This chapter provides a critical reflection on an ethnographic approach led by a non-Indigenous researcher in partnership with an Indigenous community-controlled health organization, and a team of Indigenous and non-Indigenous supervisors, advisors, critical friends, and mentors. The chapter explores the way the three interrelated principles of Indigenist research informed the study, as a critical reflection of the methodology’s achievement of a decolonizing research agenda. The flow of Maiwah provides a metaphor for the chapter’s diverse authorship. Maiwah’s tributaries, inlets, and banks (...) represent author voices at different points while the one River flowing represents coming together to form a broader collective story of the research that still respects the authors’ individual positioning. Maiwah’s flow also signifies the dialogical approach of the research – “tricky ground” for non-Indigenous researchers seeking to privilege Indigenous voices while remaining accountable to their own White privilege, particularly given that at its most basic level, research requires the “extraction of ideas” from participants. Yet, the flow of Maiwah also shows us the possibilities of research, where in this case, researcher and participants together cocreated new knowledge in support of their agendas. This process enabled both research outcomes and increased research capacity and confidence in the host agency and researcher. On this account, decolonizing research is perhaps more about relationship and devolving control over the process than it is about particular methods, and the respectful negotiation of epistemological meanings and representation of particular knowledges that can result. (shrink)

Introduction -- Evidence from children -- Evidence form infants and non-human animals -- Evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology -- Evidence from adults -- The cognitive basis of mindreading -- Elaborating and applying the theory.

Institutions play an indispensable role in our political and epistemic lives. This Chapter explores sympathetically the claim that political institutions can be bearers of epistemic vices. I start by describing one form of collectivism - the claim that the vices of institutions do not reduce to the vices of their members. I then describe the phenomenon of epistemic corruption and the various processes that can corrupt the epistemic ethoi of political institutions. The discussion focuses on some recent work by Miranda (...) Fricker and select examples from recent British political experience. The Chapter ends with suggestions for further work on the corruption and repair of the epistemic ethoi of political institutions. (shrink)

An essay review of Rutger Bregman's "Humankind: A Hopeful History" (2020).

This paper presents two challenges faced by many initiatives that try to diversify undergraduate philosophy curricula, both intellectually and demographically. Trade-offs involve making difficult decisions to prioritise some values over others (like gender diversity over cultural diversity). Backfires involve unintended consequences contrary to the aims and values of diversity initiatives, including ones that compromise more general philosophical values. I discuss two specific backfire risks, involving the critical and political dimensions of teaching philosophy. Some general practical advice is offered along the (...) way. (shrink)

In exploring corporate perceptions of the business case for supplier diversity, this paper reports on a cross-national study of large purchasing organisations that had introduced, or were in the process of introducing, purchasing initiatives aimed at ethnic minority businesses. The research investigates how LPOs portray the benefits of this form of socially responsible purchasing and suggests a business case construct based on four component elements. It also highlights a number of contextual factors that appear to have shaped business case rationales. (...) The paper concludes with a discussion of issues of cost and contingent influences affecting SD programmes and points to possible areas for future research. (shrink)

Capability theorists have suggested different, sometimes incompatible, ways in which their approach takes account of the value of freedom, each of which implies a different kind of normative relation between functionings and capabilities. This paper examines three possible accounts of the normative relation between functionings and capabilities, and the implications of each of these accounts in terms of degrees of paternalism. The way in which capability theorists apparently oscillate between these different accounts is shown to rest on an apparent tension (...) between anti-paternalism and anti-fetishism. The paper then advances a fourth account, which incorporates a concern with the content-independent or ‘non-specific’ value of freedom. Only the fourth account would remove all traces of paternalism from the capability approach. Whatever reasons advocates of the capability approach might have had for rejecting this fourth account, those reasons are not internal to the capability approach itself. (shrink)

Stories in which a hero defeats a semi-human ogre occur much more frequently in unrelated cultures than chance alone can account for. This claim is supported by a discussion of folk-tales from 20 cultures and an examination of the folk-tales from a random sample of 44 cultures. The tendency to tell these stories must, therefore, have its source in the innate human nature discussed by evolutionary psychologists. This essay argues that these stories reinforce innate positive biases in the perception of (...) self and ingroup and negative biases in the perception of outgroups. (shrink)

The neonatologist was describing the dire situation, the complexity of the fetus's anomalies, and the options—comfort care, some resuscitation—and finished by saying, “We would not recommend ECMO …” “We would not recommend” is a curious phrase. There is something ambiguous, very nebulous about it, something passive, noncommittal, maybe even deflective. As a bioethics researcher, I wondered how this phrase is interpreted, how it influences parents' moral deliberation over their options.

Toleration and respect are often thought of as compatible, and indeed complementary, liberal democratic ideals. However, it has sometimes been said that toleration is disrespectful, because it necessarily involves a negative evaluation of the object of toleration. This article shows how toleration and respect are compatible as long as ‘ respect ’ is taken to mean recognition respect, as opposed to appraisal respect. But it also argues that recognition respect itself rules out certain kinds of evaluation of persons, and with (...) these, certain bases for toleration : if recognition respect is really distinct from appraisal respect, and if the fundamental rights assigned to people on the basis of recognition respect are to be equal rights, then recognition respect must itself involve a refusal to evaluate certain basic agential capacities of persons when deliberating about how to treat them. Even where ‘ respect ’ means recognition respect, then, there is some truth both in the thesis that toleration and respect are compatible, and in the thesis that they are incompatible. The different truths in these two theses help to shed light on the nature of toleration considered specifically as a liberal democratic virtue. This point can be illustrated by showing how the foregoing analysis provides a plausible solution to the so-called ‘paradox of the tolerant racist’. (shrink)

A topic of special importance when it comes to responsibility and implicit bias is responsibility for knowledge. Are there strategies for becoming more responsible and respectful knowers? How might we work together, not just as individuals but members of collectives, to reduce the negative effects of bias on what we see and believe, as well as the wrongs associated with epistemic injustice? To explore these questions, Chapter 9 introduces the concept of epistemic responsibility, a set of practices developed through the (...) cultivation of basic epistemic virtues, such as open-mindedness, epistemic humility, and diligence that help knowers seek information about themselves, others, and the world. (shrink)

I explain why Fernando Ferreira's interesting formal result does not threaten the bilateralist account of the sense of the connectives.

Within the limited, but growing, literature on small business ethics almost no attention has been paid to the issue of social responsibility within ethnic minority businesses. Using a social capital perspective, this paper reports on an exploratory and qualitative investigation into the attitudinal and behavioural manifestations of CSR within small and medium-sized Asian owned or managed firms in the U.K., with particular reference to the distinctive factors motivating organisational responses. It offers alternative explanations of entrepreneurial behaviour and suggests areas for (...) further research. (shrink)

An intro. to Didaktic (the heart of thinking about teaching/teacher educ in Germany) for English-speaking readers, drawing on a range of writings assoc. w/ this tradition. Throws light on assumptions, characteristics, & weaknesses of curriculum thought.

This volume, co-published with the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, presents the argument that a philosophy of technology is a central component of a contemporary political philosophy. It provides a theoretical groundwork for the encounter of phenomenology and critical theory. Written for courses in social and political theory, phenomenology and critical theory.

The image of philosophy -- The relational universe -- Generic science -- Thinking bodies.

Introduction THE FACES OF GOD How many faces has God? Egyptologists have wrestled with the problem over many years ...

This article attempts to utilize the conceptual clarity typical of the work of Lucia Pizzo Russo to address the muddled question of the objectivity of perspective. By separating out the distinct problems of the objectivity of optical geometry, simple sight, and object recognition, we can clarify what we are not discussing when talking about linear perspective. These forms of objectivity are secured. But the claim is still made that linear perspective in pictorial perception is relative, because its results are not (...) consistent and often not relevant to making pictures. In its place, I nominate another objective method, the so-called Egyptian method, outlined by Rudolf Arnheim in his Art and Visual Perception. Therefore, my position is not purely relativist because the dismantling of linear perspective does not suggest that all is conventional. (shrink)

Defining and measuring biodiversity is an important research area in biology, with very interesting theoretical and applied aspects. Numerous definitions have been proposed, and these definitions of biodiversity influence how it is measured. From the still commonly used measure of species diversity, through higher taxon diversity, molecular measures, ecological measures and indicator taxa, these measures have as their fundamental shortcoming the lack of an explicit consideration of the evolutionary context represented by phylogenies. Attempts have been made to incorporate phylogenetic considerations (...) into measuring biodiversity, but more hypothesis‐driven research needs to be done. A specific case study is presented of how this added emphasis on phylogeny‐based biodiversity measurement can influence the way in which research is directed and hypotheses are generated. The elucidation of the relationship of biodiversity to ecosystem functioning is a very timely concern with the unarguable loss of biodiversity this planet is experiencing, whichever way biodiversity is measured. (shrink)

The various tasks of this book are handled in four parts. In Part One, The Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences, two related questions will be addressed in order to contextualise the whole book's relevance and the legitimacy of the questions it asks and of the points it wishes to make. In five chapters in Part Two, The Holistic-Relational Sciences, I lay out the basic premises of the four 'dissenting' sciences -- quantum-holography, chaos theory, neo-evolutionary theory, and complexity theory/self-organised criticality (...) -- as well as demonstrate their shared holism in as a non-technical a jargon as possible and with special reference to the kinds of substantive and methodological interests that the social sciences tend to share. Part Three, Dimensions of Holistic-Relational Social Science, consisting of nine chapters, extends the discussion in Part Two by dealing with specific elements of the holistic-relational sciences in more detail, and by beginning to demonstrate how they apply to the social sciences as presently constituted and how they influence the debates which currently exercise the minds of both methodologists and philosophers in the social sciences. The final three chapters which make up Part Four, Holistic-Relational Social Science, Politics, and Economics, as already hinted at above, return to the subject-matter first raised in Chapter Two, that a holistic-relational science will necessarily lead to an alternative and complementary notion of politics and public policy. (shrink)

From the 19th century to the present, philosophy has grappled with the domination of received form over ongoing experience and has proposed a return to the concrete in order to ally itself with social and intellectual liberation. My recent book, Groundwork of Phe-nomenological Marxism, identi????ies three historical phases of this task. The ????irst, associated with Karl Marx, takes political economy as its object and projects the liberation of labour. The second, asso-ciated with Edmund Husserl, takes mathematical physics as its ob-ject (...) and projects the liberation of philosophy and the human sci-ences from objectivism. The third takes ecology as its object and projects its central role in the rehabilitation of experienced nature from its objectivistic reduction to a resource—whose latest critical phase consists in the contemporary war between planetary tech-nology and place-based Indigeneity. Depuis le XIXe siècle jusqu’à nos jours, la philosophie s’est battue contre la domination de la forme reçue sur l’expérience en cours et a proposé un retour au concret pour s’allier à la libération sociale et intellectuelle. Mon dernier livre, Les Fondements du marxisme phénoménologique, identi????ie trois phases historiques de cette tâche. La première, associée à Karl Marx, prend l’économie poli-tique pour objet et projette la libération du travail. La seconde, as-sociée à Edmund Husserl, prend pour objet la physique mathéma-tique et projette la libération de la philosophie et des sciences hu-maines de l’objectivisme. La troisième prend l’écologie comme objet et projette son rôle central dans la réhabilitation de la nature vécue depuis sa réduction objectiviste à une ressource – dont la dernière phase critique consiste en la guerre contemporaine entre la techno-logie planétaire et l’indigénéité territoriale. (shrink)

In response to Leroy Little Bear's description of the Blackfoot identity as rooted in place, the article articulates an ecological conception of value based in European thought that can be in close dialogue with the telling aboriginal phrase “I am the environment.” While important similarities are noted, especially the convergence of aboriginal and ecological conceptions of value on a critique of the assessment of value by commodity price, the difficulty of rooting value in Being within the European tradition contrasts with (...) the continuity of human, animal, and cosmic intelligence in aboriginal thought. (shrink)

An extended critique of the applicability of Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche's thesis of the end of metaphysics to the philosophical practice of Socrates.

The present work develops the concept of instrumental reason in order to elaborate the implications of the connection of formalistic theory and technical action. Through a critique of this concept it establishes the limitations of instrumental reason and the necessity for a deeper conception o.

I suggest an alternative basis for Heyes’ analogy between cultural learning of mindreading and text reading. Unlike text reading, mindreading does not entail decoding of observable stimuli. Like text reading, mindreading requires relevant inferences. Identification of relevant inferences is a deeply challenging problem, and the most important contribution of cultural learning to mindreading may be an apprenticeship in thinking like a mindreader.

This volume addresses the relationship between irony and popular culture and the role of the consumer in determining and disseminating meaning. Arguing that in a cultural climate largely characterised by fractious communications and perilous linguistic exchanges, the very role of irony in popular culture needs to come under greater scrutiny, it focuses on the many uses, abuses, and misunderstandings of irony in contemporary popular culture, and explores the troubling political populism at the heart of many supposedly satirical and (apparently) non-satirical (...) texts. In an environment in which irony is frequently claimed as a defence for material and behaviour judged controversial, how do we, as a society entrenched in forms of popular culture and media, interpret work that is intended as satire but which reads as unironic? How do we accurately decode works of popular film, literature, television, music, and other cultural forms which sell themselves as bitingly ironic commentaries on current society, but which are also problematic celebrations of the very issues they purport to critique? And what happens when texts intended and received in one manner are themselves ironically recontextualised in another? Bringing together studies across a range of cultural texts including popular music, film and television, Isn't it Ironic? will appeal to scholars of the social sciences and humanities with interests in cultural studies, media studies, popular culture, literary studies and sociology. (shrink)