Belonging uncertainty, defined as the general concern about the quality of one’s social relationships in an academic setting, has been found to be an important determinant of academic achievement and persistence. However, to date, only little research investigated the sources of belonging uncertainty. To address this research gap, we examined three potential sources of belonging uncertainty in a sample of undergraduate computer science students in Germany (N= 449) and focused on (a) perceived affective and academic exclusion by fellow students, (b) (...) domain-specific academic self-efficacy beliefs, and (c) perception of one’s individual performance potential compared to that of fellow students in the field. Perceived affective and academic exclusion by fellow students and domain-specific academic self-efficacy beliefs were significant predictors of female students’ uncertainty about belonging in computer science. The perception of one’s individual performance potential in comparison to that of fellow students, however, was a relevant predictor of both male and female students’ belonging uncertainty in computer science. Our findings imply an expanded view of the theoretical concept of belonging uncertainty that goes beyond mere concerns of social connectedness. (shrink)

Horst Bredekamp’s subject is the astute deployment and perennial resonance of the startling image of the body politic that dominates the frontispiece to Leviathan: a treatise on the psychology of the individual and the dynamic of the multitude, published in 1651 by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Affirming the centrality of such a figural device for this pioneering theorist of the state, Bredekamp goes on to address the art-historical dimension of the mesmerising etched title-page. In his central chapters he (...) explores the extraordinary range of sources – from socio-cultural tradition to scientific advances – on which the author and his artist-collaborator may have drawn. In conclusion, he reveals Hobbes to be no less passionate than shrewd in his belief that the constraints and amenities of a tolerable life in common attest to the potency of the visual. As appendices, two essays and catalogues explore the portraits made of Hobbes as well as illustrations that appeared in his other works, thus systematically completing the exploration of the images connected with this exceptional philosopher. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of U.S. farmland owners, operators, and workers by race, ethnicity, and gender. We first review the intersection between racialized and gendered capitalism and farmland ownership and farming in the United States. Then we analyze data from the 2014 Tenure and Ownership Agricultural Land survey, the 2012 Census of Agriculture, and the 2013–2014 National Agricultural Worker Survey to demonstrate that significant nation-wide disparities in farming by race, ethnicity and gender persist in the U.S. In 2012–2014, White (...) people owned 98% and operated 94% of all farmland. They generated 98% of all farm-related income from land ownership and 97% of income from farm owner-operatorship. Meanwhile, People of Color farmers were more likely to be tenants rather than owners, owned less land, and generated less farm-related wealth per person than their White counterparts. Hispanic farmers were also disproportionately farm laborers. In addition to racial and ethnic disparities, there were disparities by gender. About 63% of non-operating landowners, 86% of farm operators, and 87% of tenant farmers were male, and female farmers tended to generate less income per farmer than men. This data provides evidence of ongoing racial, ethnic and gender disparities in agriculture in the United States. We conclude with a call to address the structural drivers of the disparities and with recommendations for better data collection. (shrink)

Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently argued that, just like creditworthy success in, say, chess, playing the piano, or (...) archery, creditworthy moral success is a matter of getting things right by way of manifesting a relevant skill. My main aim in this paper is to bring out an important structural difference between moral creditworthiness and creditworthiness in sports, arts, and craft, undermining attempts to use examples of the latter as a model for understanding the former. As an alternative, I propose an account of morally creditworthy action, according to which such action is a matter of manifesting virtue, not skill—a claim that's based on an important, but underappreciated, difference between the sorts of excellences constituting virtues and skills. The paper thus contributes to a more nuanced picture of normative achievements across different domains of human agency, highlighting largely overlooked structural dissimilarities among them. (shrink)

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...) is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (shrink)

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

Language technology – starting from the handwriting in early ages of humanity and perfectionated in the age of social media and micro-targeting - is used to gain and maintain power, and to rebel against it. Social media such as Telegram provide a safe space for freedom fighters in authoritarian regimes but also offer a stage for extremist, aggressive and manipulative content. This work uses romantic relationships as an example topic. The article discusses how the language used shapes the interpretation of (...) political reports based on literature. Further, this work analyses metaphorical frames around the concepts related to romantic relationships and family in influential news outlets from three countries in three languages. The analysis shows that conservative political actors use similar metaphorical frames for relationship-related concepts such as LGBT and ‘traditional family’, and with similar, manipulative purposes. The results suggest that anti-democratic discourses build on exploitation of social categories rendered subordinate to men in a similar way across conservative movements. However, changes in political leadership can facilitate societal changes towards more open and more democratic societies, but they can also change cultures and traditions to suit power interests. (shrink)

Epistemic constitutivism (EC) holds that the nature of believing is such that it gives rise to a standard of correctness and that other epistemic normative notions (e.g., reasons for belief) can be explained in terms of this standard. If defensible, this view promises an attractive and unifying account of epistemic normativity. However, EC faces a forceful objection: that constitutive standards of correctness are never enough for generating normative reasons. This paper aims to defend EC in the face of this objection. (...) I do so in two steps. First, I dispute a crucial assumption underlying the case against EC: that constitutive standards of correctness in general are ‘reason-giving’ only if and because there is also a prior reason to comply with them. Second, I outline a strategy of how EC can meet the challenge of explaining what’s special about the activity of believing such that, unlike other standard-governed activities, it is capable of generating normative reasons. (shrink)

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.

This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...) illusions and explores implications for epistemology, semantics, and disunity of science. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

In this panel six IS researchers from varying backgrounds will discuss whether epistemological anarchy, as proposed by the controversial philosopher Paul Feyerabend, has the potential to foster research progress and can help to create new insights in the IS field. Feyerabend is well known for his notion that "anything goes" in terms of methodology, and many scholars are concerned that this seemingly anarchistic sentiment can undermine efforts to systematically build and structure an epistemological and methodological foundation for an academic discipline. (...) This panel, which will be moderated by Horst Treiblmaier, includes as panelists Andrew Burton-Jones, Shirley Gregor, Rudy Hirschheim, Michael Myers, and Tom Stafford. The outcome of this discussion will be incorporated into a paper published in the DATA BASE for Advances in Information Systems. (shrink)

Von Natur aus ist der Mensch so frei wie wölfisch. Um sich selbst zu bändigen, muß er folglich einen künstlichen Riesen schaffen, den Staat, der als übergeordnete Instanz den permanenten Bürgerkrieg zu unterdrücken und Frieden zu schaffen vermag. Diese Essenz von Thomas Hobbes'"Leviathan" ist bis heute ebenso vehement verworfen wie bekräftigt worden. In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurden vor allem die historischen Bedingungen erschlossen, unter denen Hobbes sein epochales Werk verfaßte; aber seine bestürzende Grundthese, daß es des Schreckens bedarf, um inneren (...) Frieden zu erzeugen, ist eine Herausforderung für jedwede Staats- und Gesellschaftstheorie geblieben. Zu den Mitteln, mit denen der Leviathan die Menschen vom Unfrieden abhält, gehören Bilder, und aus diesem Grund steht dem Leviathan ein Frontispiz voran. Obwohl seit Jahrhunderten selbst entfernteste Aspekte von Hobbes' Werk ausgeleuchtet wurden, ist dieses grundlegende Element seiner Lehre bislang nicht erörtert worden. Eine systematische Untersuchung seiner Wertschätzung des Augensinnes fehlt ebenso wie eine umfassende Analyse seiner Bildmittel. Horst Bredekamp erschließt mit Abraham Bosse den Künstler des Frontispizes, stellt sämtliche Varianten dieses Urbildes des modernen Staates zusammen und versucht, die Vorgeschichte seiner politischen Ikonographie zu klären. Im Zentrum stehen die königlichen Kunstleiber von Westminster Abbey sowie optische Geräte, mit deren Hilfe Hobbes neben dem Körper und dem Raum auch eine künstliche Zeit als Wirkmittel des Leviathan zu etablieren suchte. Gegen Ende seiner prägnanten Analyse erörtert der Autor die Wiederkehr der Hobbesschen Staatsikone im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert sowie die Zukunft des Staates als Bild. (shrink)

Over the past several decades, the philosophical community has witnessed the emergence of an important new paradigm for understanding the mind.1 The paradigm is that of machine computation, and its influence has been felt not only in philosophy, but also in all of the empirical disciplines devoted to the study of cognition. Of the several strategies for applying the resources provided by computer and cognitive science to the philosophy of mind, the one that has gained the most attention from philosophers (...) has been the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). CTM was first articulated by Hilary Putnam (1960, 1961), but finds perhaps its most consistent and enduring advocate in Jerry Fodor (1975, 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1994). It is this theory, and not any broader interpretations of what it would be for the mind to be a computer, that I wish to address in this paper. What I shall argue here is that the notion of symbolic representation employed by CTM is fundamentally unsuited to providing an explanation of the intentionality of mental states (a major goal of CTM), and that this result undercuts a second major goal of CTM, sometimes refered to as the vindication of intentional psychology. This line of argument is related to the discussions of derived intentionality by Searle (1980, 1983, 1984) and Sayre (1986, 1987). But whereas those discussions seem to be concerned with the causal dependence of familiar sorts of symbolic representation upon meaning-bestowing acts, my claim is rather that there is not one but several notions of meaning to be had, and that the notions that are applicable to symbols are conceptually dependent upon the notion that is applicable to mental states in the fashion that Aristotle refered to as paronymy. That is, an analysis of the notions of meaning applicable to symbols reveals that they contain presuppositions about meaningful mental states, much as Aristotle's analysis of the sense of healthy that is applied to foods reveals that it means conducive to having a healthy body, and hence any attempt to explain mental semantics in terms of the semantics of symbols is doomed to circularity and regress. I shall argue, however, that this does not have the consequence that computationalism is bankrupt as a paradigm for cognitive science, as it is possible to reconstruct CTM in a fashion that avoids these difficulties and makes it a viable research framework for psychology, albeit at the cost of losing its claims to explain intentionality and to vindicate intentional psychology. I have argued elsewhere (Horst, 1996) that local special sciences such as psychology do not require vindication in the form of demonstrating their reducibility to more fundamental theories, and hence failure to make good on these philosophical promises need not compromise the broad range of work in empirical cognitive science motivated by the computer paradigm in ways that do not depend on these problematic treatments of symbols. (shrink)

The theme of the philosopher as therapist dominates Nietzsche's entire opus, from his earliest writings to the Zarathustra period and beyond. Nietzsche wishes to hasten the coming and future sanctification of a new type of synthetic human being, and his entire teaching is shaped by his own struggles against illness.Yet few Nietzsche scholars have paid this crucial therapeutic element of his thought sufficient attention. This collection of essays by leading scholars in the field is composed around the Nietzschean insight, which (...) has its roots in the Hippocratic tradition of ancient medicine, that beliefs, behaviours, ideals and patterns of striving are not things for which individuals or even cultures are responsible. Rather, they are symptoms of what an individual or culture is, which symptoms require diagnostic interpretation and evaluation. The book identifies three principal approaches in Nietzsche's philosophy: diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic. Each essay takes up this essential insight into Nietzsche's therapeutic philosophy from a different perspective and collectively they reveal an array of insightful approaches to self-induced enhancement, for both individuals and cultures. (shrink)

Digital data is an increasing and continual presence across the sites, activities and relationships of everyday life. In this article we explore what data presence means for the ways that the everyday is organised, sensed, and anticipated. While digital data studies have demonstrated how data is deeply entangled with the way in which everyday life is lived out and valued, at the same time our relationships with data are riddled with anxieties or small niggles or tricky trade-offs and their use (...) is often chaotic and muddled, part of the inevitable uncertainty about what will happen next. If the presence of data is part of the environments we inhabit, this raises the question of how and why data is valuable to us and what forms of hope and trust enable this value to further develop. (shrink)

The paper analyses Peirce’s hypoiconicity through the lens of Husserlian intentionality. Peirce’s triple structure of hypoiconicity as resemblance relation, diagrammatical reasoning and metaphoric displacement is shown to require intentional acts in its production and interpretation. Regarding hypoiconicity as a semiotic schematization of Vorstellung, the paper places it in the context of Husserl’s conception of intentionality in which iconicity appears as a stepping-stone towards the skeletonization of resemblance in diagrammatical abstraction and as schematic displacement in metaphor. As such, hypoiconic intentionality is (...) argued to play a role also in Peirce’s community conception of language. The paper’s core claim is that intentionality provides an avenue for revealing hypoiconicity as a major, critical concept of semiotics, functioning as paradigm case for investigating the convergence of semiotics and phenomenology. (shrink)

In 2007 a social scientist and a designer created a spatial installation to communicate social science research about the regulation of emerging science and technology. The rationale behind the experiment was to improve scientific knowledge production by making the researcher sensitive to new forms of reactions and objections. Based on an account of the conceptual background to the installation and the way it was designed, the paper discusses the nature of the engagement enacted through the experiment. It is argued that (...) experimentation is a crucial way of making social science about science communication and engagement more robust. (shrink)

This article presents a reading of Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, in recourse to lesser known works of his such as Dictatorship and On the Three Types of Juristic Thought and in light of a hypothesis developed while examining his comment to Concept, going back to the German re-edition of the latter in 1963. There, Schmitt offers an interpretative scheme he has himself named “Hobbes-Crystal”, encapsulating not only a suggestion of how to decipher Hobbes, but also Schmitt’s own approach (...) to politics as Political Theology. As I argue below, the relevant comment also hints at Schmitt’s opposing stance to Natural Law as a legal paradigm and philosophical tradition. I show how this is supported by the Concept’s main text and other works mentioned above, proceeding to claim the former functions on a double-level: Schmitt‘s nominalist inquiry in the concept, circular in itself (although favourably supported by a sup-posedly mere description of what is “the case”) sits on premises which not only have not been articulated openly, but also contradict the nominalist proceeding. Bringing both insights to-gether and fleshing them out by close reading, I show that Schmitt’s nominalism presupposes his adversary stance towards Natural Law. Examining the arguments for this position of his and endorsing Oliver Marchart’s work in history of political theory, I read the nominalist façade of the Concept as a case of postfundamentalist criticism of Natural Law, which Schmitt’s Hobbes studies were formative to. (shrink)

Horst Ruthrof revisits Husserl's phenomenology of language and highlights his late writings as essential to understanding the full range of his ideas. Focusing on the idea of language as imaginable as well as the role of a speech community in constituting it, Ruthrof provides a powerful re-assessment of his methodological phenomenology. From the Logical Investigations to untranslated portions of his Nachlass, Ruthrof charts all the developments and amendments in his theorizations. Instead of emphasising the definition and meaning of words, (...) Husserl's later writings point to the variation produced by a community of speakers in the act of communicating. Essential to this linguistic meaning is the intersubjective character that Ruthrof argues is so emblematic of Husserl's position. Using his concepts of intimation, introjection, reciprocity, and voice further outlines a theory that is intersubjective and communal. Bringing his study up to the present day, Ruthrof discusses metal time travel, the evolution of language, and protosyntax in the context of Husserl's late writings, progressing a comprehensive new phenomenological ontology of language with wide-ranging implications for philosophy, linguistics, and cultural studies. (shrink)

Die Pluralität theologischer Denkansätze wurde in jüngster Zeit mit einem Exklusivitätsanspruch von Teilen Analytischer Theologie konfrontiert. Vertreter*innen 'kontinentaler' Theologie sehen sich dadurch zu einem Metadiskurs über die Frage herausgefordert, wie Theologie heute grundsätzlich zu formatieren ist. In diesem Band treten Positionen zum ersten Mal in einen direkten argumentativen Austausch.

This book challenges the standard view that modern hermeneutics begins with Friedrich Ast and Friedrich Schleiermacher, arguing instead that it is the dialectic of reflective and teleological reason in Kant’s Critique of Judgment that provides the actual proto-hermeneutic foundation. It is revolutionary in doing so by replacing interpretive truth claims by the more appropriate claim of rendering opaque contexts intelligible. Taking Gadamer’s comprehensive analysis of hermeneutics in Truth and Method (1960) as its point of departure, the book turns to Kant’s (...) Critiques, reviewing his major concepts as a coherent system in relation to his sensus communis. At the heart of the book is the interaction between reflective, bottom-up search and teleological, top-down interpretative projection as provided in Part II of the third Critique. This text contends that Kant’s broad definition of nature invites the liberation of the reflective-teleological judgment from its biological exemplifications and so permits us to establish its generalised status as a path-breaking, methodological tool. Kant’s dialectic of reflective search and meaning bestowing, stipulated teleology is asserted to anticipate a series of motifs commonly associated with hermeneutics. Figures covered include Dilthey, Husserl, Ingarden, Heidegger, Gadamer, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, Vattimo, Nancy and Caputo. Their collective contributions to interpretation allow for a review of the evolution of hermeneutics from the perspective of the Kantian critique of the limitations of human cognition. The book is written for the informed, general reader, but will likewise appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students as well as researchers in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

In this book, I offer an account of intentional action. The book has two main parts: in the first part, I discuss and criticize the currently prevailing account of intentional action—the Causal Theory of Action (CTA)—and, in the second part, I offer my alternative account. The CTA proposes essentially two conditions for something that you do to be an intentional action: (1) what you do is represented by your intention (or other mental attitudes), and (2) it is caused by your (...) intention. Against the CTA, I argue that, since it conceives of representation and causality as essentially separate conditions, it cannot explain why, when someone acts intentionally, it is not a mere accident that both conditions are jointly satisfied: i.e., that the intention causes the movement it represents. The CTA’s inability to rule out such accidentality is, as I argue further, the deeper source of the notorious problem of deviant causation. Given this diagnosis, I claim that the key for a satisfactory account of intentional action is to conceive of the essential unity of representation and causality in intentional action. Doing so, I suggest, requires understanding a distinctive sort of causality at work in intentional action. Following the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, I argue that what is distinctive of the sort of causal-explanatory connection captured in action explanations like “S is doing A because she intends to do B” is that it is essentially known by the acting subject. In the final sections of the book, I then develop and defend a conception of the sort of self-knowledge involved in intentional action. (shrink)

Since the seventeenth century, our understanding of the natural world has been one of phenomena that behave in accordance with natural laws. While other elements of the early modern scientific worldview may be rejected or at least held in question—the metaphor of the world as a great machine, the narrowly mechanist assumption that all physical interactions must be contact interactions, the idea that matter might actually be obeying rules laid down by its Divine Author – the notion of natural law (...) has continued to play a pivotal role in actual scientific practice, in our philosophical interpretations of science, and in their its metaphysical implications. (shrink)

V. 1 is a detailed analysis of a previously unknown proof copy of the first edition of Galileo's Sidereus nuncius, in which watercolor drawings appear in place of the etchings of the published edition, consigned in 2005 to the antiquarian bookselling firm of Martayan Lan. V. 2 is an account of the composition and production of the edition, based on analysis of extant copies as well as the New York proof copy. V. 3 was written in response to the discovery, (...) soon after the publication of v. 2, that the proof copy was in fact an elaborate forgery produced between 2003 and 2005 under the direction of Marino Massimo de Caro, as first reported in the article "A very rare book," by Nicholas Schmidle, in The New Yorker issue of 16 December 2013. V. 4, in German, is a heavily revised edition of Horst Bredekamp's Galilei der Künstler, which had included a chapter on the then unrecognized forgery. (shrink)

Segundo o presente artigo, a crise ecológica tornou dramaticamente claw que a evolução social não deve ser apenas entendida como uma emancipação das limitações derivadas da natureza e das amarras da sociabilidade humana e ainda menos deve ser aferida pela capacidade de transformar a natureza num mew repositório de recursos naturais capazes de garantir a sobrevivência do género humano. O artigo pretende assim mostrar até que ponto o progresso social está intimamente associado com a capacidade de se manter o metabolismo (...) social com a natureza a um nível regenerativo. Precisamente neste contexto é que deve ser entendida a exigência de se associar intimamente os sistemas funcionais da economia e da técnica na rede natural que os suporta e dessa forma condicionar a direcção estàvel da evolugdo social á capacidade de resistencia, sempre em mudança, dos sistemas ecológicos. Nesse sentido, o autor define a tarefa de uma "ética social ecológica" como sendo a de contribuir para a clarificação da necessária e, diante da razão prática, responsdvel articulagdo mutua dos factores económicos, sócio-culturais e ecológicos. Essa "ética social ecólogica", diz ainda o autor, parte da constatação de que com a modernidade se alcançou um estádio da história da cultura em que a dependência do ser humano em relação a natureza está ligada com uma dependência de muitos ecosistemas, até então deixados em seu estado natural, em relação ao ser humano, de cuja integridade, por sua vez, também o ser humano depende. Porfim, o artigo interroga-se sobre até que ponto numa natureza de tal maneira "socializada" ainda se podem encontrar pressupostos para uma praxis social capaz de apontar um caminho racionalmente induzido em que se garanta ofuturo dos sistemas sociais, e mostra como esta questão conduz ao problema ético-ecológico fundamental relativo á existência de aspectos normativos no relacionamento com a natureza nas sociedades modernas. /// In the view of the present article, the ecological crisis has dramatically demonstrated that social evolution ought not be understood merely in terms of an emancipation of natural and social limitations. Even less, ought it be thought that such an emancipation implies the transformation of nature into just a reserve of natural resources for the survival of humankind. The article hopes to show the degree to which social progress is intimately associated with the capacity of maintaining the social metabolism with nature at the level at which regeneration is possible. One must come to understand the exigency of bringing functional systems of economy and technology within the natural network nature that supports them such that an equilibrium in social evolution may be established in relation to the ecological systems. In this sense, the author sees the task of an "ecological social ethics" as contributing to the clarification of the necessary articulation between economic, socio-cultural, and ecological factors. Such an ethics is conceived against the background of a modernity that reflects a stage in the history of culture in which human beings were seen as depending on many ecosystems left in their natural state. Finally, the question is raised concerning the degree to which it is still possible to find principles for a social praxis capable of opening a rational path for the social systems of the future and how this question raises a further one about the normative aspects of the relationship with nature in modern societies. (shrink)

This new volume of the SAGE Social Thinkers series, The Social Thought of Georg Simmel provides a concise introduction to the work, life, and influences of Georg Simmel. Horst J. Helle closely examines the writings and ideas of Simmel that introduced a new way of looking at culture and society and helped establish sociology’s place among the academic fields. The book focuses on the key intellectual concerns of Simmel, including the process of individualization, religion, private and family life, cities, (...) and modernization. It is ideal for use as a self-contained volume or in conjunction with other sociological theory books. (shrink)

Expulsion of senses. Acustic spaces: call and listening in interpretive sociology. Following the 'mental constructs' that are illustrative for Max Weber's Idealtypologie, the 'acustic spaces' in the cultural concept of education are developed. The study is an analysis of the organization of command and obedience in Weber's sociology of domination. His interpretive sociology is taken from Martin Heidegger. Another subject of the paper is an excursion into the sociology of music of Weber and Adorno. In the acoustic sounds of music, (...) especially in the organ and piano works, we find the process of rationalization of the Western culture. (shrink)