Comparative welfare state research is directed mainly toward the development of welfare states in advanced democracies, although the majority of people live outside the OECD and often face graver social risks arising from poverty and starvation. To secure a minimum standard of living, nearly all countries have introduced social programs to protect their citizens. Yet the timing of when governments take on the responsibility of providing social protection varies decisively across the world. Using data for 177 territories and independent states (...) over the period from 1820 to 2013, we illustrate how social security legislation has emerged throughout the world. Although we find that the patterns and pathways vary strongly between different regions, the evidence shows that the proliferation of social protection is a transnational event: regional diffusion and membership in the International Labour Organization matter irrespective of the regional and temporal context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:84 Reviews THE WAYS OF THE WITTGENSTEINS ACCORDING TO A WAUGH Richard Henry Schmitt U. of Chicago Chicago, il 60637, usa [email protected] AlexanderWaugh. TheHouseofWittgenstein:aFamilyatWar. London: Bloomsbury, 2008. Pp. 366. isbn: 0-7475-9185-7. £20.00 (hb). New York: Doubleday, 2009. Pp. 333. isbn: 0-385-52060-3. us$28.95 (hb). Ezach family is happy and unhappy in its own ways. This is hardly surprising zgiven that the family lies at the crossroad of so much (...) human experience. It is the scene for playing out genetics and for working through the rearing and civilizing of children, both nature and nurture. In economic life it constitutes the primary unit, the household. Despite Tolstoy’s ideal, none can ever be com­ pletely happy for every member all the time. And, there is no reason to think that basically happy families are any more the same than unhappy ones. But then none can ever be completely unhappy; or rather, when a family is com­ pletely unhappy it is unlikely that it will remain one. One other factor, however, intrudes on this picture: we tend to be more interested in bad or scandalous news than good. Vicarious experience brings catharsis, possibly helpful in a way. Yet, as the German language recognizes with the word “Schadenfreudez”, we can experience joy at someone else’s sorrow, despite the questions it raises about our empathy. Alexander Waugh is himself the member of a famous family. He has written December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd Reviews 85 its “autobiography” in Fathers and Sons,1 where he is principally concerned with his father Auberon (“Bron”), his grandfather Evelyn, his great-uncle Alec, and his great-grandfather Arthur. Given the family documentation at his disposal and the span of generations, that book covers enough territory, in enough detail, to give us some sense of Waugh family character. You learn what it was like to grow up in the family, down to the odour of Uncle Auberon Herbert’s cologne, “smelling like Cleopatra in her barge on her way to meet Antony for the Wrst time” according to Bron (p. 370, paperback ed.), and the family suspicion that this uncle may have been the illegitimate son of Hilaire Belloc (p. 276). The fathers and sons, from Arthur down to Alexander, all wrote for a living, witty, stylish prose, and sometimes poetry. They especially liked writing about each other in letters, essays, and novels, often to each other in public letters and dedications; and as a consequence Alexander’s book is rich, amusing, intimate, and a bit indiscrete. Arthur’s turn-of-the-century avoidance of emotion in sentimentality grew outmoded, but it was replaced in the family business with newer models, with more Xash and cynicism. When it came to Alexander’s fa­ ther Bron, he was known for his talent at vituperation, and got into verbal and legal scrapes with C. P. Snow and Bertrand Russell among others (p. 407), which led to his getting sacked but only made his journalism more widely read and more valuable to publishers. In Alexander’s disclosure of his family history, there is a sureness of touch that comes from working within his ken. Waugh studied music, and worked as a music critic. In his easy, self-depreci­ ating way, he told an interviewer for The Wall Street Journalz that he got the idea to write this book because of “the most appalling boil on my right index Wnger”. This curtailed his routine enjoyment at the piano, “But then as I sat down and pressed a chord with my left hand I thought of Paul Wittgenstein. I knew about the concerto that Ravel composed for him and I knew that he was Ludwig’s brother. He was bound to have an interesting story.”2 With access to some Witt­ genstein family papers through one of Paul Wittgenstein’s daughters, he began. But a biography of the one-armed pianist soon turned into this “family history”, in part because of the author’s previous success with his own family, but also... (shrink)

“Who are you? Tu quis es?” The interrogator was the German philosopher and pedagogue Eduard Spranger. The subject was Carl Schmitt. The place: Berlin. The time: summer of 1945. The question was “precipitous,” as Schmitt acknowledged in Ex Captivitate Salus, the book he completed following his release from Nuremberg in 1947. “Who are you?” Who, but one of the most highly acclaimed and esteemed jurists and political thinkers of the Weimar Republic, whose writings captured the attention of Georg (...) Lukács, Karl Korsch, Felix Gilbert, Leo Strauss, Ferdinand Toennies, and whose concepts significantly influenced Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann, Karl Mannheim and many other intellectuals and writers on the Left and the Right? (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar comparativamente as semelhanças contidas nas críticas à democracia liberal presentes em alguns trabalhos selecionados de Carl Schmitt e Robert Kurz. A despeito da estreita associação do primeiro autor com o regime nazista após 1933 e do segundo ser normalmente caracterizado como um pensador marxista, são verificáveis inúmeras similitudes entre ambos quando se propõem a analisar as características do liberalismo parlamentar das democracias do século XX. Uma hipótese que pode explicar tais semelhanças seria a (...) influência exercida por Schmitt sobre diversos teóricos da escola de Frankfurt, com os quais Kurz frequentemente dialoga em seus escritos e que foram inspiradores de algumas de suas reflexões – em especial, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno e Max Horkheimer, embora Schmitt também tenha influenciado Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Karl Korsch e Herbert Marcuse. Outra via de interpretação abordada aqui se refere à possibilidade de Schmitt ter encontrado, em suas teorias sobre o Estado e sobre o direito, os limites epistemológicos do liberalismo moderno, o que constitui o principal objeto de pesquisa de Kurz e foi tema recorrente nos escritos dos teóricos de Frankfurt. (shrink)

In this essay I evaluate Larry Alan Busk’s critique of contemporary democratic theorists and contemporary “democratic” politics in Democracy in Spite of the Demos in the context of Carl Schmitt’s critique of modern democracy. I argue that Busk shares Schmitt’s general conception of democracy and of the dangers attending any appeal to it. Though Busk presents Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno as alternatives to the current crop of democratic theorists, I demonstrate that Marcuse fell prey to the (...) most significant of the paradoxes and ambivalences that Schmitt prognosticated. Adorno, I argue, is less unsteady an ally, but one that stays further back from politics than Busk evidently wishes. In the end, Busk’s Schmittian critique of democracy and democratic theory extends further than he himself suggests and reveals, not to a solution to our problems, but a new way of understanding them and their severity. (shrink)

In this rejoinder to the critical comments elicited by my essay “Existential Hypotheses,” I propose to deal first with the challenge coming from the avowedly different philosophical outlook of Professor Churchman. My other critics, Professors Frank, Hempel, Nagel and Ramsperger, on the whole, share my basic conception of the tasks of philosophy of science and epistemology, even if they dissent in one important respect or another from the special solution I suggested. But since I discern even in Professor Nagel's remarks (...) a pragmatist or instrumentalist strain akin to the major contentions of Professor Churchman, it will be well to begin with a defense and further clarification of my underlying point of view. Only after this restatement of my platform will I undertake to defend semantic realism against the specific criticisms advanced by the last four authors. (shrink)

Herbert Spencer, Victorian philosopher, biologist, sociologist and political theorist, one of the founders of Social Darwinism and author of the phrase 'survival of the fittest', was nominated for the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1902, losing out to Theodor Mommsen. Spencer left his post at The Economist in 1857 to focus on writing his ten-volume System of Synthetic Philosophy, a work that offers an ethics-based guide to human conduct to replace that provided by conventional religious belief. Published in 1879, (...) this volume seeks to demonstrate that social evolution tends towards greater individualism, altruism and co-operation. Spencer argues that it is possible to establish rules of right conduct on a scientific basis, and declares that this work is the culmination of his life's study. He was anxious to publish it outside the planned order of the System, because he feared that his death would prevent its completion. (shrink)

From lectures over the BBC by a Cambridge professor on answers to our problems on the meaning of life.

The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, published in 1988, offers a balanced and comprehensive account of philosophical thought from the middle of the fourteenth century to the emergence of modern philosophy. This was the first volume in English to synthesise for a wider audience the substantial and sophisticated research now available. The volume is organised by branch of philosophy rather than by individual philosopher or school, and the intention has been to present the internal development of different aspects of the (...) subject in their own historical context. The structure also naturally emphasises the international nature of philosophy in the Renaissance. (shrink)

New computer systems of discovery create a research program for logic and philosophy of science. These systems consist of inference rules and control knowledge that guide the discovery process. Their paths of discovery are influenced by the available data and the discovery steps coincide with the justification of results. The discovery process can be described in terms of fundamental concepts of artificial intelligence such as heuristic search, and can also be interpreted in terms of logic. The traditional distinction that places (...) studies of scientific discovery outside the philosophy of science, in psychology, sociology, or history, is no longer valid in view of the existence of computer systems of discovery. It becomes both reasonable and attractive to study the schemes of discovery in the same way as the criteria of justification were studied: empirically as facts, and logically as norms. (shrink)

The commonly accepted interpretations ofFermat's method of extreme values tell us that this is a curious method, based on an approximate equality and burdened with several contradictions withinFermat's writings. In this article, both a philological approach taking into account that there is only one manuscript written inFermat's own handwriting and a mathematical approach taking into account that brilliant mathematicians usually are not so very confused when talking about their own central mathematical ideas are combined. A new hypothesis is put forward (...) which renders the mathematics clear and coherent and which does not need the assumption thatFermat was confused. Probably a number of words have been added byCarcavy in two ofFermat's papers. (shrink)

Some theists have adopted materialism for human persons. They associate this metaphysics with their belief in resurrection and focus on problems arising from personal identity, temporal gaps or material constitution, but, in this paper, I argue that being a materialist for human persons leads to an epistemological problem regarding our knowledge of God’s life. The only way to avoid this problem is to choose a particular materialist metaphysics for human persons, that is, a constitution theory that emphasizes the irreducibility of (...) the first-person perspective. (shrink)

The problem of evil throws up many awkward questions for theologians. McCabe handles the many contradictory twists and turns with dexterity and skill.>.

Capitalism is in crisis. Is a better world possible and what would it look like? Taking Socialism Seriously breaks important new paths for significant social change by examining detailed questions seriously that had previously been neglected.

Over the past decade numerous philosophers have devoted considerable effort to explicating and defending the claim that narrative can be a satisfactory form of explanation. Much of this interest in narrative has taken the form of a reaction against the covering-law model of explanation-particularly against the claim that that model is applicable to history and to what W. B. Gallie has called “the genetic sciences.” What has been lacking from most of this discussion of narrative is any very clear indication (...) of just what narrative is or any extended attempt to delineate its logical features. The philosophical yield of introducing the concept “narrative” into discussions of explanation has frequently appeared to be very small.In a recent paper Michael Ruse has argued that the logical structure of explanations relating to the theory of evolution can be examined more helpfully by using the covering-law model than by using a narrative model of explanation. (shrink)

A consideration of the unity of a class or kind as including its member or instances.

On an individualist view of testimonial justification, a subject’s belief based on testimony is justified ultimately on the basis of nontestimonial beliefs alone. The prevailing version of individualism has been inductive individualism, according to which the nontestimonial basis for a testimonial belief is an inductively based belief in the reliability of the testifier. Here I consider an alternative to inductive individualism, which I call the parity account. This is the view, endorsed in various forms by Allan Gibbard, Richard Foley and (...) Keith Lehrer, that my testimonial beliefs have epistemic standing because there is a cognitive parity between me and others. I may trust the beliefs of others because I may trust my own beliefs. I focus on an argument central to Lehrer’s account: I am worthy of my trust in what I believe; others are as worthy of my trust in what they believe as I am in what I believe; so others are worthy of my trust in what they believe. I examine whether this argument can justify my testimonial beliefs. If the parity account is to succeed, the premises of the argument need support. I criticize diverse ways of supporting the premises suggested by Lehrer and by remarks of Foley. I conclude that the parity argument cannot account for the justification of all my testimonial beliefs. It is at best an adjunct argument that depends for its force on prior justified testimonial beliefs.Author Keywords: Testimony; Justification; Parity; Trust; Individualism; Skepticism. (shrink)

The theme is socialist solidarity. Schmitt notes that efforts towards solidarity fail because we do not know how to put our ideals in practice. The example is taken from the early kibbutzim. The founders were clear about their socialist principles but did not know how to put those in practice in such simple situations as the distribution of clothing. Schmitt concludes from that example that efforts to build socialist solidarity are often impeded by our ignorance of concrete techniques (...) and arrangements needed for a solidary socialist society. (shrink)

Olivier Pelon et Anne Schmitt Étude en laboratoire des céramiques dites de Vassiliki (Crète orientale) p. 431-442. La céramique minoenne dite de Vassiliki est datée du Minoen Ancien II et se rencontre sur la plupart des sites crétois de cette époque ; très reconnaissable, elle se caractérise par un décor flammé constitué de plaques irrégulières, rouges orangées et noires. Pour la détermination de son lieu de production, on a procédé à l'étude chimique globale par fluorescence X, complétée par une (...) étude pétrographique, de divers échantillons provenant de Malia, de Myrtos-Pyrgos, de Myrtos-Fournou Koryphi et de Vassiliki même. Cette étude conduit à distinguer deux groupes de composition chimique différente. Le premier, bien représenté à Malia et à Vassiliki – ce qui autorise l'hypothèse d'échanges entre les deux sites –, pourrait provenir de Vassiliki. Le second, de facture beaucoup plus grossière et beaucoup plus abondant que le premier à Malia, est, selon toute vraisemblance, de provenance locale ; les caractéristiques de l'argile utilisée le rapprochent en effet de celle des formations métamorphiques du massif du Sélinari, à quelques kilomètres à l'Est du site. (shrink)

Pour penser philosophiquement les attitudes religieuses, le concept de croyance est parfois considéré comme inadéquat. Un des reproches souvent développés est qu’une croyance propositionnelle, croire que p, est une attitude trop théorique qui ne peut rendre compte de la foi et de la vie religieuse en général. Il est possible de répondre à ces objections mais cet article évalue la pertinence d’un concept apparemment plus fructueux : l’acceptation. Ce concept permet de rendre compte de certaines attitudes et pratiques religieuses mais (...) aussi d’une partie de la méthode des sciences sociales et de la philosophie des religions. (shrink)

Some philosophers of fiction – most famously Jerold Levinson1 - have tried to argue that fictional narrators can never be identified with real authors. This argument relies on the claim that narration involves genuine assertion (not just the pretense of assertion that lacks truthfulness) and that real authors are not in a position to assert anything about beings on the fictional plain - given that they don’t rationally believe in their existence. This debate on the status of narrators depends on (...) the idea that fictional beings and beings in the real worlds reside, as it were, at different levels. The assumption that there is a gap separating the levels of fiction and reality serves as a rationale for the claim that real authors could not possibly be en rapport with the fictional characters that they create (e.g. entertain beliefs about them, etc.). (shrink)

Dans cette contribution, j'examinerai l'argument qui renvoie dos à dos le théisme et l'athéisme et qui structure la présentation de l'alternative que constitue le Dieu à venir. N'étant ni adhérant, ni sympathisant du réalisme spéculatif, je ne proposerai pourtant pas de critique externe de la philosophie de la religion proposée par Meillassoux. De manière heuristique, je vais tenir pour acquis Après la finitude et je montrerai ce qui me semble être les faiblesses de l'argument, critiques rendant finalement peu crédible l'affirmation (...) que peut encore venir un Dieu qui ne serait ni le Dieu métaphysique, ni le Dieu du sentiment religieux. Pour cela, je vais reprendre le dilemme spectral (Meillassoux) et discuter la cohérence du concept de Dieu à venir ainsi que sa pertinence pour résoudre le dilemme. Il apparaitra alors que si l'on admet la contingence absolue, on ne peut croire raisonnablement en un Dieu, même à venir. D'où le désespoir absolu. (shrink)

Figure majeure de la philosophie morale, Derek Parfit (1942-2017) reste encore peuconnu en France. Cette introduction vise à montrer l'ampleur des thématiques abordées de Parfit en les rattachant au projet d'une éthique rationnelle, tandis que le numéro dansson ensemble, sans prétendre être exhaustif, propose des présentations et discussions de différents éléments clefs de sa philosophie.