It has recently been proposed that the evolution of human cooperativeness might, at least in part, have started as the cooptation of behavioral strategies evolved for solving problems of coordination to solve problems with higher incentives to defect, i.e. problems of cooperation. Following this line of thought, we systematically tested human subjects for spillover effects from simple coordination tasks (2x2 Stag Hunt games, SH) to problems of cooperation (2x2 Prisoner’s Dilemma games, PD) in a laboratory experiment with rigorous controls to (...) rule out subject confusion or habituation. Supporting the hypothesis that decision mechanisms for cooperation problems are linked with decision mechanisms for coordination, our main finding is that cooperation levels in PD games embedded in a sequence of SH games were significantly increased compared to a baseline sequence consisting only of PDs when subjects played in fixed pairs. No such effects could be found when players were randomly rematched each round. Additional findings include that this spillover effect cannot prevent a decay of cooperation over time, that there is no indication of a reversed effect, i.e. no signs of negative spillovers from failed cooperation to miscoordination, and that subjects self-reported preferences in SH games are prosocial. (shrink)

Coordinating behavior is widespread in contexts that include courtship, aggression, and cooperation for shared outcomes. The social significance of cooperative coordination (CC) is usually downplayed by learning theorists, evolutionary biologists, and game theorists in favor of an individual behavior → outcome perspective predicated on maximizing payoffs for all participants. To more closely model CC as it occurs under free-ranging conditions, pairs of rats were rewarded for coordinated shuttling within a shared chamber with unrestricted social interaction. Results show that animals learned (...) to work together with sensitivity to the task and type of partner. Moreover, social interaction and coordination influenced both consumption of the reward solution immediately following a session and preference for cooperation, suggesting that affective states and incentives related to cooperation extend beyond the outcomes obtained. These results support field studies by showing not only how cooperation is performed but also the importance of considering how the behavior of cooperating affects outcomes and preference for cooperating. (shrink)

Social dilemmas occur when the pursuit of self-interest by individuals in a group leads to less than optimal collective outcomes for everyone in the group. A critical assumption in the human sciences is that people's choices in such dilemmas are individualistic, selfish, and rational. Hence, cooperation in the support of group welfare will only occur if there are selfish incentives that convert the social dilemma into a nondilemma. In recent years, inclusive fitness theories have lent weight to such traditional views (...) of rational selfishness on Darwinian grounds. To show that cooperation is based on selfish incentives, however, one must provide evidence that people donotcooperatewithoutsuch incentives. In a series of experimental social dilemmas, subjects were instructed to make single, anonymous choices about whether or not to contribute money for a shared “bonus” that would be provided only if enough other people in the group also contributed their money. Noncontributors cited selfish reasons for their choices; contributors did not. If people are allowed to engage in discussion, they will contribute resources at high rates, frequently on irrational grounds, to promote group welfare. These findings are consistent with previous research on ingroup biasing effects that cannot be explained by “economic man” or “selfish gene” theories. An alternative explanation is that sociality was a primary factor shaping the evolution ofHomo sapiens. The cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying such choices evolved under selection pressures on small groups for developing and maintaining group membership and for predicting and controlling the behavior of other group members. This sociality hypothesis organizes previously inexplicable and disparate phenomena in a Darwinian framework and makes novel predictions about human choice. (shrink)

This article offers a thorough analysis of the unintended impact economic sanctions have on political repression—referred to in this study as the level of the government respect for democratic freedoms and human rights. We argue that economic coercion is a counterproductive policy tool that reduces the level of political freedoms in sanctioned countries. Instead of coercing the sanctioned regime into reforming itself, sanctions inadvertently enhance the regime’s coercive capacity and create incentives for the regime’s leadership to commit political repression. Cross-national (...) time series data support our argument, confirming that the continued use of economic sanctions (even when aimed at promoting political liberalization and respect for human rights) will increase the level of political repression. These findings suggest that both scholars and policy makers should pay more attention to the externalities caused by economic coercion. (shrink)

We investigate the effect of priming on pro-social behaviour in a setting where there is a clear financial incentive to free ride. By activating the concept of cooperation among randomly selected individuals, we explore whether it is possible to positively influence people’s voluntary contributions to the public good. Our findings indicate that cooperative priming increases contributions in a one-shot public goods game from approximately 25–36 % compared with the non-primed group. The results call for further explorations of the role (...) of priming in economic behaviours in general. (shrink)

Prisoner's dilemmas can lead rational people to interact in ways that lead to persistent inefficiencies. These dilemmas create a problem for institutional designers to solve: devise institutions that realign individual incentives to achieve collectively rational outcomes. I will argue that we do not always want to eliminate misalignments between individual incentives and efficient outcomes. Sometimes we want to preserve prisoner's dilemmas, even when we know that they systematically will lead to inefficiencies. No doubt, prisoner's dilemmas can create problems, but they (...) also create opportunities to practice the cooperative norms that make market institutions possible in the first place. An ethical market culture, I argue, benefits from the presence of prisoner's dilemmas. I first consider standard approaches for solving prisoner's dilemmas. I then argue for the value of prisoner's dilemmas. Finally, I show the significance of this argument for advocating codes of business ethics. (shrink)

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if (...) the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action.The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts.By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions. (shrink)

:A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. G. A. Cohen famously criticizes this argument for not questioning the behaviour and attitudes that make those incentives necessary. I defend the communal status of incentives against Cohen's challenge. I argue that Cohen's criticism fails to appreciate two different contexts in which we might grant incentives. We might grant unequal payment to someone because they demand it. However, unequal payment might be an offer instead. I claim (...) that incentives as offers promote the ideal of society as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage. (shrink)

Large-scale migration is one of the most topical issues of our time. There are two main problems. First, millions of persons will enter Europe in the short and middle run in spite of the firewalls we have built. When the income levels in the development countries raises, the migration pressure will even become stronger for a long time. Second, the present integration policy in most European countries is deficient. In contrast to common knowledge, strong social benefits for migrants, multicultural policies (...) and fast naturalization do not further integration. To address these two problems we propose a procedure that takes into account that most migrants react to incentives in a rational way. Migrants in our countries are joining a cooperative and take advantage of many collective goods and social institutions the citizen of the immigration countries have provided. Migrants therefore should pay an entry fee to join the cooperative. This proposal has positive consequences for both the countries of immigration and of origin, as well as for actual and would-be immigrants. It has many advantages compared to other schemes. (shrink)

This paper studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and cooperation-based incentive schemes, rather than individual compensation, affects peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which we introduce three different compensation schemes—piece rate, the equal-split-sharing-rule and a tournament—associated with a real effort task and we measure risk behaviour both before and after the effort task. We find that competition more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour compared with piece-rate compensation and in some specifications produces (...) negative peer effects. Competition also significantly reduces an individual’s feeling of attachment to their peers and self-reported peer influence. (shrink)

In The Law of Peoples Rawls claims that liberal well-ordered societies (LWOSs) should regard certain non-liberal societies, decent hierarchical societies (DHSs), as equal members of a just international order, a ‘Society of Peoples.’ Rawls maintains, however, that while the ‘basic structures’ (the main political and economic institutions) of LWOSs are fair systems of social cooperation, the basic structures of DHSs are only ‘decent’ systems of social cooperation. I explain why the basic structures of DHSs cannot be fair systems of social (...) cooperation. In doing so, I refute a recent defense of DHSs advanced by Samuel Freeman. I then argue that because the basic structures of DHSs cannot be fair systems of social cooperation, Rawls is not justified in holding that LWOSs should refrain always from offering economic incentives to DHSs in order to encourage them to liberalize their political institutions. The ultimate aim of the foreign policies of LWOSs should be a world in which liberal democratic rights are respected by all societies. (shrink)

Major construction projects have a great influence on the national economy and society, wherein cooperative relationship between construction suppliers plays an increasingly significant role in the overall supply chain system. However, the relationships between suppliers are noncontractual, multistage, dynamic, and complicated. To gain a deeper insight into the suppliers’ cooperative relationships, an evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation tendency of multisuppliers. A replicator dynamic system is further formulated to investigate the evolutionary stable strategies of multisuppliers. Then, fourteen (...) “when-then” type scenarios are concluded and classified into six different evolutionary tracks. Meanwhile, the critical influencing factors are identified. The results show that the suppliers’ production capacity, owner-supplier contract, and the owner’s incentive mechanism influence the cooperation tendency of suppliers directly. The managerial implications contribute to insightful references for a more stable cooperative relationship between the owner and suppliers. (shrink)

Game experiments designed to test the effectiveness of reward and/or punishment incentives in promoting cooperative behavior among their participants are quite common. Results from two such recent experiments conducted in Beijing, based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game and Public Goods Game respectively, are summarized here. The unexpected empirical outcomes for the repeated PD game, that cooperation actually decreased when the participants had the option of using a costly punishment strategy and that participants who used costly punishment in some round (...) of the repeated game often did so in the first round, are discussed in terms of differences in attitudes toward reputation in Chinese culture compared to other locations (mostly in Western society) where similar experiments have been conducted. The second experiment models an institution providing incentives to increase contribution levels (i.e., cooperation) to the public good. The results show that combined institutional reward and punishment is the most effective means to increase cooperation, followed by a scheme using only punishment. It is shown how these empirical results are related to the theoretical predictions that assume players play rationally by optimizing their personal payoff given their opponents’ actions in these multi-player games. (shrink)

Humans are extremely prosocial and there are many possible explanations for how we came to be this way. Some have suggested that commitments explain the evolution of human prosociality. Commitments can serve to secure mutually beneficial interaction in the face of short-term incentives to cheat. In this paper, I have two aims. First, I argue that commitment not only applies to familiar practices such as promising but also explains small-scale collaboration among humans as early as two million years ago. In (...) particular, it explains the stability of group hunting. In doing so, I provide a precisification of the concept of commitment. Second, I argue that earlier, non-linguistic forms of commitment can act as an evolutionary scaffold for more complex forms. As such, I will demonstrate how commitment can be understood to have coevolved with human cooperation. The coevolution of commitment and cooperation over our evolutionary history is, I suggest, a crucial part of the explanation of modern human prosociality. (shrink)

Drug discovery traditionally has occurred behind closed doors in for-profit corporations hoping to develop best-selling medicines that recoup initial research investment, sustain marketing infrastructures, and pass on healthy returns to shareholders. Only corporate Pharma has the man- and purchasing-power to synthesize the thousands of molecules needed to find a new drug and to conduct the clinical trials that will make the drug legal. Against this view, individual physician-scientists have suggested that the promise of applied genomics work calls for a new (...) form of social organization in order to speed the generation and understanding of new therapeutics. Recent successes in open source drug discovery show it is possible to produce valuable, empirically adequate, and sustainable collective beliefs without secrecy, proprietary attitudes, initial cooperation from Pharma, or outsized monetary incentives. After reviewing and differentiating these successes, I diagnose the source of this healthy new epistemic strategy. (shrink)

With the rapid development of society, all walks of life need the support of the Internet of Things, and the financial industry is no exception. This article integrates blockchain technology with supply chain finance and builds a supply chain financial alliance architecture based on blockchain technology and an underlying model of the Ethereum blockchain system suitable for supply chain finance. We innovated new supply chain finance models and operating mechanisms and proposed business scenarios for supply chain finance from the perspective (...) of blockchain. Taking into account the actual operation of the blockchain supply chain financial platform, the principal-agent model and the incentive theory are applied, and the supply chain financial accounts receivable model is taken as an example in the case of complete information and incomplete information. The incentive mechanism between the service provider of the chain supply chain financial platform and the core enterprise promotes the better implementation of blockchain technology and supply chain finance. Based on the existing theoretical research, this paper identifies the key influencing factors of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. These influencing factors system includes two dimensions: transaction factors and relationship factors. Transaction factors include resource dependence, uncertainty, and cooperation experience; relationship factors include corporate reputation, trust level, and relationship commitment. Based on the nature of the incentive mechanism, information sharing and revenue sharing are extracted as the measurement dimensions of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. On this basis, this article draws on the existing enterprise life cycle division method and constructs a hypothetical model of the influencing factors of the incentive mechanism in the incubation period, the growth period, and the maturity period. Relevant data was collected through questionnaires, and SPSS and AMOS software were used to perform statistical analysis, reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation hypothesis testing on the data. The performance of each influencing factor in different stages of the enterprise’s life cycle and the importance of each influencing factor in the same life cycle stage are obtained. (shrink)

Using the approach known as ‘Economics of Scientific Knowledge’, this paper defends the view of scientific norms as the result of a ‘social contract’, i.e., as an equilibrium in the game of selecting the norms under which to proceed to play the game of scientific research and publication. A categorisation of the relevant types of scientific norms is offered, as well as a discussion about the incentives of the researchers in choosing some or other alternative rules.

The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, (...) it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists. (shrink)

The inclusion of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and increased research and development (R&D) capabilities in the most recent outline of the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) international pandemic instrument signals an opportunity to reshape pharmaceutical R&D system in favour of antimicrobial product development. This article explains why the current innovation ecosystem has disadvantaged the creation of antimicrobial products for human use. It also highlights how the COVID-19 pandemic experience can inform and stimulate international cooperation to implement innovative R&D incentives to bring new, (...) life-saving antimicrobial products to the market. (shrink)

Private law and regulation are constantly involved in the evaluation of conflicts of interest, judging some of them salutary, with others requiring adjustment. Focusing on the question of conflicts of interest allows us to clarify our vision of when such adjustment is appropriate and, more specifically, when the law should supply an infrastructure for cooperative behavior. Thus, the prism of conflicts of interest provides a lens through which to view basic legal problems that turn on whether individual actors will be (...) deemed responsible to some joint interest or whether they will be at liberty to pursue their individual interests despite the adverse effects of such activity on others. This article proposes a conflicts of interest perspective for examining contract law and its immediate surroundings. It suggests a map of conflicts of interest along three axes: the remedial axis; the axis of positive duties to avoid conflicts; and the axis of the transition from independence to loyalty. Applying the map to contract doctrine, the article examines a number of contract doctrines including: remedies for breach of contract; modification; conditions; good faith in performance; and formation. The article goes on to apply the map of conflicts to two complex fact situations: corporate acquisitions and corporate bankruptcies. The analysis underscores the fact that conflicts of interest rules do not simply protect existing interests, but also contribute to the very constitution of those interests. Recognizing the constitutive role of legal rules raises questions about our ability to determine interests ex ante and thus calls for a more nuanced approach to gauging the incentive effects of a legal regime. (shrink)

Using the approach known as ‘Economics of Scientific Knowledge’, this paperdefends the view of scientific norms as the result of a ‘social contract’, i.e., as anequilibrium in the game of selecting the norms under which toproceed to play the game of scientific research and publication. Acategorisation of the relevant types of scientific norms is offered, as well as adiscussion about the incentives of the researchers in choosing some or otheralternative rules.

In Western societies scientists are increasingly expected to seek media exposure and cooperate with industry. Little attention has been given to the way such expectations affect the role of scientific experts in society. To investigate scientists’ own perspectives on these issues eight exploratory, in-depth interviews were conducted in Denmark with reputable nutrition scientists. Additionally, eight interviews were held with ‘key informants’ from the field of nutrition policy. It was found that nutrition scientists experience two dilemmas: first, between their aspiration (...) to make a collective impact on public health and the powerful incentives of each to appear frequently in the media with new messages; second, between their need to cooperate with the food industry for financial reasons and their fear that this may compromise their independence and scientific integrity. It is argued that the dilemmas identified in this study should be dealt with openly by the relevant groups of scientists. (shrink)

Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of these theories abstract away from the effects of kinship on the incentives for public goods provision, though. Here, it is investigated analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and (...) experimentally investigate collective action problems: the linear public goods game. Using recent anthropological data sets on relatedness in 61 contemporary hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies the relevant parameters of this model are then estimated. It turns out that the kinship patterns observed in these societies substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision. It is suggested, therefore, that renewed attention should be given to inclusive fitness theory in the context of public goods provision also in sizable groups, because its explanatory power with respect to this central problem in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism might have been substantially underrated. (shrink)

Policy and guideline proposals for ethical artificial intelligence research have proliferated in recent years. These are supposed to guide the socially-responsible development of AI for a common good. However, there typically exist incentives for non-cooperation ; and, these proposals often lack effective mechanisms to enforce their own normative claims. The situation just described constitutes a social dilemma—namely, a situation where no one has an individual incentive to cooperate, though mutual cooperation would lead to the best outcome for all (...) involved. In this paper, we use stochastic evolutionary game dynamics to model this social dilemma in the context of the ethical development of artificial intelligence. This formalism allows us to isolate variables that may be intervened upon, thus providing actionable suggestions for increased cooperation amongst numerous stakeholders in AI. Our results show how stochastic effects can help make cooperation viable in such a scenario. They suggest that coordination for a common good should be attempted in smaller groups in which the cost of cooperation is low, and the perceived risk of failure is high. This provides insight into the conditions under which we should expect such ethics proposals to be successful with regard to their scope, scale, and content. (shrink)

This paper argues that gossip can be a central element in inducing cooperation. The underlying assumption here is that human beings value payoffs in most societies, and are willing to have less now for more in the future. This basic interaction is tempered through gossip - as our behavior now may affect our future interactions and subsequent payoffs. As such, reputation matters and plays a crucial role in inducing cooperation. In order for gossip to be an effective policing mechanism a (...) number of conditions must be met: namely, there must be an incentive for behavior and the behavior must be conducted in a credible manner. Herein lies the utility of charisma and perhaps problem, in inducing cooperation. (shrink)

Teaching economics has been shown to encourage students to defect in a prisoner's dilemma game. However, can ethics training reverse that effect and promote cooperation? We conducted an experiment to answer this question. We found that students who had the ethics module had higher rates of cooperation than students without the ethics module, even after controlling for communication and other factors expected to affect cooperation. We conclude that the teaching of ethics can mitigate the possible adverse incentives of the prisoner's (...) dilemma, and, by implication, the adverse effects of economics and business training. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that people enter into social contracts because they are different from one another and have incentives to cooperate. In economic life, people have identical interests—namely, their own se- interests—so they have an incentive to compete. The social worlds that we create, or map, and those that are already mapped for us are increasingly complex, and thus the tracking of rationality is not so straightforward, although it is everywhere evident. In a sense, this (...) book grew out of two questions: Why hasn't the United States had a second revolution? Or is the revolution yet to come? Many have discussed the current crises that confront contemporary society, such as great economic inequalities, poverty, the declining quality of jobs, the growing power of corporate elites, and racial antago nisms. I attempt to understand these problems in terms of the radical restructuring of social life by economic and spatial forces. My specula tive thesis is that social organizations must reinforce social contracts and nurture the opportunities for them to be forged. However, contemporary organizations, particularly economic ones, have internalized the princi ples of economic markets, thereby inducing competition and easing out cooperation. In defining social contracts, I draw from Rousseau and also from Marx and his analysis of use value. One hopes that new organiza tional forms based on principles of democracy and community will evolve. In a diverse, multicultural society, this requires great mutual understanding and cooperation and the recognition of differences. (shrink)

One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to enrich (...) the current debate on goaldirected reasoning theories by studying the extent to which the principles of the bargaining theory can be used to formally characterize the concept of mutual advantage in a way which is compatible with some of the conceptually compelling principles of orthodox game theory, such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and non-comparability of decision-makers’ personal payoffs. I discuss two formal characterizations of the concept of mutual advantage derived from the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories: A measure of mutual advantage developed in collaboration with Jurgis Karpus, which is broadly in line with the notion of mutual advantage suggested by Sugden, and the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution function, which is broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie’s solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I discuss the formal properties of each solution, as well as its theoretical predictions in a number of games. I also explore each solution concept’s compatibility with orthodox game theory. I also discuss the limitations of the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories. I argue that each theory offers a compelling explanation of how a certain type of decision-maker identifies the mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games, but neither of them offers a definitive answer to the question of how people coordinate their actions in non-cooperative social interactions. (shrink)

While necessary parts of the puzzle, cultural technologies are insufficient to explain peace. They are a form of second-order cooperation – a cooperative interaction designed to incentivize first-order cooperation. We propose an explanation for peacemaking cultural technologies, and therefore peace, based on the reputational incentives for second-order cooperation.

Expectation of others’ cooperative behavior plays a core role in economic cooperation. However, the dynamic neural substrates of expectation of cooperation are little understood. To fully understand EOC behavior in more natural social interactions, the present study employed functional near-infrared spectroscopy hyperscanning to simultaneously measure pairs of participants’ brain activations in a modified prisoner’s dilemma game. The data analysis revealed the following results. Firstly, under the high incentive condition, team EOC behavior elicited higher interbrain synchrony in the right inferior (...) frontal gyrus than individual EOC behavior. Meanwhile, the IBS in the IFG could predict the relationship between empathy/agreeableness and EOC behavior, and this prediction role was modulated by social environmental cues. These results indicate the involvement of the human mirror neuron system in the EOC behavior and the different neural substrates between team EOC and individual EOC, which also conform with theory that social behavior was affected by internal and external factors. Secondly, female dyads exhibited a higher IBS value of cooperative expectation than male dyads in the team EOC than the individual EOC in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, while in the individual EOC stage, the coherence value of female dyads was significantly higher than that of male dyads under the low incentive reward condition in the rIFG. These sex effects thus provide presumptive evidence that females are more sensitive to environmental cues and also suggest that during economic social interaction, females’ EOC behavior depends on more social cognitive abilities. Overall, these results raise intriguing questions for future research on human cooperative behaviors. (shrink)

This book focuses on group behaviour in developing countries. It includes studies of producer and community organizations, NGOs, and some public sector groups. Despite the fact that most economic decisions are taken by people acting within groups -- families, firms, neighbourhood or community associations, and networks of producers -- the analysis of group functioning has not received enough attention, particularly among economists. Some groups function well, from the perspectives of equity, efficiency, and well-being, while others do not. This book explores (...) why. It covers groups that perform three types of function: overcoming market failures ; improving the position of their members, and distributing resources to the less well-off. It contrasts three modes of group behaviour: power and control; cooperation; and the use of material incentives. It explores what determines modes of behaviour of groups, and the consequences for efficiency, equity, and well-being. The book includes eleven case studies by different authors, including producers' associations in Brazil, farmers' organizations in Korea and Taiwan, community forestry groups in South Asia, organizations of sex-workers in Calcutta, and health NGOs in Uganda. Claims groups tended to be the most cooperative, cooperation fostering empowerment and self-esteem. Distributive or pro bono groups mostly operated according to power and control, while market failure groups often combined all three modes.The studies show the strong impact of norms in society as a whole on group behaviour. The recent shift towards a stronger role for market incentives has exerted powerful pressures on groups to use more material incentives, undermining the cooperation essential to sustain efficiency and equity. The universal presumption in favour of monetary incentives needs to be abandoned. Non-market behaviour needs to be valued and protected as well. (shrink)

Silvia Castellazzi shows how companies can implement their corporate responsibility and support employability and access to training in an incentive-compatible manner. The study provides insights into unrealized cooperation and disincentives which prevent companies from investing in a shared pool of employable and skilled people. The research draws on the theoretical framework of the economic ethics and on in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in two European countries. Findings show that incentives for investments in training are selective and might reinforce path-dependencies (...) and exclusion, while not supporting cooperation and productive competition. The study also shows the value of conceptualizing employability as a social rather than a psychological contract to facilitate investments and the implementation of corporate responsibility. Contents Trends and Conflicts in Employability and Provision of Training Incentives Structures and Stakeholders' Strategies A Social Contract for Employability Target Groups Researchers in business ethics, employee relations, further education and training HR and training managers; CSR managers The Author Silvia Castellazzi works as account manager in the corporate education division of MIP Graduate School of Business (Politecnico di Milano). Her research interests and activities are focused on professional and executive education, corporate responsibility and decision-making, the future of work and new forms of work organization. (shrink)

Many libertarians are familiar with the system of private law that prevailed in Iceland during the Free Commonwealth period (930 1262). Market mechanisms, rather than a governmental monopoly of power, provided the incentives to cooperate and maintain order.

International research is an essential means of reducing health disparities between and within countries and should do so as a matter of global justice. Research funders from high-income countries have an obligation of justice to support health research in low and middle-income countries that furthers such objectives. This paper investigates how their current funding schemes are designed to incentivise health systems research in LMICs that promotes health equity. Semi-structured in-depth interviews were performed with 16 grants officers working for 11 funders (...) and organisations that support health systems research: the Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research, Comic Relief, Doris Duke Foundation, European Commission, International Development Research Centre, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, Research Council of Norway, Rockefeller Foundation, UK Department of International Development, UK Medical Research Council, and Wellcome Trust. Thematic analysis of the data demonstrates their funding schemes promote health systems research with five key features that advance health equity: being conducted with worst-off populations, focusing on research topics that advance equitable health systems, having LMIC ownership of the research agenda, strengthening LMIC research capacity, and having an impact on health disparities. The different types of incentives that encouraged proposed projects to have these features are identified and classified by their strength. It is suggested that research funders ought to create and maintain funding schemes with strong incentives for the features identified above in order to more effectively help reduce global health disparities. (shrink)

This article explores the plausibility of some intuitions and counter intuitions about the anti-corruption efforts of MDBs and international organizations leveraging the power of the private sector. Regulation of a sizable percentage of global private sector actors now falls into a new area of international governance with innovative institutions, standards, and programs. We wrestle with the role and value of private sector partnerships and available informal and formal social controls. Crafting proportional informal controls (e.g., monitoring, evaluations, and sanctions) and proper (...) incentives to cooperative games across networks are the lynchpins of successful collective action programs. Ambivalence with informal social controls or effective incentives, we argue, risks far too much deference to private sector interests. (shrink)

States and other climate actors now commonly set ‘net zero’ targets – pledging that, by a certain date, they will put no more carbon into the atmosphere than they take out. However, there is controversy over what exactly should count as attaining such targets. The method of emissions accounting that states currently use – territorial emissions accounting – is often criticized as problematic, but a fully satisfactory explanation of the problem is needed. We argue that the key both to understanding (...) the problem and to solving it is that there is a specific kind of cooperative contribution – a mereological contribution – that a national net zero commitment needs to make to global climate action in order to meet the standards that global citizens should hold states to. On this basis, we propose an alternative method – Contributory Value-Chain Accounting – showing how it can be qualified to reflect trade relationships between net-zero-aligned countries, and defending it against the objections that it involves double counting, is infeasible and too informationally demanding, and that it would send the wrong incentive signals. (shrink)

Although much legal scholarship discusses the meaning of the religion clauses of the U.S. Constitution, very few articles analyze the ways in which state regulation affects actors' incentives to engage in religious behavior. Yet the question of how a law influences religious behavior is important for determining whether various laws are desirable, and whether they violate constitutional constraints. This article draws on recent economic models of religious organization to analyze the ways in which laws affect the behavior of religious groups. (...) Religious groups produce collective goods for their members, and the effect of laws can be analyzed by examining how they modify the payoffs members receive for cooperating or free riding. The article examines the use of laws to establish religious groups, to subsidize them with cash or tax benefits, to provide accommodations for them, to provide symbolic support for them, to provide secular substitutes for the collective goods they produce, and to regulate disputes between members. The article also briefly discusses the constitutional implications of the analysis. (shrink)

Government can control conflicts of interest in business firms by either issuing obligatory commands to behave in a specified way or by creating incentives to alter private behavior. In order to choose between these two approaches, we also need to know something about the nature of the subject firms and the way that they are likely to respond to particular stimuli. Legislators and legal scholars often rely on intuition to predict the behavior of firms, but this will not suffice for (...) such a complex situation. Fortunately, there is a well-developed body of scholarship that addresses organizational behavior; unfortunately, like many bodies of scholarship, it contains rival and conflicting approaches. This article discusses four of these approaches to organizational behavior: the nexus of contracts theory, an application of rational choice theory to corporations; decision theory; general systems theory and its recent autopoetic variants; and new institutionalism. It then uses each of these approaches to predict the way that firms will respond to obligatory commands and behavior incentives. The specific cases it discusses are the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and contemporary compliance theory’s idea of reasonable, responsive, or cooperative enforcement. (shrink)

Our society has long sanctioned, at least tacitly, a degree of conflict of interest in medical practice and clinical research as an unavoidable consequence of the different interests of the physician or clinical investigator, the patient or clinical research subject, third party payers or research sponsors, the government, and society as a whole, to name a few. In the past, resolution of these conflicts has been left to the conscience of the individual physician or clinical investigator and to professional organizations. (...) The public is no longer willing to allow health care providers to wholly govern their own conflicts of interest for several reasons. These include: new forms of health care financing and delivery that provide innovative and lucrative opportunities for physician or insurer enrichment at patient expense; the increased importance of commercial research support as peer-reviewed governmental research support has decreased; evidence that physicians and clinical investigators too frequently resolve conflicts of interest in their own favor; and a general societal mistrust of authority. This volume represents a multidisciplinary effort, drawing from philosophy, medicine, law, economics and public policy to identify and categorize conflicts of interest in medical practice and clinical research, and, where possible, to offer a mechanism for resolving them. Part I addresses conflicts of interest from a theoretical perspective, offering basic concepts and analytical frameworks. The second part discusses two topics prominent in current health care policy debates--self-referral and financial incentives to limit care. Part III examines conflicts of interest generated by pharmaceutical industry involvement in clinical practice and research. The final section deals with conflicts of interest in clinical research in several contexts, including institutional reviews boards, clinical trials, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements between government and private researchers, brokerage of research subjects by Contract Research Organizations, and cost-effectiveness studies. (shrink)

In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is (...) more efficient. Empirical research, however, overwhelmingly contradicts this. But employees almost never even attempt to organize worker cooperatives. I critique the explanations of the three leading analysts of the subject (N. Scott Arnold, Henry Hansmann, and Gregory Dow), all of whom offer are different transactions cost accounts, as logically defective and empirically inadequate. I then propose an explanation that has been oddly neglected in the literature, that the rarity of cooperatives is explained by the collective action problem identified by writers such as Mancur Olson. Labor management is a public good that generates the n-person prisoner’s dilemma which gives rational actors the incentive to create it in suboptimal (or no) amounts. I support this by reference to the empirical facts about the origin of existing cooperatives and show that this explanation requires no strong version of a questionable rational choice theory. This explanation is supplemented by the mere exposure or familiarity effect derived from social and cognitive psychology, which turns on the fact that labor managed firms are rare, in part because of the public goods problem, thus unfamiliar, which makes them less attractive and thus more likely to be rare. My account points advocates of labor management towards solutions such as institutional changes in incentives, which, however, themselves involve public goods issues. (shrink)

A key reason for pessimism with respect to greenhouse gas emissions reduction relates to the ?motivation problem?, whereby those who could make the biggest difference prima facie have the least incentive to act because they are most able to adapt: how can we motivate such people (and thereby everyone else) to accept, indeed to initiate, the changes to their lifestyles that are required for effective emissions reductions? This paper offers an account inspired by Rawls of the good of membership (...) of ?intergenerational cooperative union? to achieve justice that provides a solution to the motivation problem. (shrink)

Cooperative discourse procedures produce consensual siting proposals for NIMBY-projects-but only if these proposals do not affect the final siting decision. Then, the members of the discourse commissions stay independent and face few incentives to pursue consequentialist interests. However, the more influential discourse procedures become, the stronger the interest groups’ incentives are to take advantage of them. Thus, cooperative discourses turn into competitive, interest-centred procedures whose outcome is rejected by the less influential groups. The evolution of discourse procedures into functionally specialized (...) parliaments or even into FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions) seems worth pursuing. (shrink)

Protein splicing is an extraordinary post‐translational reaction that removes an intact central “spacer” domain (Sp) from precursor proteins (N‐Sp‐C) while splicing together the N‐ and C‐domains of the precursor, via a peptide bond, to produce a new protein (N‐C). All of the available data on protein splicing fit a model in which these intervening sequences excise at the protein level via a self‐splicing mechanism. Several proteins have recently been discovered that undergo protein splicing, and in two such cases, the excised (...) spacer protein is an endonuclease. Such endonucleases are capable of conferring genetic mobility upon the intervening sequences that encodes them. These intervening sequences define a new family of mobile genetic elements that are translated yet remain phenotypically silent by excising at the protein rather than the RNA level. (shrink)

Punishment of offenders is one of the most universal features of human behavior. Across time and cultures it has been common for people to punish offenders, and one can easily find examples of punishment among ancient hunter-gatherers, in holy scriptures, in popular culture, and in contemporary courts of law. Punishment is not restricted to criminal offenders, but emerges within all spheres of our social life, including corporations, public institutions, traffic, sports matches, schools, parenting, and more. Punishment strongly influences what we (...) think, how we feel, and what we do. The Moral Punishment Instinct asserts that people possess a hard-wired tendency to aggress against those who violate the norms of their group. We have evolved this instinct because of its power to control behavior by curbing selfishness and free-riding, thereby providing incentives to stimulate the mutual cooperation that ancient hunter-gatherers needed in order to survive in challenging natural environments. In this book, Jan-Willem van Prooijen methodically describes how punishment originates from moral emotions, stimulates cooperation, and shapes the social life of human beings. Guided by a host of recognizable and relatable examples, this book illuminates how the moral punishment instinct manifests itself among a variety of modern human cultures, children, tribes of hunter-gatherers, and even non-human animals-all while accounting for the role of this instinct in religion, war, racial bias, restorative justice, gossip, torture, and radical terrorism. (shrink)

Taking people’s longevity as a measure of good life, humankind can proudly say that the average person is living a much longer life than ever before. The AIDS epidemic has however for the first time in decades stalled and in some cases even reverted this trend in a number of countries. Climate change is increasingly becoming a major challenge for food security and we can anticipate that hunger caused by crop damages will become much more common. -/- Since many of (...) the challenges humanity faced in the past were overcome by inventive solutions coming from the life sciences, we are compelled to reconsider how we incentivize science and technology development so that those in need can benefit more broadly from scientific research. There is a huge portion of the world population that is in urgent need for medicines to combat diseases that are currently neglected by the scientific community and could immensely benefit from agricultural research that specifically targets their environmental conditions. At the same time efforts have to be made to make the fruits of current and future research more widely accessible. These changes would have to be backed by a range of moral arguments to attract people with diverging notions of global justice. This article explores the main ethical theories used to demand a greater share in the benefits from scientific progress for the poor. Since life sciences bring about a number of special concerns, a short list of conflictive issues is also offered. (shrink)

Like Thomas Hobbes, the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi imagines a human state of nature that is chaotic and violent, akin to Hobbes’s state of war of everyone against everyone. Like Hobbes, Xunzi pins this miserable human natural condition on the egoistical nature of people. And like Hobbes, Xunzi justifies the establishment of political authority because it brings order and peace among people. But while Hobbes takes the establishment and enforcement of positive laws by an all-powerful political authority to be sufficient (...) for keeping the state of nature at bay, Xunzi believes that positive laws alone are inadequate. Laws must be accompanied by a reformation of human nature if a well-ordered society is to be achieved and sustained. In contrast to Hobbes, then, Xunzi thinks that a well-ordered political society must have both good laws and good people. This is where the Confucian ideal of rituals comes in. Rituals have the important function of making people better in spite of their original bad nature that laws alone do not. Recalling the place of rituals in Xunzi’s ideal of a well-ordered society draws our attention to a crucial difference between Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s political philosophies. While Hobbes thinks that a peaceful political society among egotistical individuals is achievable so long as it is possible to secure the right incentive structure for them to cooperate, Xunzi thinks a stable civil order must take on the task of improving human nature. More basically, Xunzi and Hobbes see the aims of political society differently. For Hobbes, the chief purpose of politics is the peaceful co-existence of people in spite of their egoistical nature. For Xunzi, the central aim of politics is not just peaceful co-existence among individuals but their moral self-improvement and cultivation, their transformation from egoistical to social beings. (shrink)

This Article presents an innovative institutional strategy for global climate protection, quite distinct from, but ultimately complementary to and supportive of the currently stalled UNFCCC climate treaty negotiations. The bottom-up strategy relies on a variety of smallerscale transnational cooperative arrangements, involving not only states but sub-national jurisdictions, firms, and CSOs, to undertake activities whose primary goal is not climate mitigation but which will achieve greenhouse gas reductions as an inherent byproduct. This strategy avoids the inherent problems in securing an enforceable (...) treaty to secure the global public good of climate protection by mobilizing other incentives - including economic self-interest, energy security, cleaner air, and furtherance of international development - to motivate such actors to cooperate on actions that will also benefit the climate. These bottom-up regimes will contribute to global climate action not only by achieving emissions reductions in the short-term, but also by linking the bottom-up regimes to the UNFCCC system through greenhouse gas monitoring and reporting systems. In these ways, the bottom-up strategy will help secure eventual agreement on a global climate treaty. (shrink)

Background Policies to use financial incentives to encourage healthy behaviour are controversial. Much of this controversy is played out in the mass media, both reflecting and shaping public opinion. Objective To describe UK mass media coverage of incentive schemes, comparing schemes targeted at different client groups and assessing the relative prominence of the views of different interest groups. Design Thematic content analysis. Subjects National and local news coverage in newspapers, news media targeted at health-care providers and popular websites between (...) January 2005 and February 2010. Setting UK mass media. Results The study included 210 articles. Fifteen separate arguments favourable towards schemes, and 19 unfavourable, were identified. Overall, coverage was more favourable than unfavourable, although most articles reported a mix of views. Arguments about the prevalence and seriousness of the health problems targeted by incentive schemes were uncontested. Moral and ethical objections to such schemes were common, focused in particular on recipients such as drug users or the overweight who were already stereotyped as morally deficient, and these arguments were largely uncontested. Arguments about the effectiveness of schemes and their potential for benefit or harm were areas of greater contestation. Government, public health and other health-care provider interests dominated favourable coverage; oppo- sition came from rival politicians, taxpayersÕ representatives, certain charities and from some journalists themselves. Conclusions Those promoting incentive schemes for people who might be regarded as ÔundeservingÕ should plan a media strategy that anticipates their public reception. (shrink)