Revolutionizing received opinion of Taoism's origins in light of historic new discoveries, Harold D. Roth has uncovered China's oldest mystical text--the original expression of Taoist philosophy--and presents it here with a complete translation and commentary. Over the past twenty-five years, documents recovered from the tombs of China's ancient elite have sparked a revolution in scholarship about early Chinese thought, in particular the origins of Taoist philosophy and religion. In _Original Tao,_ Harold D. Roth exhumes the seminal text of (...) Taoism--_Inward Training (Nei-yeh)_--not from a tomb but from the pages of the _Kuan Tzu,_ a voluminous text on politics and economics in which this mystical tract had been "buried" for centuries. _Inward Training_ is composed of short poetic verses devoted to the practice of breath meditation, and to the insights about the nature of human beings and the form of the cosmos derived from this practice. In its poetic form and tone, the work closely resembles the _Tao-te Ching_; moreover, it clearly evokes Taoism's affinities to other mystical traditions, notably aspects of Hinduism and Buddhism. Roth argues that _Inward Training_ is the foundational text of early Taoism and traces the book to the mid-fourth century B.C. (the late Warring States period in China). These verses contain the oldest surviving expressions of a method for mystical "inner cultivation," which Roth identifies as the basis for all early Taoist texts, including the _Chuang Tzu_ and the world-renowned _Tao-te Ching._ With these historic discoveries, he reveals the possibility of a much deeper continuity between early "philosophical" Taoism and the later Taoist religion than scholars had previously suspected. _Original Tao_ contains an elegant and luminous complete translation of the original text. Roth's comprehensive analysis explains what _Inward Training_ meant to the people who wrote it, how this work came to be "entombed" within the _Kuan Tzu,_ and why the text was largely overlooked after the early Han period. (shrink)

I am grateful for Ted Nannicelli’s careful attention to my book. In his comment, Nannicelli makes two quite serious sets of objections to my views. The first set concerns my arguments against perspectivism, the view that the attitudes or perspectives manifested in artworks are morally evaluable. The second set concerns my arguments for meta-normative expressivism, the view that normative judgements are expressions of the attitudes of persons, not beliefs in mind-independent facts. In what follows, I offer responses to each of (...) these sets of objections, which I hope will go some way towards answering them. If my responses fail to fully answer the objections, perhaps they can at least shed further light on the reasons behind our disagreements. For the most part, I stand behind what I wrote, but Nannicelli’s criticisms have helped me to see the ways in which I might have said more to support certain points and in which I might have been clearer. I hope this short response can make clear what I was trying to do in the book and why I was trying to do it. (shrink)

This short political pamphlet has survived to our day through the lucky chance of being included in the minor works of Xenophon, and for over 150 years it has been the subject of lively scholarly debate. The unknown author was a confirmed oligarch, but with an insider's insight into Athenian democracy. Though he cannot approve of this form of government, he is astute enough to see that the system works well on its own terms and that it is therefore (...) popular; it will prove very hard to overthrow. The work has proved difficult to tie down to an historical context. (shrink)

§ 1. “To the mind of the philosopher”, according to Plato,1 “there belongs a vision of all time and all being"; and certainly many of the great thinkers have made it their business to speculate about the omnitudo realitatis or the ens realissimum—about the universe as a whole and in its wholeness, or about that which is supremely real—in short about ‘ the Absolute ‘. It may be that this interest in the Whole lies at the heart of all (...) genuine philosophy, giving to it its distinctive inspiration and character. It may be, on the other hand, that it is a misdirected solicitude—an anxiety to solve the inherently insoluble. The Absolute, we shall perhaps be told, is a vox nihili—a name for that which, being nothing, has no attributes ; or we, at least, can never hope to characterize it. All our available predicates, being drawn of necessity from a limited field, must ‘ come short‘must prove inadequate for so immense and so august a subject. (shrink)

_A timely call for recovering the true meanings of the nineteenth‑century terms that are hobbling current political debates__ “Masterful.... James cuts through the tangled terminological and conceptual jungle of modern globalist discourse... [with] fascinating discussions of the origins and meanings of the words.”—G. John Ikenberry, ___Foreign Affairs___ “James delves into the often-surprising intellectual origins of key concepts in the arguments about globalisation—and illuminates the debate in the process.”—Gideon Rachman, _Financial Times_, "Best Books of 2021: Politics"_ Nationalism, conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and (...) capitalism are among the most fiercely debated ideas in contemporary politics. Since these concepts hark back to the nineteenth century, much of their nuanced meaning has been lost, and the words are most often used as epithets that short-circuit productive discussion. In this insightful book, Harold James uncovers the origins of these concepts and examines how the problematic definition and meaning of each term has become an obstacle to respectful communication. Noting that similar linguistic misunderstandings accompany such newer ideas as geopolitics, neoliberalism, technocracy, and globalism, James argues that a rich historical knowledge of the vocabulary surrounding globalization, politics, and economics—particularly the meaning and the usefulness that drove the original conceptions of the terms—is needed to negotiate the gaps between different understandings and make fruitful political debate once again possible. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that we can be influenced by fictions in ways that matter morally, and some of the time we will be unaware that we have been so influenced. These arguments fall short of proving a clear causal link between fictions and specific changes in the audience, but they do reveal rather interesting and complex features of the moral psychology of fiction. In particular, they reveal that some Platonic worries (...) about the dangers of art cannot be dismissed lightly. (shrink)

Tuomela (this issue, pp. 96-103) raises several objections to the analysis and critique of methodological individualism in my (1986). In what follows I reply to those criticisms, arguing, among other things, that: (1) the alleged reductions provided by Tuomela and others fail, because they either presuppose rather than eliminate social predicates or do not avoid the problem of multiple realizations; (2) supervenience does not guarantee that the social sciences are reducible, because merely describing supervenieence bases leaves numerous questions unanswered, and (...) (3) the eliminativism that Tuomela favors verges on being self-refuting and is highly implausible short of a detailed empirical critique of the social sciences, something Tuomela does not provide and something there is little reason to think can be provided. (shrink)

Used by more than one million students around the world since its original publication, this introductory philosophy text makes accessible a wide range of philosophical issues closely related to everyday life. Emphasizing personal and immediate questions, the authors approach introductory philosophy through basic human questions rather than focusing on methodology or the history of thought. The text presents vital questions of contemporary interest in an overall framework of enduring concepts, interweaving coverage of various topics in art, history, and education. It (...) covers a variety of types of philosophy in depth, and both western and eastern perspectives are represented. Ideal for students who have no background in philosophy, Living Issues in Philosophy, 9/e simplifies technical language wherever possible; unfamiliar terms are clearly defined upon first appearance and in the end-of-chapter glossaries. Additional pedagogical features include exercises, chapter summaries, and annotated bibliographies at the end of every chapter. The text also features photo biographies of major philosophers and short excerpts from philosophical classics. (shrink)

Stephen Tracy's neat demonstration that IG I3 35—authorizing the building of a temple and appointment of a priestess for Athena Nike—was cut by the man responsible for the Promachos accounts at first seemed decisive for the traditional c. 448 B.C. against my radical down-dating. Ira Mark then argued that this decree provided for the naiskos and altar of his Stage III in the 440s: the marble temple belonged to Stage IV over twenty years later. Despite these two powerful interventions the (...) matter is not closed. David Gill has, I fancy, convincingly refuted Mark on archaeological and architectural grounds. And there is still more to be said from the epigraphic angle. IG I 36, cut on the back of the stele, looks like a delayed rider to 35. But just how delayed was it? It arranged for the regular payment of the priestess's salary by the kolakretai in office in the month Thargelion. On the traditional view the gap would be close to a quarter of a century, since 36 is firmly dated 424/3 B.C. This is quite extraordinary, though reasons have been found for it. More serious perhaps is some neglected epigraphic evidence. We have eighteen other examples in fifth-century Attic epigraphy where decrees are followed on the same stone by other texts; but virtually all the gaps are short, never more than a few years. The relevant texts are IG I 4, 11/12, 41, 42/43, 52 A–B, 59, 61, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 89, 93, 101, 127/II1, 156, 1454. It is true that 42/43 are dated c. 445–442 and c. 435–427 B.C. in IG I, but this is quite arbitrary. (shrink)

v. 1. Nicomachean ethics. Politics. The Athenian Constitution. Rhetoric. On Poetics.--v. 2. Logic.--v. 3. Physics. Metaphysics. On the soul. Short physical treaties.--v. 4. On the heavens. On generation and corruption. Meteorology. Biological treatises.

This review discusses Harold Berman’s, Law and Language, published by Cambridge University Press in 2013. It locates this short book in relation to Berman’s extensive body of publications in international and comparative law, and asks what contribution the book’s recent, posthumous publication can make to current debates over approaches to forensic linguistics. Particular attention is given to Berman’s conceptualisation of law as a ‘living language’, as well as to his coining of the term ‘communification’ to describe the value (...) of legal-lay dialogue in building a public sense of community and in sustaining the legitimacy of legal systems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd 168 Reviews A CONSCIENCE IN ACTION Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa stratoflampsacus@aol.com Reiner Braun, Robert Hinde, David Krieger, Harold Kroto, and Sally Milne, eds. Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace. Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-vch Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, 2007. Pp. xiv, 355. isbn 978-3-527-40690-6 (hb). us$60. People who detest barbarism start to act in a barbaric (...) way. This is the insanity of war. (zJoseph Rotblat, p. 168) Bertrand Russell’s famous 1954 bbc broadcast “Man’s Peril” concerned humanity ’s fate in an era of nuclear weaponry. Soon after this event, it occurred to Russell that a further course of action would be to persuade prominent scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain to sign a statement emphasizing the importance of joint action in addressing the spectre of a world in which there was availability of and even will to use nuclear armaments. He sent a draft of his petition to Albert Einstein for approval. Shortly thereafter, on a Xight from Rome to Paris, Russell heard the pilot’s announcement that Einstein had February 19, 2011 (11:48 am) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE3002\russell 30,2 040 red.wpd Reviews 169 1 Rotblat was the recipient of the 1983 Bertrand Russell Society Award (McCoy, Visionary for Peace, p. 205, and Rotblat’s c.v., ibid., p. 346). died. Upon arriving at his Paris hotel, Russell found a letter from Einstein agreeing to sign Russell’s statement. In his autobiography, Russell reports: “This was one of the last acts of his [Einstein’s] public life.” Joseph Rotblat (1908–2005)1 met Russell in 1954 at a dinner-discussion given by the bbc on the results of the Bikini test and the future of nuclear weapons. Rotblat went on to become an adviser to Russell on the details of nuclear weapon science and was subsequently recruited by the latter to sign the same document Einstein had. Rotblat chaired the press conference on 9 July 1955 at Caxton Hall in London, presenting the world with what became known as the Russell– Einstein Manifesto. Rotblat was the Manifesto’s youngest and, until his death in 2005, the last surviving signatory. Although Rotblat was not a Nobel Laureate, Russell predicted, correctly, that he would eventually become one. In reference to Rotblat and his activities, Russell remarked: He can have few rivals in the courage and integrity and complete self-abnegation with which he has given up his own career (in which, however, he still remains eminent) to devote himself to combatting the nuclear peril as well as other, allied evils. If ever these evils are eradicated and international aTairs are straightened out, his name should stand very high indeed among the heroes. (Auto. 3: 77–8) Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace is a compilation of tributes to the late Joseph Rotblat published by Wiley-vch. It features no less than 45 contributors. The volume is a celebration of one of the truly great activists for nuclear disarmament. It also features as an 84-page appendix eight of his most historic writings. There is also a new photograph of Russell (p. 89). As justly famous as Rotblat is for his eTorts to prevent nuclear war, though, his distinction in this arena tends to eclipse his other impressive achievements, most notably those in nuclear and medical physics. Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace is valuable for the attention it draws to both the more and less famous aspects of his legacy. In the present reviewer’s opinion, the book’s reminiscences have some unnecessary overlap and the editors could perhaps have more strongly encouraged each contributor to further develop instead the distinctivez things they had to say about Rotblat. Somewhat less forgivable, considering the rich details of Rotblat’s life, is the book’s lack of an index. A Polish Jew, Rotblat earned his doctorate in physics from the University of Warsaw. Among the Wrst to conclude in the late 1930s that the huge energy released by Wssion together with neutron multiplication led to the possibility of a chain reaction, Rotblat realized... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Shaping Public Theology: Selections from the Writings of Max L. Stackhouse ed. by Scott R. Paeth, E. Harold Breitenberg Jr., and Hak Joon LeeKara N. SladeShaping Public Theology: Selections from the Writings of Max L. Stackhouse Edited by Scott R. Paeth, E. Harold Breitenberg Jr., and Hak Joon Lee grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2014. 392 pp. $40.00Shaping Public Theology is the second major collection of essays (...) focused on the work of Max Stackhouse to appear since his retirement from Princeton Theological Seminary, where he served as the Rimmer and Ruth de Vries Professor of Reformed Theology and Public Life. The first, Public Theology for a Global Society, was a Festschrift composed of short pieces by his former students and colleagues, edited by Deirdre King Hainsworth and Scott R. Paeth. Shaping Public Theology, which is also edited by Paeth along with E. Harold Breitenberg Jr. and Hak Joon Lee, is a helpfully representative compilation of Stack-house’s own writing across the span of his long and prolific career. As such, it demonstrates both the generous aspirations and the significant limitations of “public theology” as Stackhouse envisioned it, as a theologically informed discourse that should be equally accessible to Christians, people of other faiths, and people of no faith or religious background. [End Page 213]The first of the book’s three sections, “Interpreting the Tradition of Public Theology,” places Stackhouse in conversation with other figures in Christian theology and ethics, both past and present. These essays locate him firmly within the strand of Christian thought inhabited by Ernst Troeltsch, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Paul Tillich, and they also reflect his significant and ongoing disagreements with some of his contemporaries, including Alasdair MacIntyre and Stanley Hauerwas. The second section, “Developing a Method for Public Theology,” provides a useful summary of Stackhouse’s distinctive theological method, defining public theology and its relationship to individuals, communities, institutions, and states. The third and final section, “Constructing a Global Public Theology,” turns to one of the major focal points of Stackhouse’s work, examining the role of public theology in the context of globalization. The text concludes with a brief summary contributed by the editors, a response from Stackhouse describing both how his thought has changed over the years and the gaps that he perceives in his work, and a comprehensive bibliography.As a collection, Shaping Public Theology provides the reader with a broad overview of the predominant themes in Stackhouse’s work. The essays demonstrate his abiding concern for an apologetic and universal framework for Christian ethics as well as his emphasis on the covenantal basis for that framework. Stackhouse’s affinity for both the Reformed tradition and the ideals of the Social Gospel movement are also evident throughout the text. In addition many of the essays reflect his ongoing engagement with the theme of “the global” and with globalization not only as a locus of critique but also as the vehicle for “the prospect of a world-comprehending culture, with a new recognition of certain common moral standards” (162).Whether these ideas are theologically helpful, however, is a matter of long-standing disagreement that will not be resolved in the limited space of this review. By treating the covenant between the Triune God and Israel as merely one instance of a “universal moral law,” and by moving from that particular to the universal through the doctrine of the Trinity, Stackhouse participates in a significant—and significantly problematic—strain of thought within the Christian imaginary (67). While he may reject the particularity espoused by George Lindbeck, Hauerwas, et al., he remains grounded within his own particularity with its own decidedly fraught history: that of the modern, progressive, Western civilizing project. As a work of moral theology, this text does have significant limitations. However, as a document of the history of Christian ethics of the twentieth century, Shaping Public Theology is a useful addition to the literature, both for research and for teaching purposes. [End Page 214]Kara N. SladeDuke UniversityCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Oxymorons of AnxietyOr the Influence of Baba Ram Dass on Harold BloomRichard Klein (bio)A REVIEW OF Harold Bloom. The Anxiety of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).In 1974, when I initially submitted this article to diacritics, it was rejected, despite my being a member of the editorial board. I had previously agreed that the piece should first be sent to Harold Bloom for his reaction; (...) he was not pleased. The editor (and founder of diacritics) judged, I think correctly, that it was better to have Bloom well disposed toward the young journal than not. He had been very generous, since its inception, giving us articles and interviews, and lending his weight to this early attempt to translate French theory into America. I was naturally deflated by the rejection, but since I believe in institutions more than individuals, I acquiesced, gracefully I think. Perhaps I shouldn't have. It has been forty years and in that time Bloom has grown even more dismissive of major theoretical developments and contemptuous of efforts to expand the canon. In his latest work, his "virtual swan song," The Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life (2011), he evokes the critical developments long championed by this journal, which have evolved over forty years, and lumps them together as: "what I shall call the New Cynicism (a cluster of critical tendencies which are rooted in French theories of culture and encompass the New Historicism and its ilk)."1 Note the ilk: making alike, in a single cluster of cynicism, what he will not differentiate. Currently, he is motivated to return to his earlier work on influence, "galvanized in part by the New Cynicism's reductio of all literary relationships to base self-interest."2 In The Anatomy of Influence, Bloom returns to the Bloom of The Anxiety of Influence to find and redefine a canonical interpretation of literary relationships that depends from his immense erudition. Against the cynics, he is excited by a nobler, disinterested perspective—a view more universally shared than what might be found, for example, in the pages of diacritics.In any case, I always hoped this article, excerpted from a much longer chapter, would one day be published. I didn't think the moment would wait forty years and for my retirement. For allowing this to see the light and for their kind indulgence of my valedictory vanity, I especially want to thank my colleagues deeply, as well as the editors of the new diacritics.Harold Bloom brings bad news. Geoffrey Hartman calls him a kakangelist; he calls himself a necromancer.3 The news is the death of poetry—an event, as Bloom at moments seems to believe, that began with Milton. Since then, things have only gotten worse and are no way bound to improve. What Bloom is saying may well be no news at all, if poetry in fact and in principle has always been dying, if its death were simultaneous with its birth—its possibility permanently implicated in its impossibility. But, if not what the man is saying, surely the way he kakangelizes, raises the most surprising questions about the possibility of something he continues to want to call "literary criticism." Hartman's carefully poised review neglects to insist on the question of Bloom's style. His opening sentence, however, does proceed straight to enumerate—with no further comment—the unwonted diversity of elements that compose Bloom's short theory of poetry: "Six essays emerge from this dense, eloquent and experiential brooding, flanked by two prose poems, and accompanied by a synoptic introduction and an interchapter on 'Antithetical Criticism.'"4 Hartman pretends to take all this perfectly for granted, as if we were quite prepared to understand, with no explanation, the nature and necessity of something called a synoptic introduction, or the status of an interchapter, or the force of a notion like [End Page 7] antithetical criticism, and, as if we should hardly be surprised to discover, the whole thing quite naturally flanked by two prose poems! Hartman picks up the new style, but for reasons not clearly readable in his text, chooses not to dwell on this most surprising news of... (shrink)

Since the 1940s Harold Garfinkel developed ethnomethodology as a distinctive sociological attitude. This sociological attitude turns the focus of the analysis of interaction to the actor’s perspective. It suggests that interaction is ongoingly produced through actions that are organized in a retrospective and prospective fashion. The ethnomethodological analysis of interaction therefore investigates how actors produce their actions in light of their analysis of immediately prior actions and in anticipation of possible next actions. Ethnomethodologists describe the relationship of actions emerging (...) from this analysis as “sequential”. This article discusses how Garfinkel’s description of practical action as “experiment in miniature” can be seen as a precursor to the concept of “sequentiality” that defines today’s ethnomethodological analysis of interaction. Having discussed the intellectual background to ethnomethodology the article briefly explores two fragments of interaction audio-/video-recorded in a museum and an optometric consultation to illustrate the key concerns of this kind of analysis. The article closes with a short reflection on current developments in ethnomethodology and their relationship to sociology. (shrink)

Another title in the reissued Oxford Classic Texts in the Physical Sciences series, Jeffrey's Theory of Probability, first published in 1939, was the first to develop a fundamental theory of scientific inference based on the ideas of Bayesian statistics. His ideas were way ahead of their time and it is only in the past ten years that the subject of Bayes' factors has been significantly developed and extended. Until recently the two schools of statistics were distinctly different and set apart. (...) Recent work has changed all that and today's graduate students and researchers all require an understanding of Bayesian ideas. This book is their starting point. (shrink)

During the 1992–1993 academic year, Harold Garfinkel offered a graduate seminar on Ethnomethodology in the Sociology Department at the University of California, Los Angeles. One topic that was given extensive coverage in the seminar has not been discussed at much length in Garfinkel’s published works to date: Aron Gurwitsch’s treatment of Gestalt theory, and particularly the themes of “phenomenal field” and “praxeological description”. The edited transcript of Garfinkel’s seminar shows why he recommended that “for the serious initiatives of ethnomethodological (...) investigations […] Gurwitsch is a theorist we can’t do without”. Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological “misreading” is not a mistaken reading, but is more a matter of taking Gurwitsch’s phenomenological demonstrations of Gestalt contextures in phenomenal fields and transposing them for making detailed, concrete observations and descriptions of organizationally achieved social phenomena. Where Gurwitsch addresses the organization of perception as an autochthonous achievement, inherent to the stream and field of individual consciousness, Garfinkel extends and elaborates this field into the social world of enacted practices. The April 1993 seminar also is rich with brief asides and digressions in which Garfinkel comments about his use of Alfred Schutz, his attitude toward publishing, his relationship with Erving Goffman, and many other matters. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Ezekiel 2: A Commentary on the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, Chapters 25–48. By Walther Zimmerli. The Prophets, Vol. II: The Babylonian and Persian Periods. By Klaus Koch. Intertestamental Literature by Martin McNamara. Palestinian Judaism and the New Testament by Martin McNamara. Jesus and the World of Judaism. By Geza Vermes. The Rediscovery of Jesus's Eschatological Discourse. By David Wenham. Sexism and God Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology. By Rosemary Ruether. In Memory of Her: A (...) Feminíst Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins. By Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza. Equal Woman: A Christian Feminist Perspective. By Myrtle Langley. Sexual Desire and Love, Origins and History of the Christian Ethic of Sexuality and Marriage. By Eric Fuchs. What Are They Saying about Peace and War? By Thomas A. Shannon. The Dangers of Deterrence: Philosophers on Nuclear Strategy Edited by Nigel Blake and K. Pole. The Cross and the Bomb: Christian Ethics and the Nuclear Debate. Edited by Francis Bridger. Foundations of Ethics. Edited by Leroy S. Rouner. Freud and Human Nature. By Ilham Dilman. What is a Law of Nature By D.M. Armstrong. Bentham. By Ross Harrison. Locke. By John Dunn. Leibniz. By G. Macdonald Ross. Berkeley. By J.O. Urmson. Kant. By Roger Scruton. Marx's Social Critique of Culture. By Louis Dupré. The Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur: A Constructive Analysis. By David E. Klemm. Science, Folklore and Ideology: Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece. By G.E.R. Lloyd. Averroes' Middle Commentaries on Aristotle's ‘Categories’ and ‘De Interpretatione’. Translated, with Notes and Introductions, by Charles E. Butterworth. Miracle in the Early Christian World: A Study in Sociohistorical Method. By Howard Clark Kee. Pagan‐Christian Conflict over Miracle in the 2nd Century. By Harold Remus. Frame of the Universe: A History of Physical Cosmology. By Frank Durham and Robert D. Purrington. The Changing of the Gods. By Frank E. Manuel. English Romanticism: The Grounds of Belief. By John Clubbe and Ernest J. Lovell, Jr. A Short History of the Catholic Church. By J. Derek Holmes and Bernard W, Bickers. The Life and Writings of the Historical Saint Patrick. By R.P.C. Hanson. Rupert of Deutz. By John H. Van Engen. Thomas More. By Anthony Kenny. Luther in Mid‐Career 1521–30. By Heinrich Bornkamm. The Night Battles: Witchcraft and Agrarian Cults in the 16th & 17th Century. By Carlo Ginzburg. Piety and Politics: Religion and the Rise of Absolutism in England, Württemberg, and Prussia. By Mary Fulbrook. Doctor Russell of Maynooth. By Ambrose Macaulay. Paul Cardinal Cullen and the Shape of Modern Irish Catholicism. By Desmond Bowen. The 1980 Synod of Bishops ‘On the Role of the Family’. By Jan Grootaers and Joseph Selling. The Godly Order: Texts and Studies relating to the Book of Common Prayer. By Geoffrey Cuming. (shrink)

In Chapter 12 of his book Material Beings (Van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press) van Inwagen argues that there are no artefacts, or very few, certainly fewer than most people believe. Artisans very rarely create, at least in the sense of causing things to come into existence. The argument in Chapter 12 is a very powerful one. I do not think that it establishes van Inwagen’s conclusion, but it does, I think, given its (plausible) premise, establish (...) that if there are not far fewer material things in the world than we ordinarily believe, then there are far more. In this sense it establishes, as Russell once said, ‘the truth about physical objects must be strange’. Furthermore, I argue at the end, we cannot avoid this conclusion even if we reject van Inwagen’s premise. Thus the defender of our common sense ontology is caught on the horns of a dilemma. So our commonsense ontology is indefensible. (shrink)

This paper and its sequel “look under the hood” of the usual sorts of proof-theoretic systems for certain well-known intuitionistic and classical propositional modal logics. Section 1 is preliminary. Of most importance: a marked formula will be the result of prefixing a formula in a propositional modal language with a step-marker, for this paper either 0 or 1. Think of 1 as indicating the taking of “one step away from 0.” Deductions will be constructed using marked formulas. Section 2 presents (...) the model-theoretic concepts, based on those in [7], that guide the rest of this paper. Section 3 presents Natural Deduction systems IK and CK, formalizations of intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of K. In these systems, occurrences of step-markers allow deductions to display deductive structure that is covered over in familiar “no step” proof-theoretic systems for such logics. Box and Diamond are governed by Introduction and Elimination rules; the familiar K rule and Necessitation are derived (i.e. admissible) rules. CK will be the result of adding the 0-version of the Rule of Excluded Middle to the rules which generate IK. Note: IK is the result of merely dropping that rule from those generating CK, without addition of further rules or axioms (as was needed in [7]). These proof-theoretic systems yield intuitionistic and classical consequence relations by the obvious definition. Section 4 provides some examples of what can be deduced in IK. Section 5 defines some proof-theoretic concepts that are used in Section 6 to prove the soundness of the consequence relation for IK (relative to the class of models defined in Section 2.) Section 7 proves its completeness (relative to that class). Section 8 extends these results to the consequence relation for CK. (Looking ahead: Part 2 will investigate one-step proof-theoretic systems formalizing intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of some familiar logics stronger than K.). (shrink)

Art has not always had the same salience in philosophical discussions of ethics that many other elements of our lives have. There are well-defined areas of "applied ethics" corresponding to nature, business, health care, war, punishment, animals, and more, but there is no recognized research program in "applied ethics of the arts" or "art ethics." Art often seems to belong to its own sphere of value, separate from morality. The first questions we ask about art are usually not about its (...) moral rightness or virtue, but about its beauty or originality. However, it is impossible to do any serious thinking about the arts without engaging in ethical questions. (shrink)

There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Faulkner, 424−429, 2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues that our more basic notions of trust are expressed by the one-place and two-place predicates. Three-place trust, contractual trust, is not fundamental. This matters. Having a clear understanding of our concepts of trust is important. The most important assumption of Faulkner’s argument is that the notion of trust expressed by the three-place predicate is not attitudinal; it (...) is a ‘metaphysical hybrid of attitude and action’. I argue that this is wrong. All three notions are attitudinal and no reason exists to deny that the one-place and two-place notions derive from the three-place one. Once one rejects Faulkner’s assumption that the three-place notion can be separated off from the others as a metaphysical hybrid argument for the priority of the one-place and two-place notions collapses. (shrink)

Whatever we choose to call Beckett’s series of disjunctive and repetitive paragraphs , Ill Seen Ill Said surely has little in common with the short story or the novella. Yet this is how the editors of the New Yorker, where Beckett’s piece first appeared in English in 1981, evidently thought of it, for like all New Yorker short stories, it is punctuated by cartoons and, what is even more ironic, by a “real” poem, Harold Brodkey’s “Sea Noise” (...) . Notice that the reader immediately knows—or is supposed to know—that Brodkey is a poet and Beckett a fiction writer, not only because “Sea Noise” is designated a poem in the issue’s table of contents, but also because its placement on the page, framed by white space, distinguishes it from Ill Seen Ill Said, which is printed in standard New Yorker columns. Yet if we examine the sound structure of Brodkey’s poem, we find that the rhythm of recurrence is, if anything, less prominent here than in the Beckett “prose.” The four stanzas are of irregular line length ; the stress count ranges from one to five ; rhyme occurs only once, at the end of the poem ; and alliteration and assonance are not marked. Unless we assume that poetry is defined by the sheer decision of its maker to lineate the text, or unless we want to call “Sea Noise” a poem because it is built around a single extended metaphor , there is no rationale for the classification the New Yorker has implicitly adopted.4The meaning of this classification is worth pondering, for it represents, in microcosm, the orthodoxy of every major literature textbook and literary history as well as of most classrooms in the United States and Britain, which that Beckett is a writer who, like the young Joyce or the young Faulkner, wrote in his dim youth some negligible, clotted lyric poems but whose real work belongs to drama and fiction. As such, we don’t teach Beckett in our poetry courses or include him in discussions of contemporary poetry and poetics. The index of any major book on the subject—say, Robert Pinsky’s The Situation of Poetry—will bear this out. And yet the irony is that contemporary poets are increasingly using forms that cannot be properly understood without the example of Beckett’s astonishing “lyrics of fiction”—to use Ryby Cohn’s apt term5—or, as I shall call them, his “associative monologues.” Perhaps, then, it is time to rethink our current procedures of canon making. In what follows, I shall use Ill Seen Ill Said as an example.4. Contemporary prosodists, perhaps because they must account for the difficult case of free verse, generally do equate verse—and hence implicitly the poem—with lineation. For example, Charles O. Hartman, in his recent Free Verse: An Essay in Prosody , observes that, difficult as it is to define the word “poetry” “rigorously and permanently,” verse can be distinguished from prose quite readily:Verse is language in lines. This distinguishes it from prose…. This is not really a satisfying distinction, as it stands, but it is the only one that works absolutely. The fact that we can tell verse from prose on sight, with very few errors…indicates that the basic perceptual difference must be very simple. Only lineation fits the requirements. [P.11]But, as I have just shown in the case of Beckett and Brodkey, what looks like verse may sound like prose and vice versa. The “basic perceptual difference” between the two is surely not as simple as Hartman suggests. I discuss this question from a somewhat different angle in “The Linear Fallacy,” Georgia Review 35 : 855-69.5. See Ruby Cohn, Back to Beckett , chap. 5, “Lyrics of Fiction.”. (shrink)

Moje zainteresowanie pracami i dziełem Michaiła Bachtina oraz Eugena Rosenstocka-Huessy bierze swój początek z odkrycia, ze obaj myśliciele zgodnie twierdzili, iż religijna moc języka oraz mowy wyrasta z różnorodnych kryzysów życiowych. Theoria przez nich stworzona zbudowana jest na gruncie praxis i czerpie swą siłę ze zderzenia doświadczeń duchowych i intelektualnych obu filozofów z rewolucyjnym wrzeniem otaczającej ich współczesności. Wykład niniejszy to próba nawiązania dialogu z osobami podzielającymi podobne zainteresowania i troski. Pisząc go kierowałem się także pragnieniem zaabsorbowania uwagi moich słuchaczy (...) przedstawione w nim istoty metalingwistyki głoszonej przez „nieortodoksyjnego" prawosławnego teoretyka literatury i filozofa języka, Michaiła Bachtina, oraz znaczeniem metanomiki opracowanej przez „rewolucyjnie konserwatywnego" chrześcijańskiego myśliciela mowy i filozofa społecznego, Eugena Rosenstocka-Huessy. Zamiarem moim jest przedstawienie roli, jaką społeczno-religijne modele filozofii i socjologii oparte na mowie i języku mogą^ odegrać w dążeniach do zaprowadzenia pokojowego współistnienia na całej naszej planecie. Ten właśnie obszar zainteresowań został określony przez Williama Jamesa, amerykańskiego filozofa pragmatyzmu, mianem „moralnego równoważnika wojny”. Przywołując na pamięć ogromną rzeszę myślicieli, których prace odnoszą się bezpośrednio do wyznaczonego tu obszaru – a w pewnych przypadkach noszą znamiona dzieła prekursorskiego – nie możemy poprzestać na wymienieniu tylko nazwiska Williama Jamesa. Inne wielkie postaci to: Charles Sanders Pierce, George Herbert Mead, a także myśliciele podejmujący zagadnienia, które później stały się treścią filozofii Rosenstocka-Huessy, tj. Giovanni Battista Vico, J. G. Hamann, Comte de Saint-Simon oraz Giuseppe Ferrari. (shrink)

We dedicate this book to John Thibaut. He was mentor and personal friend to one of us, and his work had a profound intellectual influence on both of us. We were both strongly influenced by Thibaut's insightful articulation of the importance to psychology of the concept of pro cedural justice and by his empirical work with Laurens Walker in reactions to legal institu demonstrating the role of procedural justice tions. The great importance we accord the Thibaut and Walker work is (...) evident throughout this volume. If anyone person can be said to have created an entire field of inquiry, John Thibaut created the psychological study of procedural justice. (To honor Thibaut thus in no sense reduces our recognition of the contributions of his co-worker, Laurens Walker, in the creation of the field. We are as certain that Walker would endorse our statement as we are that Thibaut, with characteristic modesty, would demur from it. ) Even to praise Thibaut in this fashion falls short of recognizing all of his contributions to procedural justice. Not only did he initiate the psy chological study of the topic, he also built much of the intellectual foun dation upon which the study of procedural justice rests. Thibaut's work with Harold Kelley (1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) created a social psy chological theory of interdependence that, among many other applica tions, serves as the basis for one of the major models of the psychology of procedural justice. (shrink)

The claim that mechanisms are essential good science is widespread. I argue, however, that these claims are ambiguous in multiple ways. I sort out different version of the mechanism idea: (1) mechanisms that are horizontal —between cause and effect— and mechanisms that are vertical —they realize in lower-level terms causal properties—: and (2) different purposes or uses mechanisms may have. I then focus on the claim that various senses of mechanism are necessary for the confirmation of causal claims. The paper (...) shows that mechanisms can be useful, essential, or harmful depending on context, using the now standard graphical causal structure framework. These conclusions also support the larger philosophy of science moral that methodological norms in science are often context specific and empirical, not a priori and universal. (shrink)

In the final chapter of Minimal Rationality Christopher Cherniak offers three arguments to show that an agent with finite cognitive resources is not capable of arriving at a true and complete theory of the universe. I discuss each of these arguments and show that Cherniak has not succeeded in making his antirealist case.

Van Fraassen, like Popper before him, assumes that confirmation and disconfirmation relations are logical relations and thus hold only among abstract items. This raises a problem about how experience, for Popper, and observables, for van Fraassen, enter into epistemic evaluations. Each philosopher offers a drastic proposal: Popper holds that basic statements are accepted by convention; van Fraassen introduces his “pragmatic tautology.” Another alternative is to reject the claim that all evaluative relations are logical relations. Ayer proposed this option in responding (...) to Popper, as did Sosa in a different context. I argue that this option should be pursued and propose a line of research that the option suggests.Keywords: Popper; van Fraassen; Representation; Confirmation; Logic; Cognitive abilities. (shrink)