Proceedings of the First Conference of the International Society for Hermeneutics and Science.

A collection in translation of essays by Paul Ricoeur.

This classic, first published in 1969, introduces to English-speaking readers a field which is of increasing importance in contemporary philosophy and theology--hermeneutics, the theory of understanding, or interpretation. Richard E. Palmer, utilizing largely untranslated sources, treats principally of the conception of hermeneutics enunciated by Heidegger and developed into a "philosophical hermeneutics" by Hans-Georg Gadamer. He provides a brief overview of the field by surveying some half-dozen alternate definitions of the term and by examining in detail the contributions of Friedrich Schleiermacher (...) and Wilhelm Dilthey. In the Manifesto which concludes the book, Palmer suggests the potential significance of hermeneutics for literary interpretation. (shrink)

OF THE many issues surrounding the new interest in hermeneutics, current debate has converged upon two.

The essay’s argument is twofold: First, it contends that Ricœur’s articulation of the social imaginary in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, reveals a turn to a general theory of culture, which is best understood as a shift from a hermeneutics of culture to a cultural hermeneutics. This move forms part of his philosophical anthropology of “real social life.” The essay proposes it is epitomized in Ricœur’s changing reception of Cassirer. Second, the essay hermeneutically reconstructs the emergence of this turn (...) in Ricœur’s intellectual trajectory, and, in so doing, contends that it is connected to a rearticulation of both the phenomenological reduction and the symbolic function that took place in the mid- to late 1960s. Ricœur’s developing response to the phenomenological problematic of the world horizon underlies these further phenomenological-hermeneutic considerations. The essay concludes with a brief sketch of Ricœur’s understanding of the symbolic mediation of action as a reconfiguration of the hermeneutical actualization of phenomenological preconditions of the symbolic. (shrink)

This book challenges the standard view that modern hermeneutics begins with Friedrich Ast and Friedrich Schleiermacher, arguing instead that it is the dialectic of reflective and teleological reason in Kant’s Critique of Judgment that provides the actual proto-hermeneutic foundation. It is revolutionary in doing so by replacing interpretive truth claims by the more appropriate claim of rendering opaque contexts intelligible. Taking Gadamer’s comprehensive analysis of hermeneutics in Truth and Method (1960) as its point of departure, the book turns to Kant’s (...) Critiques, reviewing his major concepts as a coherent system in relation to his sensus communis. At the heart of the book is the interaction between reflective, bottom-up search and teleological, top-down interpretative projection as provided in Part II of the third Critique. This text contends that Kant’s broad definition of nature invites the liberation of the reflective-teleological judgment from its biological exemplifications and so permits us to establish its generalised status as a path-breaking, methodological tool. Kant’s dialectic of reflective search and meaning bestowing, stipulated teleology is asserted to anticipate a series of motifs commonly associated with hermeneutics. Figures covered include Dilthey, Husserl, Ingarden, Heidegger, Gadamer, Apel, Habermas, Ricoeur, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, Vattimo, Nancy and Caputo. Their collective contributions to interpretation allow for a review of the evolution of hermeneutics from the perspective of the Kantian critique of the limitations of human cognition. The book is written for the informed, general reader, but will likewise appeal to advanced undergraduate and graduate students as well as researchers in the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

Jean Grondin’s starting point in his impressive book is what Hans-Georg Gadamer refers to as the universal claim of hermeneutics. Gadamer is better known for the limits his hermeneutics seems to place on universal claims. Against the reliance the Enlightenment placed on the insights of a reason common to humanity, Gadamer stresses the prejudiced and partial character of attempts to understand meaning. And against more contemporary attempts to ground Enlightenment conceptions in universal human competencies, he stresses the historicity and finitude (...) of human knowledge. Our attempts to understand the meaning of texts, conversations, historical events, and social actions and practices are conditioned by the horizon of our language, our own historical experiences, and our assumptions and expectations. Still, Gadamer ends his Truth and Method by stressing not only the linguistic character of understanding but the infinite capacity of all languages to find and express new dimensions of meaning. “Language,” he writes, “forestalls any objection to its jurisdiction. Its universality keeps pace with the universality of reason.”. (shrink)

This paper examines Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophical development from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being as a self-critique and revised understanding of Martin Heidegger. It focuses on later Levinas’s analysis of language in terms of the difference between Saying and Said. For Levinas, the Said represents the betrayal of ethical Saying into ontological essence. This echoes Heidegger’s notion of the forgetfulness of Being in beings. However, Levinas critiques Heidegger’s own philosophy as remaining within the Said. The paper explores three strategies (...) of “unsaying” that Levinas discerns in Western philosophy to disrupt ontological Said: ontology itself, skepticism, and philosophical conversation. It argues that Levinas ultimately seeks an alternative “prophetic” mode of language beyond philosophy that enacts difference, which the paper relates to Talmud. The paper claims that the later Levinas no longer simply opposes Greek to Jewish thought, but rather seeks to deploy a specifically Jewish form of language to interrupt Western metaphysics from within. (shrink)

For over a century, the increasing separation between philosophical hermeneutics, which has moved away from texts, and philology, tempted by positivism, may have caused regret. Formal and cognitive linguistics have developed partial models, thus abandoning the historical comparative methodology characteristic of cultural studies to such an extent that they have lost contact with philological and hermeneutical issues. In contrast, corpus linguistics has developed a digital philology, and is confronted with the hermeneutics of software output. But a text model must still (...) be developed that reflects not only textual semiosis (as a normed pairing between content and expression) but also the poles of Viewpoint (genetic and hermeneutic) and Guarantee (as much for content, in terms of legitimacy, as for expression, in terms of authenticity). This will allow the articulation of internal and external linguistics (as pragmatics cannot), and also the reconciliation of philology and hermeneutics, mediated by text semiotics. As the document is a philological concept, the text a linguistic concept, and the complete work the object of hermeneutics, textual semiosis is the ideal way to understand and describe the articulation between these levels of objectivity and the disciplines attached to them. (shrink)

Arguably, the most promising and compelling route to demonstrating the significance of Hegel’s thought to contemporary philosophy has been the series of recent readings that construe Hegel as continuing and completing Kant’s Copernican turn. Paul Redding explicitly locates his interpretation within this program, seeing the hermeneutic dimension of Hegel’s thought as providing for the possibility of continuing the Kantian project. Kant’s Copernican turn can be loosely stated as the procedure of reflectively uncovering unexperienced conditions of experience that contribute to the (...) nature of experience in ways that require its further re-determination and re-description. What a hemeneutic take on this reflective procedure adds is that foremost among those conditions are contexts of intersubjective or dialogical relations—structures of recognition. While perhaps disappointing to anyone interested in the problem of textual interpretation, there is finally nothing more to Redding’s account of Hegel’s “hermeneutics” than the establishing of recognitive structures as forming the ultimate horizon of human experience. I take Redding’s relentless tracking of the problem of recognition to be one of his book’s virtues. (shrink)

Moving beyond the dialogical approaches found in much of contemporary hermeneutics, this book focuses instead on the diagnostic use of reflective judgment, not only to discern the differentiating features of the phenomena to be understood, but also to the various meaning contexts that can frame their interpretation. It assesses what such thinkers as Kant, Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas and others can contribute to the problems of multicultural understanding, and reconceives hermeneutics as a critical inquiry into the appropriate contextual conditions (...) of understanding and interpretation. (shrink)

''The problem of Transcendence is the problem of our time. " I Needless to say, Transcendence was a particularly lively i~sue when Karl Heim wrote these words in the mid-1930's. Within the province of philosophi cal theology and philosophy of religion, however, it is always the prob lem, as Gordon Kaufman has recently reminded us. 2Por the question concerning the nature and the reality of Transcendence has not only to do with self-transcendence, but with the being of Transcendence-Itself, that is (...) to say, with the nature and the reality of God as experienced and understood at any given time or place. Now there are those today who would claim that any further discus sion of the latter half of this proposition, namely,Transcendence-Itse1f or God, is worthless and quite beside the point. Such persons would claim that the particular logia represented by the theological sciences has collapsed by virtue of its object having disappeared. Indeed, when one surveys the contemporary scene in philosophy and theology, there is a good deal of evidence that this is the case':"" theology of late having be come something of a "spectacle," to use Pritz Buri's term. One of the reasons for this, we here contend, is that the richness and the diversity of the meaning of Transcendence has been lost. And even though we do not here intend to resolve the issue, neither do we assume that such an enqui ry is either impossible or irrelevant. (shrink)

In this article, I offer an account of the 2014 dystopian-fiction film Divergent, based on the novel by Veronica Roth. The film tells the story of Beatrice, a young woman living in a postapocalyptic Chicago, and her process of enrolment into the higher education system. I argue that Beatrice’s troubled story can help us to uncover the high tension between today’s university’s self-alienating mechanisms and the thirst for Bildung. I suggest that the notion of ‘divergence’ can help to develop an (...) account of Bildung in an innovative direction. ‘Divergence’ is a term used in the film to define individuals—like Beatrice—who cannot fit into the categories established by the government to sort students into appropriate educational pathways. I link the notion of ‘divergence’ to an interpretation of Gadamer’s account of Bildung. First, I draw on Gadamer’s thinking to suggest the metaphor of the university as a ‘crossroads’ and outline the idea of the risks and possibilities that are attached to authentic learning experience. Then I explore the self-alienating mechanisms that Gadamer saw at work within the postindustrial structure of the university. In conclusion, I develop Gadamer’s notion of self-education along the lines of the idea of divergence. While some argue that the university can still be a place for human encounter and gathering, I aim to show that, without divergence, it remains a site of displacement, or a dystopia. (shrink)

The article reflects on the symbolic forms of domination developed in the social environment and the real games of power that they are hidden behind the representations in nowadays. It approaches the relation that the medias has in the representation context, being an instrument of domination for the processes ofconstruction of the important meanings for the structure of a society. The study calls the attention for the problematic theoretician presented for the philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, writing on the agent and society, (...) through the antagonism and exclusion between itself. Others two philosophers worked in the research are Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. Thinking on individuals separately, we have that as the participant ones to be responsible in all the constructionof ethical values, politicians, cultural among others that they guide the collective context. However, we will only get success in this question, if we know how to analyze the “search of the real”. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 37, Issue 1, pp 61 - 94 Interchanges between political, juridical and theological thought in the early modern period have been studied extensively during the past decades. Less light has been cast on the corresponding interrelations between politico-juridical thought and biblical hermeneutics. However, this issue deserves some attention, too, as the following case study on Hugo Grotius wants to show by pointing to the mutual adjustment of juridical, theological and biblical arguments in the progress of the core (...) semantics of Grotius’s natural law theory from _De iure praedae_ to _De iure belli ac pacis._. (shrink)

Not unlike the Catholics, the English Reformed circles—the Church of England—upheld the legitimacy of the Revelation and miracles, recognised the Mosaic account of creation, original sin and the Trinity, the non-corporeal nature of spiritual substance, the eternity of punishment or reward and the primacy of Church over State. And so where did Locke’s hermeneutics fit into this complex panorama in terms of the interpretations of Christian anthropology and the resurrection? As underscored in the early chapters of The Reasonableness of Christianity, (...) Locke does not appear to consider that the sin of Adam has to fall on the whole of posterity, and again there is no positive affirmation of the Trinity in this work which, although it is not named, in effect proves to be incompatible with the definitions of person and individual identity which he provides in the Essay concerning human understanding. (shrink)

In these essays, J.L. Mehta, Indian philosopher in whose life and work East and West met profoundly, reflects on the origins and potency of modern hermeneutics and phenomenology, and applies the principles of interpretation to Hindu traditions. These farseeing essays show a hopeful way for non-Western cultures to gain insight into the basic presuppositions of the Western world, and to reclaim their own origins and ways of thinking, and to participate in an emerging planetary thinking.

Looking for a way to read the classic texts of Christian antiquity without treating them either as if they were written yesterday or as if they were archaeological artefacts, the author endorses Meilaender's endeavor to develop the insights of Augustine in the modern context. He nevertheless suggests that a different way of drawing the analogy between sex and eating would better capture Augustine's distinctive way of joining theology and ethics and would enable a more vigorous defense of Augustine against modern (...) critics of his treatment of sexuality. (shrink)

The expression “grafting of hermeneutics onto phenomenology”, which Ricœur coined, is meant to characterize his hermeneutic phenomenology or Ricœurian approaches the fields of phenomenology and hermeneutics. However, the expression seems to have been quite misunderstood and therefore may have led to various misunderstandings about Ricœur’s approach and its relationship to phenomenology and hermeneutics. The term “grafting” refers to a differentiation between two methods and domains, where one method and domain is completing another method and domain. However, it is less the (...) difference between phenomenology and hermeneutics that is at stake than the difference between the phenomenological origin of Ricœur’s hermeneutics and his project of a philosophical anthropology. More often this aim is overlooked by critics who rely on their expertise in either phenomenology or in hermeneutics. By so doing their commentary of Ricœur’s philosophy suffers certain limitations. (shrink)

In these essays, J.L. Mehta, Indian philosopher in whose life and work East and West met profoundly, reflects on the origins and potency of modern hermeneutics and phenomenology, and applies the principles of interpretation to Hindu traditions. These farseeing essays show a hopeful way for non-Western cultures to gain insight into the basic presuppositions of the Western world, and to reclaim their own origins and ways of thinking, and to participate in an emerging planetary thinking.

This article re-examines the theoretical basis for environmental and heritage interpretation in tourist settings in the light of hermeneutic philosophy. It notes that the pioneering vision of heritage interpretation formulated by Freeman Tilden envisaged a broadly educational, ethically informed and transformative art. By contrast, current cognitive psychological attempts to reduce interpretation to the monological transmission of information, targeting universal but individuated cognitive structures, are found to be wanting. Despite growing signs of diversity, this information processing approach to interpretation remains dominant. (...) The article then presents the alternative paradigm of hermeneutics through the works of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer, to provide a broader interpretation of interpretation. This not only captures the essence of Tilden’s definition but construes heritage interpretation as a more inclusive, culturally situated, critically reflexive and dialogical practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show that Boudon’s explanation of action in terms of “good reasons” can be philosophically enriched by merging his methodological perspective with Mises’ praxeology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In order to develop our goal of merging Boudon’s approach with Mises’ and Gadamer’s, we will focus on two points. The first is the identification of the invariable structure of human action. Unlike Boudon, we suggest that the best way to establish this invariable structure, which makes the (...) explanation of action possible, is not to refer to the controversial concept of “human nature,” but rather to use Mises’ praxeological analysis of the invariable logic which all actions have in common. The second point analyzed in this article is the temporal and cultural dimension of the interpretative process which individuals elaborate to develop their reasons. This point, which is related to hermeneutical philosophy and is not investigated in detail by Boudon, is largely discussed by Gadamer. In our opinion, merging Gadamer’s description of the interpretative process – a process that Gadamer calls “hermeneutical circle” – and Boudon’s sociology of “good reasons” is useful because, unlike Boudon, Gadamer clarifies the epistemological nature of the interpretative process as well as the reasons why this process – which is a trial and error process – allows us to understand the actions of people who belong to different cultures. (shrink)

Gadamer's Dialectical Hermeneutics affirms the continuity between Gadamer's interest in Plato and his hermeneutics by focusing on the role of dialectic for Gadamer's own conception of understanding. Highlighting the productive and on-going nature of the dialectical tension at the heart of hermeneutics clarifies the roles that truth, good, practice, theory, and dialogue play in Gadamer's thought and emphasizes his desire to recover the practical nature of philosophy.

As his editor John L. Stanley points out, Georges Sorel was "that fascinating polymath." This volume, the third in his selected works in the English language published by Transaction, emphasizes Sorel's extraordinary writings in the philosophy of science, religion, culture, and art. For those who know Sorel only as author of Reflections on Violence, the present volume will come as a forceful reminder of the range and depth of Sorelian efforts to construct a world view. Sorel is throughout concerned with (...) the moral development of human beings. In this sense, his writings on politics are of a piece with his writings on religion, "facticity" of human history and society. Sorel's earliest writings were on religion, and key portions of that period are reflected in selections here. And he went on from there to study the sociology of science, the ways in which science fits into the cultural history of civilization and present day social relationships of industrial society. Stanley provides a profound framework based on two decades of close study and translation of Sorel's texts. He helps to explain how the partial theories of Sorel lead to holistic intellectual consequences, how the psychological method does not foreclose political activism, and how historical limits can be transformed against a background of aesthetics or considerations of taste. He shows that Sorel comes as a close as Manheim and Simmel and Durkheim to the creation of a modern social science--albeit he lacks the overall philosophical theorems of people like Marx and Weber. In Sorel we have a first-class mind at work. And in Stanley, we have a first-class analyst at work. Together, the volume adds up to something special for the political scientist, sociologist, art historian, theologian--in short for those to whom the ideal of a human science endures. John L. Stanley is professor of political science at the University of California at Riverside. He is the author of The Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel. He has written many articles and reviews on the history of European political theory. With his wife, Charlotte Stanley, he has been long engaged in the translation of the works of Georges Sorel. (shrink)

H. G. Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” elicited a controversial response in contemporary philosophy. R. Rorty and G. Vattimo tried to impart a more relativistic shade to H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In contrast, J. Derrida was inclined to consider H. G. Gadamer hermeneutics more dependent on the previous epoch of “metaphysics of presence”. This article purposes to reveal the points of contact and division between the thinking strategies employed by hermeneutics and deconstruction, providing theoretical arguments why H. G. Gadamer hermeneutics should not (...) be reduced to the so-called “metaphysics of presence”. The question whether H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics belongs to “metaphysics of presence” or not is closely intertwined with the problem of dogmatism of meaning and relativism of meaning. J. Derrida was inclined to regard H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutic as a theory of a search for and discovery of a pre-existing or objective meaning which accounts for the theory’s persistent belonging with metaphysical dogmatism. In opposition to such judgement, this article seeks to substantiate the following thesis: in H. G. Gadamer’s hermeneutics which is based on the “good will” to understand, the problem of dogmatism of meaning (there is one universal objective meaning or truth) and relativism of meaning (there is a multitude of meanings open to interpretation without reference to the primary signified) can be solved by taking into consideration the way offered by E. Husserl phenomenology, i.e. by understanding any possible “thing” (die Sache) as a “thing-in-itself” only in different perceptual perspectives (die perspektivischen Abschattungen). (shrink)