The research examines the impact of Marxist praxis on Library Science and Information Science through a methodological approach that combines bibliographic research and content analysis. The bibliographic research methodology involved systematic and critical consultation of sources such as specialized journals, reference works, and relevant studies available in academic databases like Brapci, Scielo, and Capes, as well as publications by renowned authors in Philosophy and Social Sciences. The research findings highlight the significance of Marxist praxis in transforming information services and managing (...) information units, particularly in the library context, emphasizing the democratization of knowledge and the promotion of equal access to information. Additionally, they underscore the role of information professionals in fostering cultural democracy and mitigating social disparities, reinforcing the need for a critical approach that not only facilitates access to information but also recognizes and addresses underlying power dynamics. It is concluded that Marxist praxis provides a robust theoretical framework for the critical understanding and transformation of professional practices in Library Science and Information Science, enhancing the role of information professionals as agents of social change. In this sense, the research contributes not only to the theoretical development of these fields but also to professional practice aimed at broader social goals aligned with principles of justice and equity in the dissemination and access to information in contemporary society. (shrink)

Tainted political symbols ought to be confronted, removed, or at least recontextualized. Despite the best efforts to achieve this, however, official actions on tainted symbols often fail to take place. In such cases, I argue that political vandalism—the unauthorized defacement, destruction, or removal of political symbols—may be morally permissible or even obligatory. This is when, and insofar as, political vandalism serves as fitting counter-speech that undermines the authority of tainted symbols in ways that match their publicity, refuses to let them (...) speak in our name, and challenges the derogatory messages expressed through a mechanism I call derogatory pedestalling: the glorification or honoring of certain individuals or ideologies that can only make sense when members of a targeted group are taken to be inferior. (shrink)

It is proposed here that the Confucian li, norms of appropriate behavior, be understood as part of the dynamic process of moral self-cultivation. Within this framework li are multidimensional, as they have different functions at different stages in the cultivation process. This novel interpretation refocuses the issue regarding the flexibility of li, a topic that is still being debated by scholars. The significance of this proposal is not restricted to a new understanding of li. Key features of the various stages (...) of moral development in Confucian thought are also articulated. This account presents the picture of a Confucian paradigmatic person as critically self-aware and ethically sensitive. (shrink)

Background: In health, ethics is an essential aspect of practice and care and guarantees a better quality of life for patients and their caregivers. Objective: To outline a conceptual analysis of quality of life and ethics, identifying attributes, contexts and magnitudes for health. Method: A qualitative design about quality of life and ethics in health, considering the evolutionary approach in order to analyse the concept. To collect the data, a search was done using the keywords ethic*, quality of life and (...) health. After, in total, 152 studies were found, finalizing seven relevant studies for the proposed concept analysis. Findings and discussion: Of seven studies analysed, their main results were shown by means of antecedents, consequences and attributes of the concepts. The three final attributes that synthesize the concept of quality of life and ethics in health were highlighted: Ethics dilemmas and quality of life; Human ethics and quality of life; and Ethics of care and quality of life. In fact, the attributes and context clearly reveal that ethics and quality of life influence the ability to solve ethical dilemmas, guarantee human ethics in healthcare and impact ethics in healthcare for the production of effective health policies and care that encompasses professional quality of life as well. Conclusion: The magnitude of ethical knowledge in each professional discipline permits cultivating a solidary attitude and developing the willingness to improve healthcare. The right to access, dignity and respect in care delivery are rooted in behaviours and are spontaneously applied in practice to the extent that they play an ethical role. (shrink)

Many have argued that certain statues or monuments are objectionable, and thus ought to be removed. Even if their arguments are compelling, a major obstacle is the apparent historical value of those commemorations. Preservation in some form seems to be the best way to respect the value of commemorations as connections to the past or opportunities to learn important historical lessons. Against this, I argue that we have exaggerated the historical value of objectionable commemorations. Sometimes commemorations connect to biased or (...) distorted versions of history, if not mere myths. We can also learn historical lessons through what I call repudiatory honouring: the honouring of certain victims or resistors that can only make sense if the oppressor(s) or target(s) of resistance are deemed unjust, where no part of the original objectionable commemorations is preserved. This type of commemorative practice can even help to overcome some of the obstacles objectionable commemorations pose against properly connecting to the past. (shrink)

本书主要内容包括:史料困境的突破与儒家系谱的重建;郭店竹简《性自命出》篇初探;竹帛《五行》为子思、孟子所作论;竹简《五行》分经解论:《五行》章句简注;竹简《五行》与子思思想研究等.

The Zhuangzi, a 4th century BCE Chinese text, is optimistic about life unrestrained by entrenched values. This paper contributes to existing debates on Zhuangzian freedom in three ways. First, it reflects on how it is possible to enjoy the freedom envisaged in the Zhuangzi. Many discussions welcome the Zhuangzi’s picture of release from life shaped by canonical visions, without also giving thought to life without these driving visions. Consider this scenario: in a world with limitless possibilities, would it not be (...) fraught, not knowing how to interpret situations? I suggest that freedom in the Zhuangzi is possible only if one succeeds in reorienting herself to the new ‘normal’. Second, I introduce and develop the idea of working with constraints. This focuses on an agent's maximizing the fit between relevant conditions, on the one hand, and their capabilities, on the other. Finally, I propose that self-directed practice, an important expression of agency, is required for building capabilities that enable such freedom. I examine the idea of risk involved in these firsthand experiences, articulating an account of agency that sits at the heart of hard-won Zhuangzian freedom. (shrink)

Does ‘remembering that p’ entail ‘knowing that p’? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often ‘vaguely remember’ a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology, I will construct cases where the subject (...) vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then ‘remembering that p’ does not entail ‘knowing that p’. (shrink)

By organizing crowds of scientists to independently tackle the same research questions, we can collectively overcome the generalizability crisis. Strategies to draw inferences from a heterogeneous set of research approaches include aggregation, for instance, meta-analyzing the effect sizes obtained by different investigators, and parsing, attempting to identify theoretically meaningful moderators that explain the variability in results.

Social movements may bring positive social changes. However, escalated levels of violence and delinquency in some campaigns caused public concerns about infringing personal rights and destroying public property. In modern societies, we encourage mutual respect, peace, and appropriate conflict resolutions and avoid the use of aggression across situations. This cross-sectional study examined forgiveness, moral disengagement, and reactive and proactive aggression among different types of young social activists in Hong Kong. Findings would provide insights into intervention strategies for reducing aggressive behaviors (...) in young people and helping them restore their quality of life. Our participants were 1046 local secondary school and tertiary students (583 males and 463 females) aged 12 to 25 years (M = 16.95, SD = 3.29). They completed a questionnaire about their participation in local campaigns, with psychological measures of forgiveness, moral disengagement, and aggression. The respondents were then divided into three categories: non-activists (NA), moderate activists (MA), and activists with delinquent/violent action (ADA). ANOVAs were used to examine the differences between these three types of social activists. Results indicated that ADA reported using more reactive and proactive aggression than NA, and MA reported using more reactive but not proactive aggression than NA. ADA had significantly higher levels of moral disengagement overall than NA and MA. Regarding forgiveness, both ADA and MA had significantly lower levels of absence of negative than NA. Implications for psychotherapy, education, and social policies will be discussed. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka’s Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun. Bhāviveka’s treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is required to be existent. Bhāviveka also holds that, in a conventional sense, words refer to universals and to the existent entities that possess them, while the two are cognised together. However, in his inference for the unreality of unconditioned things, (...) he likens these things to a sky-flower that never arises and is unreal even conventionally. This paper first demonstrates how taking unconditioned things as the subject of an inference can be problematic for Bhāviveka. Then, it discusses Bhāviveka’s attempts to address the problems by subsuming the unconditioned things under the domain of conventional reality. The paper concludes that these attempts show his flexibility in terms of what is taken as conventionally real. (shrink)

There is a substantial disagreement in the literature over whether ‘remembering’ is a normative concept. Some philosophers have attempted to defend the normativity of ‘remembering’ by highlighting its normative importance or its conceptual affinities with ‘knowing’ or ‘duties’. This paper will first reveal defects of these existing normativist arguments. After that, I will propose and defend a new normativist argument, according to which the concept ‘remembering’ is partly constituted by a paradigmatically normative concept, namely ‘rational’. To be more specific, I (...) argue that full possession of the concept of ‘remembering’ requires having an inclination to believe that ‘if S remembers that p, then S would be (at least defeasibly) rational in holding a memory-based belief that p’. This, according to a persuasive constitutive account of normative concepts, suffices to demonstrate the normative nature of remembering. (shrink)

Skill and Mastery: Philosophical Stories from the Zhuangzi presents an illuminating analysis of skill stories from the Zhuangzi, a 4th century BCE Daoist text. In this intriguing text that subverts conventional norms and pursuits, ordinary activities such as swimming, cicada-catching and wheelmaking are executed with such remarkable efficacy and spontaneity that they seem like magical feats. An international team of scholars explores these stories in their philosophical, historical and political contexts. Their analyses’ highlight the stories’underlying conceptions of agency, character and (...) cultivation; and relevance to contemporary debates on human action and experience. The result is a valuable collection, opening up new lines of inquiry in comparative East-West philosophical debates on skill, cultivation and mastery, as well as cross-disciplinary debates in psychology, cognitive science and philosophy. (shrink)

The cicada catcher focuses as much on technique as he does on outcomes. In response to Confucius’ question, he articulates in detail the learning he has undertaken to develop techniques at each level of competence. This chapter explains the connection between the cicada catcher’s development of technique and his orientation toward outcomes. It uses details in this story to contribute to recent discussions in epistemology on the cultivation of technique.

In order to deepen the studies on the philosophy of practice, it is essential to explore the political significance of Marx's philosophy of practice. Marx's philosophy of practice is rooted in the problem of modernity and the separation between “individual subjectivity” and “societal community” in the modern context is the basic background of Marx's practical philosophy. It is the basic interest of Marx's philosophy of practice to find a way to end this separation via critique of civil society. Therefore, Marx's (...) philosophy of practice has a clear significance, which manifests in the following aspects: one is “liberation politics,” and the other, “the regulatory mode of the socio-political institution.”. (shrink)

In this essay, Christoph Menke’s “aesthetics of force” converses with contemporary Chinese philosophy, especially with the field of Transcultural Research in the Zhuāngzǐ conducted in Taiwan. The starting point of the following reflections is that “the artist is able to be unable”. How can we philosophically describe a way of doing that retains self-awareness in the midst of self-forgetfulness? What Zhuāngzǐ discusses is an aesthetic cultivation of “contemplative perception” in the midst of doing. His language is able to describe and (...) interpret from within a way of doing that refrains from purposeful action. Menke’s approach corresponds with my reflections on Daoism and the book Zhuāngzǐ developed in recent years. Particularly important in this context is the exploration of relating aesthetics to ethical and political questions through an aesthetic transformation of subjectivity. Following the linguistic dynamics associated with the transcultural interweaving of texts, this essay connects Menke’s interpretation of Nietzsche and my interpretation of the Zhuāngzǐ. In so doing, I hope to set in motion a change in thinking on both sides. (shrink)

Civil disobedience, despite its illegal nature, can sometimes be justified vis-à-vis the duty to obey the law, and, arguably, is thereby not liable to legal punishment. However, adhering to the demands of justice and refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience may lead to a highly problematic theoretical consequence: the debilitation of civil disobedience. This is because, according to the novel analysis I propose, civil disobedience primarily functions as a costly social signal. It is effective by being reliable, reliable by being (...) costly, and costly primarily by being punished. My analysis will highlight a distinctive feature of civil disobedience: civil disobedients leverage the punitive injustice they suffer to amplify their communicative force. This will lead to two paradoxical implications. First, the instability of the moral status of both civil disobedience and its punishment to the extent where the state may be left with no permissible course of action with regard to punishing civil disobedience. Second, by refraining from punishing justified civil disobedience, the state may render uncivil disobedience—illegal political activities that fall short of the standards of civil disobedience—potentially permissible. (shrink)

Courage is a basic virtue to any heroic society. It is the defining virtue of the aristocratic warrior in the Iliad. It came with a set of other related virtues, all functioning in a social setting unique to that heroic era. However, as society evolved beyond the heroics of war to the civility of settled city–states, courage would be reviewed and redefined. In fact the whole virtue complex would undergo fundamental changes. Still later, when from out of the cities philosophers (...) rose, they would, in their commitment to a higher justice or righteousness than what the city had to offer to date, submit courage to a third critique and transformation. We see this in Greece; we may also see it in China. (shrink)

In Daoist philosophy, the self is understood as an individual interdependent with others, and situated within a broader environment. Within this framework, the concept ziran is frequently understood in terms of naturalness or nature while wuwei is explained in terms of non-oppressive government. In many existing accounts, little is done to connect these two key Daoist concepts. Here, I suggest that wuwei and ziran are correlated, ethical, concepts. Together, they provide a unifying ethical framework for understanding the philosophy of the (...) Daodejing. I explore the meaning of ziran as self-so-ness or, in human terms, as pertaining to an individual’s spontaneity. The appropriate response to the spontaneity of individuals is to avoid, insofar as possible, imposing or using restrictive norms and methods, that is, wuwei. According to this view, ziran and wuwei offer an account of ethics that attends to core notions of interdependent selfhood, including mutuality, relationality, interdependence, symbiosis, and responsiveness. (shrink)

Many scholars note that the Analects, and Confucian philosophy more generally, hold a conception of knowing that more closely approximates ‘knowing-how’ than ‘knowing-that’. However, I argue that this description is not sufficiently sensitive to the concerns of the early Confucians and their focus on self-cultivation. I propose that a particular conception of knowing—knowing to act in the moment—is better suited to capturing the Analects’ emphasis on exemplary lives in actual contexts. These investigations might also contribute to discussions on know-how in (...) epistemology in western philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, we present an account of ming 明 in the Zhuangzi's Neipian in light of the disagreements among the thinkers of the time. We suggest that ming is associated with the Daoist sage's vision: he sees through the debaters' attempts to win the debates. We propose that ming is primarily a meta-epistemological stance, that is, the sage understands the nature of the debates and does not enter the fray; therefore he does not share the thinkers' anxieties. The sage (...) takes his stance at the pivot of dao (daoshu 道樞) and, from there, responds to the different views limitlessly. (shrink)

In the Lunyu, Confucius remarks on the implausibility—or impossibility—of a life lacking in xin 信, reliability (2.22). In existing discussions of Confucian philosophy, this aspect of life is often eclipsed by greater emphasis on Confucian values such as ren 仁 (benevolence), li 禮 (propriety) and yi 義 (rightness). My discussion addresses this imbalance by focusing on reliability, extending current debates in two ways. First, it proposes that the common translation of xin as denoting coherence between a person’s words and deeds (...) is inadequate. The translation fails to capture the longer-term consistency in a person’s actions and behaviours in different circumstances across time. Second, it explores how the Lunyu passages discuss the processes of learning that prepare a person for reliable action. (shrink)

The Zhuangzi is noted for its advocacy of many different perspectives—chickens, cicadas, fish and the like. There is much debate in the literature about the implications of Zhuangzi’s pluralist inclinations. I suggest that Zhuangzi highlights the limitations of individual, perspectivally-constrained, knowledge claims. He also spurns the ‘view from nowhere’ and is sceptical about the possibility of an ideal observer. For him, wisdom consists in understanding the epistemological inadequacies of each perspective. I propose that Zhuangzi’s philosophy offers significant insights to an (...) increasingly globalized world characterized by a plurality of ethical and value commitments. It does not assume there will necessarily be universal agreement or a standardized answer. Most importantly, it is a position that seeks to augment self-understanding and enrich the self in dialogue with and response to others. (shrink)

Since the 1940s, Western epistemology has discussed Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Ryle argued that intelligent actions – manifestations of knowledge-how – are not constituted as intelligent by the guiding intervention of knowledge-that: knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that; we must understand knowledge-how in independent terms. Yet which independent terms are needed? In this chapter, we consider whether an understanding of intelligent action must include talk of knowledge-to. This is the knowledge to do this or that now, (...) not then or in general. Our argument is refined and buttressed by consideration of a text in Chinese philosophy, the Lüshi Chunqiu. This 3rd century BCE text, a compendium on good government, focuses on different types of knowledge that an effective ruler or a capable official should possess. A significant number of those discussions concern examples of knowing-how being manifested in particular situations. The text is explicitly aware of the importance of timeliness and awareness of context in manifesting know-how. Some might say that these are merely manifestations of knowing-how. But we see these examples as revealing characteristics of know-how that Ryle did not anticipate. Might knowing-to be an essential and irreducible aspect of intelligent action? (shrink)

The standard criticisms of Confucian ethics appear contradictory. On the one hand, Confucian ethics is deemed overly rule-bound: it is obsolete because it advocates adherence to ancient Chinese norms of proper conduct. On the other hand, Confucian ethics is perceived as situational ethics—done on the run—and not properly grounded in fundamental principles or norms. I give reasons for these disparate views of Confucian ethics. I also sketch an account of Confucian morality that focuses on moral development; in this account the (...) place of normative ethics is nominal. (shrink)

Drawing on the core values of western civilization, the author refines the counterparts in Chinese civilization, summarized as four core principles: duty before freedom, obedience before rights, community before individual, and harmony before conflict. Focusing on guoxue or Sinology as the basis of his approach, the author provides detailed explanations of traditional Chinese values. Recent scholars have addressed the concept of guoxue since the modern age, sorting through it and piecing it together, which has produced an extremely abundant range of (...) information. However, given that the concepts and theories involved have been left largely unanalyzed, this book develops a theoretical treatment of them in several important respects. First, it analyzes the mindset of guoxue, examining the dominant ideas and values of the era from which the term "guoxue" arose, focusing on its connection to early changes and trends in society and culture, and distinguishing three key phases of development. Past scholars mainly had in mind the range of objects studied in guoxue when defining it, and what this book underscores is the meaning of guoxue as a modern body of research. Secondly, it assesses several phases in the modern evolution of the body of guoxue research from the beginning to the end of the 20th century, id est, ending with the later phase of the National Heritage movement. Third and lastly, the book explores the various main modes of modern guoxue, which correspond step by step with the evolutionary phases of guoxue research. (shrink)

Appeal to women’s experience for moral delineation in theological ethics has been perplexed by the issue of cultural diversity and colonialism as raised by postcolonial critique. This paper aims to examine the debates from Third-World feminism and Christian feminism in dealing with difference and solidarity, leading to the call for contextual analysis and related power mappings. Margaret A. Farley’s proposal for sexual ethics in Just Love will then serve as an example to discuss how the search for common morality among (...) cultural diversity may prevent or reinforce colonial agendas and other privileges. (shrink)

A potencialidade na filosofia da educação antiga e medieval 1 Resumo: O texto aborda a potencialidade, na filosofia da educação antiga e medieval, como a capacidade de aperfeiçoamento da razão. A noção de paideia conduz essa reflexão, uma vez que perpassa o pensamento educacional desde a antiguidade clássica até a baixa Idade Média. Essa continuidade explicita a tradição da formação integral do homem que considerava os aspectos morais e políticos como uma totalidade indissociável. O encaminhamento teórico segue a concepção de (...) História Social de Braudel (1902-1985), já que o foco é a compreensão da herança teológica e filosófica, que exprime os fundamentos da educação. Para refletir sobre esse legado do conhecimento, três momentos foram estudados: a paideia grega na perspectiva aristotélica e platônica; a patrística, por meio do entendimento de Clemente de Alexandria (150-215 d.C.) e de Agostinho de Hipona (354-430 d.C.); e a escolástica, analisada nas concepções de Hugo de São Vítor (1096-1141) e Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274). Assim, nos autores apresentados, há a permanência da compreensão de que o aperfeiçoamento da razão significava a transformação em ato da potência essencial do homem: a razão. A principal finalidade da educação, portanto, era a formação da consciência de cada pessoa, pois entendia-se que esse era o principal meio para o êxito da vida em comum. Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Educação; Potencialidade; Paideia; Patrística; Escolástica. Potentiality in the philosophy of ancient and medieval education Abstract: The text addresses the potentiality, in the philosophy of ancient and medieval education, as the ability to improve reason. The notion of paideia guides this reflection since it pervades educational thought from classical antiquity to the low Middle Ages. This continuity explains the tradition of the integral formation of man which considered the moral and political aspects as an inseparable totality. The theoretical approach follows Braudel’s conception of Social History since the focus is on understanding the theological and philosophical heritage, which expresses the fundamentals of education. To reflect on this legacy of knowledge, three periods were studied: the Greek paideia in the Aristotelian and Platonic perspective; patristic, through the understanding of Clement of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo; and scholasticism, analysed in the conceptions of Hugh of Saint Victor and Thomas Aquinas. Thus, there is a continuing understanding in the authors presented that the improvement of reason meant the actualization of man's essential potency: reason. The main purpose of education was the formation of the conscience of each person, as it was understood that this was the main means for the success of life in common. Key words: Philosophy of education; Potentiality; Paideia; Patristic; Scholastic. Potencialidad en la filosofía de la educación antigua y medieval Resumen: El texto aborda la potencialidad en la filosofía de la educación antigua y medieval, como capacidad para mejorar la razón. La noción de paideia orienta esta reflexión ya que impregna el pensamiento educativo desde la antigüedad hasta la baja Edad Media. Esta continuidad explica la tradición de la formación integral del hombre que consideraba los aspectos morales y políticos como una totalidad. El enfoque teórico sigue la concepción de Braudel de Historia Social, ya que el enfoque está en la comprensión de la herencia teológica y filosófica, que expresa los fundamentos de la educación. Por tanto, se estudiaron tres períodos: la paideia griega en la perspectiva aristotélica y platónica; la patrística, a través del entendimiento de Clemente de Alejandría y Agustín de Hipona; y escolasticismo, analizado en las concepciones de Hugo de San Víctor y Tomás de Aquino. Por lo tanto, existe un entendimiento continuo en los autores presentados de que la mejora de la razón significó la actualización de lo potencial del hombre: la razón. El propósito principal de la educación era la formación de la conciencia de cada persona, pues se entendía que este era el principal medio para el éxito de la vida comunitaria. Palabras-clave: Filosofía de la educación; Potencialidad; Paideia; Patrística; Escolástica. Data de registro: 22/04/2021 Data de aceite: 22/09/2021 1 Artigo desenvolvido com base na tese Hábito e subjetividade na educação: aproximações entre Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino e a neurociência, defendida por Lais Boveto, orientada por Terezinha Oliveira. Pesquisa com bolsa doutorado CAPES. (shrink)

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements (...) for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given 1 in human nature. The figure 1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the start. I use the phrase "naturally-given" throughout the paper to indicate where a particular capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state. (shrink)

By examining fundamental Confucian concepts -- zhengming, ren, li, xiao, shu and dao -- the essay demonstrates that Confucian ways of thinking do not always fit neatly into categories such as 'moral' or rights'. The author provides a positive interpretation of certain Confucian ideas including: the concept of a person as a self- in- relation; the notion of responsibility as particularistic and dependent upon the kinds of relationships one has and the social positions one occupies; and the view of the (...) moral community as comprised by selves- in- relation who are reciprocally connected and who share similar ideals and forms of life. (shrink)

Confucianism, since the time of Confucius, emphasizes “practical wisdom” as the realization of philosophy. This approach accentuates the practical aspects of wisdom rather than the analytical rationale of the intellect. Emphasis on practical wisdom persistently reinforces a moral foundation that is not differentiated from personal virtue. At the same time, practical wisdom in Confucianism stresses self-cultivation, or the complete transformation of the self, derived from the internal state of the heart/mind (xin 心). Finally, Confucian insists that practical wisdom must be (...) transformed into practical action. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the unity of several virtues in pre-Qin Confucians. Confucius maintains the proper application and coherence of such virtues as benevolence, wisdom, trustworthiness, straightforwardness, courage, and firmness. Further, Confucius takes benevolence and nobility as characteristic of human being. Particular attention is paid to the distinction and relationship between virtuous characters and virtuous actions.

Demonstrating the limitations of the one-at-a-time approach, crowd initiatives reveal the surprisingly powerful role of analytic and design choices in shaping scientific results. At the same time, cross-cultural variability in effects is far below the levels initially expected. This highlights the value of “medium” science, leveraging diverse stimulus sets and extensive robustness checks to achieve integrative tests of competing theories.

This chapter discusses ren 仁, a major term in the Confucian Analects. It analyzes the range of meanings of ren across different conversations, paying special attention to its associations with other key Confucian terms such as li (禮 behavioural propriety) and zhi (知 understanding). Building on this analysis, the discussion focuses on ren in terms of how it is manifest in a person’s life. In particular, it expresses ren in terms of an exemplary life—a life lived well. The chapter also (...) dwells briefly on how this model of a good life can inform and enrich contemporary debates in ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Political AuthorityThe Two Wheels of the DharmaWhalen Lai“The twin wheels of the dharma The two wings of the dove”The twin wheels of the dharma, one of power and the other of righteousness, is the classic metaphor in the Buddhist view of the state and the saṅgha. We will first register the distinction of that metaphor by going back to its historical roots, showing how and why it is more (...) meaningful for Buddhists than for Hindus. Then we will map its structural growth sociologically, weigh its overall strengths and weaknesses, and consider other Buddhist options for civil order and interstate relationships. Finally we will examine the price of modernity and the crisis of authority that Buddhist culture faces.Toward a Genealogy of the Twin WheelsThe legend of the Buddha is by now well known. Prince Siddhārtha left family and home, and renounced the kingdom and the world. He had seen the inevitability of suffering. He vowed to find its cause to eliminate that result. After his enlightenment, he reflected upon releasing that path to the world. When the Buddha so taught the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path to his old companions at Benares, tradition then remembers that as the Buddha “turning the wheel of dharma.” The wheel (cakra) is a metaphor; it refers to the wheel of a sun chariot and is now on the national flag of India. That cosmic wheel has rolled on since time immemorial; as saṃsāra, it has been endless suffering. That is, until the Buddha so turned the sun wheel anew, marking it possible for the first time end that cycle and point the way to nirvāṇic liberation. History was so changed with that act of the Buddha at Benares. Mankind turned a corner. Christianity sees the event on the cross to be, likewise, a break in time. History as we know it had ended. The end time, the eschatological kingdom with its promise of a new heaven and a new earth, have dawned. The price of Adam’s sin was death. Christ’s resurrection turned that around.In Buddhism, the normal course of life and death (rebirth: saṃsāra) also ended [End Page 171] with the Buddha’s enlightenment under the Bodhi tree. The path to nirvāṇa was open. The city of nirvāṇa is in sight. Or as a Buddhist miracle would tell it, the water of the Ganges flowed backward in response to an act of truth (satyāgraha).The event at Benares when the Buddha turned the wheel of dharma anew may be a major inspiration for the ideology of the twin wheels. In general, Hinduism needs only to presume one wheel; it does not count a second. Although Hinduism knows its share of renunciation and liberation (mokṣa), the Brahmanical system set down by the Vedas is committed to safeguarding the sanctity of the caste system. It can absorb mokṣa under the larger law for its varṇāśramadharma. The renunciation is ideally the last station in life, coming after formal retirement from active household duties, and well approaching old age and a good time for learning how to transcend it. Buddhism challenged the caste system by setting up the saṅgha, a new Buddhist community. Hinduism lacks that call for reconstituting society. It does not know the “saṅgha and state” tension that Buddhists know like Christians would the tension between church and state. In the end, the Vedānta philosophy in Hinduism does not postulate that tension. The ātman-brahman identity of self and universe is inherently monistic.This is not to say Hindus do not face a basic conflict between two contrary worlds. It does but it solves it differently. The tragic dilemma in the Bhagavadgītā is that Arjuna, who came to embrace nonviolence like a Buddhist or a Jain would, was eventually persuaded to fight, namely, to perform his caste duty of being a warrior, ready to kill and be killed. That, in a Greek tragic term, is the dike of some cosmic dharma wheel. Oedipus Rex, in the end, must bow to his fate and lot... (shrink)