No De libero arbitrio , a fim de provar que Deus existe, santo Agostinho recorre à demonstração da existência de elementos inteligíveis que são universais, imutáveis e superiores a alma. No entanto, o famoso e longo processo de ascensão encontra ainda outras veredas, e no De magistro o futuro bispo de Hipona chega às realidades metafísicas (e, assim, ao próprio Deus) através da análise da linguagem verbal e da comunicação. Partindo das considerações tecidas no próprio tratado, escrito em 389, este (...) artigo pretende analisar como se dá a transcendência da alma no diálogo travado entre santo Agostinho e seu filho Adeodato, e onde se cristalizam as teorias agostinianas do conhecimento e do ensino. Ao fim do trabalho, esperamos tornar manifesta a riqueza do pensamento linguístico do santo – pelo qual podemos vislumbrar suas possíveis contribuições para as mais diversas ramificações da linguística, da filosofia e da teologia – e a sutileza de seu raciocínio. Palavras-chave : Agostinho; Linguagem; Alma; Deus.In his On the Free Will , Saint Augustine, willing to prove the existence of God, demonstrates the existence of intelligible elements which are universal, immutable and superior to the soul. Other paths, however, can fulfill this famous and long ascent, and in De magistro the future Bishop of Hippo attains those metaphysical realities (and God himself) through the analysis of the verbal language. Thus, this article aims at examining, through the considerations made in the text itself, how the transcendence of the soul occurs in this dialogue between Augustine and his son, Deusdedit, in which his theories on knowledge and learning are consolidated. At the end of our work, we hope to make clear how rich Augustine’s thought is – through which we can note his possible contributions to many ramifications of linguistics, philosophy, and theology – and how subtle are his arguments. Keywords: Augustine; Language; Soul; God. (shrink)

Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments (...) during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like-minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level. (shrink)

According to the argumentative theory of reasoning, humans have evolved reasoning abilities for argumentative purposes. This implies that some reasoning skills should be universals. Such a claim seems to be at odd with findings from cross-cultural research. First, a wealth of research, following the work of Luria, has shown apparent difficulties for illiterate populations to solve simple but abstract syllogisms. It can be shown, however, that once they are willing to accept the pragmatics of the task, these participants can perform (...) at or near ceiling. Second, historical, sociological and anthropological research has been used to claim that some Eastern cultures have not developed argumentation. These claims are the result of oversimplifications and of a selective view of the data. A closer looks reveals instead very elaborate forms of argumentation, in Chinese culture particularly. Third, cross-cultural psychologists have carried out an extensive research program aimed at showing that Easterners do not rely on the principle of non-contradiction and that they use holistic rather than analytic thinking. A review of these experiments shows that no qualitative difference emerges in the way Easterners and Westerners deal with argumentation and that in the proper context both populations can easily have recourse to holistic or analytic thinking. It is possible to conclude from this critical review that the reasoning skills involved in argumentation seem to be universal even though they can be used in different ways in various cultural contexts. (shrink)

Reasoning, defined as the production and evaluation of reasons, is a central process in science. The dominant view of reasoning, both in the psychology of reasoning and in the psychology of science, is of a mechanism with an asocial function: bettering the beliefs of the lone reasoner. Many observations, however, are difficult to reconcile with this view of reasoning; in particular, reasoning systematically searches for reasons that support the reasoner’s initial beliefs, and it only evaluates these reasons cursorily. By contrast, (...) reasoners are well able to evaluate others’ reasons: accepting strong arguments and rejecting weak ones. The argumentative theory of reasoning accounts for these traits of reasoning by postulating that the evolved function of reasoning is to argue: to find arguments to convince others and to change one’s mind when confronted with good arguments. Scientific reasoning, however, is often described as being at odds with such an argumentative mechanisms: scientists are supposed to reason objectively on their own, and to be pigheaded when their theories are challenged, even by good arguments. In this article, we review evidence showing that scientists, when reasoning, are subject to the same biases as are lay people while being able to change their mind when confronted with good arguments. We conclude that the argumentative theory of reasoning explains well key features of scientists’ reasoning and that differences in the way scientists and laypeople reason result from the institutional framework of science. (shrink)

The role of reasoning in our moral lives has been increasingly called into question by moral psychology. Not only are intuitions guiding many of our moral judgments and decisions, with reasoning only finding post-hoc rationalizations, but reasoning can sometimes play a negative role, by finding excuses for our moral violations. The observations fit well with the argumentative theory of reasoning (Mercier H, Sperber D, Behav Brain Sci, in press-b), which claims that reasoning evolved to find and evaluate arguments in dialogic (...) contexts. This theory explains the strong confirmation bias that reasoning displays when it produces arguments, which in turn explains its tendency to rationalize our decisions. But this theory also predicts that people should be able to evaluate arguments felicitously and that, as a result, people should reason better in groups, when they are confronted with other people’s arguments. Groups are able to converge on better moral judgments. It is argued that reasoning and argumentation play an important role in our everyday moral lives, and a defense of the value of reasoning for moral change is offered. (shrink)

By systematically biasing our beliefs, self-deception can endanger our ability to successfully convey our messages. It can also lead lies to degenerate into more severe damages in relationships. Accordingly, I suggest that the biases reviewed in the target article do not aim at self-deception but instead are the by-products of several other mechanisms: our natural tendency to self-enhance, the confirmation bias inherent in reasoning, and the lack of access to our unconscious minds.

Coherence plays an important role in psychology. In this article, I suggest that coherence takes two main forms in humans’ cognitive system. The first belong to ‘system 1’. It relies on the degree of coherence between different representations to regulate them, without coherence being represented. By contrast other mechanisms, belonging to system 2, allow humans to represent the degree of coherence between different representations and to draw inferences from it. It is suggested that the mechanisms of explicit coherence evaluation have (...) social functions. They are used as means of epistemic vigilance—to evaluate what other people tell us. They can also be turned inwards to examine the coherence of our own beliefs. Their function is then to minimize the chances that we are perceived as being incoherent. Evidence from different domains of psychology is briefly reviewed in support of these hypotheses. (shrink)

In “Mercier and Sperber’s Argumentative Theory of Reasoning: From Psychology of Reasoning to Argumentation Studies” (2012) Santibáñez Yañez offers constructive comments and criticisms of the argumentative theory of reasoning. The purpose of this reply is twofold. First, it seeks to clarify two points broached by Yanez: (1) the relation between reasoning (in this specific theory) and dual process accounts in general and (2) the benefits that can be derived from reasoning and argumentation (again, in this specific theory). Second, it suggests (...) one domain—the categorization of arguments—in which argumentation studies and the argumentative theory of reasoning could usefully complement each other to yield a better understanding of the processes of argumentation. (shrink)

This work mainly concerns the—here introduced—category of $\mathscr {Q}$ -sets and functional morphisms, where $\mathscr {Q}$ is a commutative semicartesian quantale. We prove it enjoys all limits and colimits, that it has a classifier for regular subobjects (a sort of truth-values object), which we characterize and give explicitly. Moreover: we prove it to be $\kappa$ -locally presentable, (where $\kappa =max\{|\mathscr {Q}|^+, \aleph _0\}$ ); we also describe a hierarchy of monoidal structures in this category.

Graphical AbstractScience and technology consortia provide a viable solution for the recent unsustainable academic growth in biomedical research.

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence (...) in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found. (shrink)

The question of the function of reasoning is drawing increased attention. One suggestion is that the function of reasoning is argumentative: to find arguments to convince others and to evaluate others’ arguments. Darmstadter offers an alternative. According to this pragmatic theory the function of reasoning is to minimally adjust our beliefs so that they remain sound guides for action. This theory is similar to the classical view, which sees reasoning as a way of improving the reasoner's beliefs and decisions. The (...) pragmatic theory shares the classical view's flaws as a theory of the function of reasoning: it does not define reasoning strictly enough, it does not offer a convincing evolutionary rationale for reasoning's existence, it does not make predictions based on this rationale, and it does not properly test these predictions. Darmstadter also points out the importance of the phenomenon of deliberation failures. While I argue that documented deliberation failures are compatible with the argumentative theory of reasoning, Darmstadter's work usefully draws attention to the importance of studying reasoning outside the laboratory and in particular in argumentative situations. (shrink)

Investigamos o problema da continuidade entre (1) cognições básicas e (2) complexas, especificamente em relação à linguagem. Nossa hipótese é a de que visões contemporâneas da linguagem não inviabilizam necessariamente a abordagem bottom-up ― abordagens tipicamente enativistas. Primeiro apresentamos a posição de Daniel Hutto e Erik Myin (2013, 2017), representantes do Radically Enactive Cognition (REC), a qual assume o desafio da continuidade e identifica na linguagem o critério para uma distinção de tipo entre (1) e (2). Em seguida, estabelecemos a (...) posição Wittgensteiniana defendida por Moyal-Sharrock (2019), na qual a linguagem seria apenas mais uma habilidade de possível desenvolvimento para (1) e (2). Haveria, portanto, somente uma distinção de grau , não de tipo. Por mais que a avaliação de Moyal-Sharrock seja interessante no sentido de que parece evitar um ceticismo de continuidade (identificado por ela no REC), também encontramos problemas em sua visão. (shrink)

The Pigeonhole Principle states that if n items are sorted into m categories and if n > m, then at least one category must contain more than one item. For instance, if 22 pigeons are put into 17 pigeonholes, at least one pigeonhole must contain more than one pigeon. This principle seems intuitive, yet when told about a city with 220,000 inhabitants none of whom has more than 170,000 hairs on their head, many people think that it is merely likely (...) that two inhabitants have the exact same number of hair. This failure to apply the Pigeonhole Principle might be due to the large numbers used, or to the cardinal rather than nominal presentation of these numbers. We show that performance improved both when the numbers are presented nominally, and when they are small, albeit less so. We discuss potential interpretations of these results in terms of intuition and reasoning. (shrink)

Expert reasoning is responsible for some of the most stunning human achievements, but also for some of the most disastrous decisions ever made. The argumentative theory of reasoning has proven very effective at explaining the pattern of reasoning’s successes and failures. In the present article, it is expanded to account for expert reasoning. The argumentative theory predicts that reasoning should display a strong confirmation bias. If argument quality is not sufficiently high in a domain, the confirmation bias will make experts (...) tap into their vast knowledge to defend whatever opinion they hold, with polarization and overconfidence as expected results. By contrast, experts should benefit even more from the power of group discussion to make the best of the confirmation bias—when they genuinely disagree that is, otherwise polarization is again likely to ensue. When experts interact with laymen other mechanisms can take the lead, in particular trust calibration and consistency checking. They can yield poor outcomes if experts do not have a sustained interaction with laymen, or if the laymen have strong opinions when they witness a debate between experts. Seeing reasoning as a mechanism of epistemic vigilance aimed at finding and evaluating arguments helps make better sense of expert reasoning performance, be it in individual ratiocination, in debates with other experts, or in interactions with laymen. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to call into question a long-established tradition within the Anglo-Saxon Nietzsche scholarship that regards Nietzsche’s middle period as positivist. Unlike most scholars, I shall demonstrate that in Human, All Too Human Nietzsche does not take a positivist position, recognizing the limits of science with regard to knowledge of reality and its contributions toward unleashing human potential. Ultimately, I will show that Nietzsche was coherent, taking an anti-positivist position in all three works of the middle period.

Discusses the biological meaning of death, attitudes of the dying, survivors, and society toward it, and such related topics as euthanasia, abortion, murder, suicide, and immortality.

Resumo Este artigo tem o objetivo de mostrar as semelhanças entre o espírito livre de Nietzsche e o gênio de Schopenhauer. Em primeiro lugar, ambos compartilham de uma abordagem mística do conhecimento: perdem sua individualidade e identificam-se aos objetos do conhecimento com o intuito de obter conhecimento do mundo. Em segundo lugar, ambas as figuras encontram-se associadas à loucura. Em terceiro lugar, o espírito livre e o gênio são indivíduos excepcionais que, diferentemente do que se passa com a maior parte (...) dos indivíduos, já não se encontram atrelados a questões mundanas. Conduzem-se na vida pacificamente, pairando sobre os valores em que as pessoas mais acreditam, cientes de sua falsidade.This article aims to show the similarities between Nietzsche’s free spirit and Schopenhauer’s genius. First of all, both share a mystical approach to knowledge: they lose their individuality and identify themselves with the objects of knowledge in order to obtain knowledge of the world. Secondly, both figures are associated with madness. Thirdly, the free spirit and the genius are exceptional individuals who unlike the majority of people are no longer attached to worldly matters. They conduct their lives peacefully, hovering over the values in which most people believe, aware of their falsehood. (shrink)

In this article, I shall analyze Schopenhauer's conception of Buddhism in the context of the Western reception of Buddhism from the seventeenth century onwards. I will focus on Schopenhauer's notion of the Buddhist palingenesis and provide an overview of the Buddhist sources Schopenhauer read before the publication of the second edition of his main work The World as Will and Representation in 1844.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dynamic Encounters between Buddhism and the West ReportLaura Langone and Alexandra S. IlievaThe following is a summary of the 2021 Postgraduate Conference titled "Dynamic Encounters between Buddhism and the West," which took place online on June 28 and 29. The conference was conceptualized, organized, and run by three AHRC funded PhD students at the University of Cambridge: Laura Langone (Faculty of Modern and Medieval Languages); Alexandra S. (...) Ilieva (Faculty of Divinity); and Harry Harland (Faculty of Law). The conference took place over two days and featured eighteen presenters across six panels, and two keynote speakers. There were speakers from four continents (Europe, North America, Asia, and Oceania). A wide range of topics in multiple fields was discussed: religious studies, neuroscience, art history, politics, philosophy, literature, philology, mathematics, art, and music. Each day consisted of three panels, each with three presentations, one keynote presentation, and a networking session.The keynote speakers were Prof. Albrecht Classen (The University of Arizona) and Prof. Graham Parkes (University of Vienna).Prof. Classen opened the conference with his presentation. He taught us that we have been globalized and transcultural since at least the Middle Ages. To support this claim, he provided us with ample evidence of Buddhist-Western exchanges in Art and Literature dotted throughout the literature and architecture of Europe. Prof. Parkes observed that following Zen Master Dōgen's thought as well as Nietzsche's philosophy we can develop a saner approach to the environment, which provides us with resources to help us to tackle the challenges of the climate crisis.Our first panel was titled "Hellenistic-Buddhist Encounters," which followed on nicely from Prof. Classen's thesis that encounters between Buddhism and the West have been ubiquitous and have dated as far back as the Hellenistic period. Our second panel, "Encounters with the Contemporary World," were impressive examples of intercultural philosophy. Each participant demonstrated a unique ability to bring Buddhist ideas into dialogue with contemporary Western philosophy, specifically ethics, philosophy of mathematics, and epistemology. The third panel, titled "Therapeutic Encounters," taught us of the therapeutic value of Buddhist meditation and philosophical inquiry. As our presenters emphasized, this therapeutic value is not just an ancient artifact to be studied anthropologically, but a relevant and applicable approach to the modern idea of well-being that therefore deserves continued scholarship.On the second day, we started with our fourth panel called "Encounters through Western Conceptual Lenses," which among others gave us insight into the reception [End Page 393] of Japanese Buddhism by the German liberal protestants of the nineteenth century. Our fifth panel—"Encounters with German Philosophy"—was an excellent example of contemporary comparative work between Buddhist philosophy, ethics, and logic, and the German thinkers Hegel and Nietzsche.We learned that Nietzsche labeled Buddhism as nihilism––a position that can be challenged through Ambedkar's reading of Buddhism. On the other hand, despite Nietzsche's criticism of Buddhism, striking similarities between his approach to life and that of Mahāyāna Buddhism can be found, both elaborating a life-affirming philosophy. We also became familiar with similarities and differences between the logic of Nishida and Hegel. Finally, our last panel, "Literary and Artistic Encounters" made for a fitting conclusion, reminding us that Buddhist-Western encounters are ongoing, not just politically and intellectually but also in art, music, and literature. These encounters are dynamic in nature and fundamentally lacking in an essential core. Instead, they are entities that echo through the ages allowing for reinterpretation and reintegration across geographic and temporal scopes.Both during and after the conference we received extremely positive feedback from the participants. The level of participation and enthusiasm was highly promising, showing that the future of intercultural studies of this sort is bright. Graduate conferences like these are key for early career scholars to set up networks and find likeminded peers to engage in ongoing dynamic encounters.In conclusion, this conference served to highlight the sophisticated emerging scholarship taking place that seeks to investigate Buddhist-Western interactions and dialogue. But, perhaps more importantly, the conference itself makes a metapoint: not only has the world been transcultural for many centuries, but the conference itself and in particular the global spatial locations of... (shrink)

Nursing research using concept analysis plays a critical role for knowledge development, particularly when concerning to broad and foundational concepts for nursing practice, such as dignity. This study aimed to synthesize research concerning concept analysis of dignity in nursing care. Based on a literature review, electronic databases were searched using the terms “dignity,” “human dignity,” “concept analysis,” and nurs*. Papers in Portuguese or English were included. The research synthesis was conducted independently by two reviewers. A total of 35 citations were (...) identified and seven papers were included. Six studies were elected using Walker and Avant concept analysis methodology while one applied the Beth Rodgers evolutionary model. The concept of dignity has been studied by nurses, and its attributes, antecedents, consequences, and similar concepts were synthesized into a definition. Dignity emerged as a fundamental concept in nursing ethics and the main attributes synthesized were personhood, sociability, respect, and autonomy. The antecedents identified were: facilitators—patient focus care, recognition, education, and ethical competence; threats—vulnerability and organizational environment. The consequences were positive coping, empowerment, and dignity preservation. The synthesis of these seven studies using concept analysis provided a clear definition of dignity. These findings challenge future research and education, particularly for the study of undergraduate and postgraduate nursing education programs to enhance skills for preserving patient dignity in clinical practice. (shrink)

En philosophie du droit, on a coutume d’opposer juspositivisme et jusnaturalisme et de placer Jeremy Bentham dans la première catégorie. Plusieurs auteurs tiennent même Bentham pour le père du juspositivisme. Je prétends pour ma part que cette façon de classer Bentham est inadéquate et nécessite une importante mise au point. S’il est vrai que Bentham était un adversaire des doctrines du droit naturel, il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant qu’il appartient au positivisme juridique; et les raisons qui pourraient justifier le (...) classement de Bentham parmi les juspositivistes militent aussi pour son association au jusnaturalisme. Que faut-il entendre exactement par « positivisme juridique », et en quel sens Bentham y adhère-t-il? C’est à cette double question que le présent article est consacré. (shrink)

Consideraciones introductorias Presentamos aquí un avance de análisis de un proyecto de investigación sobre enseñanza y aprendizaje de la argumentación que realizamos observando clases de filosofía y de biología de seis profesores de cada disciplina en cuatro Liceos públicos y dos privados. Además organizamos actividades argumentativas de aula a comienzos y finales de los cursos en el año 2012, con el fin de observar los eventuales avances en lo argumentativo. Presentamos en este trabajo los (...) - Sciences de l'éducation et (...) de la formation – Nouvel article. (shrink)