Aristotle’s fundamental rationale for the ‘teleios life’ requirement (Nicomachean Ethics i 7.1098a18) is that a virtuous activity is better when it is more continuous and more enduring. Consequently, the Aristotelian wish (boulēsis) for happiness properly inclines the virtuous person to wish for immortality. This is not an incoherent wish because mortality is coincidental to the human being as such.

Humanism, modernity, and scientific rationality are examined critically in these collected essays.

According to Aristotle, the medical art aims at health, which is a virtue of the body, and does so in an unlimited way. Consequently, medicine does not determine the extent to which health should be pursued, and “mental health” falls under medicine only via pros hen predication. Because medicine is inherently oriented to its end, it produces health in accordance with its nature and disease contrary to its nature—even when disease is good for the patient. Aristotle’s politician understands that this (...) inherent orientation can be systematically distorted, and so would see the need for something like the Hippocratic Oath. (shrink)

-- v. 3. Truth, knowledge, and modality.

An attempt has been made to find some valuable information for particle detection with the help of Solid State Nuclear Track Detectors. The detector is characterized by a critical value of the energy-loss rate by the charged particle. Only those charged particles which give up energy exceeding the critical value alone can produce teachable tracks. The detection thresholds of nuclear track detectors can be specified in terms of their energy loss rates. The findings have been found within a good agreement (...) with the other works. (shrink)

Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the human good – in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” refers to theoretical wisdom – cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a single virtue, (...) that virtue could in principle be a whole virtue that arises from the combination of all the others. I also clarify that the definition of the human good aims at capturing the nature of human eudaimonia only in its primary case. (shrink)

What is a human body? Some reasons are given for thinking that, in the primary case, it is a body that is both of and suitable to a rational animal.

Symposium in Helsinki, 24-27 August 1970 / Entretiens de Helsinki, 24-27 août 1970.