_ _ _Unsanctifying Human Life_ offers a collection of Singer's best and most challenging articles from 1971 to the present. The book includes early critiques of various approaches to philosophy and the role of philosophers, followed by controversial works on the moral status of animals, infanticide, euthanasia, the allocation of scarce health care resources, embryo experimentation, environmental responsibility, and reflections on how we should live.

In this paper I explore the prospects of a Neo-Aristotelian position—according to which the difference between the human species and non-human animals is a difference in ‘form’—in the context of the question of how the human form of life is related to the idea of education. Two interpretations of this idea have been suggested by contemporary Neo-Aristotelian philosophy that offer contrasting accounts of the role played by education. According to the first, the idea of a formal (...) difference goes with a notion of potentiality, according to which the distinctiveness of the human is mainly a product of education, and hence a matter of second nature. According to the second, the idea of the human is the idea of a formally distinctive kind of first nature that explains the very possibility of education. I maintain that both interpretations do justice to an important aspect of human life yet fail fully to grasp the significance of the notion of ‘form’ that they employ. I argue that to embrace the insight that the difference of the human is a difference in ‘form’, we must think of the human as a form of life whose very concept contains the concept of education. The concept of education, I argue, is a logical concept, contained in the concept of life that it describes. (shrink)

A commentary that points out the way in which proposed Human Life Amendments might not prove a bulwark against all abortion. Any such Constitutional amendment would, however, have unintended effects, such as opening the way for embryos to be counted in the federal census, among other things.

Human Life in Motion presents for the first time the previously unpublished transcripts of the seminars on Aristotle Martin Heidegger gave in the 1920s. These transcripts reveal much about the evolution of his thought during that time. Detailed student transcripts for these seminars appear among the papers of one of Heidegger's students, Helene Weiss, held today in the Special Collections Department of Stanford University. Analyzing and organizing hundreds of pages of these transcripts written by different students, Francisco Gonzalez (...) brilliantly reconstructs the original seminars. He summarizes what Heidegger presented and claimed in each class. Gonzalez also throws into relief the overarching philosophical significance of the seminars, showing how the different interpretative moves or claims are connected and where they lead, something which in turn requires explicating them in the context of both the Aristotelian texts discussed and Heidegger's own thought during this period. Essential reading for students and scholars of Heidegger or Aristotle, Human Life in Motion is a publishing event that forces a reconsideration of the thought and legacy of both philosophers. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the fundamental axiological claim of the New Natural Law Theory, according to which human life has an intrinsically valuable, cannot be defended within the framework assumed by the New Natural Law Theory itself, and further, that such a claim turns out to be false relative to a wider eudaimonistic framework that the Natural Law theorist is committed to accept. I do this this by adopting a dialectical standpoint which excludes any assumptions that (...) could be denied by the New Natural Law theorist, except for the axiological claim, and show that the New Natural Law theorist cannot argue for the axiological claim's plausibility, and moreover, that in such a setting the New Natural Law theorist is compelled to replace the axiological claim by the claim that human life is instrumentally valuable. La afirmación axiológica fundamental de la Nueva Ley Natural según la cual la vida humana tiene un valor intrínseco, no puede ser defendida dentro del marco teórico asumido por dicha teoría, y resulta ser falsa en un marco eudemonista más amplio, que debe ser aceptado por el teórico de la ley natural. Se asume una posición dialéctica que excluye cualquier suposición que pueda ser negada por el teórico de la NLN, con excepción de la afirmación axiológica, y se demuestra que él no puede mostrar la plausibilidad de la afirmación axiológica; más aún, que se ve forzado a reemplazar la afirmación axiológica por la aceptación de que la vida humana tiene un valor instrumental. (shrink)

This book comprises an attempt to examine how we might set about an- swering the question: How much is society prepared to pay to reduce mortality: Or more brutally, what is the value of human life? The justification for attempting to answer such questions lies in the de- sirability of injecting increased explicitness and rationality into decision-making in those areas of the public sector which are con- cerned with life saving. Given that resources are already being de- (...) ployed to such activities as crash-barriers on motorways, helicopters for air-sea rescue, kidney machines and other life-saving measures - although such activities result only in a reduction in risk of death, not itsillimination, in the policy fields affected - this means that already at the present time, at least by implication, values are be- ing placed by decision-makers on the saving of life. (shrink)

Human concern over the urgency of current environmental issues increasingly entails wide-ranging discussions of how we may rethink the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world. In order to provide a context for such discussions this anthology provides a selection of some of the most important, interesting and influential readings on the subject from classical times through to the late nineteenth century. Included are such figures as Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Hildegard of Bingen, St Francis of Assisi, (...) Bacon, Decartes, Kant, Mill, Emerson and Thoreau. As the collection as a whole amply demonstrates, the history of western philosophical accounts of nature can help us to better understand current attitudes and problems. Human Life and the Natural World may also be of interest to a broad range of philosophers and students of philosophy, and more generally to those with a concern for the environment that engages the intellect as well as the heart. (shrink)

Focusing on the application of science and medicine to ordinary life in today's world, Section I of this volume is a general survey of the field of bioethics. Section II and III deal with the beginning of life and death with dignity. The last two Sections IV and V present arguments relating to the proper management of health resources to preserve life and genetic experimentation to enhance the life of future generations.

This chapter contains sections titled: * Body Matters * Direction * Genetic Testing * Conclusion * References * Further Reading.

Belliotti unravels the paradoxes of human existence to reveal paths for crafting meaningful, significant, valuable, even important lives. He argues that human life is not inherently absurd; examines the implications of mortality; contrasts subjective and objective meaning, and evaluates contemporary renderings of meaningful human lives.

The purpose of the study is to identify a common theoretical basis for the study of human life as capital and unconditional higher value. Theoretical basis is based on the value-laden and revised structural constructivism, provided by the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, critical analysis of the concepts of capital as the embodiment of social expectations, the biological concept of the value of human life, as well as the concepts of its sanctity. Originality. It is (...) proved that one should not consider the value of human life as capital only but instead takes into account its different value interpretations, especially when forming the social identity of a person. Moreover, in each of the value systems, the value of human life can be recognized as unconditional, which does not prevent the coexistence of such different value interpretations within the framework of one social identity, which then inevitably becomes a multiple social identity. Conclusions. Human life cannot be considered as a result of integrating economic expectations into the concept of "advertising" capital: first, expectations may well be inadequate; second, expectations by themselves are not directly related to capital; third, expectations do not necessarily lead to development; fourth, one should clearly distinguish between the spontaneous "expectations" and the values that express people’s strong motivation as members of social communities. The multiplicity of possible cultural conditions that affirm the unconditional value of life indicates that this unconditionality is always relevant rather than absolute. The multiple social identities could be used to add value to the protection of human life, the affirmation of multiple social identities is a means of affirming the unconditional value of human life – it is unconditional in several alternative ways. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the close to medium future, the life sciences might permit a vast extension of the human life span. I will argue that this is a very desirable development for the individual person. The question whether death is a harm to the dying is irrelevant here. All it takes is that being alive is good for the living person and not being alive is not good for anyone. Thus, living persons who expect to live on happily (...) are rationally required to want to stay alive. Eventual uncertainty whether it will be possible to be happy in the future provides no objection, but rather an incentive to try. This view, however, may be naive in assuming that persons are unchanging entities that exist separately from their psychological information. Objections have been derived from reductionistic views that value our future experiences in a way that declines with time, so that there will be a future point beyond which only negligible value accrues. If we adopt such a view, then we cannot now be concerned to have experiences beyond that point. I argue that these arguments fail to take into account all the reasons we might have to be concerned for the future and all the kinds of such concern that come from them. The adoption of a plausible reductionistic account can arguably weaken our concern for the future and certainly change its quality in important ways. But this provides no objection to the desire to live forever, nor to live at all. (shrink)

Attempting to steer moral philosophy away from abstract theorizing, Moral Disquiet and Human Life argues that moral philosophy should be a practical, rational, and argumentative engagement with reality, and that moral reflection should have ...

Research into the mechanisms of aging has suggested the possibility of extending the human life span. But there may be evolutionary biological reasons for senescence and the limits of the cell cycle that explain the infirmities of aging and the eventual demise of all human organisms. Genetic manipulation of the mechanisms of aging could over many generations alter the course of natural selection and shift the majority of deleterious mutations in humans from later to earlier stages of (...) life. This could harm people in the distant future by making them more susceptible to premature disease and mortality. Thus there are biological and moral reasons to carefully consider the implications of exploiting this technology on a broad scale to extend the lives of people in the present and near future. (shrink)

In this paper I critically examine the key normative claim of the so-called ‘new Natural Law ethics’, namely, the claim that being alive, in the biological sense of the word, has an intrinsically valuable standing. This claim is at the basis of the absolute condemnation of all acts aiming at destroying such a good. After explaining the meaning of this fundamental normative claim, I engage in a dialectical argument between the suicidal person and the new Natural Law ethicists in order (...) to show that, despite the reluctance of new Natural Law ethicists to argue in favour of the intrinsically valuable standing of life, such argument is absolutely necessary. Finally, I critically examine the arguments that have been adduced to support it and reject them. (shrink)

Right to life is an essential natural right protected and defended by law. The aim of this publication is to discuss the main issues regarding human right to life and its protection in the Roman law. Article deals with the problems of beginning and end of the human life and legal capacity in Rome, elements of legal protection of slaves and family members subject to pater familias life as well as the principle crimes attempting (...) to human life. First of all, the right to life as well as the right to liberty were held to be the institutes of natural law (ius naturale) meanwhile institutes that provided possibility to withdraw those rights (e. g. patria potestas that in the most ancient époque included right to decide on subject person’s right to life) are derived from the branches of positive law—civil (ius civile) and law of nations (ius gentium). Such attitude of the Roman jurisprudence had a solid impact on recognizing right of life to be an inherent law of every person, deriving immediately from the human nature and not conferred by the society and the state. (shrink)

Animalism is the view that we are primarily living beings of the species Homo sapiens. Being alive consists in the realization of biological processes. Accordingly, our conditions of existence and persistence have nothing to do with things like mental continuity. Hence, mental capabilities seem to be irrelevant to understanding the core of our nature as human beings. In recent years, the debate on animalism has focused on certain intractable ontological puzzles. However important these puzzles may be, they do not (...) get to the heart of the widespread reluctance to accept animalism. One crucial reason lies in the fact that this view does not seem to respect our deeply entrenched understanding of ourselves as mental beings. The aim of my paper is thus to provide a stronger conception of the ontological relevance of our mental capabilities – without giving up the cen- tral claims of animalism. In particular, I discuss three proposals: first, the idea that being a human being involves the potential to develop mental capabilities; second, the idea that it is an essential feature of human beings to have a brain with the natural function of developing mental capabilities; and third, the idea that the ontological relevance of mental capabilities may emerge in the context of specifying something like the general human form of life. (shrink)

This essay examines whether or not absurdity is intrinsic to human life. It takes Camus’ interpretation of ‘The Absurd’ as its conceptual starting point. It traces such thought back to Schopenhauer, whose work is then critically analysed. This analysis focuses primarily on happiness and meaning. This essay accepts some of Schopenhauer’s premises, but rejects his conclusions. Instead, it considers Nietzsche’s alternatives and the role of suffering in life. It posits that suffering may help people acquire meaning and (...) escape absurdity. It then analyses the role of compassion in absurdity, in reference to Nietzsche’s work and Buddhist teachings. Lastly, it examines absurdity in relation to death, rejecting the notion that death exacerbates absurdity. This paper understands absurdity to be a natural part of the human condition, as characterised by suffering, death and an absence of meaning. It concludes that although human life is absurd by nature, it need not remain so. (shrink)

I dispute the claim that the disclosure of the life-world by phenomenology is an accomplishment of 'permanent' significance. By briefly reviewing the meaning of the "world" and "life-world" in the writings of Husserl, Gurwitsch, Schutz-Luckmann, Ortega, Heidegger, Jonas, Straus, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, I show that they all treat the world, or rather the affairs which comprise it, as passively present whether viewed as a mental acquisition or as the "Other." But the meaning of the world-as that wherein are (...) met physical demands upon us which must be satisfied if we are to continue living-cannot be considered either as a mental acquisition or as something that is "other" and over against us. A living being as living cannot fail to attend to the agency of the affairs of which the life-world consists, as well as one's own exploring and coping actions. If we are to really speak of life, then we must acknowledge the mutual and reciprocal activities of living beings and world. (shrink)

The author examines traditional Catholic teaching on abortion, genetic manipulation, euthanasia, and war, and shows how it has evolved through the centuries, with special emphasis on papal pronouncements, the writings of the Church Fathers, and the frequent conflicts in Theological opinion. But, more than this, he suggests approaches for dealing with these questions today, when the sensitive counselor finds himself in a situation where he must try as best he can to protect innocent human life and at the (...) same time not demand of the individual more than he can understand or bear.--. (shrink)

This paper explicates secular psychodynamic growth through the life time and meditation as routes to the transpersonal from the perspective of evolutionary developmental biology, based around a multi-line model of growth. A multi-line model raises many significant points for a transpersonal audience. Such models have been pioneered by Hunt. When set on the footing of evolutionary developmental biology and nonlinear dynamics these kind of models become all the more cogent, penetrating and far reaching, validating plurality and diversity in both (...) the process and final form of transpersonal development. The "anecdotal" accounts which Hunt reports, and which this paper adds to, can thus be amalgamated with an established and sophisticated research program . Such developments are symptomatic of a general movement in the sciences towards a non-linear paradigm, to which the transpersonal movement might have been slow to respond. (shrink)

Contemporary humanity—especially urban‐industrial civilization with its domination of nature—is disturbing complex, integrated, self‐regulating systems that have evolved over long periods of time. We are threatening not only biological ecosystems but also human self‐regulating capabilities at both the biological and the social‐systems levels. This paper presents examples of such disturbance both in the organism—respiratory‐cardiovascular problems related to environmental pollution‐and at the population level—rates of infant mortality and relations between fertility and mortality in light of economic and emotional factors. Prospects for (...) our future survival and flourishing are thus linked less to technical know‐how than to ecological understanding. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Just Doctoring: Medical Ethics in the Liberal State. By Troyen A. Brennan. The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity. By Ezekiel J. Emanuel.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y GassetBob SandmeyerHoward N. Tuttle. Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset. New York: Peter Lang, 2005. Pp. x + 200. Cloth, $59.95.This is a book which seeks to sketch out a coherent philosophy of life. (...) By arguing that "human life is radical reality," Professor Tuttle places the ontological priority of "my life" over and against that of every reality encountered in that life. Yet the life at issue in this book is no solus ipse, and the things or pragmata of this life do not therefore depend on the I for their being. As Ortega y Gasset asserts, I am myself and my circumstances. Neither subject nor substance exists independently of the other. As such, each bears the mark of this bi-polarity (40, 45). Hence human life, "my life," is not conceived here as a subjective immanence but rather as a carnate life that projects itself, i.e., its possibilities, into the concrete situation of its worldly circumstances. Indeed, the narrative structure of this projection expresses a central categorical feature of human life, its historicity. "Human life becomes here conceived as the historical stream of the inner and outer, the 'I' and its world" (155). Every reality takes its meaning from—in truth, has its status as a transcendent reality from—the manner and the guise in which it appears within the narrative of this self-construction of my life (5, 26, 40, 45, 88, 156, 171). This is a thesis, Tuttle argues, that has its roots in the writings of three figures: Wilhelm Dilthey, to whom the author refers as the "founder of the philosophy of human life," Martin Heidegger, the famous German philosopher whose explication of the structure of Dasein is central to the situated intersubjectivity of "my life" articulated in this book, and José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher whose writings arguably play the most central role in the work (6, 26, 142, 155, 166).Professor Tuttle ought to be commended for the breadth of his undertaking and the economy of his presentation. Given its ambition, this is a short work of no more than 179 pages excluding notes and bibliography. This pithiness and a general lack of technical jargon speak well of the work, especially as it seems likely to find its way into the hands of young scholars interested in existential phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and continental philosophy generally. Indeed, within this broad field there are too few efforts like this one which seek to examine the interconnection of these three philosophers. Yet the very attributes that make this book a favorable addition to any collection also contribute to a serious defect in the work. Where its brevity demands precise articulation, the book often falls into repetition. The discussion of the distinction between clock time and lived time, for instance, comes across as especially belabored. Throughout the work, there are passages which appear virtually identical in different sections. And where its accessible presentation offers an easy introduction to some very difficult material, its lack of focus leaves one to wonder about the efficacy of its message. As Professor Tuttle remarks in the last lines of the work, "this essay is at very best only a collection of abstract and skeletal thought forms that have been generated within my life in its relation to its circumstances" (178).Reading the work, then, one wonders if it is best suited for the young scholar, the accomplished academic, or both. A lack of sufficient background footnoting restricts the acceptability of this work as a tool for serious research. For instance, given the aims of the book one would expect that Heidegger's lectures on "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview" would have a prominent role in the essay, yet it is not even cited. The essay thus seems best directed towards more novice scholars. Yet the skeletal feel of the work and the unfocused integration of many of the themes from the different writings of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset... (shrink)

On its release, the Instruction on Respect for Human Life was accused of obstructing the technological enhancement of human life by using slippery slope arguments to impose the Magisterium’s opinion that accepting certain new technologies, like homologous artificial fertilization, would weaken resistance to practices the Church traditionally has opposed. To the contrary, the instruction calls attention to the fact that by using these technologies, we have in principle accepted all sorts of thigs, with or without technology, (...) which are destructive of human life. (shrink)

Many believe that moral value is—at least to some extent—dependent on the developmental states necessary for supporting rational activity. My paper rejects this view, but does not aim simply to register objections to it. Rather, my essay aims to answer the following question: if a human being’s developmental state and occurrent capacities do not bequeath moral standing, what does? The question is intended to prompt careful consideration of what makes human beings objects of moral value, dignity, or goodness. (...) Not only do I think we can answer this question, I think we can show that nascent human life possesses goodness of precisely this sort. I appeal to Aquinas’s metaethics to establish the conclusion that the goodness of a human being—even if that being is an embryo or fetus—resides at the substratum of her existence. If she possesses goodness, it is because human existence is good. (shrink)

Peirce calls philosophy “cenoscopy”, that is, a view of the general. By that, he means that its aim is to provide a general view of the positive facts of human life and experience. Thus, cenoscopy begins its inquiries scrutinizing everything; experience shows us that is universal and pervasive, general and evident. The method of cenoscopic inquiry, as its very name says, rests upon the careful observation of all manifestations of usual and common experience, limiting itself to what can (...) be inferred from it: our common-sense experiences constitute the positum of philosophical inquiry. So, the biggest difficulty in philosophical inquiry is to cope with the certainties of common-sense, which are extremely vague and general, such certainties as expressed in propositions such as “fire burns”. Such experiences inform our world view, before any scientific world view, and as such it does not occur to us we can doubt them – they acquire the indubitable status of instinctive beliefs. In fact, common-sense beliefs are the very ground of our rational certainties, thus constituting the inevitable hic et nunc from where to start any philosophical and scientific inquiry. This paper aims at presenting Peirce’s main tenets of common-sense in relation to his conception of philosophy. (shrink)

Are children of equal, lesser, or perhaps even greater moral importance than adults? This work of applied moral philosophy develops a comprehensive account of how adults as moral agents ascribe moral status to beings - ourselves and others - and on the basis of that account identifies multiple criteria for having moral status. It argues that proper application of those criteria should lead us to treat children as of greater moral importance than adults. This conclusion presents a basis for critiquing (...) existing social practices, many of which implicitly presuppose that children occupy an inferior status, and for suggesting how government policy, law, and social life might be different if it reflected an assumption that children are actually of superior status. (shrink)

This paper critiques the competing “Grandmother Hypothesis” and “Embodied Capital Theory” as evolutionary explanations of the peculiarities of human life history traits. Instead, I argue that the correct explanation for human life history probably involves elements of both hypotheses: long male developmental periods and lives probably evolved due to group selection for male hunting via increased female fertility, and female long lives due to the differential contribution women’s complex foraging skills made to their children and grandchildren’s (...) nutritional status within groups provisioned by male hunting. (shrink)