In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 145 sustain such a view. Second, there are a couple of peccadillos concerning the chronology of Aquinas's writings: the " young Aquinas " of the third book of the Commentary on the Sentences (p. 24, note h) is distinguished from the "mature Aquinas " of question 22 of the De veritate (p. 26), though only four years actually searate them (1255 and 1259 approximately) ; there is (...) mention of " Aquinas' constant teaching, from his Commentary on Aristotle's Peri hermeneias to the Summa theologica " (p. 296, n. 12), though the former is dated to 1269-71 and the latter to 1266-73. Third, I have some stylistic cavils about the excessive use of cross-referencing, which tends to clutter the text, and the lavish use of italics, which distracts rather than aids the reader; it almost seems as if the author lacks confidence in the reader's wit and memory. Even with these minor failings, this is a book which has much to recommend it. Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology Berkeley, California GREGORY RoccA, O.P. The Eyes of Faith. By PIERRE RoussELOT, S.J. New York: Fordham University Press, 1990. Pp. 117. $27.50 (cloth). Although small in size, this long-awaited English version of The Eyes of Faith will make an important contribution to our knowledge of Thomism. In addition to Joseph Donceel's translation of Rousselot's famous articles, the volume contains Avery Dulles's translation of his reply to the objections raised against them by Hippolyte Ligeard and Stephane Harent and the summary of Rousselot's theology of faith made by the General of the Society of Jesus, Wlodimir Ledochowski. Although Rousselot was without question one of the outstanding Thomists of this century, his teaching career was very short. Appointed to the faculty of the lnstitut Catholique de Paris in 1909, the year after he received his doctorate from the Sorbonne, Rousselot was mobilized in 1914 and killed in battle in 1915; that early death prevented him from taking part in the remarkable flowering of NeoThomism after the First World War. Of Rousselot's major publications only one, The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, has been translated into English. The companion work, The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages, published with The Intellectualism in 1908, has been available to English-speaking readers only through secondary sources; it has never been translated. The same has been true both of " The Eyes of Faith," the pair of ground-break- 146 BOOK REVIEWS ing articles on the theology of faith which Rousselot published in 1910, and the set of companion articles which were published in the same year to justify the philosophical foundations on which that theology was built. Scattered rather widely through a number of French reviews, this important set of articles has never been easy for Englishspeaking Thomists to find and, as a result, their knowledge of Rousselot 's theology-and, to some extent, of his philosophy-has had to come to them at second hand. For Thomists this has, of course, been regrettable because of Rousselot 's importance in the history of Neo-Thomism. Years after his death, even in the middle of this century, his influence on the teaching of philosophy and theology in the Society of Jesus remained quite strong, despite the cautions expressed about it by the Order's General. One sign of that influence, perhaps indirect, can be seen in the later work of Bernard Lonergan. Lonergan's cognitional theory and the theological method which he built upon it were justified by the distinction between ratio and intellectus which Lonergan saw in Saint Thomas's philosophy of knowledge. Rousselot had begun the study of that distinction and decades later-in the interval between the appearance of Lonergan's "Verbum" articles and his history-making InsightPegaire was to carry it further in his historical study " lntellectus " et "ratio" selon saint Thomas d'Aquin. In the early years of this century, Rousselot and his Belgian confrere Joseph Marechal attached themselves to the movement in the Society of Jesus away from Suarezianism, a trend which earlier Jesuit Thomists like Giovanni Cornaldi and Louis Billot had started. But unlike these earlier Jesuit Thomists and in opposition... (shrink)

In this, the first published collection of writings by Hippolyte Havel (1871–1950), Nathan Jun brings a crucial, yet largely forgotten revolutionary figure back into historical focus. Havel was a Czech anarchist at the center of New York’s political and artistic circles at the turn of the twentieth century. He was an editor of numerous publications, including Emma Goldman’s Mother Earth and his influence on several writers, artists, and intellectuals (including Eugene O’Neill, Joseph Stieglitz, and Sadakichi Hartmann) helped shape American (...) modernism. Proletarian Days provides an illuminating introduction to the man and his times. (shrink)

1st ser. The philosophy of art. The ideal in art.--2d ser. The philosophy of art in Italy. The philosophy of art in the Netherlands. The philosophy of art in Greece.

In this paper, ambiguity aversion to uncertain survival probabilities is introduced in a static life-cycle model with a bequest motive to study the optimal demand for annuities. Provided that annuities’ return is sufficiently large, and notably when it is fair, positive annuitization is known to be the optimal strategy of ambiguity neutral individuals. Conversely, we show that the demand for annuities decreases with ambiguity aversion and that there exists a finite degree of aversion above which the demand is non-positive: the (...) optimal strategy is then to either sell annuities short or to hold zero annuities if the former option is not available. To conclude, ambiguity aversion appears to be a relevant candidate for explaining the annuity puzzle. (shrink)

An understanding of factors influencing the decision of rural people to keep sheep and/or goats is crucial when formulating technologies and policies that support village-based small ruminant production. The knowledge of such factors will also improve assessment of impact intervention strategies on the livelihoods of rural people. Structured questionnaires administered in 228 households were used to study the ownership patterns of small ruminants in southern Benin. The ownership of goats was higher (91%) than sheep (35%) because goats are not affected (...) by any ethnic or cultural restrictions. Goats are also perceived to be a less risky to invest into compared to sheep. Women represented 71% of the keepers of goats. Predictive models of ownership were developed using logistic regression. The results showed that younger household members (p < 0.05) especially young women (60%) are more likely to own small ruminants. Owners of small ruminants are less likely to be involved in off-farm activities and would often have no access to credit facilities. Gender, ethnicity, and perception of risk associated with species are the major factors affecting people’s choice of species. These findings highlight the financing and insurance roles that small ruminants, particularly goats, are playing in the study area. In order to develop suitable technologies and formulate policies to improve productivity and enhance livelihoods, the constraints to goat production need to be identified, and the local knowledge of the keepers should be investigated. (shrink)

C'est par anachronisme que l'on distingue aujourd'hui en Taine l'historien, le psychologue, le critique et l'écrivain. Cet ouvrage entreprend de montrer l'unité de son oeuvre et propose une réflexion sur la nature propre des sciences humaines, dont Taine a contribué à forger l'identité moderne.

L'article qui précède fait suite à deux autres que nous avons publiés ici même l'an dernier¹. Nous résumons d'abord brièvemnet ceux-ci parce qu'ils fournissent à celui-là la perspective dans laquelle il convient de le lire. La valeur que peut avoir le roman pour le psychologue ne consiste pas uniquement dans la description de types psychologiques qu'il lui fournit, mais aussi et surtout en ce qu'il contribue à former et à enrichir son expérience personnelle. Expérience, non pas dans le sens technique (...) et étroit de ce mot, mais dans sa signification originellement humaine: une aptitude à pénétrer autrui, à le comprendre du dedans, cœur. La rencontre d'autrui donne lieu à une triple connaissance: connaissance discursive, connaissance par Einfühlung d'une existence humaine concrète, rencontre dans l'autre du Dasein humain en général. C'est l'union de ces trois qui constitue la connaissance par le cœur, connaissance qui ne peut s'apprendre d'une manière théorique et ne s'acquiert que par l'exercice. Elle est à la base de toute compréhension psychologique réelle. Le roman de valeur, bien qu'il soit un produit de l'« imagination », transcende l'existence concrète dans la direction de l'être et par une sorte de recréation nous fait entrevoir les fondements et les destinées de l'homme qui sont le fond et le cadre de son existence concrète. Comment le roman s'y prend-il ? Par delà l'innerweltliche être-avec de Heidegger, qui nous fait saisir l'autre intentionnellement comme un objet dans le monde du souci, Binswanger a montré la transcendence possible vers un « über die Welt hinaus sein » selon le mode de la « Wirheit ». Seule cette relation avec l'autre, haussée au plan de l'intemporel, peut être, à travers la connaissance discursive, la base d'approche pour une connaissance psychologique fondamentale. Or cette relation le roman de valeur la rend possible, parce que tout en étant à la fois une création technique et un commerce sur le mode du jeu, il transcende cependant ces deux formes fondamentales de l'existence quotidienne, par le fait que l'« imagination » de l'auteur projette l'existence comme la concrétisation de l'être-homme comme-tel, ou, si l'on veut, du Dasein. Il est une « poétisation » qui rend possible la rencontre de l'autre sur la base commune du Dasein comme « über-die-Welt-hinaus-sein ». Malgré la non-existence du monde sur-réaliste que le roman évoque, ce monde n'est cependant pas irréel. Il représente l'élaboration concrète de la connaissance vécue que prend l'auteur des possibilités de la réalité humaine par la réalisation de ces possibilités mêmes. C'est précisément parce que les situations que le roman nous décrit ne sont pas celles que la vie nous donne d'éprouver, ne sont pas des photographies, qu'elles provoquent un recul et nous donnent accès à une connaissance plus pure de l'essentiel. Et l'auteur est grand, lorsqu'il réussit à évoquer dans son oeuvre un climat qui rendra possible au lecteur de communier avec lui et de pénétrer jusqu'au fond de la réalité humaine. Le roman devient alors une source importante de cette Daseinserkenntnis dont Binswanger nous parle. Sous ce rapport les romans de Dostojewski dépassent tous les autres. Ils sont véritablement une école de formation psychologique. Ses personnages sont autant d'incarnations du problème de la signification de l'existence. Problème que l'on ne trouve nulle part exprimé explicitement, mais que l'on sent toujours présent comme l'arrière-fond sur lequel se déroule le jeu des questions et des réponses. Par sa foi en la fécondité de l'amour désintéressé, Dostojewski nous met en contact avec la source ontologique de l'amour et de la haine, de la bonté et du péché. C'est à cause de cela que la lecture de ses romans peut, en raison de leur élévation même, devenir comme un tourment. Elle provoque chez le lecteur une sorte de crise où il se voit confronté avec cet être fondamental qui est pour chacun le sien propre. En un sens, l'homme dans les romans de Dostojewski est toujours le « vieil homme », l'homme qui est seul avec son angoisse et sa culpabilité, dans un monde où la mort se dresse devant lui, mais avec dans le cœur une nostalgie de rédemption et de paix, pleine d'espérance. Dans les personnages de Dostojewski c'est notre propre Dasein que nous découvrons, dépouillé de ses contingences spatio-temporelles. Et c'est précisément parce que cette découverte est impossible dans le déroulement fugace et toujours inachevé de la vie journalière, que le roman nous oiffre ici une image plus pure de l'existence, de ses possibilités et de ses fondements. Sous la conduite de Dostojewski l'homme se découvre soi-même à travers la crise existentielle comme une liberté authentique qui transcende son « être naturel » et sa « structure psychique », et par ailleurs il y fait l'expérience de son angoisse et de son vertige en face de sa propre ifinitude et de sa mort. Mais en toute crise il y a aussi l'attente d'une rédemption, la liberté de «homme nouveau», qui se réalise par le choix de l'acceptation et par là transcende le monde de l'angoisse et du souci vers l'intimité du « Heimat ». Nul n'a réussi comme Dostojewski à esquisser une image aussi claire de la réalité humaine, et c'est pour cette raison qu'il faut considérer son œuvre comme une contribution fondamentale à la connaissance psychologique et à la formation du psychologue. L'article publié dans ce numéro veut illustrer les considérations qui précèdent par le cas typique d'Hippolyte dans L'idiot. Alors qu'il veut vivre, l'homme doit mourir. Mais qui rentre en soi-même peut se demander si, dans le fond caché de nous-mêmes, le contraire n'est pas tout aussi vrai. C'est l'un des problèmes que Dostojewski n'a cessé de reprendre dans ses romans. Hippolyte, le jeune tuberculeux qui se voit tout près de la mort, en est une très importante élaboration. Ce jeune homme à l'intelligence pénétrante, mais aigri et humilié, nous offre l'image de l'homme désemparé devant l'irréductible conflit de la mort et de la vie. Il devra mourir bientôt, lui qui aurait voulu vivre « grand ». Il ne peut accepter cette mort insensée à laquelle le livre cette maladie qui lentement l'épuisé. C'est contre cette mort « naturelle » inévitable — le mur qui fait face à son lit de malade et les terribles scorpions qui hantent son rève — que s'insurge sa liberté. Il en vient à décider qu'il se donnera la mort lui-même, afin que sa mort soit au moins un acte libre. Mais auparavant il fait à ses amis la lecture de sa confession, « l'explication nécessaire », sous la devise: « Après moi le déluge ». Ce doit être l'expression de ses convictions dernières, la preuve de l'unique liberté que la nature lui concède encore. Mais quand il décharge son arme, il apparaît qu'il avait oublié d'y mettre la balle. Mais Hippolyte n'était pas seul. Le prince Myschkin, homme naïf à l'âme d'enfant, a deviné ses luttes intérieures dès leur première rencontre. Il a essayé de montrer à Hippolyte la voie de l'abandon comfiant où il pourrait se libérer de son orgueil et de son ressentiment. Mais Hippolyte n'a pas voulu s'engager dans cette voie. Il voulait garder la vie, et c'est pour cela qu'il mourut d'une mort en quelque sorte impropre et insensée. Ce choix d'Hippolyte, le choix de la révolte et du désespoir, ne s'offre pas à l'analyse ou à l'étude comme un problème scientifique. Il ne peut être approfondi que dans la rencontre avec une existence qui s'est choisie elle-même telle. C'est le mérite de Dostojewski de nous avoir montré dans la figure d'Hippolyte qu'un homme n'apprend à se connaitre soi-même ou à connaitre autrui qu'en faisant quelque chose, et de nous l'avoir montré avec un tel respect pour le secret de l'ultime destinée de l'homme. (shrink)

Jean-Guillaume-César-Alexandre-Hippolyte de Colins (1783-1859), a Belgian baron who lived mainly in Paris, sought to develop a position—rational socialism—intermediate between the extremes of full capitalism (with only private property) and full communism (with only collective property). All persons fully own themselves and the artifactual wealth that they produce, and they are entitled to an equal share of the natural resources and of the assets inherited from previous generations. Gifts and bequests are to be subject to heavy taxation (although at less (...) than 100% of their value, for efficiency reasons). Natural resources are subject to a rent-tax. A warning about the following reading: Colins writes in many places as if he held that an unrestricted right to make gifts and bequests is both necessary for efficient social functioning and required by justice. His ultimate view, however, is that efficient social functioning requires only some kind of weak (partially restricted) right to make gifts and bequest, and that justice does not require any such right. More specifically, he holds that justice requires that gifts and bequests be taxed as much as compatible with efficient social functioning. (shrink)

The expression “Gnostic Empedocles” refers to the summary of the teachings of this philosopher presented by Hippolytus of Rome in the Refutation of All Heresies. Above all, it concerns the notice devoted to Marcion and his disciples, who were accused of following the poems of Empedocles rather than the Gospel. However, Hippolytus is inspired by the readings of Empedocles provided by different groups of Gnostics. This interpretatio gnostica was also known in Christian circles. The analysis of this interpretation, based on (...) the notice about Marcion, allows us to propose a new interpretation of Bardaisan’s thought — mentioned by Hippolytus — as an unknown testimony of the reception of Empedocles. (shrink)

TAINE ( 1828-1893 ), HISTORIEN ET POLITOLOGUE DU XIXE SIECLE, ASSOCIE HISTOIRE ET POLITIQUE, TRADITION ET NATION, ET RELANCE LE COURANT DE PENSEE CONTRE-REVOLUTIONNAIRE ET TRADITIONALISTE. DISCIPLE DE SPINOZA ET DE HEGEL, IL LAICISE LE TRADTIONALISME EN REJETANT LA REFERENCE A DIEU POUR LE PRIMAT DE LA SCIENCE. COMTISME, POSITIVISME ANGLAIS DE STUART MILL ET BUCKLE, SCIENTISME, NATURALISME ET DARWINISME LE CONDUISENT A ADOPTER UNE METHODE HISTORIQUE DETERMINISTE REPOSANT SUR LES CONCEPTS DE "RACE, MILIEU ET MOMENT". DE CETTE METHODE, TAINE (...) ENTEND FONDER UNE SCIENCE DE LA POLITIQUE NATURELLE, HISTORIQUE ET EXPERIMENTALE. PAR AILLEURS, LA PENSEE POLITIQUE DE TAINE EST DE TYPE DUALISTE, ENTRE TRADITIONALISME ET LIBERALISME. TAINE POSE LA QUESTION DE LA PLACE DE L'INDIVIDU FACE AU POUVOIR. IL SE MONTRE LIBERAL EN PRECONISANT UNE MONARCHIE CONSTITUTIONNELLE ET UN REGIME PARLEMENTAIRE. FACE A L'ETAT, QU'IL SOUHAITE LIMITE, IL DEFENT LES DROITS ET LES LIBERTES DE L'INDIVIDU. IL PROPOSE D'AMENAGER LE SUFFRAGE UNIVERSEL EN LE RENDANT INDIRECT MAIS ACCEPTE CEPENDANT LA FORCE DU NOMBRE. LA PENSEE POLITIQUE DE TAINE APARAIT AINSI TRES ORIGINALE; C'EST CE QUE MONTRE SA POSTERITE PUISQU' ELLE INSPIRE LES PENSEURS NATIONALISTES COMME BARRES MAIS EGALEMENT LES HOMMES DE GAUCHE DE LA IIIE REPUBLIQUE COMME HERRIOT ET BLUM. (shrink)

Olger Hippolyt Bochkovsky is a prominent Ukrainian sociologist, publicist and political figure. The most important area of his studies is the process of creation in which he distinguishes between two stages - ethnogenesis and natiogenesis. The ethnogenetic process, according to O. Bochkovsky, lasted until the Great French Revolution. Its main result is the formation of the people as - ethnographic raw materials. Let us dwell on this in more detail.

Hippolyte Taine a rédigé, en 1870, au moment où son oeuvre changea d’orientation, une monographie relatant l’observation du développement du langage chez son propre enfant. Ce texte, connu de Darwin, est l’une des premières tentatives d’observer le développement, l’évolution, de l’enfant. Le but n’en est pas tant de décrire l’enfant pour lui-même que de polémiquer avec le linguiste Max Müller au sujet de l’origine du langage. L’observation de Taine veut montrer expérimentalement que la théorie évolutionniste rend compte de la (...) genèse du langage chez l’individu et dans l’espèce humaine. Mais l’enjeu réel est de nier qu’il existe une rupture entre l’intelligence de l’homme et celle de l’animal. Max Müller s’en tenait à appliquer la théorie de l’évolution au changement des langues. Taine, lui, veut affirmer la continuité du développement psychologique dans la nature: ce ne sont pas les langues qui évoluent mais l’intelligence ellemême. (shrink)

Sensationism, a philosophy that gained momentum in the French Enlightenment as a response to Lockean empiricism, was acclaimed by Hippolyte Taine as "the doctrine of the most lucid, methodical, and French minds to have honored France." The first major general study in English of eighteenth-century French sensationism, _The Authority of Experience_ presents the history of a complex set of ideas and explores their important ramifications for literature, education, and moral theory. The study begins by presenting the main ideas of (...) sensationist philosophers Condillac, Bonnet, and Helvétius, who held that all of our ideas come to us through the senses. The experience of the body in seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching enabled individuals, as John C. O'Neal points out, to challenge the sometimes arbitrary authority of institutions and people in positions of power. After a general introduction to sensationism, the author develops a theory of sensationist aesthetics that not only reveals the interconnections of the period's philosophy and literature but also enhances our awareness of the forces at work in the French novel. He goes on to examine the relations between sensationism and eighteenth-century French educational theory, materialism, and _idéologie_. Ultimately, O'Neal opens a discussion of the implications of sensationist thought for issues of particular concern to society today. (shrink)

The author presents Hippolyte Taine´s conception of society and state, which are, in her interpretation as well as Taine´s theory, deeply interconnected. It is quite obvious, however, that Taine was a committed liberal. This follows from his explicit ideas on the function of the state, his ruthless criticism of the Jacobin phase of French Revolution and Napoleonic conception of state as well as the state in which he lived, because that state stemmed from the Napoleonic conception. In the second (...) part the author focuses on Taine´s description of the English system. Taine sees both its advantages and drawbacks. Generally speaking, he finds the English system preferable to the French one. However, on the basis of the theory of race, moment and environment, it was not possible to imple­ment the English model in France. (shrink)

Left-libertarian theories of justice hold that agents are full self-owners and that natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner. Unlike most versions of egalitarianism, leftlibertarianism endorses full self-ownership, and thus places specific limits on what others may do to one’s person without one’s permission. Unlike the more familiar right-libertarianism (which also endorses full self-ownership), it holds that natural resources—resources which are not the results of anyone's choices and which are necessary for any form of activity—may be privately appropriated only (...) with the permission of, or with a significant payment to, the members of society. Like right-libertarianism, left-libertarianism holds that the basic rights of individuals are ownership rights. Such rights can endow agents—as liberalism requires—with spheres of personal liberty where they may each pursue their conceptions of “the good life”. Left-libertarianism is promising because it coherently underwrites both some demands of material equality and some limits on the permissible means of promoting this equality. It is promising, that is, because it is a form of liberal egalitarianism. Left-libertarian theories have been propounded for over two centuries. Early exponents of some form of self-ownership combined with some form of egalitarian ownership of natural resources include: Hugo Grotius (1625), Samuel Pufendorf (1672), John Locke (1690), William Ogilvie (1781), Thomas Spence (1793), Thomas Paine (1795), Hippolyte de Colins (1835), François Huet (1853), Patrick E. Dove (1850, 1854), Herbert Spencer (1851), Henry George (1879, 1892), and Léon Walras (1896).1 It is striking how much of the current debate about equality, liberty, and responsibility has already been addressed by these authors. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.3 (2000) 397-413 [Access article in PDF] Betwixt Two Ages Cast: Milton, Johnson, and the English Renaissance Jack Lynch To judge by the most visible institutional mechanisms of literary periodization --the anthology, the history of literature, and the survey course--John Milton has come unstuck in time. The Norton Anthology of English Literature prints its excerpts from Paradise Lost under the rubric "The Early (...) Seventeenth Century (1603-1660)" along with Jonson and Bacon, not under "The Restoration and Eighteenth Century (1660-1785)" alongside Dryden and Bunyan. 1 Milton gets a chapter to himself in volume five of the Oxford History of English Literature, English Literature in the Early Seventeenth Century 1600-1660, not in volume six, English Literature of the Late Seventeenth Century. 2 And Stanford Uni-versity's two-part survey of English masterpieces puts Milton in English 10 ("Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton and their Contemporaries") rather than English 11 ("From the Enlightenment to the Modern Period"). But his most important work appeared in 1667, the same year as Dryden's Annus Mirabilis and Sprat's History of the Royal Society, works now invariably consigned to the latter of the two periods. Milton is almost univerally accorded the title of the last great writer of the English Renaissance, while his contemporaries stand at the beginning of what we clumsily call the "long eighteenth century." 3The situation is not new; it began neither with the Norton Anthology nor the Oxford History. As long ago as 1853 Hippolyte Taine placed Milton in book II [End Page 397] of his History of English Literature, "The Renaissance," rather than in book III, "The Classic Age." 4 But Taine was not the originator of this habit; he was only an inheritor of older paradigms. In fact a search for the causes of this treatment of the seventeenth century would take us back to the seventeenth century itself, only a few years after the publication of Paradise Lost, and into the eighteenth, when Milton's epic took its central place in the English canon.To remark upon this peculiar violation of strict chronology in English literary history is not necessarily to quarrel with it; it may well be that specialists in the English Renaissance have more interesting things to say about it than do those in the eighteenth century. But Milton's treatment at the hands of literary historians deserves attention, for it takes us straight to the heart of questions of literary periodization. Because eras make sense only in relation to one another, periodization is never entirely disinterested. Periods are imposed in retrospect in an attempt to extract the most useful or satisfying narrative out of the events of the past, and it is therefore inevitable that they should serve the cultural needs of the present.Some of the most enduring acts of periodization come out of cultural movements which divide themselves from their immediate predecessors, dividing us from them, now from then. Thomas Vogler observes that "the perennial goal of historical thought can be seen to be a mode of self-definition in the form of a narrative in which a 'modernity' defines itself over against a past perceived as essentially different." 5 As Peter Bürger points out, periodization inevitably, if sometimes indirectly, results in "the construction of the present." 6 This invocation or creation of an ever-new sense of now (along with its resulting creation of a series of thens) amounts to a declaration of modernity.Perhaps the most important such declaration of modernity came when the Florentine humanists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries traded the classical and Christian models of six ages or four monarchies for a new three-term model, one with three great ages: ancient, middle, and modern. 7 Francesco Petrarca is a central figure in this transformation: for him, defining modernity meant first discovering or inventing a post-classical Dark Age against which to measure the brightness of modern enlightenment.Petrarch never gave a definitive account of a modern world, though by allying himself... (shrink)