In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:33 HOW TO BECOME A MODERATE SKEPTIC: HUME'S WAY OUT OF PYRRHONISM The nature and extent of Hume's skepticism have been assessed in various ways. He was viewed as a radical skeptic until the end of the XIXth century. Many contemporary interpretations, which can be traced back to Kemp Smith's book, have claimed since that a reassessment was indispensable if we are to take seriously either the very project (...) of a science of human nature or Hume's naturalist conception of belief. The idea of a science of human nature presupposes that at least some sort of positive knowledge is possible. The naturalist conception of belief claims that some of our beliefs, though lacking rational justification, are nevertheless unavoidable and gain this way a certainty all their own. Both the Treatise of Human Nature in Book I and the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding -1 conclude with a moderate or mitigated skepticism after making a strong case for radical pyrrhonism. In this paper I wish to carry out two connected tasks: first I want to consider whether Hume's skepticism in the Treatise is the same as that of the Enquiry or not; second, I want to determine which arguments he puts forward for his shift from pyrrhonism to modern skepticism. The most noticeable differences between the Treatise and the Enquiry occur immediately after the analysis of causation. In the Enquiry we find almost nothing concerning the reality of the external world and the nature of the self, but Hume emphasizes heavily the 34 anti-metaphysical and anti-theological outcomes of the science of human nature in his sections on Liberty and Necessity (VIII), on Miracles (X), on Providence and a possible future state (XI). He stresses the devastating agnostic consequences of his principles and his agnosticism culminates in the dreadful censorship of the final lines of the book. On the contrary, the fourth part of the Treatise, Book I, offers an intricate and sophisticated treatment of various subjects. The intricacy shows in the very title of this part: "Of the Sceptical and Other Systems of Philosophy." Hume actually intertwines the exposition of his skeptical system — an expression which sounds odd — with the critical examination of rival systems and an attempt at accounting for the nature of things. These intricate undertakings are the direct upshot of Hume's analysis of causation. He thinks he has established that our causal beliefs are the products of custom alone and that nevertheless they are our only reliable beliefs. Lacking any rational justification, they are simply natural — which means that we cannot hinder ourselves from making inferences and predictions. Accordingly, reason has been immersed in the wider concept of imagination and thus naturalized: it is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (T 179). Basically, some beliefs are unavoidable. Now, a crucial problem is to know how far we can go into the analysis of such natural beliefs. In the Treatise, Hume sets out to investigate some of them whereas in the Enquiry he is more prudent and merely talks of instincts without considering their mechanism. In the Treatise, the tentative analysis of these natural beliefs has important metaphysical outcomes. Using the concepts and principles of his new-born science of human nature, Hume provides us with 35 a new ontology which states the nature of things from the standpoint of our beliefs concerning it. Thus, we get a Humean version of the nature of the external world and of the nature of the self. Unfortunately, this assessment of what there is on the basis of what we believe there is has unwanted skeptical effects. Hume's "as if" ontology tends to appear definitely fictitious, all the more so because the analysis of our natural beliefs is not successful and even quite defective. So, the skeptical outcome pushes through the positive project itself as the failure to account for our natural beliefs shakes the very belief in their special reliability. Such is, for example, the blatant result of the study of our belief in the external world (T 217). Again, in the Treatise, Hume is eager to emphasize the devastating anti-metaphysical implications of his thought. Under the... (shrink)

Understanding science requires appreciating the values it presupposes and its social context. Both the values that scientists hold and their social context can affect scientific communication. Philosophers of science have recently begun studying scientific communication, especially as it relates to public policy. Some have proposed “guiding principles for communicating scientific findings” to promote trust and objectivity. This paper contributes to this line of research in a novel way using behavioural experimentation. We report results from three experiments testing judgments about the (...) trustworthiness, competence and objectivity of scientists. More specifically, we tested whether such judgments are affected by three factors: consulting or not consulting nonscientists, conducting research under a restrictive or non-restrictive governmental communication policy, and the source of a lab’s funding (i.e., government funding, private funding, or a combination of the two). We found that each of these factors affects ordinary judgments of trustworthiness, competence and objectivity. These findings support several recommendations that could help improve scientific communication and communication policies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:360 HUME'S NATURALI Z EP PHILOSOPHY In "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine claimed that the failure of reductive-foundationalist attempts in epistemology, after the model of Carnap' s Aufbau, must lead to a redefinition of epistemology's task. Instead of setting out to reconstruct the whole fabric of our knowledge from absolute data through deductive operations, we should investigate how human subjects derive their knowledge of nature from sensory inputs. Thus epistemology is (...) to be conceived as a branch of natural science, cognate with psychology, not as the study of the foundations of science any more. In the present paper, I will first outline Quine's position and his related interpretation of Hume's philosophical enterprise. Then, I will try to assess the relevance and fairness of Quine's account and consider in what measure it allows us to understand the novelty of Hume's conception of philosophy, since Hume also advocated a nonfoundationalist conception of philosophy which bears some striking analogy to naturalized epistemology. Finally, I will suggest which consequences are to be drawn from this unusual view of Hume, especially as regards the self-reference of philosophy. Quine's position in the matter of epistemology is well known. For him, under its traditional form and program, epistemology used to deal with the foundations of science, be it mathematics or the science of nature. This foundationalist approach had two connected aspects, one which Quine calls conceptual; the other he calls doctrinal. As Quine 361 puts it "the conceptual studies are concerned with clarifying concepts by defining them, some in terms of others" (Quine, p. 69). In the same manner, the doctrinal studies attempt to establish laws "by proving them, some on the basis of others" (Quine, p. 69). Derivative concepts will be defined in terms of the clearer ones and complex laws will be proved from primitive and obvious ones. Thus the traditional or classical conception of epistemology involves simultaneously a theory of concepts or meanings and a theory of truth. These two branches (Quine speaks of a duality of structure or bifurcation) converge so as to provide an analysis of the way our knowledge of nature -- and our knowledge in general — stems from and is built upon our sensory experience which validates it. In so characterizing epistemology, Quine simply restates in his own terms the f oundationalist and reductivist program of positivist epistemology, which itself tied in with the logicist program in mathematics. Then Quine suggests that Hume dealt with both sides of this program, the conceptual and the doctrinal. To begin with, Hume developed what might be called a theory of concepts or meanings in terms of our sensory data. Such is the point of his theory of ideas which consists in tracing them back to the original impressions they are derived from. In spite of its limitations, which hinge on the lack of an approach in terms of statements, Hume's phenomenalism does the job of a theory of meaning and concepts. Hume also attempted to give an answer to the question of the truth of our knowledge. In this case again, his phenomenalist stand allows him to account for the truth of our singular statements concerning our perceptions, even though this result is achieved at the cost of identifying objects and sensory data. 362 However, when Hume comes to general statements and singular statements concerning future events, his attempt fails. This is not surprising. According to Quine, if it were possible to improve on Hume's theory of meaning and concepts, especially through the use of contextual definition techniques, by contrast, all the attempts to logically derive the truth of our knowledge from true premises have failed. In matter of induction, we are not one step further than Hume was. "The most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasions actually to observe. The hopelessness of grounding natural science upon immediate experience in a firmly logical way was acknowledged" (Quine, p. 74). Or "the Humean predicament is the human predicament." For Quine, foundationalist attempts of the sort Hume engaged in involve two cardinal principles of empiricism which remain unchallenged. One of these principles is to the effect... (shrink)

A *very* rough draft of a paper on Anselm's "ontological argument" in which I argue that the argument in the Proslogion rests on a robust notion of having "that then which nothing greater can be thought" in one's mind.

All the manifestos for a ‘total work of art’ after Wagner were political programmes: political, however, in a sense directly antithetical to the modern idea of the political. The goal of the total work of art was the formation of the people as a homogeneous political body, as the other of the social and political division, conflict and uncertainty inherent in the whole movement of democratic revolution since the 18th century. In each case the union or synthesis of the arts (...) prefigures the reconciliation of the classes as the condition of the unity of the people. But who is this people that will realize itself in the total work? Is it the same people for the artists of the Bauhaus as it is for the leaders of the Third Reich? These are the questions I try to answer through an interrogation of the continuities and breaks in the re-workings of the Wagnerian concept of the Gesamtkunstwerk in the programmes of the Bauhaus and the policies of National Socialism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Dark Arts of Politics:Aesthetics and Engineering in Nazism and FascismJonathan AllenThe Cult of Art in Nazi Germany, by Eric Michaud, translated by Janet Lloyd. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 271 pp.Building Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Democracy: Gaetano Ciocca—Architect, Inventor, Farmer, Writer, Engineer, by Jeffrey T. Schnapp. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, 291 pp.Despite their obvious centrality to the history of the twentieth century, sixty years after the (...) defeat of the Axis powers fascism and Nazism remain elusive phenomena, hard to define with any real clarity. Scholars wrangle not only over the identification of their central characteristics but also over whether the similarities between fascism and Nazism are close enough to justify considering them as parts of a single category. A growing number of studies, however, ranging from general histories such as Norman Davies's Europe: A History and Mark Mazower's Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, to more specialized works such as Zeev Sternhell's Neither Left Nor Right and Robert Paxton's fine The Anatomy of Fascism, argue the case for treating fascism and Nazism together.1 A mark of all of these books is their willingness to give serious attention to fascist ideologies and to the interactions between these ideologies and fascist practice and culture. This interest, in turn, makes it necessary to examine anew broader questions about the relations between fascism and the circumstances and attitudes of modern life.The two works under consideration here—The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany, by Eric Michaud, and Building Fascism, Communism, and Liberal Democracy, by Jeffrey T. Schnapp—share the growing concern to take seriously fascist ideology and culture as essential to an understanding of the movement. Michaud sets out to present an analysis of Nazi myth, which he argues was constructed with reference to two models: art and Christianity (xii). His immensely erudite study relates Nazi conceptions of the leader to Romantic views of genius and Christian doctrines concerning the role of the Savior. This allows him to present a distinctive view of Nazi ideology, one that relates it to themes and debates that have figured prominently in the history of European culture and belief. [End Page 113]Schnapp, on the other hand, focuses on the career of a single man—Gaetano Ciocca. Though Ciocca is now an obscure figure, unlikely to be familiar even to most students of fascism, Schnapp argues that his career deserves attention for several reasons. In the first place, he "strove to translate a fascist politics into the language of modern technics in the domains of architecture, urbanism, theater design, animal husbandry, drainage and transportation systems" (7). What is more, Ciocca was no power-hungry opportunist but rather a committed and reflective intellectual, who spent much of his time writing books and articles aimed at explaining and justifying his various projects to a general audience. Last but not least, though Ciocca's passionate commitment to fascism cooled as World War II wore on, this had no visible effect on his engineering projects. In the aftermath of the war, Ciocca presented himself as a nonpolitical "rebuilder" concerned to provide for popular need. In this guise, he served Italy's postwar liberal democracy as enthusiastically as he had previously devoted his projects to the cause of fascism. Ciocca thus presents us with an intriguing puzzle: a committed and reflective fascist intellectual—no Eichmann, Schnapp insists—who was nevertheless able to function equally effectively after the demise of the fascist regime. Schnapp argues that Ciocca's career forces us to examine with care the complex relations between technologies and political ideologies. In fact, I think it compels us to consider more general questions about the extent to which Ciocca's conception of himself as a modernizing technocrat could be equally at home in the political contexts of fascism and a certain kind of elite-centered liberal democracy. Schnapp hints at this issue at several moments but does not address it in a sustained way.Though there have been some notable exceptions, most studies of Nazism in particular have tended to gravitate toward one of two explanatory options. The first, more common in philosophical circles, has been to view... (shrink)

This article considers two of the methodological steps in a Community of Philosophical Enquiry: developing the questions and voting on the questions. Both of these practices are enacted by the 8-9 year old children who are the participants in a philosophical enquiry, which I facilitated at a government primary school in South Africa. Matthews (1994) reminds us that children as philosophical thinkers/doers have been left out of the dominant narratives about children and childhood. A question that guides this research is (...) where is the place for philosophical questions (developed by children) and the kind of philosophical thinking/drawing/creating/being for child (and adults) in schools? How do we make space for such questioning–so that the richness of these pedagogical encounters can really matter and make a difference to the teaching and learning taking place? Gandorfer in an interview with Barad (2021), suggests that critical thought “is to encounter what is unrecognizable and imperceptible, yet sensible and constructive of sense without separating it from the physical world” (p. 20). I would agree and apply this to the critical thoughts of child. This thinking is not located in the child, in their mind and does not emerge only through the thoughts, child verbalises. A critical posthumanism theory/practice analysis ensures that as researcher, I do not stand outside of the research peering in at a distance. Similarly the children, the questions, the voting and the enquiries are not separate from the world, they are all already entangled with the world. When the children are voting on the questions, this performs as a pedagogy of interruption (Michaud, 2020). As the facilitator, I do not know which question will receive the largest number of votes for the philosophical enquiry. This makes possible an emergent curriculum in its be(com)ing. Toby Rollo’s (2016) formulations about child as political agent and not just moral agent and the implications for more democratic and just schooling are theorised in this paper through the act of the children voting on the questions. I argue that children are not just excluded from participating in decisions about what and even how they are learning at school but from most pedagogical practices in classrooms and schools. I show how the children creating the questions and voting on the questions can be democratic practices with political and moral implications in a community of philosophical enquiry. (shrink)

A portfolio-resampling procedure invented by Richard and Robert Michaud is a subject of highly controversial discussion and big scientific dispute. It has been evaluated in many empirical studies and Monte Carlo experiments. Apart from the contradictory findings, the Michaud approach still lacks a theoretical foundation. I prove that portfolio resampling has a strong foundation in the classic theory of rational behavior. Every noise trader could do better by applying the Michaud procedure. By contrast, a signal trader who (...) has enough prediction power and risk-management skills should refrain from portfolio resampling. The key note is that in most simulation studies, investors are considered as noise traders. This explains why portfolio resampling performs well in simulation studies, but could be mediocre in real life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Perjury and Pardon, Volume 1 by Jacques DerridaRalph ShainDERRIDA, Jacques. Perjury and Pardon, Volume 1. Translated by David Wills. Edited by Ginette Michaud and Nicholas Cotton. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2022. 368 pp. Cloth, $45.00This is the translation of a volume in the posthumously published series of Derrida's lecture courses. The most important of these are the early Heidegger: The Question of Being and History (...) (1964–65) and Theory and Practice (1975–76), no parts of which were published by Derrida. Substantial portions of the first volume of the lectures on Perjury and Pardon were published as separate essays, so the main question concerning this book is what it adds to the published portions.For those readers who are familiar with Derrida's most famous work and are curious about his deconstructive ethics ("ethics beyond ethics") and have not read any of the essays drawn from this book (such as "To Forgive: the Unforgiveable and the Imprescriptible," "Literature in Secret," and "Typewriter Ribbon"), this is a good place to approach the topic. One will find here many of Derrida's classic moves, such as the deconstruction of texts, concepts, and traditions. One will find conditions of possibility that are also conditions of impossibility, concepts that are contaminated from within by their opposites, and appeals to the experience of the impossible and to the distinction between a general and restricted economy.One will also find here those points that seem to be Derrida's weakest, such as the insistence on the privacy of the mental, a rather wobbly treatment of the separation between intending and causality, and the [End Page 545] claim, important for Derrida's "poetico-performative" theory of truth, that all constatives depend on a prior performative—a promise to tell the truth, always already contaminated by failure and hence a "perjury." (The first and third of these are also found in Derrida's published work.)The topics in this book are helpful in situating Derrida vis-à-vis other thinkers, especially those in the Frankfurt School. Derrida's concept of an impossible, paradoxical pardon might be compared with Adorno's concept of utopian moments. The promise of truth implicit in every constative might be compared with Habermas's quasi-transcendental ideal speech situation.Even if one has read one or more of the published portions, if one is unsure how they fit together, these lectures will allow one to see how they cohere. In the third session Derrida provides an outline of the project, which he qualifies with the comment that "I am aware of the grossly schematic character of this outline." Grossly schematic, yes, but grossly schematic outlines are very helpful. Here's the gist of the outline: "stubbornly tracking down in the Biblio-Koranic tradition a logic of economy, an economy, a sublime ruse which... comes to contradict and undermine a demand for finite-infinite forgiveness, forgiveness without condition, the aneconomic forgiveness that is nevertheless at the heart of this same thinking... showing that on the supposed Greek side, the aneconomic notion of forgiveness comes to organize the aneconomic logic and 'syngnomic' rationality of a so-called Greek culture." In short, the concept of forgiveness that is derived from the monotheistic traditions of forgiveness claims not to be pragmatic or goal oriented, but Derrida shows that it is, whereas the Greek concept that is the closest equivalent, and is supposed to be entirely pragmatic, has moments that exceed any limited economy. (If this still sounds opaque, see Derrida's essay on Bataille and general economy in Writing and Difference.)Even those who are well versed in deconstructive ethics and have read the published parts of this book may still find it quite interesting. Derrida's verbal elucidations of the typescript are transcribed from recordings and placed in footnotes. There are quite a few of these, and some of them are interesting. The editorial apparatus will allow one to confirm that one has indeed read all of the published parts, which one should not take for granted since a couple of them are in relatively obscure venues. The readings of texts are of variable interest, but even in the... (shrink)

What is it that makes Nietzsche Nietzsche? In The Shortest Shadow, Alenka Zupancic counters the currently fashionable appropriation of Nietzsche as a philosopher who was "ahead of his time" but whose time has finally come -- the rather patronizing reduction of his often extraordinary statements to mere opinions that we can "share." Zupancic argues that the definitive Nietzschean quality is his very unfashionableness, his being out of the mainstream of his or any time.To restore Nietzsche to a context in which (...) the thought "lives on its own credit," Zupancic examines two aspects of his philosophy. First, in "Nietzsche as Metapsychologist," she revisits the principal Nietzschean themes -- his declaration of the death of God, the ascetic ideal, and nihilism -- as ideas that are very much present in our hedonist postmodern condition. Then, in the second part of the book, she considers Nietzsche's figure of the Noon and its consequences for his notion of the truth. Nietzsche describes the Noon not as the moment when all shadows disappear but as the moment of "the shortest shadow" -- not the unity of all things embraced by the sun, but the moment of splitting, when "one turns into two." Zupancic argues that this notion of the Two as the minimal and irreducible difference within the same animates all of Nietzsche's work, generating its permanent and inherent tension. (shrink)

Aktualnejshaya problema segodnyashnego dnya - vyhod iz sistemy globalnyh krizisov, s kotorymi stolknulos naselenie Zemli, i perehod k "obschestvu razumnogo potrebleniya," obschestvu znaniya. Ogromnuyu rol v etom protsesse igraet obrazovanie - sotsialnyj institut, odnoj iz zadach kotorogo yavlyaetsya sohranenie i translyatsiya znaniya v sotsialnyh sistemah. A chto takoe informatsiya? Iznachalno ee teoriya voznikla dlya nuzhd tehniki. Iz-za etogo mnogie ee aspekty ostalis ne razvitymi, potomu chto oni prosto ne byli vazhnymi dlya tehnicheskih sistem. Primenenie teorii informatsii k biologicheskim sistemam uzhe (...) zastavilo zanyatsya voprosom vozniknoveniya novoj informatsii. A rabota s sotsialnymi sistemami vydvinula takie ponyatiya, kak tsennost, effektivnost, slozhnost informatsii i t. d. Bolee polnyj podhod k teorii informatsii, v svoyu ochered, pozvolyaet najti resheniya ryada problem v teorii sotsialnyh sistem, v chastnosti v obrazovanii, i pokazat puti optimizatsii etih protsessov. (shrink)