This article suggests a fresh look at gauge symmetries, with the aim of drawing a clear line between the a priori theoretical considerations involved, and some methodological and empirical non-deductive aspects that are often overlooked. The gauge argument is primarily based on a general symmetry principle expressing the idea that a change of mathematical representation should not change the form of the dynamical law. In addition, the ampliative part of the argument is based on the introduction of new degrees of (...) freedom into the theory according to a methodological principle that is formulated here in terms of correspondence between passive and active transformations. To demonstrate how the two kinds of considerations work together in a concrete context, I begin by considering spatial symmetries in mechanics. I suggest understanding Mach's principle as a similar combination of theoretical, methodological and empirical considerations, and demonstrate the claim with a simple toy model. I then examine gauge symmetries as a manifestation of the two principles in a quantum context. I further show that in all of these cases the relational nature of physically significant quantities can explain the relevance of the symmetry principle and the way the methodology is applied. In the quantum context, the relevant relational variables are quantum phases. (shrink)

The concept of well-being is one of the oldest and most important topics in philosophy and ethics, going back to ancient Greek philosophy and Aristotle. Following the boom in happiness studies in the last few years it has moved to centre stage, grabbing media headlines and the attention of scientists, psychologists and economists. Yet little is actually known about well-being and it is an idea often poorly articulated. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being provides a comprehensive, outstanding guide and (...) reference source to the key topics and debates in this exciting subject. Comprising over forty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six parts: well-being in the history of philosophy current theories of well-being, including hedonism, and perfectionism examples of well-being and its opposites, including friendship and virtue and pain and death theoretical issues such as well-being and value, harm, identity and well-being and children well-being in moral and political philosophy well-being and related subjects including law, economics, and medicine. Essential reading for students and researchers in ethics and political philosophy, it will also be an invaluable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by (...) evaluative prudential properties, and defends the view that evaluative well-being facts generate agent-relative reasons for the relevant agent. It also investigates whether prudential discourse is normative. It is proposed that prudential discourse is normative by arguing that prudential judgements are normative judgements. The case for this is presented by analogy with moral discourse by showing that the features of moral judgements that metaethicists appeal to when articulating, explaining, and justifying the claim that moral judgements are normative are also possessed by prudential judgements. Various objections to the analogy are also considered. (shrink)

Online Public Shaming is a form of norm enforcement that involves collectively imposing reputational costs on a person for having a certain kind of moral character. OPS actions aim to disqualify her from public discussion and certain normal human relations. We argue that this constitutes an informal collective punishment that it is presumptively wrong to impose on others. OPS functions as a form of ostracism that fails to show equal basic respect to its targets. Additionally, in seeking to mobilise unconstrained (...) collective power with potentially serious punitive consequences, OPS is incompatible with due process values. (shrink)

THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS. I begin §1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (§2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (§3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (§4-5), Regan (§6), and Schroeder and (...) Feldman (§7). I then (§8) reply to an imagined objector who claims that the Locative Analysis generates implausible results with respect to punishment, virtue and agent-centered duties. (shrink)

Noradrenergic pathways are involved in mediating the central and peripheral effects of physiological arousal. The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of noradrenergic transmission in moral decision-making. We studied the effects in healthy volunteers of propranolol (a noradrenergic beta-adrenoceptor antagonist) on moral judgement in a set of moral dilemmas pitting utilitarian outcomes (e.g., saving five lives) against highly aversive harmful actions (e.g., killing an innocent person) in a double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel group design. Propranolol (40 mg orally) (...) significantly reduced heart rate, but had no effect on self-reported mood. Importantly, propranolol made participants more likely to judge harmful actions as morally unacceptable, but only in dilemmas where harms were ‘up close and personal’. In addition, longer response times for such personal dilemmas were only found for the placebo group. Finally, judgments in personal dilemmas by the propranolol group were more decisive. These findings indicate that noradrenergic pathways play a role in responses to moral dilemmas, in line with recent work implicating emotion in moral decision-making. However, contrary to current theorising, these findings also suggest that aversion to harming is not driven by emotional arousal. Our findings are also of significant practical interest given that propranolol is a widely used drug in different settings, and is currently being considered as a potential treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder in military and rescue service personnel. (shrink)

In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malicious pleasure might be misleading.

This book takes a new approach to ethics by focusing on the kinds of dilemmas that confront people almost daily on the job.

Pedro Abelardo apresenta na sua obra uma teoria da virtude de natureza, à primeira vista, aristotélica. Ao que parece, essa concepção também contém diferentes elementos estoicos, que não se opõem necessariamente à visão do Estagirita. Todavia, o essencial da interpretação da Escola do Pórtico acerca da virtude difere da explicação dada por Aristóteles. No presente estudo, pretendemos examinar, primeiro, a índole da virtude como habitus na obra de lógica de Abelardo. Nesse caso, não há dúvida de que predomina a influência (...) aristotélica. Em seguida, indicamos outras particularidades da virtude encontradas, desta vez, em tratados éticos e teológicos do nosso protagonista, as quais se revelam antes de caráter estoico. Em suma, projetamos identificar as diferentes fontes antigas e os principais intermediários latinos usados por Abelardo para elaborar a sua própria teoria da virtude. Trata-se de deixar clara a influência filosófica dominante em Abelardo sobre essa questão da virtude, já que este lógico não pode harmonizar teses substancialmente inconciliáveis. Peter Abelard in his work presents a theory of virtue, which is, at first sight, of Aristotelian nature. It seems that this view also contains different Stoic elements, but they are not necessarily opposed to Stagirite's vision. However, the essentials of the Stoa School about virtue differ from the explanation given by Aristotle. In this paper, we intend to examine, first, the nature of virtue as habitus in Abelard's work on logic. In this case, there is no doubt that Aristotle's influence on this topic predominates. Next, we specify other features related to virtue found, this time, in ethical and theological treatises of our protagonist that appear to be basically Stoic. In short, we want to identify the different ancient sources and the main Latin mediators used by Abelard to elaborate his own theory of virtue. In other words, we would like to shed light on the predominant philosophical authority on Abelard's theory of virtue since this logician cannot harmonize theses that are fundamentally irreconcilable. (shrink)

The Stoic School takes up the tripartite division of philosophy of the post-Platonic Academy, in which physics occupies, alongside dialectics and ethics, a prominent place. In this tripartition, there is no metaphysics, nor in the two subdivisions of Stoic physics. For the thinkers of the Stoa, there is nothing beyond physics. In spite of this statement, we try to discover, in this article, the presence of a study devoted to first philosophy among the various topics investigated by the Stoics in (...) their physics. It is with this aim that we first examine what precisely Aristotle deals with in the Metaphysics. This preliminary investigation will serve as a point of reference for determining what can be considered as metaphysics, at least in ancient Greece. Afterwards, we are interested in the Stoic view of nature itself since nothing superior exists. This examination leads us to scrutinize the Stoic conception of the Good, a notion closely linked to the subject of physics. We then take a good look at each one of the topics found in the two Stoic divisions of physics, highlighting the matters approaching Aristotelian metaphysics. On that occasion, a specific analysis is devoted to the two Stoic principles, due notably to the relevance of the subject in relation to first philosophy. From the diversity of the elements found in the course of our study, we come to the final part, in which we establish the position of the Stoic School on metaphysics. (shrink)

Chez Paul Tillich, le concept de Dieu s’oppose au modèle « interventionniste » du théisme traditionnel en Occident. Cet article se propose de déterminer si, et en quel sens, d’après Tillich, on peut dire que Dieu agit pour influencer le cours des événements historiques. On soutient que son concept de « pouvoir Spirituel » fournit une réponse à cette question. Pour clarifier cette thèse, on explore les concepts d’esprit, de pouvoir, de sens, de vocation, de kairos et de renoncement au (...) pouvoir. Selon Tillich, la vocation de groupes sociaux déterminés est animée d’un pouvoir divin conférant tout ensemble un don et une tâche. Pour les chrétiens, la vocation de Jésus le Christ, qui consiste à proclamer la venue du Royaume de Dieu comme le sens ultime de l’histoire, constitue le critère permettant de juger les vocations concrètes. Dieu agit en offrant un sens, qui doit être choisi et réalisé. (shrink)

The central question raised in the present article concerns the ontological nature of the intentional act, previous to the proper moral action, in Aristotle’s and Abelard’s thinking. More precisely, we examine two subjects indirectly interconnected. First, we treat the secular problem of the exact nature of will (boulêsis) in Aristotle, which certainly refers to a rational act (logikos), the source of which is, however, the appetite (orexis). The second point is related to the notion of consent (consensus) in Abelard, which (...) also raises the question of its voluntary or rational ontological character. Both topics are connected in so far as the Abelardian consent is similar to the Aristotelian idea of choice (proairesis), and particularly to that of the Stoic assent (sunkatathesis), and not, as some commentators believe, to the Augustinian notion of will as a free and spontaneous act. This identification of the Abelardian consent with the Augustine’s will comes from a confusion, which is more terminological and perspectival than interpretative. (shrink)

Abelard closely follows the Augustinian view with regard to the notion of intention. However, he distances himself from him concerning the contribution of acts in the evaluation of moral responsibility. Independent thinker, the philosopher of the twelfth century, then, uses an ancient Stoic thesis according to which all actions are indifferent, except those related to virtue and vice. He also takes back another idea of the Stoa concerning, this time, the concept of will as habitus. In this paper, we first (...) expound Abelard’s position on these issues before presenting the main sources to which he has access directly. (shrink)

This essay forms the introduction for Hocquenghem’s L’après-mai des faunes. Published in January 1974, the essay reflects critically on the legacy of the events of May, 1968, and the abandonment of so-called revolutionary thought soon after. Hocquenghem calls on the left no longer to form itself simply in reaction to the bourgeois class and its values, but to find ways for turning (away) through “volutions” of action from the apathy of leftism as he has found it. Critiquing the air of (...) crisis meant to stop thinking as such, Hocquenghem “Volutions” reads as current today as when it was written. (shrink)

From what norms does the ethics of belief derive its oughts, its attributions of virtues and vices, responsibilities and irresponsibilities, its permissioning and censuring? Since my inductive risk account is inspired by pragmatism, and this method understands epistemology as the theory of inquiry, the paper will try to explain what the aims and tasks are for an ethics of belief, or project of guidance, which best fits with this understanding of epistemology. More specifically, this chapter approaches the ethics of belief (...) from a focus on responsible risk management, where doxastic responsibility is understood in terms of the degree of riskiness of agents’ doxastic strategies, a riskiness which is in turn most objectively measured through accordance or violation of inductive norms. Doxastic responsibility is attributable to agents on the basis of how epistemically risky was the process or strategy of inquiry salient in the etiology of their belief or in their maintenance of what one believes or accepts. (shrink)

Hersch’s objective in his paper was to “illustrate how an existential ontology has a great deal to offer psychotherapists”. The first of three sections addresses existential themes such as guilt and anxiety and explores the notion of bad faith; the second focuses on why existential ontology provides a more suitable grounding for psychotherapy than traditional models; and the third offers the author’s invention of a mental status examination that is derived from existential ontology. To illustrate how existential ontology may be (...) useful to psychotherapists, Hersch directs our attention to those existential themes that are crucial to understanding the role ontology plays, existential.. (shrink)

On the basis of an interpretation of key passages in The Gay Science, this paper examines Nietzsche's idea of amor fati—love of fate. Nietzsche's idea of amor fati involves the wish to be able to learn how to see things as beautiful. This gives the impression that amor, love, is supposed to play some role in the beautification of fate. But Nietzsche also explains amor fati in relation to his desire to be a devoted “Yes-sayer.” This pulls the interpretation of (...) amor in a different direction; for now it seems as if the love Nietzsche wants to cultivate is supposed to be expressed in a positive, affirmative attitude toward one's fate. How to think this duality under the single idea of amor fati? I develop a novel reading of amor fati as a form of practice, as something that we can do, and explain in its light how the two moments of love are to be brought together. The relation of amor fati to the “Eternal Recurrence of the Same” is also addressed: mastering the practice of amor fati can enable one to pass successfully the test of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. (shrink)

This article deals with the question of how ethicists respond to practical moral problems emerging in health care practices. Do they remain distanced, taking on the role of an expert, or do they become engaged with nurses and other participants in practice and jointly develop contextualized insights about good care? A basic assumption of dialogical ethics entails that the definition of good care and what it means to be a good nurse is a collaborative product of ongoing dialogues among various (...) stakeholders engaged in the practice. This article discusses the value of a dialogical approach to ethics by drawing on the work of various nursing scholars. We present a case example concerning the quality of freedom restrictions for intellectually disabled people. Issues for discussion include the role and required competences of the ethicist and dealing with asymmetrical relationships between stakeholders. (shrink)

The ways in which Wittgenstein was directly influenced by William James (by his early psychological work as well his later philosophy) have been thoroughly explored and charted by Russell B. Goodman. In particular, Goodman has drawn attention to the pragmatist resonances of the Wittgensteinian notion of hinge propositions as developedand articulated in the posthumously edited and published work, On Certainty. This paper attempts to extend Goodman’s observation, moving beyond his focus on James (specifically, James’s Pragmatism) as his pragmatist reference point. (...) It aims to articulate the affinity between Wittgenstein’s thought on the topic of certainty and that of the neglected pragmatist thinker, George Santayana. -/- The paper draws on Duncan Pritchard’s recent reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in order to articulate the concept of certainty involved in the notion of hinge propositions. It identifies two important and related points of affinity between this Wittgensteinian line of thought on certainty and the line of thought on the same topic articulated in Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith. The paper argues, firstly, that, both lines of thought reflect a pragmatist concept of certainty, according to which our most fundamental certainties are not conceived as purely theoretical objects of belief or knowledge but rather as thearational presuppositions of beliefs and practical action. Secondly, it examines the way inwhich the pragmatist concept of certainty functions, for the two thinkers as a response to scepticism. It argues that although the two thinkers’ responses are very different, they are mutually compatible and, together, point towards the possibility of a distinctively pragmatist response to scepticism, which involves an anti-epistemological model of the intimate relation of the human self to the world. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Ce qui se passe, se produit ou arrive et qui présente une certaine importance pour les hommes " : pareille définition, en raison de son manque de rigueur scientifique, ne saurait satisfaire l'auteur de cet ouvrage. Le grand événement y est présenté comme une notion susceptible de faire l'objet d'une approche authentiquement épistémologique. Rejetée du système scientifique de façon tapageuse, hâtive et passionnelle durant la majeure partie du XXe siècle par contagion disciplinaire en dépit (...) du réel tourmenté de cette période, la notion de grand événement a été réhabilitée à la faveur de Mai 1968 et des récentes découvertes des sciences dites exactes, mais avec une certaine méfiance voire une certaine honte et sans que l'on en ait tiré toutes les conséquences. L'auteur se prononce en faveur d'une prise en considération affirmée et effective de cette notion intrinsèquement révolutionnaire qui apparaît, à plus d'un titre, comme le trublion de l'ordre scientifique établi. Il se risque même à préconiser la création d'une science transversale dont le grand événement constituerait l'objet. Son approche se situe à la croisée des recherches sur le travail de mémoire et sur le retour du présent qui animent la réflexion de ce changement de siècle et de millénaire. Cette provocation épistémologique interpellera tous ceux qui, à un titre ou à un autre, ont été ou sont confrontés aux grands événements : historiens, journalistes, politologues, diplomates, juristes... acteurs et spectateurs.". (shrink)

The relationship between animal rights and contractarian theories of justice such as that of Rawls has long been vexed. In this article, I contribute to the debate over the possibility of inclusion of animals in Rawls’s theory of justice by critiquing the rationale he gives for their omission: that they do not possess moral personality. Contrary to Rawls’s assumptions, it appears that some animals may possess the moral powers that comprise moral personality, albeit to a lesser extent than most humans. (...) Some animals can act in pursuit of preferences and desires (and communicate them non-verbally), which might be taken as implicitly selecting a conception of the good; further, scientific research demonstrating inequity aversion and social play behaviors suggests that some animals can have a sense of justice relating to their own social groups. I conclude that Rawls’s theory needs to acknowledge any animals that can be considered to meet the threshold of moral personality, while the concept of moral personality as a range property may also require reconsideration. (shrink)

This paper examines religious epistemics in relationship to recent defenses of belief-credence dualism among analytic Christian philosophers, connecting what is most plausible and appealing in this proposal to Wittgenstein’s thought on the nature of religious praxis and affectively-engaged language-use. How close or far is Wittgenstein’s thought about faith to the analytic Christian philosophers’ thesis that “beliefs and credences are two epistemic tools used for different purposes”? While I find B-C dualism appealing for multiple reasons, the paper goes on to raise (...) critical concerns about the manner in which it has been applied to the epistemology of religious belief. I argue that this application is at odds with some of Wittgenstein’s best insights, and that it presents a promising but comparatively unbalanced account of religious epistemics. (shrink)

Mark Evan Bonds’ recent book, Absolute Music, deepens considerably the historical context within which Eduard Hanslick’s famous treatise on musical beauty can be read. This paper argues that, with the aid of this expanded context, we can understand Hanslick’s treatise to have provided contemporary and subsequent audiences with a kind of meta-programme for listening to symphonic and other non-texted music. That is to say, Hanslick’s text arguably informed and directed the way audiences came to listen to instrumental music by furnishing (...) them with imaginative constructs which could then be applied to the practice of musical listening. In much the same way as the texts which supply the poetic scenarios of so-called programme music, Hanslick’s ‘meta-programme’ became indispensable to an expanding culture of musical listening in the second half of the 19th century and beyond beyond. My claim thus contradicts the well-known formalist tenets of Hanslick’s musical aesthetics. (shrink)

On the 24th and 25th of December every year two very different stories are told: one in people’s homes, by the fireplace or Christmas tree, to pyjamaed but excited and sleepless children; the other to people of all ages in the more imposing setting of candlelit churches and cathedrals. I want to ask, in this essay: Does the telling of these two stories have anything in common? What can we learn by comparing them? The first one, the one I call (...) the ‘secular’ mythology, is the story of Father Christmas. The second, ‘sacred’ mythology is the religious reason why Christmas was ever celebrated as Christmas at all. Although the figure of Santa partly originated in an early Christian bishop (and partly in pagan figures), he has these days become rather more secularized—even, for some, a symbol of secular commercialism. I want to compare these two mythologies as they might effect the way in which we think about Christmas today. I think that philosophical reflection along these lines will allow us to draw some interesting conclusions relevant to theology and the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Presents 3 hermeneutic answers to the problem of relativism. The 1st answer is drawn from L. Wittgenstein's anthropological hermeneutics. Wittgenstein went beyond relativism by making explicit universal anthropological categories that are specified differently in different cultures. The 2nd answer lies in H.-G. Gadamer's historical hermeneutics. By introducing the concepts of tradition and fusion of horizons, Gadamer evades both absolutism and relativism. The 3rd answer is developed by J. Habermas in his critical hermeneutics. By situating communicative action in the life-world, and (...) stressing the possibility of discussion and critique, Habermas can ascertain that there is no absolute truth without having to surrender to relativism. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the trolley method of moral philosophy has three shortcomings not yet adequately addressed in the literature. First, trolley problems highlight high stakes ethical decisions. These decisions do not represent the majority of ethical decisions made by most people, and thus, the trolley method ignores most of moral life. Second, the trolley method operates by way of a faux-anonymization of moral agents. This process leads to descriptions of moral agents being unwittingly supplied by those to (...) whom the problems are presented and thereby the formation of a paradigmatic moral agent which excludes a considerable number of real world moral persons. Lastly, the trolley method mischaracterizes what most moral decision-making is like by presenting a moral agent's decision as isolated, uninfluenced, and made with full self-awareness. (shrink)

1. Since I don't know who you are, dear reader, and since I know that some people don't have hands, I don't know whether you have hands. Probably you do, but knowing that something is probable is rarely, if ever, a way of knowing that thing. By contrast, I know that I have hands. Let me check. Yes, here is one of my hands; and here is another. Since I know that here is one of my hands and that here (...) is another, and since I know that it follows from those two claims that I have hands, I can deduce that I have hands. So, I know that I have hands. (shrink)

Résumé Le but de cet article est d’interroger les trois notions de texte, discours et cognition, et les modèles théoriques, complémentaires ou opposés, qui les illustrent et les défendent. Pour cela, les notions ne seront pas analysées à la suite, une par une, mais en parallèle, deux par deux. Reprenant les orientations de mes travaux actuels en linguistique textuelle et en linguistique cognitive, je les confronterai en deux temps : texte vs. discours et texte vs. cognition. Cette double confrontation, avec (...) le texte pour dénominateur commun, laisse ainsi entendre, d’une part, que si je prends en compte le discours comme le cadre contextuel, situationnel, générique, où apparaît le texte, je m’attache au texte comme objet d’analyse, suivant en cela une tradition « pragoise », à la fois structurale ou macro-syntaxique et fonctionnelle ; cela laisse entendre, d’autre part, que cette conception du texte permet de concilier les théories néo-pragoises à celles que développent les linguistiques cognitives d’aujourd’hui, centrées sur diverses compétences, activités ou opérations, mentales, sémantiques, pragmatiques et sémiotiques, souvent regroupées sous le terme englobant ou résultant de représentation : espaces mentaux, projections, mélange (blending), émergence de sens. Pour finir je montre que la procédure de double intégration, conceptuelle et prédicative, permet d’illustrer la complémentarité des deux modèles, mental-cognitif et macrosyntaxique-textuel. (shrink)

Comment l'idéologie nazie a-t-elle imprégné et corrompu jusqu'au plus intime de la pensée et du langage? Jargon de l'authenticité est l'une des charges les plus féroces écrites contre Heidegger et son jargon. Qu'est-ce que le jargon? C'est un maniement de la langue qui vise à exercer un charme magique sur les lecteurs grâce à une sacralisation du langage et à un pathos de l'authenticité. Nationalisme, repli sur soi, mépris de la réalité sociale sont dès lors autant de voies pour perdre (...) l'objet, le monde, les choses. Un livre qui mérite d'être confronté à la célèbre étude de Klemperer, LTI, qui porte sur le langage totalitaire sous le IIIe Reich. (shrink)

Whether and how music is involved in evoking emotions is a matter of considerable debate. In the target article, Juslin & Vll (J&V) argue that music induces a wide range of both basic and complex emotions that are shared with other stimuli. If such a link exists, it would provide a common basis for considering the interactions among music, emotion, timing, and time perception.

This paper explores the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious and critiques it from a phenomenlogical perspective, especially Sartre and Heidegger, with a view to conceptualizing the unconscious from an ontological rather than psychological mindset.

It is question in this text of analyzing the intention to mean something to somebody in the light of the husserlian concept of intentionality. The communication is described there as aiming at the cooperation between the persons by means of ostensive appearance of some of their intentions, on the foundation of the desire of recognition. The constituent role of the communication for any Community is put in it in evidence.