This paper analyzes the notion of possibility in biology and demonstrates how synthetic biology can provide understanding on the modal dimension of biological systems. Among modal concepts, biological possibility has received surprisingly little explicit treatment in the philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to argue for the importance of the notion of biological possibility by showing how it provides both a philosophically and biologically fruitful category as well as introducing a new practically grounded way for its assessment. (...) More precisely, we argue that synthetic biology can provide tools to scientifically anchor reasoning about biological possibilities. Two prominent strategies for this are identified and analyzed: the design of functionally new-to-nature systems and the redesign of naturally occurring systems and their parts. These approaches allow synthetic biologists to explore systems that are not normally evolutionarily accessible and draw modal inferences that extend in scope beyond their token realizations. Subsequently, these results in synthetic biology can also be relevant for discussions on evolutionary contingency, providing new methods and insight to the study of various sources of unactualized possibilities in biology. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is described as a new field of biotechnology that models itself on engineering sciences. However, this view of synthetic biology as an engineering field has received criticism, and both biologists and philosophers have argued for a more nuanced and heterogeneous understanding of the field. This paper elaborates the heterogeneity of synthetic biology by clarifying the role of design and the variability of design methodologies in synthetic biology. I focus on two prominent design methodologies: rational design and directed evolution. (...) Rational design resembles the design methodology of traditional engineering sciences. However, it is often replaced and complemented by the more biologically-inspired method of directed evolution, which models itself on natural evolution. These two approaches take philosophically different stances to the design of biological systems. Rational design aims to make biological systems more machine-like, whereas directed evolution utilizes variation and emergent features of living systems. I provide an analysis of the methodological basis of these design approaches, and highlight important methodological differences between them. By analyzing the respective benefits and limitations of these approaches, I argue against the engineering-dominated conception of synthetic biology and its “methodological monism”, where the rational design approach is taken as the default design methodology. Alternative design methodologies, like directed evolution, should be considered as complementary, not competitive, to rational design. (shrink)

Synthetic biology offers a powerful method to design and construct biological devices for human purposes. Two prominent design methodologies are currently used. Rational design adapts the design methodology of traditional engineering sciences, such as mechanical engineering. Directed evolution, in contrast, models its design principles after natural evolution, as it attempts to design and improve systems by guiding them to evolve in a certain direction. Previous work has argued that the primary difference between these two is the way they treat variation: (...) rational design attempts to suppress it, whilst direct evolution utilizes variation. I argue that this contrast is too simplistic, as it fails to distinguish different types of variation and different phases of design in synthetic biology. I outline three types of variation and show how they influence the construction of synthetic biological systems during the design process. Viewing the two design approaches with these more fine-grained distinctions provides a better understanding of the methodological differences and respective benefits of rational design and directed evolution, and clarifies the constraints and choices that the different design approaches must deal with. (shrink)

Annawe live where people used to keep cowsin a stifling polyethylene sunwe make holes for love therewhen the water is high we walk on itfrom the bed to the chair then the windowsillthere we hang like rags on the edge of lightonce we woke in history melancholycan't fall back asleep circumambulatelike a child's sobs in a dead bellywar: the worst day of my lifeTatyanacurfew cage bars are made of waxwhen we set ourselves on fire, the light goes on in the (...) houselike a sunflower on the pan of a deep fieldit's as if we were still alive but then night deliversthe viper of the widow's ribbon under every doorlet them get up and go, it's not about the eyes of othersour faces are under the washed-out water of tearsbut they don't go we don't goit is where thyme once was picked up and memory grewgathering songs in tufts of hair, the sacks of Augustwere pregnant with hope for a new summerwhere we still speak for ourselveslet them get up and go, our time is running outleaving sand on things so they get water back laterwe outlive ourselves, we hold the earth by the throatlike the bird of an old love on the lining of a fashionable dressTamarathey just came and shut the passage of flowering timeinto a nailed-up victory box, as if we were snow dyingin the arms of cut-down apple trees in a cesspool of guiltnow my man and I go to get our pensions like cons off to rollcallbut even there they say: special people live in Donetsk:here you would say: and their special gods:occupation: its shimmering rhythm keeps trouble at baysilence: its dirty threads stitch up everyone's mouthswith porous fingers of laughter, from ear to eara train forgets itself and digs into the groundit's making to remember passenger lovesdoesn't know why it's here and what to do with so many namesFainathe rotten cabbage of despair knocks at the doorof invisible night with its severed head, the world still like waterscorched by screams a bird's throat makes threatswhile we go down into memory deeper and deeperwhile we root out the weeds of languagelike eglantine wind from a wound in the landscapepast the gates of death, empty nests of rootsstone light over the great junkheap of loveinfantile fears in the frozen cradle of breathwe leave lists of traces like snow in the marginsstained with blood of freedom from textualitythey will someday return home with our traces, the treesbeasts squint there from the swings of fire and guiltthey laugh over the ravine of this shameful feastthey don't feel the ground shifting beneath themin a long echo's noose tolls the hollow heartFor Oleh Kotsarevwe shall inter civilization in the woodsso that the waking sunhears the green record of sunrisenaked enter the running dance circlebreak into the childish laughter of natureearth shall not know earth in the mirror of our movementsearth shall not know us everso water leaving the memories of fireplace beaststurns to snow in the see-through cupped hands of cloudsso trees pushing roots into rainturn to sky in the arms of birdswe are not afraid, we shall say,to be or not to be in the umbilical cord of timewe shall tie together white kerchiefs of tears in the house of love. (shrink)

This study aims to analyse the perspectives of Muslim students on pluralism and freedom of religion, as well as the worship place establishments, holy book assessments and practices of other religions. This study uses a cohort-based quantitative method through data collection, interviews and documentation, which involves 1300 respondents from 13 state Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia. In order to collect information from the respondents, this research uses an online questionnaire. It also conducts online interviews to directly confirm the information (...) obtained from the questionnaire. This research discovers that Muslim students are tolerant in accepting plurality and religious diversity, yet intolerant in the holy book assessment, place of worship establishments and practices of other religions. Contribution: This study contributes towards developing a persuasive concept concerning religious moderation, commenced by analysing socio-theological perspectives of highly educated society. (shrink)

Das Wort "Kulturrelativismus" wird in Bezug auf mehrere, methodologisch recht unterschieliech Überzeugungen angewandt, von denen ich drei hervorhebe: 1. den deskriptiven, 2. den methodolgischen, 3. den axiologischen Relativismus. Die Aufgabe des Referates beschränkt sich auf Erörterungen, 1. worin die Meinungsdifferenzen in Bezug auf den deskriptiven Relativismus beruhen, 2. ob der deskriptive und methodologische Relativismus den axiologischen zur Folge hat, 3. ob es gegenwärtig Ansätze von einem überkulturell anerkannten Maß des Guten gibt.

The author draws a distinction between active and passive resistance. The latter is defined as a mental protest against some events in public life that is not followed by additional action. The former, or active resistance, is further divided by the author into resistance with the use of violence and resistance which renounced violence. She concentrates on the concept of violence and puts the question if, and in what circumstances, a recourse to violence is justified. She quotes various opinions on (...) that matter. The problem of using violence is the problem of the admissibility of various modes of action, or means of action, she says. As every method of protest in every society can be adopted in defence of either good or bad ends, the author focuses on the question, what criteria of evaluation of the objectives defended by resistance can be relied upon. She ends her paper by pointing out that resistance is the most important form of non-violent resistance. (shrink)

By professional ethics I mean written standards which answer the question.

Pojęcie godności używane bywa przede wszystkim w dwóch znaczeniach. W znaczeniu egalitarnym godność jest walorem przysługującym wszystkim ludziom jako takim, walorem niestopniowalnym i niezbywalnym. W znaczeniu selektywnym człowiek wykazuje się godnością lub nie wykazuje, a także wykazuje się w mniejszym lub większym stopniu, zależnie od swoich indywidualnych cech i od swojego indywidualnego sposobu postępowania. Artykuł poświęcony jest problemom godności w sensie egalitarnуm. Autorka szuka w nim odpowiedzi na trzy pytania: Jakie postulaty moralne kojarzone są współcześnie z godnością człowieka? W jaki (...) sposób argumentuje się na rzecz ludzkiej godności? Jakimi motywami kierują się ludzie, szanując godność człowieka? (shrink)

The widely acclaimed components of the humanistic ethical program are to be found at present in personalism, universalism, and humanitarianism. The author unreservedly subscribes to this program and postulates that the value of every human individual be recognized irrespective of his individual characteristics, that all actions which affect any human being be performed only with due respect to the autonomous good of the human being, and that no man be ever treated only as an instrument in his existence. Trying to (...) supply a justification for these postulates most authors point out that human dignity is presumably founded on such merits as reason and conscience. The author resolved to expose the weakness of this line of argument. A recourse to empirical features that allegedly distinguish human species from the others may not serve as a good reason in defense of those particular human individuals who clearly lack them. The author endavours to show that universalism which gives ~very man a minimum rights may justly be treated as unacceptable particularism, as typically ‚human speciesism’, indeed. It excludes from the regions of moral concern all animals, which like humans, are capable of suffering. Many authors take the sentience to be the single most important feature shared by animals and humans, which imposes on us the obligation to take care of animals as well as humans. The author contents that the delineation of the range of creatures with respect to whom we have moral obligation is one of the axioms which cannot be argued for or against. There are no logical reasons for drawing the boundaries here or there. We must rely on our ultimate moral convictions that we perceive as our feeling of being morally right. The delineation of the range of the creatures whose autonomous good we will take into account in our activity is a question of an axiomatic decision. We will not find any empirical features either in men or animals, which could impose a logical necessity for counting certain specimens in or others out. We must rely on the most elementary sense of solidarity which makes another creature our fellow-creature. The numerous controversies between different degrees and different kinds of particularism, or between particularism and universalism with respect to humans, or between universalism encompassing only humans and universalism extended to the whole reach of creatures capable of suffering has its source not so much in the differences in knowledge of facts but as in different emotional evaluative attitudes towards them. (shrink)

The first part of the article presents Petrażycki’s theory of moral and legal phenomena, which he called collectively ethical phenomena. The second part is devoted to normative issues. Petrażycki appreciated a specific moral ideal of personality; he wished that men should refute blameworthy acts instinctively and impulsively. Moral rules, according to him, are to be observed not because of the possible consequences of the acts but because of a positive or negative emotional attitude towards the acts as such. He believed (...) that moral rules are always obligatory, independently of the circumstances. (shrink)

Moralists and philosophers of law often demand that the axiological systems be in conformity with “human nature”, or with “nature”. Among conceptions which look for footing in human nature two main trends may be distinguished.