This paper presents a way of classifying different forms of naturalness and unnaturalness. Three main forms of (un)naturalness are found as the following: history- based (un)naturalness, property-based (un)naturalness and relation-based (un)naturalness. Numerous subforms (and some subforms of the subforms) of each are presented. The subforms differ with respect to the entities that are found (un)natural, with respect to their all-inclusiveness, and whether (un)naturalness is seen as all-or-nothing affair, or a continuous gradient. This kind of conceptual analysis is needed, first, because (...) discussion concerning (un)naturalness is common in current bioethics and environmental ethics, and second, because the terms natural and unnatural are highly ambiguous. Thus, the lack of an exact definition of the type of (un)naturalness may lead into equivocation, other forms of bad argumentation, or at least vagueness. (shrink)

Autonomy has been recognised as a key principle in healthcare, but we still need to develop a consistent understanding of older people’s perceived autonomy in residential care. This study aimed to identify, describe and synthesise previous studies on the perceived autonomy of older people in residential care. Ethical approval was not required, as this was a review of published literature. We carried out an integrative review to synthesise previous knowledge published in peer-review journals in English up to September 2019. Electronic (...) and manual searches were conducted using the CINAHL, Philosopher’s Index, PubMed, SocINDEX, Scopus and Web of Science databases. The data were analysed using the constant comparison method. The review identified 46 studies. Perceived autonomy referred to the opportunities that older people had to make their own choices about their daily life in residential care, and achieving autonomy promoted both health and quality of life. Autonomy was linked to older people’s individual capacities, including their level of independence, physical and mental competence, personal characteristics, and whether relatives shared and supported their perceived autonomy. Professionals could facilitate or hinder older peoples’ autonomy in a number of ways, including providing opportunities for autonomy, how daily care needs and activities were managed, and controlling older people’s choices. Professionals’ characteristics, such as education and attitudes, and the older people’s living environments were also associated with their perceived autonomy and included organisational characteristics and physical and social care facilitators. Older people’s perceived autonomy promoted health and quality of life in residential care. However, their autonomy was associated with a number of protective and restrictive individual and environmental factors, which influenced whether autonomy was achieved. (shrink)

Is food’s naturalness conceptually connected to its healthiness? Answering the question requires spelling out the following: (1) What is meant by the healthiness of food? (2) What different conceptual meanings the term natural has in the context of food? (3) Are some of those meanings connected to the healthiness of food? In this paper the healthiness of food is understood narrowly as food’s accordance with nutritional needs of its eater. The connection of healthiness to the following five food-related senses of (...) the term “natural’’ is analyzed: naturalness as nutritive suitability, naturalness as moderate need satisfaction, naturalness as lack of human influence, naturalness as authenticity, and naturalness as familiarity. It is concluded that some very common current uses of the term “natural,” such as naturalness as lack of human influence, are not conceptually connected to the healthiness of food. Nevertheless, the first two senses of naturalness are strongly conceptually connected to healthiness in the food context and the last one may be indirectly related to it. Thus, desire for natural food is not necessarily mistaken and misguided. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the following four alternative ways of understanding the outcomes of resurrection biology. Implications of each of the ways are discussed with respect to concepts of species and extinction. Replication: animals created by resurrection biology do not belong to the original species but are copies of it. The view is compatible with finality of extinction as well as with certain biological and ecological species concepts. Re-creation: animals created are members of the original species but, despite their (...) existence, the species remains extinct. The view is incompatible with all species concepts presented. Non-extinction: animals produced belong to the original species which actually never went extinct. The view may be consistent with phenetic and phylogenetic species concepts as well as with finality of extinction. According to literal resurrection, resurrection biology is successful in reversing extinction through the creation of new members of species that once went extinct. This view presupposes non-finality of extinction and it is compatible with phenetic species concepts. It is notable that no species or extinction concept is consistent with all possible views of resurrection biology nor is any view of resurrection biology consistent with all species or extinction concepts. Thus, one’s views regarding species and extinction determine which views one can adopt regarding resurrection biology and vice versa. (shrink)

While nudging has garnered plenty of interdisciplinary attention, the ethics of applying it to climate policy has been little discussed. However, not all ethical considerations surrounding nudging are straightforward to apply to climate nudges. In this article, we overview the state of the debate on the ethics of nudging and highlight themes that are either specific to or particularly important for climate nudges. These include: the justification of nudges that are not self-regarding; how to account for climate change denialists; transparency; (...) knowing the right or best behaviours; justice concerns; and whether the efficacy of nudges is sufficient for nudges to be justified as a response to the climate crisis. We conclude that climate nudges raise distinct ethical questions that ought to be considered in developing climate nudges. (shrink)

Assisted migration is a controversial conservation measure that includes moving species threatened by climate change beyond their indigenous range. Sandler argues that assisted migration exhausts most of the value of the species moved and that assisted migration, thus, fails to be a workable conservation measure. We show how accepting the moral relevance of species’ indigenous range helps to reconcile Sandler's argument with earlier arguments about value loss in ecosystem restoration by Elliot and Katz. Contrary to Sandler, they do not favour (...) losing a biological unit to retaining it in a human-influenced form. Drawing on the distinction between property- and history-based understandings of naturalness, we further argue that the outcomes of assisted migration to the predicted range are more natural in the property-based sense of the term, and thus retain more value, than the outcomes of ‘‘assisted migration'’ elsewhere. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 329-344, October 2011.

Conservation scientists are arguing whether naturalness provides a reasonable imperative for conservation. To clarify this debate and the interpretation of the term natural, I analyze three management strategies – ecosystem preservation, ecosystem restoration, and ecosystem engineering – with respect to the naturalness of their outcomes. This analysis consists in two parts. First, the ambiguous term natural is defined in a variety of ways, including (1) naturalness as that which is part of nature, (2) naturalness as a contrast to artifactuality, (3) (...) naturalness as an historical independence from human actions, and (4) naturalness as possession of certain properties. After that, I analyze the different conceptions with respect to their implications for the three management strategies. The main conclusion is that there exists no single conception of naturalness that could distinguish between the outcomes of the three management methods. Therefore, as long as the outcomes of the different methods are regarded as being of a different value in conservation, we should either abandon the idea of naturalness as the guiding concept in conservation or use the term natural only in the ways that take both its historical and feature dependent meanings into consideration. (shrink)

This paper argues for the following four claims: the terms “natural” and “unnatural” are ambiguous. Genetically modified food is unnatural in some senses of the term “unnatural”. Natural food should be favored over unnatural food in some senses of the terms “natural” and “unnatural”. Genetically modified food is not necessarily unnatural in a sense that would offer a good reason for favoring food that is not genetically modified. The claims are defended by distinguishing four different senses of the terms “natural” (...) and “unnatural”. Each sense is analyzed with respect to its moral relevance for food choice. (shrink)

Individuals’ food choices are intimately connected to their self-images and world views. Some dietary choices adopted by consumers pose restrictions on their use of genetically modified food (GMF). It is quite generally agreed that some kind of labeling is necessary for respecting consumers’ autonomy of choice regarding GMF. In this paper, we ask whether the current practice of mandatory labeling of GMF products in the European Union is a sufficient administrative procedure for respecting consumers’ autonomy. Three issues concerning this question (...) are discussed. First, we argue that labeling needs to be accompanied by relevant and understandable information on genetic modification, genetically modified food, and the European practice of GMF labeling. Second, we claim that this type of informing makes it less likely that consumers start to avoid GMF products just because labels make them suspicious of the products. It is further noted that even though some consumers may react to labels this way, labels do not restrict their autonomy of choice. Third, a need for more precise labels indicating the source of the transferred gene is considered. It is found out that such labels are not morally necessary when also non-GMF products are available and no relevant differences (such as differences in price and healthiness) exist between them and GMF products. However, in some other cases more precise labels may be needed for respecting consumers’ autonomy of choice. (shrink)

The European Union’s policies regarding genetically modified food are based on the precautionary principle and the requirement of respecting consumers’ autonomy. We ask whether the requirement of respecting consumers’ autonomy regarding GMF implies that both GMF and non-GMF products should be available in the market. According to one line of thought, consumers’ choices may be autonomous even when the both types of products are not available. A food market with only GMF or only non-GMF products does not strictly speaking compel (...) people to buy the type of products available, and a possibility to refuse to buy is enough for consumers’ choice to be autonomous. According to another line of thought, the unavailability of GMF or non-GMF products restricts the autonomy of those consumers who are unwilling to use the only type of products available in the market. From the point of view of autonomy, a food market with only GMF or only non-GMF products does not offer enough alternatives for consumers. Moreover, the whole point of the European Union’s requirement of respecting consumers’ autonomy is to enable an autonomous choice between GMF and non-GMF—not just to give a possibility to refrain from buying. However, this does not imply that producers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, or public authorities have a moral duty to see that there are both GMF and non-GMF products available in the market. The requirement to respect autonomy is prima facie in nature, and in the context of GMF, other prima facie requirements are often stronger and override it. Not only the consumers’ autonomy of choice but also environmental values, other people’s well-being, and the autonomous choice of farmers, retailers, and other relevant parties should be respected. Thus, according to the both lines of thought, the requirement to respect consumers’ autonomy of choice does not imply that there should be both GMF and non-GMF products available in the market. (shrink)

The effective collection and management of personal data of rapidly migrating populations is important for ensuring adequate healthcare and monitoring of a displaced peoples’ health status. With developments in ICT data sharing capabilities, electronic personal health records (ePHRs) are increasingly replacing less transportable paper records. ePHRs offer further advantages of improving accuracy and completeness of information and seem tailored for rapidly displaced and mobile populations. Various emerging initiatives in Europe are seeking to develop migrant‐centric ePHR responses. This paper highlights their (...) importance and benefits, but also identifies a number of significant ethical, legal and social issues (ELSI) and challenges to their design and implementation, regarding (1) the kind of information that should be stored, (2) who should have access to information, and (3) potential misuse of information. These challenges need to be urgently addressed to make possible the beneficial use of ePHRs for vulnerable migrants in Europe. (shrink)

Nudges are a way to steer people’s behavior through changes in how choices are presented. Nudge research has been incorporated into public policy in many countries, and nudge research, thus, has the potential to directly influence societies and individuals. As a result, research ethics for nudge research is needed to ensure that nudges developed are not instances of unethical manipulation of people. In this paper, I argue that two types of slippery slopes from ethically fine nudges to ethically problematic ones (...) can take place in nudge research. The conceptual slippery slope follows from (1) the broad way of defining nudges, (2) the multitude of different ways of understanding manipulation of people, (3) many manipulation definitions implying that some nudges are manipulative, and (4) some forms of manipulation of people being prima facie wrong. The empirical slippery slope rests, first, on the possibility of small steps from ethically acceptable to wrong nudges, and second, on the cognitive limits typical to human beings (including nudge researchers). Both slippery slope arguments imply the need to of nudge researchers to create so-called firebreaks. The firebreaks can take the form of ethical justifications. To avoid slippery slopes, certain types of arguments should be excluded from these justifications. (shrink)

The concept of an artefact is central to several bioethical arguments. In this paper, I analyse this concept with respect to living and also non- living entities. It is shown that a close relationship between bringing an entity into existence and its intentional modification is necessary for its artefactuality. The criterion is further improved by analyses of the nature of intentionality in artefact production and the differences between artefacts and their side-effects. Further, in order to clarify the meaning of the (...) term 'bring into existence', issues related to sortal terms and functions of artefacts are considered. As the result of these analyses, the criterion for being an artefact is founded on the following double condition: An entity x is an artefact only if x has been intentionally brought into existence by intentionally causing the coming artefact x to have certain properties. An entity x is an artefact only if causing x to have certain properties has led x to have some new functions – that is, functions that are not present in the raw materials of x. The double condition is used for clarifying the status of several biotic entities such as gardens, commercial fields, polluted natural areas, ecosystems including alien species, restored ecosystems and transgenic organisms. (shrink)

Background: Research ethics training courses are gaining hold in the academia. Learning is affected by learner’s conception of the topic. Thus, knowledge regarding research ethics understandings of the participants of the training courses is needed. Methods: A data driven qualitative content analysis was utilized in a survey after a compulsory research ethics course for doctoral researchers in Finland. In an anonymous online survey, 17 respondents answered open questions concerning research ethics and its relevance. Results: Doctoral researcher’s views can be understood (...) with four core categories: (1) the relevance of research ethics; (2) motivation for learning and following research ethics, (3) the nature of research ethics; and (4) changes due to taking a research ethics course. All categories have subcategories. Conclusions: The views of the doctoral researchers greatly vary along the continuums formed by the core categories and subcategories. Understanding their views is important for the development of the training courses and teaching. (shrink)