The first international Newman Conference took place in Luxembourg from July 23rd till July 28th, 1956. Many representatives of various countries of Europe were present. Apart from the well nigh perfect organization, it was undoubtedly this common sympathy and admiration for Cardinal Newman that explains the extremely pleasant atmosphere that prevailed throughout these days. It was not, however, a dolce far niente, because every day was filled with addresses and lectures which in various ways and from differing points (...) of view tried to estimate the importance of Newman for the modern age. Some lecturers looked back into the history of the Cardinal and showed how in fact his works still held their message, couched in terms and modes of thinking that are in harmony with the deepest needs and desires of modern man. Others went farther and indicated lines along which a still more profound influence of Newman could be expected in the future. The whole of the conference consequently was something of a stocktaking showing the capital realized and the promises for the future. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 491 adequacy of his ideas. Yet our view of a person's character can govern our view of what he is trying to do. More specifically, if we think Dewey never completely abandoned the idealistic standpoint with its emphasis upon the harmony of self and community realization, that he sought out easy solutions to tough moral problems, we will not regard his work as making an honest (...) attempt even to face these problems. (Coughlan is very sympathetic to Randolph Bourne's criticism of Dewey on this point.) Viewing Dewey in this way, one is tempted to come to Coughlan's conclusion that there is an ambiguity in Dewey's philosophy about how values are created and, moreover, that this conclusion "haunts any philosophy.., that does not allow itself to appeal to some transcendent source" (pp. 161-162). By the time we reach this latter conclusion we have forgotten that the aim of Dewey's moral philosophy is not to point to some transcendent source that tells us what is "right" to do. Indeed, to the extent that we appeal to such a source, we are apt to ignore the existent factors that are responsible for creating the problem. Put another way, Dewey's standpoint requires that we reject the view that one of the parties to a moral conflict is wrong because he holds the wrong moral rule and the other right because he holds to some rule that truly tells us what we "ought" to do. Instead, he maintains that the origin of the conflict is within the situation itself, and the only way out of the conflict (if there is a way out) is to take advantage of or even reconstruct the factors in the situation. Instrumentalism is the position, itself always open to revision and reconstruction on particular points, that the philosopher can offer an interpretation of moral and political problems that makes them more amenable to resolution. The philosopher, unlike the casuist, cannot tell us what to do. He attempts to provide a conception of ourselves and our social situation that will enable us to go about doing. On specific matters, Coughlan uncovers much new and interesting information. To list only a few items: he points to the possible influence of a minister named Newman Smyth on Dewey's short-lived philosophy of "dynamic intuitionalism" as developed toward the end of the important 1884 paper, "The New Psychology." He gives the most complete account so far of Dewey's unsuccessful "Thought News" experiment at Michigan and of the early development of the organic circuit theory. He tells us something of the details of Vermont life that would tend to dispel the simplistic notion that Dewey's interest in democracy was a product of his growing up there. And--most interesting of ail--a fascinating chapter on the early life of Mead and his friend Castle reveals that at one point Mead was so reduced to despair at the prospect of a cold universe governed by the laws of Newtonian physics that he simply rid himself of it by maintaining that space is simply a construction of the optic nerve: "the three dimensions simply rest upon it!" (p. 128). It was a tough time to try to become a successful philosopher. His tendency to speculate about Dewey's motives aside, Coughlan has given us the most complete and carefully worked out treatment of the early years of Dewey's life. DONALD F. KOCH Michigan State University Human Reafity and the Social World: Ortega's Philosophy of History. By Oliver W. Holmes. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975. Pp. xi + 175. $12.50) Professor Holmes's study in intellectual history is an inquiry into the interrelationship of Ortega's social and intellectual experiences with the formation of his ideas. In the author's own words: "This essay attempts a systematic analysis of Ortega's philosophy of human reality, the social world, and history. The unified analysis of his philosophy drew heavily upon the traditions of historicism, phenomenology, and existentialism. Such was the influence of these philosophical traditions that Ortega became, at once, critic and representative of their respective positions, problems, and solutions" (p. vii). 492 HISTORY... (shrink)

The religious autobiography of John Henry Newman (1801-1890), in which he discusses his conversion to Roman Catholicism.

While one of John Henry Newman's principal aims in the Grammar of Assent is to explain how men can give a ‘real assent’ to the existence of God, the major part of the actual phenomenology of religious belief in the work is concentrated in the fifth of its ten chapters. Unfortunately, this section of the essay has been overshadowed by the preliminary distinction between real and notional apprehension and by the later invocation of the illative sense; but perhaps the (...) time is now ripe for a closer examination of this central part of Newman's philosophy of religion, which is in many ways the key to the successes and failures of Newman's new method in philosophical theology. (shrink)

v. 1. General introduction to the study of Newman's philosophy.--v. 2. The text.

Those who study unique events and processes cannot manipulate the world to ‘test’ theories, to ensure conclusions are rational, as falsificationism prescribes. This has left historical sociologists and kindred researchers to use hermeneutics, forms of counterfactual reasoning, and covering laws, but these techniques do not ensure explanations are accountable to the object of inquiry. I repurpose the falsificationist principle of negativity to serve rational theoretical redescriptions of this class of objects. We must work in a theoretical medium, as the main (...) criticism of falsificationism maintains. Theoretical prejudices can nevertheless be held in check, making space for new conclusions, via the double break characteristic of scientific reflexivity. A directional dynamic toward rational explanations can then result by starting with negative cases, which inherently bring case-theory misfits into focus, and applying immanent critique to cycle from worse to better such fits. This allows us to manipulate our theories to ‘test’ the world. (shrink)

This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion (...) of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus. (shrink)

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about what a person values, whether a person is happy, whether a person has shown weakness of will, and whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed (...) asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non-moral in nature. (shrink)

Widespread scholarly agreement has it that Descartes' theory of judgment favors a compatibilist interpretation. This essay explains and rebuts the standard arguments made on behalf of compatibilist readings, while explaining and defending a libertarian interpretation. Along with relevant Fourth Meditation doctrines and texts, my analysis encompasses a much discussed 1645 letter discussing his account. Although some scholars view the letter as departing from the account of theMeditations, I argue that the two works present a consistent view – allowing us to (...) take at face value that the letter purports to elaborate Descartes' intended meaning in the associated Fourth Meditation passage. (shrink)

By considering situations from the paradox of the twins in relativity, it is shown that time passes at different rates along different world lines, answering some well-known objections. The best explanation for the different rates is that time indeed passes. If time along a world line is something with a rate, and a variable rate, then it is difficult to see it as merely a unique, invariant, monotonic parameter without any further explanation of what it is. Although it could, conceivably, (...) be explained by the flow of something, it is better explained by the passing of a point present, which faces the problem that there is no absolute simultaneity in special relativity so that the present for an object is confined to just that object. This raises problems about presentism, eternalism, simultaneity, and special relativity. These issues are addressed first by giving accounts of presentism and eternalism and then an account of existence and times for objects relative to world lines. Finally, an analogy between a world of relativistic objects and Leibniz’s ontology of monads. (shrink)

We argue that the physics of complex materials and self-organizing processes should be made central to the biology of form. Rather than being encoded in genes, form emerges when cells and certain of their molecules mobilize physical forces, effects, and processes in a multicellular context. What is inherited from one generation to the next are not genetic programs for constructing organisms, but generative mechanisms of morphogenesis and pattern formation and the initial and boundary conditions for reproducing the specific traits of (...) a taxon. There is no inherent antagonism between this “physicalist” perspective and genetics, since physics acts on matter, and gene products are essential material components of living systems whose variability affects the systems’ parameters. We make this notion concrete by summarizing the concept of “dynamical patterning modules” (DPMs; Newman and Bhat, Phys Biol 5:1–14, 2008; Int J Dev Biol 53:693–705, 2009), an explicit physico-genetic framework for the origin and evolution of multicellular form in animals, as well as (when differences in interaction toolkit genes and applicable physical processes are taken into account) in multicellular plants (Hernández-Hernández et al., Int J Dev Biol 56:661–674, 2012). DPMs provide the missing link between development and evolution by revealing how genes acting in concert with physics can generate and transform morphology in a heritable fashion. (shrink)

On Descartes’s account, the will is the central player in judgment, a role that this chapter aims to explain. The first section situates the will in Descartes’s broader ontology of mind. The second section characterizes the will’s contributions to judgment. The third section addresses the will’s voluntary control over judgment. The fourth section considers whether, on Descartes’s account, our epistemic responsibility in judgment is best understood as a form of compatibilism or incompatibilism.

As a clinical geneticist I have been amazed at the speed of discovery over the past 20 years. The specific genetic causes of thousands of rare genetic conditions have been defined due to improvements in genomic sequencing, computing power and international collaborations to phenotype individuals with similar clinical features. This knowledge has resulted in an increased ability to make accurate molecular diagnoses which informs optimal treatment and clinical care, can remove the need for unnecessary investigations and informs reproductive decision-making. However (...) for any given individual, this genetic testing can often take weeks or months before the initial genetic diagnosis is made within a family. Occasionally genetic information is required more quickly to define a clinical action. For years point of care testing (POCT) has been a mainstay of clinical care, for example, in confirming pregnancy or monitoring blood glucose. I had been keen to explore scenarios where a genetic POCT could be employed in clinical practice. To me, an obvious example appeared to be neonatal testing to avoid gentamicin-induced hearing loss. Here was a situation where we had known about the genetic …. (shrink)

In this book about metaphysics the author defends a realistic view of universals, characterizing the notion of universal by considering language and logic, the idea of possibility, hierarchies of universals, and causation. He argues that neither language nor logic is a reliable guide to the nature of reality and that basic universals are the fundamental type of universal and are central to causation. All assertions and predications about the natural world are ultimately founded on these basic universals. A distinction is (...) drawn between unified particulars and arbitrary particulars ; unified particulars are the terms of causal relations and thus the real constituents of the world. The world is not made up of events but of unified particulars and basic universals. (shrink)

In its comparison of anarchist and poststructuralist thought, From Bakunin to Lacan contends that the most pressing political problem we face today is the proliferation and intensification of power. Saul Newman targets the tendency of radical political theories and movements to reaffirm power and authority, in different guises, in their very attempt to overcome it. In his examination of thinkers such as Bakunin, Lacan, Stirner, and Foucault Newman explores important epistemological, ontological, and political questions: Is the essential human (...) subject the point of departure from which power and authority can be opposed? Or, is the humanist subject itself a site of domination that must be unmasked? As it deftly charts this debate's paths of emergence in political thought, the book illustrates how the question of essential identities defines and re-defines the limits and possibilities of radical politics today. (shrink)

Over the past several decades, psychological essentialism has been an important topic of study, incorporating research from multiple areas of psychology, philosophy and linguistics. At its most basic level, essentialism is the tendency to represent certain concepts in terms of a deeper, unobservable property that is responsible for category membership. Originally, this concept was used to understand people’s reasoning about natural kind concepts, such as TIGER and WATER, but more recently, researchers have identified the emergence of essentialist-like intuitions in a (...) number of other contexts, including people’s representation of concepts like SCIENTIST or CHRISTIAN. This paper develops an account that aims to capture how essentialism may operate across these varied cases. In short, we argue that while there is diversity in the forms essentialism can take, these varied cases reflect the same underlying cognitive structure. (shrink)

This text sets out to give a reinterpretation of Schon's work. It breaks new ground by looking systematically at the entirety of his writings, by identifying critical difficulties with Schon's work, and by subjecting his work to reinterpretation.

Newman Robert Glass argues that there are three workings of emptiness capable of grounding thinking and behavior: presence, difference, and essence. The first two readings, exemplified by Heidegger and Mark C. Taylor respectively, present opposing views of the work of emptiness in thinking. The third, essence, presents a position on the work of emptiness in desire and affect. Glass begins by offering a close analysis of presence and difference. He then fashions his own understanding of essence, or emptiness. He (...) goes on to use this third reading to construct a comprehensive Buddhist position based in desire and affect -- a Buddhism of essence. (shrink)

The basic kinds of physical causality that are foundational for other kinds of causality involve objects and the causal relations between them. These interactions do not involve events. If events were ontologically significant entities for causality in general, then they would play a role in simple mechanical interactions. But arguments about simple collisions looked at from different frames of reference show that events cannot play a role in simple mechanical interactions, and neither can the entirely hypothetical causal relations between events. (...) These arguments show that physics, which should be authoritative when it comes to the metaphysics of causality, gives no reasons to believe that events are causal agents. Force relations and some cases of energy-momentum transfer are examples of causal relations, with forces being paradigmatic in the macroscopic world, though it is conceivable that there are other kinds of causal relation. A relation between two objects is a causal relation if and only if when it is instantiated by the two objects there is a possibility that the objects that are the terms of the relation could change. The basic metaphysics of causality is about objects, causal relations, changes in objects, and a causal primitive. The paper also includes a discussion of the metaphysics of forces and a discussion of the metaphysics of energy and momentum exchanges. (shrink)

This paper solves the special composition question for solid objects and discusses the properties of wholes in relation to the properties of their parts, including emergent properties. By considering the causal properties of solid objects, this paper argues that it is possible for objects that are undoubtedly ontological units (called atoms) to combine to form a whole that is also an ontological unit of the same standing. It begins by considering the various different kinds of property that a whole object (...) could possess and the ways in which those properties could be related to the properties of its atoms, where some of the properties of the whole could be called emergent properties. There are properties of the whole that are determinate relative to the properties of the atoms, where the atoms’ possessing certain properties, being arranged spatially in a certain way, and with certain forces connecting them determine the instantiation of a specific property of the whole. There are also properties of the whole that are merely determinate as to kind, where the properties of the atoms merely determine that some property belonging to a certain kind will be instantiated. Further distinctions are made between properties of the whole that cannot be possessed by the atoms and properties of the whole that can. These distinctions are illustrated by a few physical examples. A number of different arguments are then given to show that a whole object composed of atoms possesses monadic properties of its own that are causally significant. Next a “real boundary condition for solid objects” is proposed, where the appropriate sort of boundary is both a spatial and an energetic boundary, one having to do with energy states. The paper concludes with a simple example of a solid object that is used to show that the description of the action and motion of the whole cannot be reduced to the descriptions of the actions and motions of its atoms. (shrink)

In this article, I use a mental models computational account of representation to illustrate some details of my previously presented inferential model of scientific understanding. The hope is to shed some light on possible mechanisms behind the notion of scientific understanding. I argue that if mental models are a plausible approach to modelling cognition, then understanding can best be seen as the coupling of specific rules. I present our beliefs as ?ordinary? conditional rules, and the coupling process as one where (...) the consequent of one ordinary rule (OR) matches and activates the antecedent of the rule to which it is coupled in virtue of the activation of an intermediate ?inference? rule. I argue that on this approach knowledge of an explanation is the activation of ORs in a cognitive hierarchy, while understanding is achieved when those activated ORs are also coupled via correct inference rules. I do not directly address issues regarding the plausibility of mental models themselves. This article should therefore be seen as an exercise in refining the inferential model within an already presupposed computational setting, not one of arguing for the psychological adequacy of computational approaches. (shrink)

Throughout his career as a theologian, deacon, priest and cardinal, John Henry Newman remained a committed believer in the value of education. A graduate of Trinity College, Oxford, his own academic experiences shaped his friendships, politics and faith. His Discourses, delivered initially as a series of lectures when he was rector of the newly-established Catholic University of Ireland, inspired a generation of young and talented Catholic scholars. Providing an intelligent but accessible analysis of the relationship between theology and other (...) academic disciplines, the lectures were celebrated in the popular press for dispensing instruction to those who 'had no traditions to guide them in forming a correct estimate of what a university ought to be'. Newman argued that a university should foster the 'diffusion and extension of knowledge' rather than religious or moral training, and that it should prepare students for life in the world. (shrink)

While the link between servant leadership and organizational citizenship behavior has been established, the individual-level mechanisms underlying this relationship and its boundary conditions remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate the salience of the mediating mechanisms of leader–member exchange and psychological empowerment in explaining the process by which servant leaders elicit discretionary OCB among followers. We also examine the role of followers’ proactive personality in moderating the indirect effects of servant leadership on OCB through LMX and psychological empowerment. Analysis (...) of survey data collected from 446 supervisor–subordinate dyads in a large Chinese state-owned enterprise suggests that while servant leadership is positively related to subordinate OCB through LMX, psychological empowerment does not explain any additional variance in OCB above that accounted for by LMX. Moderated mediation tests confirm the moderating effect of proactive personality through LMX. By providing a nuanced understanding of how and when servant leadership leads followers to go above and beyond their job role, our study assists organizations in deciding how to develop and utilize servant leaders in their organizations. (shrink)