In der Psychoanalyse unterliege die Sicht auf weibliche ­Sexualität, so die Autorin, immer noch Relikten einer »phallischen Logik«, die ihr ein binäres und defizitäres Muster von Kastration und Mangel aufzwinge. Dies zeige sich u. a. darin, dass die Vagina als Pendant zum Penis gilt. Anatomisch ist dies allerdings nicht korrekt, denn die Klitoris bildet das zentrale weibliche Sexualorgan. Von hier aus lasse sich eine eigenständige, unabhängige weibliche Sexualität jenseits von Heteronormativität und Reproduktion konzipieren. Nachdem der von Freud behauptete Objektwechsel in (...) der sexuellen Entwicklung des Mädchens zu Recht kritisiert wurde, stehe damit auch der Wechsel der sexuellen Leitzone in Frage. Dieser Perspektivenwechsel wirft neues Licht auf die genitale Sexualität und die Triebtheorie. Die Autorin schlägt den Begriff der »Zirklusion« als Triebmodalität vor, der die phalluszentrierte Penetration ergänzt. (shrink)

Editorial - Religião, Arte e Patrimônio Cultural Dossiê: Religião, Arte e Patrimônio Cultural (Religion, Art and Cultural Heritage).

Das Freud’sche Konzept der »Objektwahl« wird rekonstruiert und seine Bedeutung für die gegenwärtige psychoanalytische Theoriebildung und analytische Praxis reflektiert. Thematisiert werden die Konflikthaftigkeit des Begehrens und die phantasmatischen Liebesbedingungen, die der Objektwahl zugrunde liegen. Doch vor dem Hintergrund eines Primats des Anderen im Rahmen der Allgemeinen Verführungstheorie von Jean Laplanche erscheinen die Vorstellungen von »Objekt« und »Wahl« problematisch. Vielmehr scheint das Subjekt dem »Objekt« unterworfen, und die Objektwahl könnte als Antwort auf die Verführung verstanden werden. Sie besitzt konstitutive Bedeutung für (...) die Gestaltung von Paarbeziehungen und kann den Charakter fortwährender Umschriften, aber auch eines beeinträchtigenden Wiederholungszwangs annehmen. (shrink)

Moritz Schulz explores counterfactual thought and language: what would have happened if things had gone a different way. Counterfactual questions may concern large scale derivations or small scale evaluations of minor derivations. A common impression, which receives a thorough defence in the book, is that oftentimes we find it impossible to know what would have happened. However, this does not mean that we are completely at a loss: we are typically capable of evaluating counterfactual questions probabilistically: we can say (...) what would have been likely or unlikely to happen. Schulz describes these probabilistic ways of evaluating counterfactual questions and turns the data into a novel account of the workings of counterfactual thought. (shrink)

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...) we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. (shrink)

This article explores melodrama's capacity to evoke strong emotional responses with a focus on the ending of King Vidor's Stella Dallas. It suggests a consideration of the phenomenological concept of instrument-mediation as coined by Vivian Sobchack as a filmic structure that fosters melodrama's emotional appeal and the spectator's engagement with it. It suggests a self-reflexive element in highly emotional film scenes that inscribes the spectator's subject position into the film, thus enabling the film to impact the spectator's body. This reflection (...) of a spectator's perspective enables and fosters the communication of emotionality. Consequently, instrument-mediation describes one function and strategy of the melodramatic mode. (shrink)

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured by (...) a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed. (shrink)

According to a suggestion by Williamson, outright belief comes in degrees: one has a high/low degree of belief iff one is willing to rely on the content of one’s belief in high/low-stakes practical reasoning. This paper develops an epistemic norm for degrees of outright belief so construed. Starting from the assumption that outright belief aims at knowledge, it is argued that degrees of belief aim at various levels of strong knowledge, that is, knowledge which satisfies particularly high epistemic standards. This (...) account is contrasted with and shown to be superior to an alternative proposal according to which higher degrees of outright belief aim at higher-order knowledge. In an “Appendix”, it is indicated that the logic of degrees of outright belief is closely linked to ranking theory. (shrink)

The pressures that led to the evolution of episodic memory have recently seen much discussion, but a fully satisfactory account of them is still lacking. We seek to make progress in this debate by taking a step backward, identifying four possible ways that episodic memory could evolve in relation to simulationist future planning—a similar and seemingly related ability. After distinguishing each of these possibilities, the paper critically discusses existing accounts of the evolution of episodic memory. It then presents a novel (...) argument in favor of the view that episodic memory is a by-product of the evolution of simulationist future planning. The paper ends by showing that this position allows for the maintenance of the traditional view that episodic memory operates on stored memory traces, as well as explaining a number of key features of episodic memory: its being subject to frequent and systematic errors, its neural co-location with the capacity for simulationist future planning, and the potential existence of non-human episodic memory. (shrink)

According to the knowledge norm of belief, one should believe p only if one knows p. However, it can easily seem that the ordinary notion of belief is much weaker than the knowledge norm would have it. It is possible to rationally believe things one knows to be unknown The aim of belief, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). One response to this observation is to develop a technical notion of ‘outright’ belief. A challenge for this line of response is to (...) find a way of getting a grip on the targeted notion of belief. In order to meet this challenge, I characterize ‘outright’ belief in this paper as the strongest belief state implied by knowledge. I show that outright belief so construed allows this notion to play important theoretical roles in connection with knowledge, assertion and action. (shrink)

Three facts are widely thought to be key to the characterization of human cognitive uniqueness (though a number of other factors are often cited as well): (a) humans are sophisticated cultural learners; (b) humans often rely on mental states with rich representational contents; and (c) humans have the ability and disposition to make and use tools. This article argues that (a)–(c) create a positive feedback loop: Sophisticated cultural learning makes possible the manufacture of tools that increase the sophistication of representational (...) decision-making, which in turn allows for yet further increases in the sophistication of cultural learning and tool manufacture. (shrink)

Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from (...) uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data. (shrink)

Statements about the behavior of biochemical entities (e.g., about the interaction between two proteins) abound in the literature on molecular biology and are increasingly becoming the targets of information extraction and text mining techniques. We show that an accurate analysis of the semantics of such statements reveals a number of ambiguities that have to be taken into account in the practice of biomedical ontology engineering: Such statements can not only be understood as event reporting statements, but also as ascriptions of (...) dispositions or tendencies that may or may not refer to collectives of interacting molecules or even to collectives of interaction events. (shrink)

Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...) prior knowledge of the subject, this is the ideal reference tool for those coming to Logic for the first time. (shrink)

Key Terms in Logic offers the ideal introduction to this core area in the study of philosophy, providing detailed summaries of the important concepts in the study of logic and the application of logic to the rest of philosophy. A brief introduction provides context and background, while the following chapters offer detailed definitions of key terms and concepts, introductions to the work of key thinkers and lists of key texts. Designed specifically to meet the needs of students and assuming no (...) prior knowledge of the subject, this is the ideal reference tool for those coming to Logic for the first time. (shrink)

This book is the first systematic treatment of the philosophy of science underlying evolutionary economics. It does not advocate an evolutionary approach towards economics, but rather assesses the epistemic value of appealing to evolutionary biology in economics more generally. The author divides work in evolutionary economics into three distinct, albeit related, forms: a structural form, an evidential form, and a heuristic form. He then analyzes five examples of work in evolutionary economics falling under these three forms. For the structural form, (...) he examines the parallelism between natural selection and economic decision making, and the parallelism between natural selection and market competition. For the evidential form, he looks at the relationship between animal and human economic decision making, and the evolutionary explanation of diversity in human economic decision making. Finally, for the heuristic form, he focuses on the plausibility of equilibrium modeling in evolutionary ecology and economics. In this way, he shows that linking evolutionary biology and economics can make for a powerful methodological tool that can enable progress in our understanding of various economics questions. Structure, Evidence, and Heuristic will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, evolutionary biology, and economics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Is uncertainty about preferences rationally possible? And if so, does it matter for rational decision? It is argued that uncertainty about preferences is possible and should play the same role in rational decision-making as uncertainty about worldly facts. The paper develops this hypothesis and defends it against various objections.

This paper studies degrees of doxastic justification. Dependency relations among different beliefs are represented in terms of causal models. Doxastic justification, on this picture, is taken to run causally downstream along appropriate causal chains. A theory is offered which accounts for the strength of a derivative belief in terms of (i) the strength of the beliefs on which it is based, and (ii) the epistemic quality of the belief-forming mechanisms involved. It is shown that the structure of degrees of justification (...) converges to ranking theory under ideal conditions. (shrink)

In this paper an approach to the exhaustive interpretation of answers is developed. It builds on a proposal brought forward by Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984). We will use the close connection between their approach and McCarthy’s (1980, 1986) predicate circumscription and describe exhaustive interpretation as an instance of interpretation in minimal models, well-known from work on counterfactuals (see for instance Lewis (1973)). It is shown that by combining this approach with independent developments in semantics/pragmatics one can overcome certain limitations of (...) Groenenedijk and Stokhof’s (1984) proposal. In the last part of the paper we will provide a Gricean motivation for exhaustive interpretation building on work of Schulz (to appear) and van Rooij and Schulz (2004). (shrink)

Kein Geringerer als Arthur Schopenhauer beurteilte Kants Prolegomena als die "schönste und faßlichste aller Kantischen Hauptschriften, welche viel zu wenig gelesen wird, da sie doch das Studium seiner Philosophie außerordentlich erleichtert". Die Prolegomena von 1783 sind eine Kurzfassung der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft", deren Plan und Ergebnisse sie übersichtlich darstellen sollen. In Umkehrung der Methode der Kritik - statt der synthetischen Lehrart wird nun die analytische befolgt - nimmt Kant unter der Leitfrage "Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?" eine (...) Inhalts-, Umfangs- und Grenzbestimmung reiner Erkenntnis vor. Orientiert am Ideal der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaft soll der Metaphysik hinsichtlich der Gewißheit ihrer Prinzipien die Nobilitierung einer Wissenschaft zuteil werden, die ihr vor der Kritik versagt war. Damit sind die Prolegomena nicht nur eine Einführung in den Transzendentalen Idealismus Kants, sondern dokumentieren bereits die Weiterführung dieser Kritischen Philosophie, welche sich über die "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" (1785) sowie die "Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" (1786) bis zur zweiten Auflage der Kritik (1787) und über diese hinaus fortsetzt. (shrink)