This book offers a superbly clear analysis of the standard arguments for and against scientific realism. In surveying claims on both sides of the debate, Kukla organizes them in ways that expose unnoticed connections. He identifies broad patterns of error, reconciles seemingly incompatible positions, and discovers unoccupied positions with the potential to influence further debate. Kukla's overall assessment is that neither the realists nor the antirealists may claim a decisive victory.

The instrumentalist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data runs as follows: (1) every theory has empirically equivalent rivals; (2) the only warrant for believing one theory over another is its possession of a greater measure of empirical virtue; (3) therefore belief in any theory is arbitrary. In this paper, I examine the status of the first premise. Several arguments against the universal availability of empirically equivalent theoretical rivals are criticized, and four algorithms for producing empirically equivalent rivals are (...) defended. I conclude that the case for the first premise of the argument from underdetermination is very strong. The disposition of the argument itself depends on the fate of the second premise. (shrink)

The works of the early Greek philosophers are not only a fundamental source for understanding archaic Greek culture and the whole of ancient philosophy, but also a perennially fresh resource that has stimulated Western thought until the present day. This nine-volume edition presents all the major fragments from the sixth to the fourth centuries BC.

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously (...) hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with (...) both realism and instrumentalism. I also repudiate van Fraassen's argument to the effect that the instrumentalist account of scientific practice is logically weaker, hence better, than the realist account. In the end, there are no scientific practice arguments on the table that support either side of the debate. It is also noted that the deficiencies of van Fraassen's argument are recapitulated in Putnam's miracle argument for realism. My pessimistic assessment of the state of the debate is reminiscent of Arthur Fine's. However, Fine's argument for the ‘natural ontological attitude’ once again repeats the problems of van Fraassen's and Putnam's arguments. (shrink)

In this article, we first review the development of clinical ethics in pediatrics in the United States. We report that, over the last 40 years, most children’s hospitals have ethics committees but that those committees are rarely consulted. We speculate that the reasons for the paucity of ethics consults might be because ethical dilemmas are aired in other venues. The role of the ethics consultant, then, might be to shape the institutional climate and create safe spaces for the discussion of (...) difficult and sometimes contentious issues. Finally, we report how pediatric clinical ethics has evolved differently in a number of other countries around the world. (shrink)

Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

In _The Immaterial_,_ _French social philosopher André Gorz argues, in his finely-tuned and polemical style, that the economic boom that accelerated in the 1990s and crashed so spectacularly in 2008 was based largely on an immaterial consumption of symbols and ideas, as capitalism tried to overcome the crisis of the formally industrial regime by throwing itself into a new, so-called knowledge economy. In this, the last full-length theoretical work Gorz completed before his death, he argues instead for the creation (...) of a true knowledge economy. This economy would be based on zero-cost exchange and pooled resources, and knowledge would be treated as humanity’s common property. Currently, in order to exploit knowledge and turn it into capital, the capitalist enterprise privatizes specialized knowledge and claims ownership through private licenses and copyright. But as Gorz shows, the traditional foundations of such capitalist economics have begun to crumble because of the immaterial nature of this new form of product, which makes it almost impossible to measure in monetary terms. The knowledge economy, Gorz declares, _is_ the crisis of capitalism. Thought-provoking and divisive, _The Immaterial _is the perfect book for our time, as we begin to reimagine the structures of our economic system in order to rebuild and move forward. “It is to Gorz... that readers should turn for a compelling combination of sharp analysis, well-wrought polemic, and suggestions for the future.”—_Red Pepper_ “A great figure of the intellectual Left.”—Nicolas Sarkozy “Gorz’s intelligence strikes you at the very first glance: it is one of the nimblest, acutest intelligences I know.”—Jean-Paul Sartre. (shrink)

The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria (...) of theoreticity fails, that there is a Bayesian solution to the problem of scientific disregard that fares better, and that this successful solution supports a distinctively Bayesian version of the underdetermination thesis. (shrink)

Orthomodular logic is a weakening of quantum logic in the sense of Birkhoff and von Neumann. Orthomodular logic is shown to be a nonlinear noncommutative logic. Sequents are given a physically motivated semantics that is consistent with exactly one semantics for propositional formulas that use negation, conjunction, and implication. In particular, implication must be interpreted as the Sasaki arrow, which satisfies the deduction theorem in this logic. As an application, this deductive system is extended to two systems of predicate logic: (...) the first is sound for Takeuti’s quantum set theory, and the second is sound for a variant of Weaver’s quantum logic. (shrink)

The antirealist argument from the underdetermination of theories by data relies on the premise that the empirical content of a theory is the only determinant of its belief-worthiness (premise NN). Several authors have claimed that the antirealist cannot endorse NN, on pain of internal inconsistency. I concede this point. Nevertheless, this refutation of the underdetermination argument fails because there are weaker substitutes for NN that will serve just as well as a premise to the argument. On the other hand, antirealists (...) have not made a convincing casefor NN (or its weaker substitutes) either. In particular, I criticize van Fraassen's recent claim that all ampliative rules in epistemology must be rejected on the grounds that they lead to incoherence. The status of the underdetermination argument remains unsettled. (shrink)

Forster and Sober present a solution to the curve-fitting problem based on Akaike's Theorem. Their analysis shows that the curve with the best epistemic credentials need not always be the curve that most closely fits the data. However, their solution does not, without further argument, avoid the two difficulties that are traditionally associated with the curve-fitting problem: that there are infinitely many equally good candidate-curves relative to any given set of data, and that these best candidates include curves with indefinitely (...) many bumps. (shrink)

Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin's contention that neither van Fraassen's Darwinist explanation nor Laudan's methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine's suggestion--that the empirical adequacy of our theories already explains their success--is more promising for antirealists. Leplin claims that this putative explanation collapses into realism on one reading (...) and into vacuity on another reading. But his analysis conflates three doctrines into two, and one of the three avoids both realism and vacuity. (shrink)

La délicate mise en rapport de la philosophie nietzschéenne et de l’économie est d’une pratique récente. Dans ce contexte, cet article est motivé par l’introduction du traitement nietzschéen de la « destruction créatrice » en économie et la manière de justifier philosophiquement cette référence. Pour cela, nous mettons en concurrence les interprétations évolutionnistes et nietzschéennes de la destruction créatrice. Ces deux métaphores nous semblent difficilement conciliables et nous avançons des arguments en faveur de la volonté de puissance, contre la lutte (...) pour la vie, pour mieux interpréter le mécanisme de destruction créatrice. (shrink)

Cet article s’inscrit dans la lignée de précédents travaux visant à rapprocher l’entrepreneur schumpétérien et le surhumain nietzschéen. Les deux partagent une créativité pouvant s’interpréter comme l’extériorisation d’un surcroît de force qui, dans l’optique nietzschéenne, s’assimile à la source extra-morale de l’accroissement de la vie. Reste à savoir si le cadre dans lequel ils évoluent est le même. Au-delà d’une approche historique du cycle de la conjoncture, notre hypothèse est que l’approche philosophique d’un cycle du devenir s’avère être féconde pour (...) une interprétation enrichie du cycle de la conjoncture, complétant et prolongeant ainsi notre interprétation du surhumain et de l’entrepreneur. (shrink)

Effective infectious disease control may require states to restrict the liberty of individuals. Since preventing harm to others is almost universally accepted as a legitimate (prima facie) reason for restricting the liberty of individuals, it seems plausible to employ a mid‐level harm principle in infectious disease control. Moral practices like infectious disease control support – or even require – a certain level of theory‐modesty. However, employing a mid‐level harm principle in infectious disease control faces at least three problems. First, it (...) is unclear what we gain by attaining convergence on a specific formulation of the harm principle. Likely candidates for convergence, a harm principle aimed at preventing harmful conduct, supplemented by considerations of effectiveness and always choosing the least intrusive means still leave ample room for normative disagreement. Second, while mid‐level principles are sometimes put forward in response to the problem of normative theories attaching different weight to moral principles, employing a mid‐level harm principle completely leaves open how to determine what weight to attach to it in application. Third, there appears to be a trade‐off between attaining convergence and finding a formulation of the harm principle that can justify liberty‐restrictions in all situations of contagion, including interventions that are commonly allowed. These are not reasons to abandon mid‐level theorizing altogether. But there is no reason to be too theory‐modest in applied ethics. Morally justifying e.g. if a liberty‐restriction in infectious disease control is proportional to the aim of harm‐prevention, promptly requires moving beyond the mid‐level harm principle. (shrink)

The aim of this book is not to impart a substantive knowledge of core psychological theories, or even to analyze critically selected theories. Instead, it is to prepare the reader to analyze and advance the theoretical literature in any tradition. Theoretical psychology stands in the same relation to psychology as theoretical physics does to physics. The traditional way to study theoretical psychology is to take up one approach after another--behavioral, psychoanalytic, cognitive, and so on. The aim of this book is (...) not to impart a substantive knowledge of core psychological theories, or even to analyze critically selected theories. Instead, it is to prepare the reader to analyze and advance the theoretical literature in any tradition. A good theoretician should be able to contribute to the study of psychoanalytic theory as readily as to behavioral theory. The skills required are the same. Instead of covering a sequence of theories, therefore, the book is organized around types of theoretical activities. It is not a work in theoretical psychology; it is a book about theoretical psychology. It also confronts psychologists' underestimation of the variety and the significance of theoretical work. Many theoretical issues do not call for empirical research--they require nothing but thinking. (shrink)

Les Lois de Platon constituent une œuvre majeure dans l'histoire de la pensée politique.

In March 2010, Professor Tom Devine, widely acknowledged as the leading academic historian of Scotland, presented a plenary lecture for the Royal Society of Edinburgh's yearly symposium, "Connections between Scotland and Slavery." Publicly advertised as a reply to the question "Did Slavery Make Scotland Great?" Devine's talk was eagerly anticipated by the group of international scholars gathered at the University of Edinburgh. His answer, however, may have been more controversial than the audience anticipated. Devine said that the economic transformation of (...) eighteenth-century Scotland was a direct result of capital produced by slave labor, disproportionately financed and largely managed by Scots. The notion that... (shrink)

Frühgeborene im Grenzbereich der Lebensfähigkeit befinden sich in einer prognostischen Grauzone. Das bedeutet, dass deren Prognose zwar schlecht, aber nicht hoffnungslos ist, woraus folgt, dass nach Geburt lebenserhaltende Behandlungen nicht obligatorisch sind. Die Entscheidung für oder gegen lebenserhaltende Maßnahmen ist wertbeladen und für alle Beteiligten enorm herausfordernd. Sie sollte eine zwischen Eltern und Ärzt*innen geteilte Entscheidung sein, wobei sie unbedingt mit den Präferenzen der Eltern abgestimmt sein sollte. Bei der pränatalen Beratung der Eltern legen die behandelnden Ärzt*innen üblicherweise numerische Schätzungen (...) der Prognose vor und nehmen in der Regel an, dass die Eltern ihre Behandlungspräferenzen davon ableiten. Inwieweit probabilistische Daten die Entscheidungen der Eltern in prognostischen Grauzonen tatsächlich beeinflussen, ist noch unzureichend untersucht. In der hier vorliegenden Arbeit wird eine Studie reflektiert, in welcher die Hypothese geprüft wurde, dass numerisch bessere oder schlechtere kindliche Prognosen die Präferenzen werdender Mütter für lebenserhaltende Maßnahmen nicht beeinflussen. In dieser Studie zeigte sich, dass die elterlichen Behandlungspräferenzen eher von individuellen Einstellungen und Werten als von Überlegungen zu numerischen Ergebnisschätzungen herzurühren scheinen. Unser Verständnis, welche Informationen werdende Eltern, die mit einer extremen Frühgeburt konfrontiert sind, wünschen und brauchen, ist noch immer unvollständig. Bedeutende medizinische Entscheidungen werden keineswegs nur rational und prognoseorientiert gefällt. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird diskutiert, welchen Einfluss der Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung auf das Beratungsergebnis haben kann und welche Implikationen sich aus den bisher vorliegenden Studienergebnissen ergeben – klinisch-praktisch, ethisch und wissenschaftlich. (shrink)

Empirical research is largely supportive of the assertion of instrumental stakeholder theory that a positive relationship exists between “managing for stakeholders” and firm performance. However, despite considerable debate on the subject, the amount of variation across firm investments in stakeholders (stakeholder management performance) has not been adequately investigated. We address this gap using a sample of more than eighteen thousand firm-level observations over ten years. We find evidence to support an inverted U–shaped relationship between variation in stakeholder management performance and (...) Tobin’sq, suggesting that firms that have some imbalance in their stakeholder management, but not too much, perform best. We discuss the implications of our study for instrumental stakeholder theory and managerial practice. (shrink)

According to André Orléan, the characteristics of the economical sciences dead ends in the analysis of Jacques Sapir, is the desire expressed by the orthodox movement to radically split up from the social sciences in order to establish the economical science as autonomous. André Orléan also points out Jacques Sapir-,s criticism to his book The monetary violence, according to which it induces a form of monergol essentialism that would render the currency an essential and contradictory social relation.

RésuméCette étude présente en quelque sorte le bilan des recherches de l'auteur, et en explicite le principe d'intelligibilité. Les thèmes abordés sont aussi divers que les dimensions de la philosophie elle‐même; le principe en est l'analyse des structures de pensée, c'est‐à‐dire une méthode permettant de dégager l'intelligibilité des choses qui se présentent à l'expérience humaine, en en ordonnant les éléments empiriques. Or, c'est la philosophie qui révèle l'intelligibilité des choses. La méthode d'analyse des structures de pensée permet donc de comprendre (...) aussi bien la diversité des choses que la spécificité des doctrines, en ordonnant les premières à leurs causes premières et les secondes en un système intelligible, dont les éléments, les doctrines spécifiques, se répondent les unes aux autres et s'ordonnent à une structure d'intelligibilité première, participée par chacune et indissociable du système qu'elle constitue avec toutes.Le projet est ambitieux; le principe en est d'une extrême simplicité. Il réside dans le fait empiriquement incontestable des questions premieres de l'intellect humain, auxquelles répondent la pluralité des causes. L'analyse des structures de pensée est donc une méthode d'induction causale, qui prend un tour spécifique selon l'ordre qu'elle institue entre les causes: causalité réciproque de causes totales, ou causalité concourante non réciproque de causes partielles. Le premier ordre détermine la structure de pensée aristotélicienne; le second, la structure de pensée scotiste. Le passage de l'un à l'autre est la révolution doctrinale la plus importante que l'Occident ait vécue, la seule véritable à proprement parler, puisqu'elle commande le courant dominant de la philosophie occidentale jusqu'à nos jours. On s'en rend bien compte en suivant les implications de la structure de pensée scotiste dans les cas examines ici: composition de la substance, intellection, volition, relation de la toute‐puissance divine et de la puissance active créée. (shrink)

Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, concluding (...) that Optimistic Molinism is undefeated and merits further exploration. (shrink)

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This article takes up Diogenes again, investigating some of the reasons Diogenes has been unappreciated, and making a case for Diogenes' mind-based teleology as a significant philosophical contribution. The sophists, too, have suffered from the charge, which goes back to Plato, of not being “real” philosophers. Diogenes did not bother himself with, or was not interested in, showing in what sense the world is organized in the best possible manner; this looked to him as something that happened as a matter (...) of course. What did interest him, on the other hand, was to show what the thing that exercised intelligence is. From this point of view, the emphasis is definitely not on teleology, but rather on noetics. Here, primary textual evidence is available, for the fragments, as well as Simplicius's presentation of them, definitely support the view that the point of Diogenes' argumentation was to show that intelligence is air's. (shrink)