Nietzsche's strengths as a critic are widely acknowledged, but his peculiar style of critique is usually ignored as rhetoric, or dismissed as violent or simply incoherent. In this book, Nietzsche's concept of the agon or Wettkampf, a measured and productive form of conflict inspired by ancient Greek culture, is advanced as the dynamic and organising principle of his philosophical practice, enabling us to make sense of his critical confrontations and the much disputed concept of transvaluation or Umwertung. Agonal perspectives are (...) cast on a number of key problems in his thought across a broad range of texts. Topics and problems treated include: critical history and the need for a limit in the negation of the past; Nietzsche contra Socrates and the problem of closure; Nietzsche contra humanism and the problem of humanity; Nietzsche contra Kant on genius and legislation; the problem of self-legislation in relation to life and temporality; Nietzsche's sense of community in its articulation with law, and the normativity of taste; ressentiment and the question of therapy in Nietzsche and Freud; and the problem of total affirmation in relation to critique. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Nietzsche's Socio‐Physiology and the Question of Sovereignty Nietzsche versus Liberalism on Freedom and Resistance Freedom and Resistance in Nietzsche's Later Thought On the Necessity of Conflict for Freedom: Nietzsche's Critique of the Subject.

Interpretations of Poetry and Religion is the third volume in a new critical edition of the complete works of George Santayana that restores Santayana's original text and provides important new scholarly information.Published in the spring of 1900, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion was George Santayana's first book of critical prose. It developed his view that "poetry is called religion when it intervenes in life, and religion, when it merely supervenes upon life, is seen to be nothing but poetry." This statement (...) and the point of view it espoused contributed significantly to the debate between science and religion at the turn of the century, and its eloquence and clearsightedness continue to have an impact on current discussions about the nature of religion.Interpretations of Poetry and Religion affronted Santayana's peers with its assault on literary and religious pieties of the cultivated classes. William James called its philosophy of harmonious and integral ideal systems nothing less than "a perfection of rottenness."In his insightful introductory essay, Joel Porte observes that while Santayana's theory of correlative objects, his espousal of the "ideal" - the normal human affinity for abstraction - and exaltation of the imagination may have offended some at Harvard, these ideas had a significant influence on other Harvard scholars T.S. Eliot and Santayana's "truest disciple," Wallace Stevens.Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr., heads the Department of Philosophy and Humanities at Texas A & M University. William G. Holzberger is a Professor of English at Bucknell University. Joel Porte is Whiton Professor of American Literature at Cornell University. (shrink)

This second volume arising from the Frontiers in American Philosophy Conference held at Texas A&M University is "festive, celebrating the diversity of thought and influences in American philosophy," say its editors. In these thirty-six essays, there is no attempt to define an American ethos; in fact, the editors conclude that, even pragmatism, identified by Tocqueville as America's defining attribute, should not be described as a national philosophy. It is, as Gerard Deledalle notes in his essay, "the new universal philosophy, because (...) it is the philosophy of experience and democracy that is any nation's `manifest destiny.'" These articles, by thoughtful scholars from North America and several European nations, look forward through the developments presently shaping philosophical inquiry in the United States and backward to the origins and plurality of the American intellectual heritage. Not a parochial or narrow perspective, the focus on American philosophy sharpens the dialogue that clarifies and explicates American thought in the context of a world community. (shrink)

At head of title: The Johns Hopkins University. Institute for the Study of Law.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY To make this theme conspicuous to the reader, the author deals with three topics in Aristotle's first philosophy: the path from beings to the primary instance of being, the study of sensible substance, and the distinction between the potential and the actual. Grene's essay on the most perplexing of Aristotle's works is the least satisfactory in her study. Though she acknowledges that the path of (...) thg Aristotelian first philosopher is not easy, her analysis of the school X67oLmakes the road more facile than it, in fact, is. For example, what is the relation between Wisdom (the science of principles and causes), the science of being-qua-being, and the science of immovable substance? How can the latter be universal and, at the same time, have as its object one kind of being? Why does Aristotle dismiss substrate in the sense of compound of form and matter as a candidate for substance? It would seem to satisfy his criteria of thisness and separability better (or at least in more instances) than substrate in the sense of form. Finally, it is hard to avoid Ross's conclusion (Aristotle's Metaphysics, Vol. 1, pp. ci) that Aristotle in Book Z moves away from the view that the primary ontological units are sensible individuals toward the view that they are pure forms. The real is either the object of definition (and this appears to be Aristotle's view for the most part in Book Z) or it is the individual (the doctrine of the Categories); it cannot, on Aristotelian grounds, be both. Grene's resolution of the difficulty will not bear scrutiny. She says (p. 205): "Definition is of the universal. But the object of definition is the real substance, the being-what-it-is of the thing. This is substance and not universal." The incompatibility of the first and third sentences in this passage constitutes what Grene refers to (p. 205) as "a very perplexing situation indeed;" and they also reflect the "double meaning" which "pervades Aristotle's whole treatment of substance" (Ross, Aristotle, p. 166). It is the doctrine of the first sentence which comes to the fore in Book Z, for there Aristotle concludes (i) that ot~r is r6 I"L~Tv e~tL and maintains (ii) that rb rl ~v rival 'will belong to nothing which is not a species of a genus' (1030"12-13). And we hardly need be reminded that an Aristotelian species is not an individual. Grene, it seems to me, relieves our perplexity somewhat, but only by blurring the oscillation in Aristotle's mind on this point, e.g., when she implies that the unambiguous doctrine of Book Z is that "as far as the perceived world goes, the naturalist's specimen, the individual of a type, the member of a class, is the prototype of the real" (p. 205). In very readable prose Grene has given us a picture of Aristotle that is at once engaging and in most respects faithful to the interests and outlook of her model. She says in a bibliographical note that her book is "meant more for the undergraduate reader or the general public than for scholars already conversant both with the text and the tradition" (p. 257). I suggest that the account Grene has given us is stimulating and refreshing also for the scholar. JosxAtt B. GOULD,JR. Glaremont Graduate School La filosofia medievale: Antologia di testi. Edited by Nicola Abbagnan0. (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1963. Pp. 440. -----Coll. del Candelaio. L. 2700.) it is the purpose of this, the second volume in the Antologia di testi filosofici to appear under the general editorship of the fine Italian scholar, Nicola Abbagnano, to provide an introduction to the history of mediaeval philosophy through the presentation of selected primary source materials in Italian translation. The book could have been a significant addition to the sparse philosophical literature of the period that is now available BOOK REVIEWS 259 to the non-Latin reader; instead, it turns out to be a sort of catalogue of opinions on a wide variety of philosophical topics held by many of the thinkers active in the period: between St... (shrink)

Enterprises seem to entirely operate on their management. But behind the scenes directors play a very important role. On a strategic level (in the long term) they will determine the direction of the company.Even though on the level of daily management a great deal of quality instruments and control systems exist, this is not the case on the highest level, the board. It is in this specific area that the idea of corporate governance must be situated.

La montée des populismes ramène à l’avant-plan une question souvent négligée : la colère politique pousse-t-elle à l’action ou à l’inaction? Plus fondamentalement, nous cherchons ici à savoir si la propension à l’engagement politique est plus grande lorsqu’elle s’adosse au cynisme ou, au contraire, lorsqu’elle s’adosse au pragmatisme. L’analyse est menée sur deux fronts, l’un empirique, l’autre théorique. Dans le premier cas, la European Social Survey sert de corpus, avec plus de 100 000 répondants, répartis dans 12 pays, sur une (...) période de douze ans. L’analyse théorique s’appuie sur les réflexions de William James et de John Dewey, deux fondateurs du pragmatisme moderne. Ce double effort tend à corroborer l’approche pragmatique, à disqualifier radicalement l’approche cynique et, par ricochet, à s’interroger sur le rôle la colère citoyenne comme levier pour l’action. (shrink)

Este artigo examina e compara Kant e Nietzsche enquanto pensadores do conflito. Argumenta-se no § 1 que, para ambos os filósofos, o conflito desempenha um papel essencial e construtivo em vários domínios de seu pensamento, e que ambos nos oferecem um rico conjunto de insights sobre as qualidades produtivas do conflito. Contudo, Kant não é capaz de formular um conceito genuinamente afirmativo do conflito que faça jus aos prodigiosos poderes produtivos por ele descritos. Em vez disso, ele promove uma guerra (...) de extermínio (Vernichtungskrieg) filosófica contra toda guerra, destinada a negá-la em favor de uma reivindicação absoluta pela paz ('paz perpétua'). Como nos mostra a análise de "Zum ewigen Frieden" no § 2, a possibilidade de ação construtiva requer a eliminação da guerra em favor da paz perpétua por meio do Estado de Direito, e o conflito é, na melhor das hipóteses, produtor de sua própria negação. A parte final do artigo se volta para Nietzsche em busca de um modelo conceitual que permita uma compreensão genuinamente afirmativa do conflito e seus potenciais produtivos. A filosofia da vida de Nietzsche é uma ontologia do conflito que culmina em um ideal de maximização da tensão baseado em um equilíbrio de poderes mais ou menos equânimes. Argumenta-se que a noção nietzschiana de afirmação da vida nos compromete com uma posição que se situa entre a guerra kantiana e o direito cosmopolita, focando a nossa atenção nas relações antagônicas que se estabelecem tanto no interior quanto entre uma pluralidade de ordenamentos jurídicos. This article examines and compares Kant and Nietzsche as thinkers of the conflict. It is argued in paragraph one that conflict plays a fundamental and constructive role for both philosophers in several domains of their thought, and that both of them offer us a rich set of insights on the productive qualities of conflict. However, Kant is unable to formulate a genuinely affirmative concept of conflict that does justice to the prodigious productive powers described by him. Instead, he promotes a termination philosophical war (Vernichtungskrieg) against all war intended to negate it in favor of an absolute vindication for peace ('perennial peace'). As evidenced by "Zum ewigen Frieden" analysis in paragraph two, the possibility of a constructive action requires the elimination of war for the perennial peace through the Rule of Law, and conflict is, at its best, producer of its own negation. The closing part of the article turns to Nietzsche in search of a conceptual model to genuinely understand conflict and its productive potential. Nietzsche's life philosophy is an ontology of conflict that culminates in an ideal of maximizing tension based on a balance of more or less equitable powers. It is argued that Nietzsche's notion of affirmation of life commits us to a position that is between Kantian war and the cosmopolitan law, bringing to our attention the antagonistic relations within and among a plurality of legal systems. (shrink)

To push the edges of the known, to look at the accepted in novel ways, is indeed to stand at the frontiers of a field. In Frontiers in American Philosophy thirty-five contemporary scholars explore classical American thought in bold new ways. An extraordinary range of issues and thinkers is represented in these pages--from such core themes as metaphysics and social philosophy, which receive primary attention, to some consideration of American philosophers' technical accomplishments in mathematical logic and philosophical analysis. The authors (...) also offer new perspectives on the work of the leading American philosophers, including George Herbert Mead, William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Emma Goldman. Not surprisingly perhaps, a great deal of the discussion revolves, either directly or indirectly, around that great axis of intellectual issues commonly known as the "realism/idealism" controversy. It seems fitting that so much attention is devoted to the possibility of some sort of middle position between "external realism" and its antipode in some form of relativistic subjectivism. For, in the last analysis, such a middle position is for the American philosophers the core meaning of "pragmatism.”. (shrink)

Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten is popular as an introduction into his philosophy and into fundamental ethics in general. Its third chapter is, nevertheless, a notoriously difficult text. According to many interpreters, it raises questions rather than answering them. This article tries to answer some questions which often remain unclear even in the secondary literature: how is the logical structure of the chapter; what exactly is the synthetic character of the categorical imperative; how does freedom function as the third, (...) connecting term in this synthesis; what is the relationship between questions concerning the possibility and the validity of the categorical imperative? In his own words, Kant wants to give here 'a deduction of the principle of morality' but also of the concept of freedom. The double use of the term 'deduction' needs an accurate interpretation. One thesis of the article is that the deduction of freedom must not be identified with the problematic deduction of the categorical imperative. The deduction of the concept of freedom has a more modest function within the proof of the possibility of the categorical imperative. This means that the question concerning the proof of its validity is still open; but the very idea that such a proof is neither possible nor necessary evokes already the notion of the factum der Vernunft. (shrink)

The concept of Umwertung, central to Ecce Homo, is marked by discrepancies and incongruities that seem to defy philosophical comprehension. This paper focuses on the problem of Yes-saying and No-saying at the core of Umwertung. How can total affirmation be combined with radical critique, as Nietzsche claims? Nietzsche's favoured idiom of warfare exhibits the incommensurability of these positions, but it also points to a deeper problem: in waging war against idealism, Nietzsche risks repeating idealism, conceived as a war to the (...) death against other forms of life and thought. In §2 idealist warfare is analysed more closely, and in §3 it is contrasted with Nietzschean warfare, cinceived as an agonal form of oppositional thinking that avoids repeating idealism. This model of warfare is, however, undermined by the affirmative and destructive excesses of Nietzsche's text, and §4 proposes a different approach to the problem of Yes- and No-saying. On this approach, the affirmation of reality as war or conflictual multiplicity demands 1. the adoption of antagonistic positions with destructive intent against life-negating positions , but also 2. the overcoming of every antagonistic position in favour of an 'impossible' or fictional standpoint in the relation between antagonists; this alone allows all antagonistic positions to be affirmed. This approach is proposed as a general way to make sense of the fictional qualities of Ecce homo, its excesses and incongruities, and in §5 it is applied as a corrective to the account of Umwertung as a comparative practice proposed by Gerd Schank. (shrink)

Religion and science are altogether too different to be rationally incompatible . If—as is done here—one defends such a thesis, one seems to sever the link between religion and truth. This link seems to many to be really essential: is not the highest requirement of a person, especially a religious person, „to live in the truth” ? And is it not necessary for rational beings to try and give a rational justification for one's religious beliefs? But perhaps „the truth” which (...) is of such importance to the religious person is not a theoretical truth; perhaps „to live in the truth” is not a matter of trying not to be fooled or of being prepared to change one's views according to new and better information. Furthermore, the desire for independent justification seems either incompatible with religious belief or rather pointless. The link between religion and truth can only be seriously discussed if one understands the relationship between religious beliefs and attitudes like truthfulness, trust, obedience to authority, etcetera. One objection to our position could be that it leads to a kind of „schizophrenic” split or disconnection between religion and the scientific outlook. To this objection we reply that since the arrival of science and technology human life is full of similar kinds of disconnection between non-scientific beliefs and attitudes, and scientific beliefs and technical approaches. To want to conserve science and technology and at the same time to want to restore the „Cosy Universe”-situation, is pure wishful thinking. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 446-461.

La conception naturaliste de l'homme comme conatus n'est pas liee chez Spinoza a une conception ethique utilitariste, egoiste ou hedonique. Au contraire, et paradoxalement, elle est susceptible de s'accommoder d'une pensee ethique qui, a son stade le plus developpe, consiste en de tres hautes vertus et des sentiments religieux eleves. Ceci n'est possible que parce que le conatus est interprete comme capable d'une activite libre. Cette liberte est concue, non pas comme une realisation, par la volonte, de valeurs qui seduisent (...) sans necessitation, mais comme une activite emanant de maniere spontanee ou quasi-automatique d'une source autonome, c. a. d. non determinee par l'exterieur. (shrink)

This paper is an interpretation of the precise meaning of Spinoza's provocative theses that "right is might", and that the real basis of political and other authority is power. The possibility condition of these radically modern theses — that imply the end of traditional theologico-political thinking — is a peculiar naturalistic theology. At the same time, this paper provides a brief, but thorough introduction to Spinoza's political philosophy. Some aspects of it which are often neglected, such as the intricate relationship (...) beween the law and the mores of the people, are given their due weight. (shrink)