Uber die Unabhangigkeit der Gegenstande vom Denken"; a discussion of the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties, and the eliminability of the modal moment; and a philosophical application of the logic to a solution of the paradox of analysis. (shrink)

This paper reexamines some examples, discussed by Mates and others, of sentences containing both definite descriptions and quantifiers. It has frequently been claimed that these sentences provide evidence for the view that definite descriptions themselves are quantifiers. The main goal of this paper is to argue this is not so. Though the examples are compatible with quantificational approaches to definite descriptions, they are also compatible with views that treat definite descriptions as basically (...) scopeless. They thus provide no reason to see definite descriptions as quantifiers. Even so, this paper shows that the examples do raise a surprising range of complex issues about how quantifier scope works, and where it occurs. Thus, a clear picture of how these examples work will help us to understand better where definite descriptions fit into the larger picture of quantifiers and related phenomena. (shrink)

Definite descriptions are in the focus of philosophical discussion at least since Russell's famous paper "On Denoting". We present in this paper a logic with descriptions in Russell's spirit. The formulation, however, is closely related to Schütte's development of predicate logic, i.e. the formulation of the calculus uses positive- and negative-parts. With respect to this slightly more sophisticated formulation it is possible to formalize Russell's convention that is originally stated in the metalanguage of his theory of (...) class='Hi'>descriptions within our calculus. In this paper we prove an elimination theorem for this calculus. (shrink)

The article presents a careful analysis of the idea of the “open texture” of empirical concepts and the problems of verification in the way that they were formulated by Friedrich Waismann. The idea of the “open texture” means for Waismann a certain type of a linguistic indeterminacy or a sort of lack of definition, which must be distinguished from, and linked to, another types like vagueness or ambiguity. It is shown that empirical statements are not conclusively verifiable for two different (...) reasons: the incompleteness of description of the material object and the open texture of the terms involved. We cannot conclusively verify statements in which the empirical concepts are used, because we cannot define these concepts in an exhaustive way because of their open texture. Thus, the definition of the concept will be incomplete. Waismann’s approach to definition plays here a key role, and it is directly related to the open texture of concepts. The author proposes interpreting the open texture as an immanent property of the concept, as something that is embedded in it a priori, and which can cause a vagueness. Nevertheless, an open texture must be distinguished form a vagueness. This leads to the conclusion that an open texture is a possibility of vagueness; vagueness can be remedied by giving more accurate rules, open texture cannot. In this sense, the “open texture” of a language allows for a more precise definition of concepts (by adjusting the definition) if appropriate circumstances arise. This justifies the thesis that the argument of the open texture is the ontological basis of the linguistic anti-reductionism of Friedrich Waismann. (shrink)

Definite descriptions (e.g. 'The king of France in 1997', 'The teacher of Aristotle') do not stand for particulars. Or so I will assume. The semantic alternative has seemed to be that descriptions only have meaning within sentences: i.e., that their semantic contribution is given syncategorimatically. This doesn't seem right, however, because descriptions can be used and understood outside the context of any sentence. Nor is this use simply a matter of "ellipsis." Since descriptions do not (...) denote particulars, but seem to have a meaning in isolation, I propose that they be assigned generalized quantifiers as denotations — i.e. a kind of function, from sets/properties to propositions. I then defend the pragmatic plausibility of this proposal, using Relevance Theory. Specifically, I argue that, even taken as standing for generalized quantifiers, descriptions could still be used and understood in interpersonal communication. (shrink)

In some sentences, demonstratives can be substituted with definite descriptions without any change in meaning. In light of this, many have maintained that demonstratives are just a type of definite description. However, several theorists have drawn attention to a range of cases where definite descriptions are acceptable, but their demonstrative counterparts are not. Some have tried to account for this data by appealing to presupposition. I argue that such presuppositional approaches are problematic, and present a (...) pragmatic account of the target contrasts. On this approach, demonstratives take two arguments and generally require that the first, covert argument is non-redundant with respect to the second, overt argument. I derive this condition through an economy principle discussed by Schlenker (2005). (shrink)

Queen Anne is dead, and it is a fallacy to substitute a definite description for another designator of the same object in stating the content of someone’s propositional attitudes. The fallacy can take subtle forms, as when Godel’s incompleteness theorems are used to argue against mechanistic views of mind. Some instances of the fallacy exemplify a more general logical phenomenon: the set of principles satisfied by one sentential operator can differ from, and even contradict, the set of principles satisfied (...) by another sentential operator coextensive with the first. These notions will be formally defined. The phenomenon will be explored through a series of example, with particular attention to the misapplication of Godel’s results. (shrink)

Paul Elbourne defends the Fregean view that definite descriptions ('the table', 'the King of France') refer to individuals, and offers a new and radical account of the semantics of pronouns. He draws on a wide range of work, from Frege, Peano, and Russell to the latest findings in linguistics, philosophy of language, and psycholinguistics.

Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions sparked an ongoing debate concerning the proper logical and linguistic analysis of definite descriptions. While it is now widely acknowledged that, like the indexical expressions 'I', 'here', and 'now', definite descriptions in natural language are context-sensitive, there is significant disagreement as to the ultimate challenge this context-sensitivity poses to Russell's theory.This reader is intended both to introduce students to the philosophy of language via the theory of descriptions, (...) and to provide scholars in analytic philosophy with ready access to some of the central contributions in this area. It includes classic works by Russell, Carnap, Strawson, Lambert, Donnellan, Grice, Peacocke, Kripke, Wettstein, Soames, Neale, and Schiffer. (shrink)

Zermelo, Frege and Russell accepted a common theme regarding classes. Classes were determined by other entities—functions, concepts, properties or conditions—and a class was only acceptable in the theory if there was such a determining entity. Thus, the existence of a class was taken to be dependent on a concept, function, condition, etc. whose satisfaction or fulfillment by an element determined the element to be a member of the class. This feature was behind Russell’s “no class theory,” where a class was (...) not only taken to be “determined by” a function but was considered to be “replaceable” by its determining function, as well as Frege’s problematic claim that every concept determined a class. Thus, Russell could identify the class of φs with, and Frege could take there to be a class of φs whose elements were all things falling under φ. Treating classes in such a manner does not provide for an adequate ontological assay of classes. If classes are entities, then whether or not there exists a class cannot depend on there being a property or function or concept or condition specifying membership in the class. Such a concept or property merely allows us to provide a definite description of the class. It is not the basis for the existence of the class. Russell’s “no class” theory of the first edition of Principia takes class abstracts and the classes they purportedly denote as “incomplete symbols.” As applied to the class abstract signs, the notion of an “incomplete symbol” means that such signs are only meaningful in contexts, in fact, are contextually defined. Thus, their meaning is not supplied by an entity such a sign purportedly denotes. As applied to a purported entity, to say of such a “thing” that it is an incomplete symbol is to say that it doesn’t exist. Thus, Russell classified the King of France in 1905, the king, as well as the definite description, as an incomplete symbol and called propositions “incomplete symbols” when he denied that there were such entities. (shrink)