The Moral Habitat offers a new and systematic interpretation of Kant's moral and political philosophy. Herman introduces the idea of a moral habitat to examines the dynamic system of duties that exists between individuals and civic institutions.

By focussing on the logical relations between scientific theories and religious beliefs in his book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga overlooks the real conflict between science and religion. This conflict exists whenever religious believers endorse positive factual claims to truth concerning the supernatural. They thereby violate an important rule of scientific method and of common sense, according to which factual claims should be endorsed as true only if they result from validated epistemic methods or sources.

Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view.

This volume collects ten essays investigating some fundamental aspects of Kant's ethics, drawing wider conclusions for moral philosophy. Herman aims to undermine some received ideas about how Kantian ethics works and what it means in practice.

Paul Churchland's philosophical work enjoys an increasing popularity. His imaginative papers on cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology are widely discussed. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979), his major book, is an important contribution to the debate on realism. Churchland provides us with the intellectual tools for constructing a unified scientific Weltanschauung. His network theory of language implies a provocative view of the relation between science and common sense. This paper contains a critical examination of Churchland's network (...) theory of language, which is the foundation of his philosophy. It is argued that the network theory should be seen as deriving its point from traditional empiricism. The network theory enables the empiricist to resist the phenomenalistic temptations inherent in his position, and to build a realist philosophy on the basis of the representative theory of perception. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the representative theory is presupposed by Churchland's main argument in favour of the network view. Churchland tends to conceive of himself as a naturalistic epistemologist. But the philosophical faction to which Churchland belongs is rather that of modern neo?Kantianism. (shrink)

In this paper an attempt is made to reconstruct the development of Husserl’s conception of intentionality from 1891 up to 1900/01. It is argued that Husserl’s concept of intentionality in the Logical Investigations took shape under the influence of problems originating in two different fields: the philosophy of perception and philosophical semantics. This multiple origin of the concept of intentionality of 1900/01 is then adduced as an explanation of tensions within the text of the Investigations, tensions whieh account for the (...) fact that various contradictory interpretations of Husserl’s concept of intentionality are supported by the texts.The paper starts with a brief and schematic interpretation of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Next, the theory of perception of the ‘Psychological Studies for Elementary Logic’ is compared with that contained in the Investigation’s.On the basis of an analysis of Husserl’s early theory of reference to non-existing referents (‘Intentional Objects’, 1894) and of his criticism of Twardowski, it is concluded that his concept of int.entionality of 1900/01 is not free from ambiguities: Husserl wavers between a non-relational and a relational concept. Finally, it is shown why Husserl’s “official” concept in the Investigations was the non-relational version. (shrink)

Religion and science are altogether too different to be rationally incompatible . If—as is done here—one defends such a thesis, one seems to sever the link between religion and truth. This link seems to many to be really essential: is not the highest requirement of a person, especially a religious person, „to live in the truth” ? And is it not necessary for rational beings to try and give a rational justification for one's religious beliefs? But perhaps „the truth” which (...) is of such importance to the religious person is not a theoretical truth; perhaps „to live in the truth” is not a matter of trying not to be fooled or of being prepared to change one's views according to new and better information. Furthermore, the desire for independent justification seems either incompatible with religious belief or rather pointless. The link between religion and truth can only be seriously discussed if one understands the relationship between religious beliefs and attitudes like truthfulness, trust, obedience to authority, etcetera. One objection to our position could be that it leads to a kind of „schizophrenic” split or disconnection between religion and the scientific outlook. To this objection we reply that since the arrival of science and technology human life is full of similar kinds of disconnection between non-scientific beliefs and attitudes, and scientific beliefs and technical approaches. To want to conserve science and technology and at the same time to want to restore the „Cosy Universe”-situation, is pure wishful thinking. (shrink)

In his book Mind and World (1994), John McDowell defends the Kantian position that the content of experience is conceptual. Without this Kantian assumption, he argues, it would be impossible to understand how experience may rationally constrain thought. But McDowell's Kantianism is either false or empty, and his view of the relation between mind and world cannot be stated without transcending the bounds of sense. McDowell's arguments supporting the Kantian thesis, which are very different from Kant's arguments, essentially involve a (...) fallacy of ambiguity. In order to understand how thought may be rationally constrained by experience we should become empiricists. (shrink)

Classical aesthetics sees the experience of the beautiful as an anthropological necessity. But, in fact, the beautiful is rather the central category designating classical art, and one can question the relevance of this category considering contemporary art. The reference term most frequently used for contemporary art is interesting: works of art solicit the interests of my faculties (the cognitiveintellectual, the pragmatic community-oriented moral, the affective aesthetic faculties). It is interesting to notice that the categories of the beautiful and the ugly (...) have an axiological-moral value. It looks as if the qualities of contemporary art works are judged according to the intensity of the impact on the interests of our faculties. It reveals important, in this respect, to distinguish the ugly from the sublime and the monstrous. Kant’s Third Critique is of some importance in defi ning these categories. (shrink)

Certaines maximes énigmatiques dÉpicure nous parlent de l'essence du plaisir en termes de concentration et d'ex-centration, de condensation et d'ex- tension, d'implosion d'explosion. Un certain épicurisme chez Kant lui fait dire la même chose, là où le sentiment vital est invoqué dans l'expérience esthé- tique. Le plaisir esthétique est mis en rapport avec la tensivité, le corps, la vie, le corps-en-vie. Toutefois, le plaisir, dans la tradition épicurienne, semble être l'inter- face de eros et aisthèsis, d'une érotétique et d'une esthétique, (...) le corps-en-vie étant un corps-désir et un corps-sensation. Lucrèce, en bon épicurien et en préfi- gurant un certain Merleau-Ponty, évoque dans sa poésie géniale la vérité des sens, celle du corps-sensation défini à partir de la " sensation globale " du corps .Some enigmatic maxims of Epicurus discuss the essence of pleasure focusing on terms like concen- tration and excentration, condensation and extension, implosion and explosion. The epicurist tendency in Kant makes him saying similar things. He mentions " vital feeling " in his determination of the aesthetic experience. Aesthetic pleasure then is related to " tensivity ", the body and life, the living body. However, pleasure, in the Epicurean tradition, seems to be the interface o/eros and aisthèsis, of a erotetic and an aesthetic, because the living body is at the same time a body-desire and a body-sensation. Lucretius, as a good Epicurean and announcing Merleau-Ponty, writes in his genial poem about the truth of the senses, the truth of body-sensation defined from the point of view of the " global sensation " of the body. (shrink)

Two sorts of values are to be distinguished: economic values which are related to the subjective needs and desires of sensitive beings, and non-economic or spiritual values which are related to persons living in a common culture. The present 'crisis of values' has to do with a confusion between these two different kinds of values. Spiritual values and norms should also be distinguished from ideals and related principles. Ideals and principles are abstractions originating in the attempt to organize human life (...) in a strictly rational way, independently of the insertion of human beings in a common culture. Spiritual values are characterized by a certain sort of transcendence vis à vis the desires and opinions of persons. They are neither subjective, nor strictly objective; neither universal, non purely particular. Values are necessarily incarnated in concrete objects, persons, structures etc. Therefore, even transcendental values are necessarily expressed in concrete forms or symbols. As a consequence, all values are vulnerable and in principle susceptible to change and loss. The norms related to spiritual values should not be considered as fossilized forms or remnants of values. They rather refer to boundaries and distinctions without the honouring of which values cannot exist. Therefore, these norms are no obstacle to freedom, but its possibility-condition. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to my critics on three points: -My book is not an apologetics for Catholic tradition in general or traditional moral views in bio-ethics, but a plea for a philosophical-hermeneutical reappropriation of metaphors and insights from that tradition; -My book is not a defence of the traditional natural law approach, but an attempt atan hermeneutical and internal critical elucidation of ethical sensibility; -I disagree with a pragmatic attitude leading to 'monster assimilation' and with pleas for a (...) 'transcendance opératoire' of existing human nature and its cultural-symbolic 'mindedness'. (shrink)

Since the first selection of George Santayana's letters was published in 1955, shortly after his death, many more letters have been located. The Works of George Santayana, Volume V, brings together a total of more than 3,000 letters. The volume is divided chronologically into eight books of roughly comparable length. Book Two covers Santayana's first decade as a "freelance philosopher," following his resignation from Harvard University and move to Europe. Of particular interest is Santayana's continuing correspondence with the American philosopher (...) Charles Augustus Strong and with his sister Susana Sturgis de Sastre. Also included is correspondence with such notable figures as Bertrand Russell, Robert Seymour Bridges, Horace Kallen, and Logan Pearsall Smith. The correspondence covers Santayana's resignation from Harvard, his time in England during World War I, and comments on his philosophical work during this period. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper is on what we understand when we are said to understand semiotic sequences, such as sentences, arguments, proofs, road indications, jokes, and works of art, and on how we can understand them. The theory of understanding defended here is psycho‐pragmatic, and it is anthropologically oriented. The contention is that we always understand significances: users of semiotic systems have an acceptance relation with a significance ≪[]: the conveyed proposition is modified by the universal rationality operator ≪, and by the (...) partial mood‐operator. We can understand significances by the fact that they are descriptively presented to the users of semiotic systems as common values of the community to which they belong and want to belong. (shrink)

Paul Churchland has become famous for holding three controversial and interrelated doctrines which he put forward in early papers and in his first book. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979): eliminative materialism, the doctrine of the plasticity of perception, and a general network theory of language. In his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Churchland aims to make some results of connectionist neuroscience available to the general public and explores the philosophical and (...) social consequences that neuroscience is likely to have. I argue that these results of neuroscience refute the three doctrines that Churchland advocated in his earlier works. Yet youthful dreams do not die easily and Churchland is reluctant to relinquish his early views. (shrink)

Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Nicolai Hartmann and analytic philosophers such as Ryle, Strawson, and Jennifer Hornsby may be interpreted as using competing intellectual strategies within the framework of one and the same research programme, the programme of developing a natural conception of the world. They all argue that the Manifest Image of the world (to use Sellars's terminology) is compatible with, or even more fundamental than, the Scientific Image. A comparative examination of these strategies shows that Hartmann's strategy (...) of stratification is superior to those of Heidegger, Ryle, and Strawson. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Parables of Narrative ImaginingDavid Herman (bio)Mark Turner. The Literary Mind. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996.The literary mind? The literary mind? The literary mind? Any which way you parse it, the title of Mark Turner’s provocative, elegantly written study seems to beg important questions, assume things that do not by any means go without saying. First parse: is there in fact a literary (part of the) mind? That is, is (...) there some nondiscrete but semi-autonomous module of cognitive capacities required for using and understanding literary discourse—a module that takes information (as its input) from other modules, operates on that information in some way, then feeds the transformed information (as its output: “literature”) into yet other modules, which in turn take that information as their input? 1 Second parse: assume that there is some module involved in the production and interpretation of literary discourse. Then of what nature, exactly, are the operations performed within that module, and how do they operate on the input in a way that makes the output specifically literary? How precisely is literature born from this process or set of processes? Doesn’t this kind of account suffer from all the disadvantages (inexplicitness, for example) that it inherits from its parent model, the black-box explanation? Third parse: should we even be talking about “minds” at all in connection with literature and the study of literature? Hasn’t “The Intentional Fallacy” and everything that has happened since in the fields of critical and cultural theory—from Marxism and poststructuralism to New Historicism and cultural studies—taught us to center critico-theoretical discourse anywhere but in “the mind”? Hasn’t all this research exposed the mind (of the author, reader, subject, or postsubject, as the case may be) as a construct with more or less noxious political and cultural properties? Are not the discourses of and about the mind so many strategies of interpellation—vehicles by which ideology can work to implant the illusions of inviolable inwardness, unchanging essence, and predetermined identity within a subject that takes such imagined realities to be its real conditions of existence? 2Turner does not directly address any of these questions—at least in the way that I have framed them. That may be grounds for criticism: if you are using a title that can be construed as polemical, then the onus is on you to explain just how the title positions your work in a wider context of argumentation. But at the same time, Turner’s analysis reformulates the underlying problems to which some of my questions point, thus raising [End Page 20] other, equally important issues. Coming to terms with these other issues may change the way we ask questions about things like literature and the mind. Specifically, as part of a larger “cognitive revolution” now unfolding in social-scientific and humanistic disciplines ranging from linguistics to literary and narrative theory, Turner’s book provides ample reasons for not thinking the idea of mind tantamount to an ideology of mind. 3 After all, reducing mind to an ideology of inwardness leaves unexplained any number of basic facts about perception, cognition, and language processing. There is, for example, our ability to use “image schemata” such as motion along a path and bounded interior to make sense of events like milk being poured into a cup, on the one hand, and contained spaces like the ones inside bottles, heads, and houses, on the other hand [Turner 16]. Relying on such schemata, I don’t regularly try to pour wine into a cutting board or to measure, in miles per hour, the speed of an asparagus stalk as it sits on the kitchen counter.There is also—to invoke a slightly different cognitive-scientific vocabulary—our ability to make predictions about emergent situations and sequences of events on the basis of prior, stereotypical situations and sequences stored in the memory as knowledge representations sometimes called frames and scripts [see Schank and Abelson]. For example, the script associated with making a purchase guides me in my interaction with the person at a cash register, such that I can make seemingly effortless predictions about what this person wants me to do... (shrink)