I am not so insular and I hope not so presumptuous as to suppose that there is no contemporary philosophy apart from that empiricism which dominates very much of Great Britain, North America and Scandinavia. So let us notice that contemporary philosophy embraces broadly three points of view, though it will be part of my argument that they largely combine in the lessons they have to teach us, and in many of their implications for theology.

This paper argues for a completely universal scepticism, according to which no beliefs at all are justified to the least degree. The argument starts with a version of the Agrippan trilemma, according to which, if we accept that a belief is justified, we must choose between foundationalism, coherentism of a particular sort, and an infinite regress of justified beliefs. Each of these theories is given a careful specification in terms of the relationship of “justifiedness in p depending on justifiedness in (...) q”. It is then argued that no beliefs – not even beliefs about phenomenal experiences – are foundational in the required way. Both coherentism and infinitism are untenable, since, since they face various objections, most significantly the objection that acceptance of either would commit one to allowing that all beliefs were justified. Because the three possible accounts of justificational structure all fail radically, it is concluded that no beliefs are justified. (shrink)

Sceptics have been accused of achieving their sceptical conclusions by an arbitrary (though usually implicit) redefinition of terms like “justified”, so that, while it may be true that no belief is justified in the sceptic’s new sense of the word, all the beliefs we have taken as justified remain so in the ordinary, standard meaning of the term. This paper defends scepticism against this charge. It is pointed out that there are several sorts of case where someone’s belief may be (...) properly termed justified in one “sense”, or from one “point of view”, but from another, equally properly termed unjustified. It is argued that the point of view of the sceptic, or the sense in which he uses the term, is one of the perfectly standard ones, and not some arbitrarily introduced new sense. In addition, an explanation that is not damaging to scepticism is provided of a sceptic’s own continued ascriptions of justifiedness in everyday contexts. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to the paper “The Validation of Induction” by Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75:1, 1997), in which the authors propound the thesis that the arguments commonly thought of as good inductive arguments “properly construed, are deductively valid”. I maintain that they have not established this claim, and neither have they established a number of associated but logically independent claims that they make about inductive arguments and inductive inferences.

I discuss and criticise Douglas Gasking’s paper, “The Analytic-Synthetic Controversy” (in the current issue of this journal). Gasking proposes an explanation of our classifying together as “analytic” statements like “Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried man”. He proposes that the feature common to the statements that we so classify is that they provide the only “semantic anchor” for a word that does not have, in Quine’s terms, a socially constant stimulus meaning. I argue that, (...) even after modifications are introduced to allow the account to handle certain difficulties, the account falls to some fatal objections. (shrink)

I wrote this essay for three reasons. First, in proofreading The Reconstruction of the Humanistic Spirit, I felt that this great pile of articles contained only general discourses on the social and cultural problems of China and the Western world but did not mention my own philosophical position and religious faith. Although the pattern and style of the essays in this book might excuse this defect, I was afraid that some of my readers would find it difficult to grasp the (...) main themes of thought in the book. Therefore, I wanted to write an article to compensate a bit for this shortcoming. Second, for many years, in teaching courses on Chinese or Western philosophy, I have been used to following the general lecturing method of university professors who stress the objective introduction of philosophical doctrines to enrich students' knowledge. (shrink)

My discussion in previous chapters was limited to the origin of Chinese culture and its fundamental spirit exhibited in the process of historical development. In what follows, I am going to discuss the spirit of Chinese culture in specific areas such as philosophy of nature, theory of human nature, ideals of moral life, the world of daily living, the world of ideal personalities, and the spirit of art and religion. The center of discussion will be a comparison between Chinese and (...) Western philosophy and culture. Therefore, before discussing Chinese cosmologies, I am going to present the cosmologies in the West as a preparation for comparison. Nevertheless, the main task of this chapter is not a special treatise on the natural sciences and philosophies of China and the West. Instead, my focus is on the differences between ideas of nature, their values and fundamental spirit. I hope my readers understand this point first. (shrink)

Razdel 1. Sot︠s︡ialʹnai︠a︡ filosofii︠a︡ nauki -- Razdel 2. Sot︠s︡ialʹnai︠a︡ ėpistemologii︠a︡ : sot︠s︡ialʹnostʹ, kommunikat︠s︡ii︠a︡, ponimanie -- Razdel 3. Case studies -- Razdel 4. Analitika.

Although the principle of respect for personal autonomy has been the subject of debate for almost 40 years, the conversation has often suffered from lack of clarity regarding the philosophical traditions underlying this principle. In this article, I trace a genealogy of autonomy, first contrasting Kant’s autonomy as moral obligation and Mill’s teleological political liberty. I then show development from Mill’s concept to Beauchamp and Childress’ principle and to Julian Savulescu’s non-teleological autonomy sketch. I argue that, although the reach for (...) a new principle to guide choices in physician–patient relationships can rightfully be seen as important, the notion that is now called autonomy within bioethics has corollaries that undermine critical aspects of medical care. As such, there is need for a richer account of the interplay between the free choice of patients and the informed recommendations of doctors. (shrink)

Modern studies of the subject the philosophical methodology of science can be brought to fruition and accordingly become the property of scientists, that is, really "work" in science, only on one condition: if they are designed not in an abstract, a priori fashion and are oriented not toward "science in general" but toward its real, concrete forms, analysis of which now has general methodological significance — it is important as a component of the general epistemology of science. This is associated (...) with the fact that, unlike classical science, modern science, particularly natural science, no longer isolates studies of philosophical methodology as an important element that does not enter into the very "body of science" but makes it an organic part and condition for concrete research. In order to understand this to the full, one must recall how the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics arose, those two fundamental disciplines that changed the face of modern science and the very style of scientific thought, and that demanded the development of a special theory of physical knowledge. Moreover, this special theory largely defined, as we know, new approaches in general epistemology, because physics became the leading branch of natural science. (shrink)

We do not usually draw conclusions and summarize the results of our round table meetings. The speakers share their ideas, divergent viewpoints are discussed, and a certain level of approach to the problems under discussion is formulated. Therefore, today I will also not attempt to draw a conclusion.

In one sense, all academic thoughts are human ideas, and all cultures are productions of man. Therefore, the spirit of all human cultures is always humanistic. To discuss any kind of academic thoughts is to discuss the ideas of man. Speaking in this way, however, we cannot reveal and illuminate the meaning of such terms as "humanistic thought" or "humanistic spirit" because of the lack of contradistinctions. We must then say that, in addition to humanistic thought or spirit, there are (...) also human thoughts or spirit which are nonhumanistic, super-humanistic, subhumanistic, and even antihumanistic. (shrink)