Diese Untersuchung wendet sich gegen die verbreitete Interpretationstendenz, Platons Anamnesislehre als Lehre von einer Art gelingender Identifikation auszulegen. Dabei wird behauptet, Platon habe geglaubt, der Mensch besitze auf eine mythisch unerklärliche Weise die Begriffe aller Dinge apriori in sich und brauche sich beim Anblick eines konkreten Einzeldings nur an diesen vorgeburtlichen Besitz zu erinnern, um dieses Ding begrifflich richtig zu identifizieren. Durch eine sorgfältige, dem Wortlaut im einzelnen folgende Interpretation zeigt Lee, daß der Mensch nach Platon lediglich in der Lage (...) ist, die allgemeinen Kriterien und Prinzipien des Denkens analytisch aufzudecken. Erst die methodische Erschließung und Anwendung dieser - apriorischen, d.h. in jeder Erfahrung vorausgesetzten - Kriterien ermöglicht ein Fortschreiten des Erkennens auch in Bezug auf Einzeldinge. Die Anamnesislehre erweist sich dadurch als eine immer noch bedenkenswerte kritische Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Sicherheit des Erkennens. (shrink)

Reconciliation of semantic holism with interpretation of individual expressions is advanced here by means of a relativization of sentence meaning to object language theories viewed as idealizations of belief-systems. Fodor's view of the autonomy of the special sciences is emphasized and this is combined with detailed replies to his recent criticisms of meaning holism. The argument is that the need for empirical evidence requires a holistic approach to meaning. Thus, semantic realism requires semantic holism. -/- .

Philosophy; philosophical theology; philosophical anthropology; history.

H. S. Eveling; XI.—Composition and Criticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 213–232, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

ḥeleḳ 1. Hadrakhah le-shalom bayit : sefer hadrakhah meforaṭ be-ʻinyene shidukhim ṿe-shelom bayit be-niśuʼin ʻa. p. maʼamre Ḥazal -- ḥeleḳ 2. Hadrakhah le-ṭaharat ha-bayit : ʻiḳre ha-halakhot ha-ḥiyuniyot : ʻa. p. pisḳe maran ha-Shu. ʻa. ṿeha-Rema uve-tsiruf hakhraʻot aḥarone zemanenu.

It has been argued that if an animal is psychologically like us, there may be more scientific reason to experiment upon it, but less moral justification to do so. Some scientists deny the existence of this dilemma, claiming that although there are scientifically valuable similarities between humans and animals that make experimentation worthwhile, humans are at the same time unique and fundamentally different. This latter response is, ironically, typical of pre-Darwinian beliefs in the relationship between human and non-human animals. Another (...) irony is that debate about such issues has facilitated the participation once more of philosophers in questions concerning experimental psychology: ironic because laboratory-oriented psychologists, especially since the turn of the last century, had been eager to establish the independence of their subject from any influence of philosophy and its investigative methods, as well as from any kind of anthropomorphism.In Britain, certainly more so than in the United States, ethical constraints have prevented the development of psychological research with animals along certain routes. By the 1980s British professional and academic societies had published codes of conduct and guidelines for their members, in part responding to public concern about the welfare of animals in the psychological laboratory. What led to the establishment of these codes and guidelines? This paper analyses the historical background against which professional concern for ethical cost in experimental animal psychology began to take shape, leading to the societies' open pronouncements of the 1980s. (shrink)

It is easy to understand why Hegel's philosophy should be little studied by English-speaking philosophers today. Those who at the beginning of the twentieth century initiated the movement we are now caught up in presented their earliest philosophical arguments as criticisms of the prevailing Anglo-Hegelian views. It may now be thought illiberal to take much interest in this perhaps excusably slaughtered royal family, and positively reactionary to hanker after the foreign dynasty from which it sometimes claimed descent. Hegel was a (...) systematic philosopher with a scope hardly to be found today, and men who, as we say, wish to keep up with their subject may well be daunted at the idea of having to understand a way of looking at philosophy which they suspect would not repay them for their trouble anyway. Furthermore, since Hegel wrote, formal logic has advanced in ways he could not have foreseen, and has, it seems to many, destroyed the whole basis of his dialectical method. At the same time, the creation of a science of sociology, it is supposed, has rendered obsolete the philosophy of history for which Hegel was at one time admired. In countries where there are Marxist intellectuals, Hegel does get discussed as the inadvertent forerunner of historical and dialectical materialism. But in England, where there is no such need or presence, there do not seem to be any very strong ideological reasons for discussing him. In what follows I shall be asking you to direct your thoughts to certain forgotten far-off things which I hope you will find historically interesting even if you do not agree with me that they give important clues for an understanding of human nature and human society. (shrink)

Trataremos de acercarnos a la concepción clásico-cristiana de oíkois y téine a partir del planteo actual de la relación, tan problemática, de técnica y medio ambiente. Marcharemos, por tanto, en pos de la noción clásica, no sólo como quien busca en la antigüedad un par de términos epónimos, sino con la aspiración de hallar las formas modélicas que puedan inspirar la solución de una aguda crisis cultural. Esta crisis se caracteriza por la crispada relación establecida, en el mundo moderno, entre (...) el desarrollo tecnológico y el ámbito vital del hombre, su entorno, su "casa". Ante todo, es necesario observar que la técnica moderna no representa simplemente el último estadio de la téjne, como continuidad, en extensión e intensidad, del milenario esfuerzo del hombre por dominar a la naturaleza mediante el empleo de habilidades artesanales. Hay en la técnica moderna algo de absolutamente peculiar, de cualitativamente diverso. Debemos subrayar, por tanto, para alcanzar su plena comprensión, el calificativo de moderna: la téjne ha cambiado de sentido. No se trata ya de un fenómeno más de nuestro mundo, sino que ahora el mundo moderno puede ser calificado como mundo técnico; técnica es también la cultura propia de la modernidad. (shrink)

Ist das menschliche Handeln vorbestimmt oder kann der Einzelne frei entscheiden? In Auseinandersetzung mit den Positionen von Chrysipp, Epikur und Karneades gelangt Cicero zur Auffassung, dass es für den menschlichen Willen keine von außen wirkenden und vorausgehenden Ursachen gebe, die diesen Entscheidungsprozess bestimmen. Die Mitte 44 v.Chr. begonnene und unvollendet gebliebene Schrift schließt sich unmittelbar an "De divinatione" und "De natura deorum" an.

pereḳ 1. ʻOśeh fele -- pereḳ 2. Ḥidud be-divre Torah -- pereḳ 3. Ḥidud be-mile de-ʻalma -- pereḳ 4. Ḳetsat shut śikhliyot ṿe-ʻimahem shene derushim le-midrash Talmud Torah.