In his paper “Non-human moral status: problems with phenomenal consciousness,” Joshua Shepherd emphasized an objectivist understanding of welfare to establish the moral status of non-human entities...

Human brain organoids are three-dimensional masses of tissues derived from human stem cells that partially recapitulate the characteristics of the human brain. They have promising applications in many fields, from basic research to applied medicine. However, ethical concerns have been raised regarding the use of human brain organoids. These concerns primarily relate to the possibility that brain organoids may become conscious in the future. This possibility is associated with uncertainties about whether and in what sense brain organoids could have consciousness (...) and what the moral significance of that would be. These uncertainties raise further concerns regarding consent from stem cell donors who may not be sufficiently informed to provide valid consent to the use of their donated cells in human brain organoid research. Furthermore, the possibility of harm to the brain organoids raises question about the scope of the donor’s autonomy in consenting to research involving these entities. Donor consent does not establish the reasonableness of the risk and harms to the organoids, which ethical oversight must ensure by establishing some measures to mitigate them. To address these concerns, we provide three proposals for the consent procedure for human brain organoid research. First, it is vital to obtain project-specific consent rather than broad consent. Second, donors should be assured that appropriate measures will be taken to protect human brain organoids during research. Lastly, these assurances should be fulfilled through the implementation of precautionary measures. These proposals aim to enhance the ethical framework surrounding human brain organoid research. (shrink)

v. 1. A critical edition of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra) -- v. 2. An annotated translation of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra).

An ethical and legal framework is needed to regulate the rapidly developing human brain organoid research field properly. However, considering the legal issues involved in human brain organoid research remains underdeveloped and scattered. This article reviews the legal issues of human brain organoid research, grouping them into the following five broad themes: (1) consciousness, (2) legal status, (3) consent, (4) ownership, and (5) transplantation. The issues in each topic include both the urgent (e.g., appropriate forms of consent) and the speculative (...) (e.g., protection of conscious human brain organoids). Therefore, we have attempted to be as explicit as possible about the timescale within which each issue will be realized and to prioritize each. Examining these issues has revealed legal issues specific to human brain organoid research and issues common to research in other fields. Further discussion of human brain organoid research from a legal perspective is needed in the future, considering discussions in related fields. (shrink)

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness is the result of a means of valid cognition. It has also been understood that Dignāga accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object as the result; in PS ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the (...) result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object is the result. In I 9ab he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramāṇa and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna is the phala, Kumārila points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramāṇa and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature, i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasaṃvitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthaniścaya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. (shrink)

仁斎にとっての「学問」とは、世界の見え方を刷新させるものである。そして、そのような「学問」の道を開いたのが孔子であった。.

A survey of high school student expectations on biotechnology was made, including the information, where it came from, how information resources influence their scientific thoughts. GM crops were used as the theme of biotechnology, because the technology is concerned with food which all people have a relationship with. From the 977 responses obtained from 8 high schools it was found most high schools' students expected benefits and risks from biotechnology. A wide variety of fruits and vegetables improvements were given when (...) students were asked to think about how they would improve their favourite fruit and vegetable. The information given by mass media tended to increase the feeling that science was risky. (shrink)

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)

This book is an unprecedented consideration of the challenges of what we can do for generations yet to come. Many growing intergenerational conflicts of interest, such as climate change and fiscal sustainability, are the result of the historically new progress of increasing human power, and the resolution of those conflicts demands a new intergenerational ethic. The book offers fresh new ideas for resolving intergenerational conflicts through the exploration of an entirely new field, conceptualized in philosophy, developed in economics, and tested (...) in experiments. In particular, this work develops the theory of intergenerational cooperation based on a new relationship of direct reciprocity between generations. From experimental results, the possibility of intergenerational cooperation through Kantian categorical imperative is shown. The book also examines the effectiveness of inviting representatives of future generations, which are called "imaginary future generations", into the deliberations for current policy decisions. The original Japanese edition of this book was awarded the 66th Nikkei Prize for Excellent Books in Economic Science. The prize was established in 1958 to contribute to the advancement of academics and knowledge in the fields of economics, management, and accounting, as well as to its general dissemination and application. (shrink)

This study aims to provide a comprehensive review of the ethical, legal and social issues in human brain organoid research, with a view to different types of research and applications: in vitro research, transplantation into non-human animals, and biocomputing. Despite the academic and societal attention on the possibility that human brain organoids may be conscious, we have identified diverse issues in human brain organoid research and applications. To guide the complex terrain of human brain organoid research and applications, a multidisciplinary (...) approach that integrates ethical, legal, and social perspectives is essential. (shrink)

「士農工商は天下を治めるたすけとなる」―江戸期、都市化・経済化の流動的な波の中で、人々の生のつながりの公共的意義を説いた梅岩。広範な影響を及ぼしたその心学は、人々に希望を与え、世界のすべての存在が共に 幸福になることをめざす創造的・運動的な営みであった。.

As social, locative, and mobile media render the intimate public and the public intimate, this volume interrogates how this phenomenon impacts art practice and politics. Contributors bring together the worlds of art and media culture to rethink their intersections in light of participatory social media. By focusing upon the Asia-Pacific region, they seek to examine how regionalism and locality affect global circuits of culture. The book also offers a set of theoretical frameworks and methodological paradigms for thinking about contemporary art (...) practice more generally. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline how one might conduct a comprehensive ethical evaluation of human brain organoid transplantation in animals. Thus far, ethical concerns regarding this type of research have been assumed to be similar to those associated with other transplants of human cells in animals, and have therefore not received significant attention. The focus has been only on the welfare, moral status, or mental capacities of the host animal. However, the transplantation of human brain organoids introduces several new ethical (...) issues. Many of these are related to uncertainty regarding whether or not brain organoids might be conscious. While these concerns might not be immediately relevant, they warrant closer scrutiny. We discuss how various ethical issues are relevant to different stages of human brain organoid transplantation and can guide the ethical evaluation of research. Our examination would broaden the horizons of the debate on the transplantation of brain organoids. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Meaning and Non-Existence: Kumārila’s Refutation of Dignāga’s Theory of Exclusion by Kei Kataoka and John TaberCharles A. Goodman (bio)Meaning and Non-Existence: Kumārila’s Refutation of Dignāga’s Theory of Exclusion. By Kei Kataoka and John Taber. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2021. Pp. 268. Paper $44.00, ISBN 978-3-7001-8641-0.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (seventh century CE) was a brilliant and highly original thinker, a master of Sanskrit style, and perhaps the most (...) formidable philosophical critic the Buddhist tradition has ever faced. Yet among philosophers trained in Western traditions, his work is today almost unknown. One key cause of this unmerited neglect may be that very little of Kumārila’s oeuvre has been available in Western languages. The present work, by two prominent experts on Mīmāṃsā, presents one of the most influential and difficult chapters of Kumārila’s most important work, the Commentary in Verses, in a clear and accurate English translation.As one of the greatest philosophical authors to have appeared in the traditions we now call Hinduism, Kumārila’s works in general are of considerable interest to specialists in Hindu thought. The particular chapter translated in this volume, however, may well be of broader significance than most of his writings. In that chapter, the Apohavāda, Kumārila offers a thorough and wide-ranging critique of the philosophy of language advocated by Dignāga, a key figure in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Many scholars maintain that it was this critique in particular that motivated Dharmakīrti, another major Buddhist epistemologist, to formulate a new version of this understanding of language, one that would be widely accepted and influential among Buddhists in India and Tibet. Thus, anyone interested in the history of Buddhist philosophy may also find much to ponder in this volume.Several traditions of South Asian philosophy, including the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Kumārila’s own Mīmāṃsā school, were realists about universals. They held that universals were permanent, mind-independent entities and that our understanding of the world was dependent on them. Kumārila’s views on the topic are especially uncompromising, as he holds that we can directly perceive universals in the ordinary things we encounter.These views were, however, rejected by Buddhist epistemologists, who sought to develop nominalist or conceptualist understandings of thought and language that could dispense with real universals. Their most important attempts to do so take the form of theories of apoha, a Sanskrit word literally meaning “exclusion.” In its most basic form, a doctrine of apoha maintains that a general [End Page 1] term such as “cow” manages to be meaningful by excluding all non-cows. But this deceptively simple formulation leads to a variety of interpretations, each facing its own difficulties. In his chapter, Kumārila is unstinting in pointing out a wide variety of objections that can be raised against the apoha view as expressed in the works of Dignāga.One way to think about the apoha theory is that it is fundamentally ontological in nature, seeking to avoid the problems with postulating real universals by arguing that the meanings of words, being exclusions, are negations or absences, not positive entities. Many scholars understand the theory in this way, but Kumārila points out fundamental flaws with this approach. One of the gravest of these flaws is that if absences are non-entities, it is unclear how they can be, at the level of ontology, any different from each other. As a result, the theory is in danger of entailing that all words are synonyms.Another possible way to understand the apoha theory is that it seeks mainly to offer an account of the psychological process by which human minds construct the meanings of words, understanding this process as fundamentally contrastive in nature. A form of this psychological interpretation also briefly comes in for critique by Kumārila, in the guise of the view that our ideas of distinct exclusions are produced by vāsanā-s, a difficult Sanskrit word referring to underlying psychological processes or tendencies that, according to Buddhists, shape our... (shrink)

This paper examines human-nonhuman splices from a multidisciplinary approach, involving bioengineering and literary studies. Splices are hybrid beings, created through gene-splicing—a process which combines the DNA of the two species, resulting in a hybrid or chimeric being. A current trend in biotechnological research is the use of spliced pigs for xenotransplantation. Hiromitsu Nakauchi’s pancreas study that splices pigs with human iPS [induced pluripotent stem] cells in order to grow human organs inside pigs is being compared to a highly similar (...) case of porcine hybrids: the pigoon from Margaret Atwood’s fictional MaddAddam trilogy. Atwood’s pigoons are pigs, genetically modified with human stem cells to facilitate the growth of various human organs for use in organ transplants with no risk of rejection. The case studies from science and science fiction overlap significantly and thus allow for a critical reading of the two highly different sources with a focus on ethical and moral questions regarding the use and abuse of nonhuman animals for human purposes. Furthermore, the context of the fictional works adds new layers of knowledge and new perspectives to the problematic issue of animal “enhancement.” Through the dynamic agency that can be detected within Atwood’s novels and that encompasses human, animal, and hybrid agency, the reader can develop empathy for other-than-human experiences and use this new perspective for a critical reflection of actual technoscientific developments that affect both human and nonhuman animal life. The combination of the two discourses reveals a value of science fiction for both the scientific community and society at large, demonstrating how its critical reception can result in enhanced ethical standards. (shrink)

Even after the demise of the influential Uno School in the 1980s, Japanese economists have been continuously engaged in the categorial reconstruction of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy, especially the theory of value and money. Writing in the 1980s–2000s, authors of the ‘post-Uno School’, such as Ebitsuka Akira, Mukai Kimitoshi, Kataoka Kōji etc., broadened the value-theoretical views of Uno School orthodoxy to include, among others, the Neue Marx-Lektüre (predominantly H.-G. Backhaus and M. Heinrich) and the French economists C. Benetti (...) and J. Cartelier. This paper will confront the ‘post-Uno School’s’ reading of Marx’s theory of value, which poses the theories of value and money as unreconcilable, leading them to discard the theory of value in favour of a ‘monetary approach’. We show that the dismissal of value theory leads to an introduction of Baileyan and neoclassical elements into Marx’s theory, which we believe to be both theoretically and practically precarious. (shrink)