This chapter aims to contribute to the endeavour of investigating nonhuman animals as experiencing subjects in their own right with their own species-specific histories. Our focus is on the examination of pain experience in animals. We argue that there is need for more research in which pain experience in animals is accounted for in species-specific terms. Making use of empirical studies in the fields of neurobiology, evolutionary-developmental biology, comparative psychology, and cognitive ethology, we try to offer a phenomenological analysis of (...) indications and expressions of pain experience in animals. We attempt to show how different animals are capable of indicating and expressing specific and unique experiences of pain in terms of their particular species, evolution, and places of living in human and natural contexts. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

This article provides current Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) data from samples of business managers and professionals across 50 societies that are culturally and socioeconomically diverse. We report the society scores for SVS values dimensions for both individual- and societal-level analyses. At the individual-level, we report on the ten circumplex values sub-dimensions and two sets of values dimensions (collectivism and individualism; openness to change, conservation, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence). At the societal-level, we report on the values dimensions of embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective (...) autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony. For each society, we report the Cronbach’s α statistics for each values dimension scale to assess their internal consistency (reliability) as well as report interrater agreement (IRA) analyses to assess the acceptability of using aggregated individual level values scores to represent country values. We also examined whether societal development level is related to systematic variation in the measurement and importance of values. Thus, the contributions of our evaluation of the SVS values dimensions are two-fold. First, we identify the SVS dimensions that have cross-culturally internally reliable structures and within-society agreement for business professionals. Second, we report the society cultural values scores developed from the twenty-first century data that can be used as macro-level predictors in multilevel and single-level international business research. (shrink)

Do Morals Matter? is an accessible and informed guide to contemporary ethical issues that reflects upon the intersection of religion and morality. An informal yet informed guide through the key ethical issues we are facing today, from moral decision making in business and medicine, to the uncertainty of war and terrorism, and the condition of our environment. Reflects on religion’s intersection with morality, exploring the challenge of pluralism in major world religions, and the question of Humanism and God’s role in (...) ethics. Considers the forecast of future situations that will be affected by today’s ethical decisions. Questions what accounts for the variances in ethical beliefs in different cultures, and how we properly reassess our conceptions of ethical standards as new issues arise. Written by the internationally regarded Ian Markham, Dean of Hartford Seminary and author of numerous books on world religions and ethics. (shrink)

Yet many in the USA and Europe are not familiar with his important work; this book seeks to rectify that gap.In Globalization, Ethics and Islam, Jewish, ...

Too many parts of the world testify to the difficulties religions have in tolerating each other. It is often concluded that the only way tolerance and plurality can be protected is to keep religion out of the public sphere. Ian Markham challenges this secularist argument. In the first half of the book, he advances a careful critique of European culture which exposes the problem of plurality. His analysis of the Christendom Group is contrasted with the outlook found in the USA, (...) where a religiously informed culture may be seen to be tolerant. In the second half of the book, the author argues that plurality is better safeguarded by a theistic, rather than a secularist, foundation. He submits that too often secularists use relativist arguments, while theists want to appeal to the complexity of God's world. He concludes that in our post-modern world the religious affirmation of diversity offers genuine political possibilities for cultural enrichment. (shrink)

In five works spanning a decade, Philip E. Tetlock's interest in counterfactuals has changed. He began with an optimistic desire to make social science more rigorous by identifying best practices in the absence of non-imagined controls for experimentation. Soon, however, he adopted a more pessimistic analysis of the cognitive and psychological barriers facing experts. This shift was brought on by an awareness that experts are not rational Bayesians who continually update their theories to keep up with new information; but instead (...) are affected by political, cognitive, and psychological heuristics, including hindsight bias, cognitive conservatism, and the fundamental attribution error. But techniques of computational simulation-involving the rigorous production of large numbers of counterfactual worlds-make it possible to mitigate both problems that Tetlock identifies: that history, produced only once, is a lousy teacher; and that humans, with their collection of non-Bayesian heuristics, are lousy pupils. Tetlock was wrong to reject this approach as theoretically promising but rhetorically and practically impractical. (shrink)

This article re-evaluates the significance attributed to Hecataeus¿ encounter with the Theban priests described by Herodotus (2.143) by setting it against the evidence of Late Period Egyptian representations of the past. In the first part a critique is offered of various approaches Classicists have taken to this episode and its impact on Greek historiography. Classicists have generally imagined this as an encounter in which the young, dynamic and creative Greeks construct an image of the static, ossified and incredibly old culture (...) of the Egyptians, a move which reveals deeper assumptions in the scholarly discourse on Greeks and ¿other¿ cultures in the Mediterranean world. But the civilization that Herodotus confronted in his long excursus on Egypt was not an abstract, eternal Egypt. Rather, it was the Egypt of his own day, at a specific historical moment ¿ a culture with a particular understanding of its own long history. The second part presents evidence of lengthy Late Period priestly genealogies, and more general archaizing tendencies. Remarkable examples survive of the sort of visual genealogy which would have impressed upon the travelling Greek historians the long continuum of the Egyptian past. These include statues with genealogical inscriptions and relief sculptures representing generations of priests succeeding to their fathers¿ office. These priestly evocations of a present firmly anchored in the Egyptian past are part of a wider pattern of cultivating links with the historical past in the Late Period of Egyptian history. Thus, it is not simply the marvel of a massive expanse of time which Herodotus encountered in Egypt, but a mediated cultural awareness of that time. The third part of the essay argues that Herodotus used this long human past presented by the Egyptian priests in order to criticize genealogical and mythical representations of the past and develop the notion of an historical past. On the basis of this example, the article concludes by urging a reconsideration of the scholarly paradigm for imagining the encounter between Greeks and ¿others¿ in ethnographic discourse in order to recognize the agency of the Egyptian priests, and other non-Greek ¿informants¿. (shrink)

I propose to explain Kant’s novel claim, in the Critique of Pure Reason, that all judgments have a formal modality. I begin by distinguishing the modality of a judgment’s form from the modality of its content, and I suggest that the former is peculiar in merely affecting the subject’s understanding of his own act of judging. I then contrast the modal account of such an understanding (in terms of the possibility and actuality of a judgment) with the traditional, non-modal understanding (...) of it (in terms of the giving and withholding of assent). I conclude by suggesting that Kant prefers the former because he conceives of knowledge on Aristotle’s model: as a progress in the mind from capacity to act. (shrink)

In a companion review1 we discussed the data supporting the conclusion that at least two subtypes of spectrin exist in mammalian brain. One form is found in the cell bodies, dendrites, and post‐synaptic terminals of neurons (brain spectrin(240/235E)) and the other subtype is located in the axons and presynaptic terminals (brain spectrin(240/235)). Our recent understanding of brain spectrin subtype localization suggests a possible explanation for a conundrum concerning brain 4.1 localization. Amelin, an immunoreactive analogue of red blood cell (rbc) cytoskeletal (...) protein 4.1, is localized in neuronal cell bodies and dendrites when brain sections are stained with antibody against rbc protein 4.1. However, it has recently been suggested that synapsin I, a neuron‐specific phosphoprotein associated with the cytoplasmic surface of small synaptic vesicles, is related to erythrocyte 4.1. In this review we hypothesize that there are at least two forms of brain 4.1: a cell body/dendritic form (amelin) which is detected with rbc protein 4.1 antibody, and a unique form found exclusively in the presynaptic terminal (synapsin I). The binding of synapsin I to brain spectrin(240/235), and its ability to stimulate the spectrin/F‐actin interaction in a phosphorylation‐dependent manner suggests a model for the regulation of synaptic transmission mediated by the neuronal cytoskeleton. (shrink)

Discovering Spinoza's early modern psychology some 35 years into his own clinical practice, Ian Miller now gives shape to this connection through a close reading of Spinoza's key philosophical ideas. With a rigorous and expansive analysis of Spinoza's Ethics in particular, Miller explores how Spinozan thought simultaneously empowered the original conceptual direction of psychoanalytic thinking, and anticipated the field's contemporary theoretical dimensions. Miller offers a detailed overview of the philosopher's psychoanalytic reception from the early work of German-language psychoanalytic thinkers, such (...) as Freud and Andreas Lou-Salome, forward into its Anglophone reception, influencing both mid-century humanistic American psychoanalysis as well as anticipating thinkers such as Bion and Winnicott. Covering key concepts in psychoanalytic theory and clinical practice, this book demonstrates how knowledge of Spinoza's philosophical work can help to both illuminate and improve modern psychoanalytic therapies. (shrink)

Thinking about ethics -- Philosophical ethics -- Why not do wrong? -- Is the ethical a human construct or a factual realm? -- Do you just do what is right or do you try to predict the outcomes? -- Natural law and virtue ethics -- Ethics and the bible -- Learning from the wisdom of the world -- Humanism : do we need god to realize that people just matter? -- Ethical dilemmas -- Dilemmas in bed -- Dilemmas in business (...) -- Dilemmas in medicine -- Dilemmas involving violence and power -- Dilemmas in government and leadership -- Dilemmas and the future : the environment, animals, and plants -- Dilemmas in the cyber world -- Making a decision -- Becoming a morally serious person -- Taking an ethical position. (shrink)

The value scenario is a useful tool in the sheaf of methods within value sensitive design. When envisioning new technology, this tool supports the designer in speculatively considering relevant stakeholders, values expressed or rebuffed by an artifact’s design, and tensions that may exist between those values. This paper explores how science fiction stories can serve as value scenarios to supplement traditional historical methods, especially when informants are no longer accessible.

Everyday Writing in the Graeco-Roman East. By Roger S. Bagnall. Sather Classical Lectures, vol. 69. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011. Pp. xiv + 179, illus. $49.95.

Health services internationally struggle to ensure health care is “person-centered” (or similar). In part, this is because there are many interpretations of “person-centered care” (and near synonyms), some of which seem unrealistic for some patients or situations and obscure the intrinsic value of patients’ experiences of health care delivery. The general concern behind calls for person-centered care is an ethical one: Patients should be “treated as persons.” We made novel use of insights from the capabilities approach to characterize person-centered care (...) as care that recognizes and cultivates the capabilities associated with the concept of persons. This characterization unifies key features from previous characterisations and can render person-centered care applicable to diverse patients and situations. By tying person-centered care to intrinsically valuable capability outcomes, it incorporates a requirement for responsiveness to individuals and explains why person-centered care is required independently of any contribution it may make to health gain. (shrink)

Democracy and justice are often mutually antagonistic ideas, but in this innovative book Ian Shapiro shows how and why they should be pursued together. Justice must be sought democratically if it is to garner legitimacy in the modern world, he claims, and democracy must be justice-promoting if it is to sustain allegiance over time. _Democratic Justice_ meets these criteria, offering an attractive vision of a practical path to a better future. Wherever power is exercised in human affairs, Shapiro argues, the (...) lack of democracy will be experienced as injustice. The challenge is to democratize social relations so as to diminish injustice, but to do this in ways that are compatible with people’s values and goals. Shapiro shows how this can be done in different phases of the human life cycle, from childhood through the adult worlds of work and domestic life, retirement, old age, and approaching death. He spells out the implications for pressing debates about authority over children, the law of marriage and divorce, population control, governing the firm, basic income guarantees, health insurance, retirement policies, and decisions made by and for the infirm elderly. This refreshing encounter between political philosophy and practical politics will interest all those who aspire to bequeath a more just world to our children than the one we have inherited. (shrink)

The conviction that Gilles Deleuze is doing something radical in his work has been accompanied by a corresponding anxiety as to how to read it. In this rigorous and lucid work, Ian Buchanan takes up the challenge by answering the following questions: How should we read Deleuze? How should we read _with_ Deleuze? To show us how Deleuze’s philosophy works, Buchanan begins with Melville’s notion that “a great book is always the inverse of another book that could only be written (...) in the soul, with silence and blood.” Buchanan demonstrates that the figure of two books—one written in ink and the other written in blood—lies at the center of Deleuze’s hermeneutics and that a special relation must be established in order to read the second book from the first. This relation is Deleuzism. By explicating elemental concepts in Deleuze—desire, flow, the nomad—Buchanan finds that, despite Deleuze’s self-declared moratorium on dialectics, he was in several important respects a dialectician. In essays that address the “prehistory” of Deleuze’s philosophy, his methodology, and the utopic dimensions of his thought, Buchanan extracts an apparatus of social critique that arises from the philosopher’s utopian impulse. _Deleuzism_ is a work that will engage all those with an interest in the twentieth-century’s most original philosopher. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the question of whether it is ever permissible to grant a request for physician-aid-in-dying (PAD) from an individual suffering from treatment-resistant depression. I assume for the sake of argument that PAD is sometimes permissible. There are three requirements for PAD: suffering, prognosis, and competence. First, an individual must be suffering from an illness or injury which is sufficient to cause serious, ongoing hardship. Second, one must have exhausted effective treatment options, and one’s prospects for recovery (...) must be poor. Third, the individual must be judged competent to request PAD. I argue that many cases of treatment-resistant depression meet the first two requirements. Thus, the key question concerns the third. I consider four features of depression that might compromise a person’s decision-making capacity. Ultimately, I conclude that PAD requests from depressed patients can be permissibly granted in some circumstances. (shrink)

This article is a critical notice of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright's *The Reason's Proper Study* (OUP). It focuses particularly on their attempts (crucial to their neo-logicist project) to say what a singular term is. I identify problems for their account but include some constructive suggestions about how it might be improved.

This article examines India’s response to the global soil health crisis. A longstanding centre of agricultural production and innovation, India has recently launched an ambitious soil health programme. The country’s Soil Health Card (SHC) Scheme intervenes in farm-scale decisions about efficient fertiliser use, envisioning farmers as managers and soil as a substrate for production. India is also home to one of the world’s largest alternative agriculture movements: natural farming. This puts farmer expertise at the centre of soil fertility and attends (...) to the wider ecological health of soils. Despite emerging as a mode of resistance to dominant agricultural systems, natural farming is now being delivered in increasingly bureaucratic ways by India’s state governments. This article offers Himachal Pradesh as a case study in how the soil is governed, drawing on 38 semi-structured interviews with scientists, agricultural officers, non-governmental organisation leaders, and activists. Rather than assess approaches to soil health according to their ecological bottom line, we examine the differing forms of knowledge, expertise and ‘truth’ in the SHC and Natural Farming approaches. Our analysis reveals discontinuities in how farmers are imagined, as well as continuities in how quasi-spiritual language combines in a bionationalist project, positing assumptions about the correct arrangement of life in nationalist terms. We point to a shift toward hybrid and pick-and-mix approaches to soil health, as farmers and their organisers are increasingly invested with the capacities to combine multiple options. We see a fracturing of expertise and the opening up of epistemic pluralism in responses to the soil fertility crisis. (shrink)

I present some counterexamples to Adams's Thesis and explain how they undermine arguments that indicative conditionals cannot be truth-evaluable propositions.

This essay assesses the account of truth presented in Wiggins's 2002 paper ‘An indefinibilist cum normative view of truth and the marks of truth'. I agree with Wiggins that we should seek, not to define truth, but to elucidate it by unfolding its connections with other basic notions. However, I give reasons for preferring an elucidation based on Ramsey's account of truth to Wiggins's Tarski-inspired approach. I also cast doubt on Wiggins's thesis that convergence is a mark of truth, arguing (...) instead that a claim which is up for assessment as true or false must be one to which different speakers/hearers can attach, and know that they are attaching, the same sense. I use this principle to rule out an account of indicative conditionals, and bring some considerations to bear on the question of whether those conditionals have truth values. An appendix revisits a debate about the determinateness of distinctness. (shrink)

Recent advances in virtual technologies have allowed the investigation of simulated moral actions in aversive moral dilemmas. Previous studies have employed diverse populations in order to explore these actions, with little research considering the significance of occupation on moral decision-making. For the first time, in this study we have investigated simulated moral actions in Virtual Reality made by professionally trained paramedics and fire service incident commanders who are frequently faced with and must respond to moral dilemmas. We found that specially (...) trained individuals showed distinct empathic and related personality trait scores and that these declined with years of experience working in the profession. Supporting the theory that these professionals develop resilience in moral conflict, reduced emotional arousal was observed during virtual simulations of a distressing dilemma. Furthermore, trained professionals demonstrated less regret following the execution of a moral action in virtual reality when compared to untrained control populations. We showed that, contrary to previous research, trained individuals made the same moral judgments and moral actions as untrained individuals, though showing less arousal and regret. In the face of increasing concerns regarding empathy decline in healthcare professionals, we suggest that the nature of this decline is complex and likely reflects the development of a necessary emotional resilience to distressing events. (shrink)

A rhetoric of refuge and escape is a consistent feature of the world’s great garden traditions. The connections between a desire for escape, need for refuge and disquieting sense that life is no longer what it ought to be gestures to a complex conception of garden appreciation. I explore these connections using Christian, Islamic, and Chinese garden traditions. In them one finds a conception of certain gardens as places of moral refuge from the corruption and failings of the mainstream world.

I offer a new interpretation of Feyerabend’s ‘conquest of abundance’ narrative. I consider and reject both the ontological reading as implausible and the ‘historical’ reading as uncompelling My own proposal is that the ‘conquest of abundance’ be understood in terms of an impoverishment of the richness of human experience. For Feyerabend, such abundance is ‘conquered’ when individuals internalize distorting epistemic prejudices including those integral to the theoretical conceptions associated with the sciences. I describe several ways, identified by Feyerabend, in which (...) individuals can be led to occlude the richness of their experience in ways that are existentially impoverishing. (shrink)

This chapter draws an analogy between substance dualism (SD) and one kind of creationism. Some substance dualists appear to believe that SD is preferable to physicalism because only the former can account for the existence of morality. Some dualists are attracted to emergence, although it is unclear that it is a form of SD; indeed, it is not clear that it is a form of dualism at all, and if it is it would seem to be a form of property (...) dualism. The chapter discusses SD's relationship to three key elements of religious doctrine and the idea of emergence. It describes most serious arguments for physicalism and consequently against SD. According to SD, mind and brain are radically different substances, the former nonphysical, the latter physical. Advocates of occasionalist SD claim that God appropriately correlates mental and physical events occasion by occasion. (shrink)

Building on the landmark O’Regan and Noë (Behav Brain Sci 24:939–973, 2001) that introduced us to the sensorimotor theory of perception, Alva Noë has continued to develop and defend a highly influential enactivist account of perception. Said account takes perceptual experience to be mediated by sensorimotor knowledge (knowledge of the law-like relations that hold between bodily movements and sensory changes). In recent work, Noë has argued that we should construe sensorimotor knowledge as a kind of conceptual knowledge. One significant theoretical (...) advantage of his account, he contends, is that it allows us to better characterize our embodied coping skills by way of showing how they are manifestations of a conceptual-and-yet-not-representational kind of understanding. He argues that both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of skill alike assume that conceptual understanding must be wedded to explicit judgement, and therefore have failed to correctly characterize the role of understanding in skilled performance. This paper argues against Noë’s contention that skilled action is always permeated with understanding. It argues additionally that Noë’s of unorthodox notion of conceptual understanding is unstable and, if it were adopted, would over-intellectualize the role of perception in action. The paper concludes by arguing that doing so frees us up to take more seriously the enactivist options for understanding skilled performance without introducing notions of conceptual understanding at all. (shrink)

Kant defines ‘enlightenment’ as ‘humankind’s emergence from its self-imposed immaturity’. This essay considers the meaning, role, and novelty of this definition, while also examining its relation to the Enlightenment slogans: ‘sapere aude’ (‘Dare to be wise!’) and ‘Think for yourself’. It is argued that there are two subtly different aspects to the ‘immaturity’ from which Kant, insofar as he endorses the transformative process of enlightenment, is urging us to ‘emerge’. These aspects correspond to his two images of immaturity: first, confinement (...) within a kind of baby walker (Gängelwagen), and, second, attachment to ‘leading strings’ (Leitbande). It is argued that the first is a matter of thinking only ‘by courtesy’, the second a matter of thinking under the guidance of another – one’s guardian. It is asked whether Kant’s slogan ‘think for yourself’ might not be pragmatically self-defeating, and whether his insistence that one think for oneself can be made consistent with his permitting belief formation on the basis of the testimony of another. Finally, Kant’s concept of enlightenment is situated with respect to his distinction between the public and private ‘uses of reason’, on the one hand, and his defence of ‘freedom of the pen’, on the other. (shrink)

As Paul Thompson has argued, agriculture, and food systems more generally, can be usefully analyzed with tools from the philosophy of technology. Don Ihde’s framework of multistability of possible relationships with technology suggests Thompson is right when he argues for the possibility of societies reforming their food systems to be more sustainable, participatory, and just through a focus on agrarian ideals. Ihde’s framework also suggests that for those of us who interact with food systems as consumers, these technologies are in (...) a “background relationship” with us, in which the technologies of food systems are ignored if they are functioning properly. This background relationship can thus create epistemic deficits which pose a serious impediment to sustainability reforms. I examine this impediment and the opportunities in the disturbance of a system to reduce communities’ and individuals’ epistemic deficit. One recent example of disturbance to the food system this paper will examine is the COVID-19 pandemic. No one would wish for exogenous disruptions like the pandemic, and positive change coming out of them is not inevitable, but this paper will suggest that it is at least possible that we can emerge from disturbance with the resources to make our food systems better. (shrink)

Throughout the writings of Paul Feyerabend, there are constant references to the historical contingency of the scientific enterprise, often accompanied by philosophical claims about the significance of that contingency. This paper presents those contingentist claims, situates them in the context of more recent work on the contingency of science, and offers an interpretation of their significance. I suggest that Feyerabend’s sense of contingency was connected to his defences of pluralism, and also to the ‘conquest of abundance’ narrative developed in the (...) very late writings. (shrink)

Philip Jourdain put this question to Frege in a letter of 28 January 1909. Frege had, indeed, next to nothing to say about ordinals, and in this respect Bob Hale has followed the master. As I hope this chapter will show, though, the topic is worth addressing. The natural abstraction principle for ordinals combines with full, impredicative second-order logic to engender a contradiction, the so-called Burali-Forti Paradox. I shall contend that the best solution involves a retreat to a predicative logic. (...) Such a retreat has implications for other neo-Fregean theories, including the cardinal arithmetic on which Hale has focused. The discussion will touch on a topic which has been at the centre of Hale’s more recent work—namely, the interpretation of plural and higher-order quantifiers. (shrink)

_Emotions in Plato_, through a detailed analysis of emotions such as shame, anger, fear, and envy, but also pity, wonder, love and friendship, offers a fresh account of the role of emotions in Plato’s psychology, epistemology, ethics and political theory.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein claims that tautologies 'say nothing'. Retrospectively, he explains that when he had called tautologies 'senseless' was trying to bring out that they possessed a zero quantity of sense. Insofar as it is the limit of a series of propositions of diminishing quantity of sense, tautology resembles a degenerate circular conic section. But it also resembles the result of a summing together of equal and opposite linear vector quantities. This essay contends first, that each of these models (...) plays a role in shaping the Tractatus's conception of a tautology as saying nothing in virtue of possessing a zero quantity of sense and, second, that these models are not fully reconciled. Indeed, many of the puzzling features of the Tractatus's conception of logic arise from Wittgenstein's failure to bring about the needed reconciliation. These points are argued for by working through the development of Wittgenstein's views on these matters in the Wartime Notebooks and other pre-Tractatus writings. (shrink)

This paper seeks to develop a Wittgensteinian response to the Scope Problem, which ensnares a theory of truth considered as inflationary. The scope problem challenges any inflationary truth theory to provide a single explanation which can account for the concept of truth given the diversity of statements that most of us are willing to accept as true. In line with Wittgenstein's later-views on language and philosophy and their corresponding functions, this paper provides a general diagnosis of the problem: similarities in (...) syntax do not entail similarities in meaning. By employing Wittgenstein's metaphors (i.e., "handles" and "tools") and an analysis via concrete cases and analogies, this paper responds to the challenge presented by the Scope Problem, not by providing a satisfactory definition of truth but rather by providing its "dissolution" á la Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This handbook provides a critical guide to the most central proposition in modern linguistics: the notion, generally known as Universal Grammar, that a universal set of structural principles underlies the grammatical diversity of the world's languages. Part I considers the implications of Universal Grammar for philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, and examines the history of the theory. Part II focuses on linguistic theory, looking at topics such as explanatory adequacy and how phonology and semantics fit into Universal (...) Grammar. Parts III and IV look respectively at the insights derived from UG-inspired research on language acquisition, and at comparative syntax and language typology, while part V considers the evidence for Universal Grammar in phenomena such as creoles, language pathology, and sign language. The book will be a vital reference for linguists, philosophers, and cognitive scientists. (shrink)