This paper studies general numerical networks with support and attack. Our starting point is argumentation networks with the Caminada labelling of three values 1=in, 0=out and ½=undecided. This is generalised to arbitrary values in [01], which enables us to compare with other numerical networks such as predator?prey ecological networks, flow networks, logical modal networks and more. This new point of view allows us to see the place of argumentation networks in the overall landscape of networks and import and export ideas (...) to and from argumentation networks. We make a special effort to make clear how general concepts in general networks relate to the special case of argumentation networks. We pay special attention to the handling of loops and to the special features of numerical support. We find surprising connections with the Dempster?Shafer rule and with the cross-ratio in projective geometry. This paper is an expansion of our 2005 paper and so we also consider higher level features such as numerical attacks on attacks, and propagation of numerical values.We conclude with a brief view of temporal numerical argumentation and with a detailed comparison with related papers published since 2005. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NECESSARY PROPOSITIONS AND THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION MARK ROBERTS University of Rhode Island Kingston, Rhode Island IT IS COMMONPLACE to define contradictory, contrary, and subcontrary propositions in the following way: contradictory propositions cannot both be true and cannot both be false; contrary propositions cannot both be true but can both be false; and subcontrary propositions can both be true but cannot both be false. In his Introduction to Logic (...) 1 Irving Copi raises a problem with two of these definitions which he believes forces him to limit the range of propositions which can be used in the square of opposition. Since contrary propositions can both be false, but the falsity of a necessarily true proposition is not possible, a necessarily true proposition has no contrary. Therefore, only contingent propositions can be contraries. Subcontrary propositions can both be true, but the truth of a necessarily false proposition is not possible.2 This problem is rarely raised in other logic texts, but, it is interesting to note, it is mentioned by a number of neoscholastic philosophers, for example, P. Nicholas Russo,3 Rev. H. Grenier,4 1 Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 178-179. Copi first introduced this problem in the fifth edition of his work on the basis of an article by David H. Sanford entitled " Contraries and Subcontraries,'' Nous 2 (1968) : 95-96. Sanford argues that the most reasonable way to resolve the problem of necessary propositions is to assume that contingent propositions comprise the square of opposition. 2 Copi, pp. 178-179. 8 Nicholas Russo, Summa Philosophica (Boston: Apud Marlier et Socios, 1[;85), p. 23. 4 Henri Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, Vol. I (Charlottetown, Canada: St. Dunstan's University, 1950), p. 69. 427 428 MARK ROBERTS G. Sanseverino,5 Jacques Maritain,6 F.-X. Maquart,7 P. Coffey,8 and others.9 (It is also mentioned by Bishop Whately.10 ) Each of these philosophers makes necessarily true or false propositions an exception to the definition of contrary and subcontrary propositions. The reason is they and Copi interpret the definitions of contrary and subcontrary propositions to mean that the falsity of each contrary proposition is possible and the truth of each subcontrary proposition is possible. It should be mentioned, however, that the position of the philosophers cited above is not entirely the same as Copi's. Copi reasons that these definitions imply that necessary propositions have no contrary or subcontrary. The other philosophers believe that necessary propositions can be contraries and subcontraries. Thus, in the case of necessary propositions contrary and subcontrary propositions are, instead, defined merely in terms of their quantity and quality, not by whether or not they can both be false or can both be true. In fact, Coffey and some of the other philosophers cited above assert that, when the propositions composing the square are necessary, one can infer the truth of the universal from the truth of 5 Gaietano Sanseverino, Philosophia Christiana, Vol. II (Neapoli: Vincentii Manfredi, 1862), pp. DCCXXXVIII ff. 6 J. Maritain, An Introduction to Logic (London: Sheed & Ward, 1937), p. 135, notes 1 & 2. 7 F.-X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol. I (Parisiis: Andreas Blot, 1937)' p. 126 ff. 8 P. Coffey, The Science of Logic, Vol. 1 (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), p. 225, 226. 9 Joseph Gredt, Elementa Philosophiae, Vol. I (Friburgi: Herder, 1929), p. 46, notes 1 & 2; Sylvester J. Hartman, A Textbook of Logic (New York: American Book Co., 1936), p. 162 ff; Roland Houde and Jerome J. Fischer, Handbook of Logic (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., 1954), p. 61; Eduard Hugon, Cursus Philosophiae Thomisticae, Vol. I (Parisiis: P. Lethielleux n.d), p. 155; Dennis C. Kane, Logic: The Art of Predication and Inference (Providence: Providence College Press, 1978), p. 98 ff; Francis P. Siegfried, Essentialia Philosophiae (Philadelphia: Dolphin Press, 1927), p. 25; Francis Varvello, Minor Logic, trans. and supplemented Arthur D. Fearon (San Francisco: Univ. of San Francisco Press, 1933), p. 73 ff. 10 Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston: James Munroe & Co., 1854), p. 77 ff. PROPOSITIONS AND THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION 429 the particular and the falsity of the particular from the falsity of the universal.11 Maritain maintains that in the case... (shrink)

By the death, last summer, of Jack Robson, the world of utilitarian studies and a wider world of scholarship on both sides of the Atlantic lost one of their most distinguished figures. It would not be appropriate here, even if it were possible now, to attempt a full and measured assessment of his work. Writing only a few months after the news of his death, while the sense of loss is still so sharp for all his many friends, two things (...) are possible. Something can and should be said to acknowledge and celebrate Robson's achievement as a scholar; and to this can be added some personal recollections of one whose human qualities were as outstanding as his scholarship. (shrink)

The object of this article is to examine, with the work of Jeremy Bentham as the principal example, one strand in the complex pattern of European social theory during the second half of the eighteenth century. This was of course the period not only of the American and French revolutions, but of the culmination of the movements of thought constituting what we know as the Enlightenment. Like all great historical episodes, the Enlightenment was both the fulfilment of long-established processes and (...) the inauguration of new processes of which the fulfilment lay in the future. Thus the seminal ideas of seventeenth-century rationalism realized and perhaps exhausted their potentialities in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The ideas with which this article is concerned, however—conveniently grouped and labelled as the ideas of utilitarianism—only began to achieve systematic development in these later decades of the eighteenth century. Within that period—during the first half and more of Bentham's long life—attempts to apply those ideas to the solution of social problems met largely with failure and frustration. Yet unrealized potentialities remained, the realization of which was reserved for a time when the world of the philosophes no longer existed. The movements for social and political reform which have played so large a part in modern history since the French Revolution may be judged in widely differing ways; but whatever the verdict, these movements surely cannot be understood without due consideration of that part of their origins which lies in eighteenth-century utilitarianism. (shrink)

In studying the thinkers discussed, we have generally used (translations of) their writings. The very breadth of this study makes one dependent upon ...

Cultural boundaries in Islam based on Hadith (Islamic traditions).

SUFFERING HUMAN AND DIVINE INTRODUCTION I KNEW when I asked Dr. H. Wheeler Robinson to write this volume on Suffering that I was giving him the most difficult ...

In the modern world of total technologization, scientific knowledge devoid of worldview correction (humanitarian expertise) carries a threatening tendency of self-denial: without a constant, philosophically correct transformation of objective knowledge about certain fragments (branches) of the surrounding reality into human knowledge (questions) about itself, the practical effectiveness of such knowledge inevitably accumulates in itself the threat of practical helplessness. Aim and the tasks of the research. Based on an in-depth analysis of the category of existence, as well as on modern (...) philosophical reflections on the methodological and cognitive insolvency of the idea of the world, to find out the real meaning of those changes that this idea meaningfully undergoes in the conditions of the modern total technologization of human life. The research methodology. From a methodological point of view, the author prefers a dialectical approach, considering the analyzed phenomena, regardless of the mode of their reality, in their development and internally contradictory essence. H. Plesner’s theory of eccentric positionality serves as a certain base point for the analysis of human nature and, accordingly, the world of human existence. Research results: The problematic existence of the world and the epistemological «failure» of the corresponding category, declared in some modern philosophical reflections, are connected exclusively with its anthropological and worldview function, which is based on the fundamental uncertainty of a man’s place in the world. The «worthlessness» («futility») of worldview thematization is derived from the allencompassing inability of the human figure in the world, from that «emptiness» and «invisibility» (specific own transparency) of the spiritual dimension of human existence, on which, however, this existence is based. Discussion. The human «option» of fulfilling the unity of living being can be characterized as extremely intense. In this variant, the phylogenetic line of development turns into an ontogenetic point of worldliness devoid of predetermined content, a fundamentally new type of integration. The horizons of such integration far exceed primarily because of its understanding. And the subject of such a meaningful life is forced to integrate everything that happens to him every time into a certain system (synthesis) of the world. That subjectivity the world has distinguishes the subject from the thing. Subjectivity and the world mutually belong to each other - they are correlative. A thing exists because it is what it is. The subject (and with it his world) does not exist like that. A subject is how and to what it relates. But the relation «how» and «to what» is not carried out completely anew and isolated every time, but exists in its multiplicity in a certain relationship. Each individual case, each individual action (method of action) acquires its meaning from a wider, structured context – in whole or in part. This context is the «world», the «life world» of the real subject, or the «world» as an anthropological idea. Conclusions. The task of modern humanitarianism is not only to find opportunities for rational use of the fact of the fundamental openness of the human being, but also to cultivate the ability to reconcile a man with himself, to accept himself. This gives us certain reasons to hope for the enduring significance of worldview thematization. Criticism regarding the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that to become a man, one must already be one, could be considered fair, but only if one does not take into account the principled nature of such an aphoristic position, because this is exactly how the human world exists - as the art of tolerance uncertainty. (shrink)

Methoden. Im obigen Artikel ist die „Phylogenie des Stammbaumes” untersucht worden. Beginnend mitHaeckel werden 26 Typen phylogenetischer Symbole kritisch besprochen, d.h. nicht die Resultate, sondern nur die Methoden, z.B. bezüglich Systematik und Phylogenie, lebender und ausgestorbener Organismen, geologischer Perioden, Stufen und homologer Variationen, geographischer Verbreitung, Diversität, etwaiger Bedeutung der Einzelheiten, Mono-, Bi- und Polyrheithrie , usw. Der Faktor Zeit wird dabei für phylogenetische Systeme als der wesentlichste betrachtet. Der Autor hat daher in seinen- neuen Darstellungen die Begriffe „Zeit-Stufen” oder „Zeit-Globen-Oberflächen” (...) eingeführt; diese stehen senkrecht zum „Zeit-Radius”. Auf diesem Grunde wird ein neues Kriterium zur Unterscheidung systematischer und phylogenetischer Vorstellungen denjenigen anderer Autoren hinzugefügt. Erläuterungen. Nach einer Übersicht über die besprochenen Schemen im 1. Teil werden die Verhältnisse zwischen systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen sowie die Verbindung ihrer Symbole untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass viele Einzelheiten solcher Konstruktionen oft, wissentlich oder unwissentlich, keine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Der Verfasser hat versucht zu zeigen, dass es erwünscht wäre, möglichst mit allen Einzelheiten einer symbolischen Darstellung irgendeine Bedeutung zu verbinden: Linien und Entfernungen in der Ebene, Winkel in räumlichen Schemen. Die letztgenannten werden besonders für solche Arten von phylogenetischen Systemen empfohlen, bei denen der Faktor Zeit stets eine der Dimensionen bildet. Dieser Grundsatz wird mit der Evolution systematischer Einzelheiten in Verbindung gebracht, und Merkmals-Phyletik, homologe Variationen, Stufen, Polyrheithrie, Analogie und Homologie, Konvergenz und Verwandtschaft, etc. werden kurz im Lichte der Vererbungslehre besprochen. Es istHayata's extrem dynamischen Ansichten zu verdanken, dass das Statische in den systematischen und phylogenetischen Darstellungen aufgelockert worden ist. Méthodes. Dans l'article inséré ci-dessus il s'agit de ce qu'on pourrait appeler „la phylogénie de l'arbre généalogique”. En commençant parHaeckel , l'auteur discute 26 types divers de symboles phylogénétiques, c.à.d. seulement les méthodes , par exemple en ce qui concerne la taxonomie et la phylogénie, les organismes récents et éteints, les périodes géologiques, les niveaux et les variations homologues, la distribution géographique, la diversité, la signification éventuelle des détails, la mono-, bi- et polyrheithrie , etc. Le Temps est considéré comme l'élément le plus essentiel dans tout système phylogénétique. Par conséquence, l'auteur a introduit dans ses nouvelles représentations les idées de „Niveaux” ou de „Surfaces des Sphères du Temps” qui sont imaginés perpendiculaires au Radius-Temps. Dans l'ordre de ces idées un nouveau critère est ajouté à ceux donnés par d'autres auteurs pour la distinction des systèmes taxonomiques et des représentations phylogénétiques. Justifications. Après une récapitulation des systèmes, énumérés dans la première partie, les relations des constructions taxonomiques et phylogénétiques, ainsi que les connections de leurs symboles sont discutées. Souvent plusieurs détails sont, sciemment ou insciemment, dépourvus de toutes signification. L'auteur a essayé de démontrer qu'il serait désirable d'attribuer autant que possible de significations définies au détails d'une représentation symbolique de la nature décrite: aux lignes et aux distances dans le plan, aux angles dans l'espace. Les constructions tridimensionales sont particulièrement recommandées pour plusieurs systèmes phylogénétiques; dans de tels systèmes le Temps devrait toujours remplir la fonction d'une des dimensions. Ce principe est mis en rapport avec l'évolution des unités taxonomiques; phylogénie des charactères, variations homologues, niveaux, polyrheithrie, analogie et homologie, convergence et relations héréditaires, tous ces sujets sont brièvement discutés dans leurs rapports avec la Génétique. Selon l'opinion de l'auteur, c'est aux idées ultra-dynamiques d'Hayata que la taxonomie et la phylogénie doivent la pénétration féconde du dynamisme dans leurs systèmes trop souvent statiques. (shrink)