Does consciousness collapse the quantum wave function? This idea was taken seriously by John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner but is now widely dismissed. We develop the idea by combining a mathematical theory of consciousness (integrated information theory) with an account of quantum collapse dynamics (continuous spontaneous localization). Simple versions of the theory are falsified by the quantum Zeno effect, but more complex versions remain compatible with empirical evidence. In principle, versions of the theory can be tested by experiments with (...) quantum computers. The upshot is not that consciousness-collapse interpretations are clearly correct, but that there is a research program here worth exploring. (shrink)

To ask about the relation of science and religion is a fool's errand unless we clarify which science we are discussing, whose religion we are speaking about, and what aspects of each we are comparing. This Element sets the study of science and religion in a global context by examining two ways in which humans have understood the natural world. The first is by reference to observable regularities in the behavior of things; the second is by reference to the work (...) of gods, spirits, and ancestors. Under these headings, this work distinguishes three varieties of science and examines their relation to three kinds of religion along four dimensions: beliefs, goals, organizations, and conceptions of knowledge. It also outlines the emergence of a clear distinction between science and religion and an increase in the autonomy of scientific inquiry. It is these developments that have made conflicts between science and religion possible. (shrink)

Theorists from John Stuart Mill to Robert Nozick have argued that citizens can gain insight into the demands of justice by experimenting with diverse forms of political life. I consider the rationa...

This is a reply to Weinfurt's article examining the Sweeping Model. Overall, our positions are not as incompatible as they may seem, although I feel that his conclusion, that the Sweeping Model cannot explain human attention, does not follow from his comments. I will proceed through his article and clarify issues as they arise. Our difference of opinion may result from differing goals, with Weinfurt being concerned with more abstract aspects of cognition, and myself with basic perception and how it (...) may be achieved before proceeding to the more abstract. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We argue that this is (...) a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This paper is a restatement of my earlier analysis of this argument (1954), Revised in the light of critical comments by other scholars and of closer study of the text. It includes a critical discussion of an alternative formalization of the argument, First offered by wilfrid sellars (1955) and retained (with modifications) by colin strang (1963), Which eliminates successfully the inconsistency of the premises of the argument but has dubious support from plato's text.

In the business ethics literature, many argue that managerial decision making ought to be improved by more robust ethical concerns. Some see the virtue of “practical wisdom” as the key for improved managerial decision making. However, because of the epistemic limitations confronting decision makers in the face of irreducible market complexity, there is a risk that practical wisdom, employed in the context of day‐to‐day managerial decision making, becomes an impractical concept. Nevertheless, if the attempt to incorporate virtue ethics (and its (...) related concepts) into business practices is laudable, if indeed a virtuous life is worth pursuing and practical wisdom plays an essential role toward that end, it is important to attempt to salvage practical wisdom and uncover its appropriate usage. Thus, this article pursues two major ends. First, upon surveying some of the prominent and standard usages of the term, it articulates concerns, rooted in epistemic limitations, about the way that practical wisdom appears in business ethics literature. Second, it offers a new way forward for understanding “practical wisdom.” By contextualizing day‐to‐day, rule‐based managerial decision making within the ethical value of the market order, practical wisdom reappears as the higher‐order capacity to pursue vocations, as morally worthwhile projects, in business. (shrink)

We examine the notion of conditionals and the role of conditionals in inductive logics and arguments. We identify three mistakes commonly made in the study of, or motivation for, non-classical logics. A nonmonotonic consequence relation based on evidential probability is formulated. With respect to this acceptance relation some rules of inference of System P are unsound, and we propose refinements that hold in our framework.

Recent controversy over the existence of biological laws raises questions about the cognitive aims of theoretical modeling in that science. If there are no laws for successful theoretical models to approximate, then what is it that successful theories do? One response is to regard theoretical models as tools. But this instrumental reading cannot accommodate the explanatory role that theories are supposed to play. Yet accommodating the explanatory function, as articulated by Brandon and Sober for example, seems to involve us once (...) again in a reliance on laws. The paper concludes that we must rethink both the nature of laws and theoretical explanation in biology. (shrink)

Result of a conference, "Sociobiology: implications for human studies", held at San Francisco State University on June 14-15, 1977. Includes index. Bibliography: p. 295-316.

This paper concerns the problem of how to give historical explanations of scientist's decisions to prefer one theory over another. It is argued that such explanations ought to contain only statements about the beliefs and preferences of the agents involved, and, in particular, ought not to include evaluative premises about the theories themselves. It is argued that Lakatos's attempt to build into such historical explanations premises of an evaluative kind is deficient. The arguments of Laudan to the effect that such (...) explanations depend crucially upon evaluative assumptions about the rationality or irrationality of decisions are examined. It is argued that they do not establish the need for such assumptions. Similar criticisms are then shown to be applicable to a version of the 'hermeneutical' model of explanation for human actions. (shrink)

(2013). Malebranche and Chinese Philosophy: A Reconsideration. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 262-280. doi: 10.1080/09608788.2012.718869.

Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL (...) against Steglich-Petersen’s arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck. (shrink)