The objective of this paper is to develop and describe a construct of the ethos of the corporate codes of ethics (i.e. an ECCE construct) across three countries, namely Australia, Canada and Sweden. The introduced construct is rather unique as it is based on a cross-cultural sample seldom seen in the literature. While the outcome of statistical analyses indicated a satisfactory factor solution and acceptable estimates of reliability measures, some research limitations have been stressed. They provide a foundation for further (...) research in the field and testing of the ECCE construct in other cultural and corporate settings. We believe that the ECCE construct makes a contribution to theory and practice in the field as it outlines a theoretical construct for the benefit of other researchers. It is also of managerial interest as it provides a grounded framework of areas to be considered in the implementation in organizations of corporate codes of ethics. (shrink)

This paper examines the implementation, communication and benefits of corporate codes of ethics by the top companies operating in Australia, Canada and Sweden. It provides an international comparison across three continents. It is also based on a longitudinal approach where three national surveys were performed in 2001–2002 and replications of the same surveys were performed in 2005–2006. The empirical findings of this research show in all three countries that large organisations indicate a substantial interest in corporate codes of ethics. There (...) are, however, differences in the ways that the companies in each country implement and communicate their corporate codes of ethics and the benefits that they see being derived from them. The longitudinal comparison between 2001–2002 and 2005–2006 indicates changes in the implementation, communication and benefits of corporate codes of ethics in the three countries. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to test the embeddedness of codes of ethics (ECE) in organizations on aggregated data from three countries, namely Australia, Canada and the United States. The properties of four constructs of ECE are described and tested, including surveillance/training, internal communication, external communication and guidance. The data analysis shows that the model has satisfactory fit, validity and reliability. Furthermore, the results are fairly consistent when tested on each of the three samples (i.e. cross-national validation). This cross-national (...) study makes a contribution beyond previous descriptive or exploratory studies by using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling. Nevertheless, a number of limitations are raised, all of which provide opportunities for further research in refining, extending and testing the proposed ECE model in other cultural and corporate settings. (shrink)

Based on the 'Partnership Model of Corporate Ethics' (Wood, 2002), this study examines the ethical structures and processes that are put in place by organizations to enhance the ethical business behavior of staff. The study examines the use of these structures and processes amongst the top companies in the three countries of Australia, Canada, and Sweden over two time periods (2001–2002 and 2005–2006). Subsequendy, a combined comparative and longitudinal approach is applied in the study, which we contend is a unique (...) approach in the area of business ethics. The findings of the study indicate that corporations operating in Sweden have utilized ethical structures and processes differently than their Canadian and/or Australian counterparts, and that in each culture the way that companies fashion their approach to business ethics appears congruent with their national cultural values. There does, however, appear to be a convergence of views within the organizations of each culture, as the Swedish companies appear to have been more influenced in 2005–2006 by an Anglo-Saxon business paradigm than they have been in the past. (shrink)

This study uses a specific method to analyze the contents of the codes of ethics of the largest corporations in Australia, Canada and Sweden and compares the findings of similar content analyses in 2002 and 2006. It tracks changes in code contents across the three nations over the 2002–2006 period. There were statistically significant changes in the codes of the three countries from 2002 to 2006: the Australian and Canadian codes becoming more prescriptive, intensifying the differences between these and the (...) Swedish codes. The contents of these codes and the nature of the changes they have undergone over time are culturally driven: Australia's and Canada's reflecting their similar cultural profiles and Sweden's reflecting its differences from these countries on organizationally relevant cultural dimensions. The study reveals that corporate codes of ethics are living documents as reflected by the significant longitudinal changes in the frequencies of mention of several of the 60 items underpinning the content analysis of the codes of ethics. Consequently, and in light of their growing prevalence and importance as instruments of corporate governance, they should not be treated as static but as dynamic documents that are subject to various environmental factors. The clear implication of the findings of this study is that for corporate codes of ethics ‘one size does not fit all’ and that these instruments must be carefully monitored and revised to reflect changing conditions. (shrink)

Popular film as a medium of communication, expression and storytelling has proved one of the most durable and fascinating cultural forms to emerge during the twentieth century, and has long been the object of debate, discussion and interpretation. _Film After Jung _provides the reader with an overview of the history of film theory and delves into analytical psychology to consider the reaction that popular film can evoke through emotional and empathetic engagement with its audience. This book includes: an introduction to (...) film scholarship discussions of key Jungian concepts Post-Jungian film studies beyond film. It also considers the potential for post-Jungian contributions to film studies, and the ways in which these can help to enrich the lives of those undergoing clinical analysis. _Film After Jung_ encourages students of film and psychology to explore the insights and experiences of everyday life that film has to offer by applying Post-Jungian concepts to film, image construction, narrative, and issues in cultural theory. It will enhance the film student’s knowledge of film engagement as well as introducing the Jungian analyst to previously unexplored traditions in film theory. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to examine the ‘Code of Ethics Quality’ (CEQ) in the largest companies of Australia, Canada and the United States. For this purpose, a proposed CEQ construct has been applied. It appears from the empirical findings that while Australia, Canada and the United States are extremely similar in their economic and social development, there may well be distinct cultural mores and issues that are forming their business ethics practices. A research implication derived from the performed (...) research is that the construct provides a selection of observable and measurable elements in the context of CEQ. The construct of CEQ consists of nine measures divided into two dimensions (i.e. staff support and regulation). They should not be seen as a complete list. On the contrary, it is encouraged that others propose and elaborate revisions and extensions. A practical implication of this paper is a structure of what and how to examine the CEQ in a managerial setting. It may assist companies in their efforts to establish, maintain and improve their ethical culture, norms and beliefs within the organization and supporting them in their ethical business practices with different stakeholders in the marketplace and society. The dimensions and measures of the construct may be used as a frame of reference for further research. They may be useful and applicable across contexts and over time using similar samples when it comes to large companies, as small‐ or medium‐sized ones may not have considered all areas nor have the elements in place. This is a research limitation, but it provides an opportunity for further research. (shrink)

This paper examines the contents of the codes of ethics of 83 of the top 500 companies operating in the private sector in Australia in an attempt to discover whether there are national characteristics that differentiate the codes used by companies operating in Australia from codes used by companies operating in the American and Canadian systems. The studies that were used as a comparison were Mathews (1987) for the United States of America and Lefebvre and Singh (1992) for Canada. (...) The major conclusion is that, whilst Australian codes do have some characteristics that differentiate them from the other two groups, it appears that companies in all three cultures are driven by the same motives to develop codes. (shrink)

Should organ transplants be given to patients who have waited the longest, or need it most urgently, or those whose survival prospects are the best? The rationing of health care is universal and inevitable, taking place in poor and affluent countries, in publicly funded and private health care systems. Someone must budget for as well as dispense health care whilst aging populations severely stretch the availability of resources. The Ethics of Health Care Rationing is a clear and much-needed introduction to (...) this increasingly important topic, considering and assessing the major ethical problems and dilemmas about the allocation, scarcity and rationing of health care. Beginning with a helpful overview of why rationing is an ethical problem, the authors examine the following key topics: What is the value of health? How can it be measured? What does it mean that a treatment is "good value for money"? What sort of distributive principles - utilitarian, egalitarian or prioritarian - should we rely on when thinking about health care rationing? Does rationing health care unfairly discriminate against the elderly and people with disabilities? Should patients be held responsible for their health? Why does the debate on responsibility for health lead to issues about socioeconomic status and social inequality? Throughout the book, examples from the US, UK and other countries are used to illustrate the ethical issues at stake. Additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and discussion questions make this an ideal starting point for students new to the subject, not only in philosophy but also in closely related fields such as politics, health economics, public health, medicine, nursing and social work. (shrink)

In this paper I urge friends of truth-value gaps and truth-value gluts – proponents of paracomplete and paraconsistent logics – to consider theories not merely as sets of sentences, but as pairs of sets of sentences, or what I call ‘bitheories,’ which keep track not only of what holds according to the theory, but also what fails to hold according to the theory. I explain the connection between bitheories, sequents, and the speech acts of assertion and denial. I illustrate the (...) usefulness of bitheories by showing how they make available a technique for characterising different theories while abstracting away from logical vocabulary such as connectives or quanti- fiers, thereby making theoretical commitments independent of the choice of this or that particular non-classical logic. (shrink)

Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism (2006) characterises pluralism about logical consequence in terms of the different ways cases can be selected in the analysis of logical consequence as preservation of truth over a class of cases. This is not the only way to understand or to motivate pluralism about logical consequence. Here, I will examine pluralism about logical consequence in terms of different standards of proof. We will focus on sequent derivations for classical logic, imposing two different restrictions on classical (...) derivations to produce derivations for intuitionistic logic and for dual intuitionistic logic. The result is another way to understand the manner in which we can have different consequence relations in the same language. Furthermore, the proof-theoretic perspective gives us a different explanation of how the one concept of negation can have three different truth conditions, those in classical, intuitionistic and dual-intuitionistic models. (shrink)

In an attempt to determine the epistemic status of computer simulation results, philosophers of science have recently explored the similarities and differences between computer simulations and experiments. One question that arises is whether and, if so, when, simulation results constitute novel empirical data. It is often supposed that computer simulation results could never be empirical or novel because simulations never interact with their targets, and cannot go beyond their programming. This paper argues against this position by examining whether, and under (...) what conditions, the features of empiricality and novelty could be displayed by computer simulation data. I show that, to the extent that certain familiar measurement results have these features, so can some computer simulation results. (shrink)

The literature on values in science struggles with questions about how to describe and manage the role of values in scientific research. We argue that progress can be made by shifting this literature’s current emphasis. Rather than arguing about how non-epistemic values can or should figure into scientific assessment, we suggest analyzing how scientific assessment can accommodate non-epistemic values. For scientific assessment to do so, it arguably needs to incorporate goals that have been traditionally characterized as non-epistemic. Building on this (...) insight, we show how the adequacy-for-purpose framework recently developed for assessing scientific models can provide a general framework for describing scientific assessment so that it goes beyond purely epistemic considerations. Adopting this framework has significant advantages and opens the possibility of effecting a partial rapprochement between critics and proponents of the value-free ideal. (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish different kinds of pluralism about logical consequence. In particular, I distinguish the pluralism about logic arising from Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance from a pluralism which maintains that there are different, equally “good” logical consequence relations on the one language. I will argue that this second form of pluralism does more justice to the contemporary state of logical theory and practice than does Carnap’s more moderate pluralism.

This paper gives an outline of three different approaches to the four-valued semantics for relevant logics (and other non-classical logics in their vicinity). The first approach borrows from the 'Australian Plan' semantics, which uses a unary operator '⋆' for the evaluation of negation. This approach can model anything that the two-valued account can, but at the cost of relying on insights from the Australian Plan. The second approach is natural, well motivated, independent of the Australian Plan, and it provides a (...) semantics for the contraction-free relevant logic C (or RW). Unfortunately, its approach seems to model little else. The third approach seems to capture a wide range of formal systems, but at the time of writing, lacks a completeness proof. (shrink)

A logic is said to be contraction free if the rule from A→(A→B) to A→B is not truth preserving. It is well known that a logic has to be contraction free for it to support a non-trivial naïve theory of sets or of truth. What is not so well known is that if there is another contracting implication expressible in the language, the logic still cannot support such a naïve theory. A logic is said to be robustly contraction free if (...) there is no such operator expressible in its language. We show that a large class of finitely valued logics are each not robustly contraction free, and demonstrate that some other contraction free logics fail to be robustly contraction free. Finally, the sublogics of Łω (with the standard connectives) are shown to be robustly contraction free. (shrink)

Recent allegations of unethical decision-making by leaders in prominent business organizations have jeopardized the world's confidence in American business. The purpose of this research was to develop a measure of managerial moral judgment that can be used in future research and managerial assessment. The measure was patterned after the Defining Issues Test, a widely used general measure of moral judgment. With content validity as the goal, we aimed to sample the domain of managerial ethical situations by establishing links to dimensions (...) of managerial performance, as well as to the types of organizational justice issues managers encounter. Proposed scenarios were evaluated for realism by ethics officers and human resource managers. Results indicated that the new measure is reliable and correlates with a number of relevant variables in the hypothesized manner, demonstrating evidence of construct validity. Implications for future research and for human resources management are discussed. (shrink)

Wendy S. Parker and I have advanced an inductive-risk approach to the provision of climate information that relies on the contextual values of information users. This approach aims to improve the e...

This paper continues the work of Priest and Sylvan in Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics, a paper on the simplified semantics of relevant logics, such as B⁺ and B. We show that the simplified semantics can also be used for a large number of extensions of the positive base logic B⁺, and then add the dualising '*' operator to model negation. This semantics is then used to give conservative extension results for Boolean negation.

Different natural deduction proof systems for intuitionistic and classical logic —and related logical systems—differ in fundamental properties while sharing significant family resemblances. These differences become quite stark when it comes to the structural rules of contraction and weakening. In this paper, I show how Gentzen and Jaśkowski’s natural deduction systems differ in fine structure. I also motivate directed proof nets as another natural deduction system which shares some of the design features of Genzen and Jaśkowski’s systems, but which differs again (...) in its treatment of the structural rules, and has a range of virtues absent from traditional natural deduction systems. (shrink)

Mark Balaguer's Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics presents an intriguing new brand of platonism, which he calls plenitudinous platonism, or more colourfully, full-blooded platonism. In this paper, I argue that Balaguer's attempts to characterise full-blooded platonism fail. They are either too strong, with untoward consequences we all reject, or too weak, not providing a distinctive brand of platonism strong enough to do the work Balaguer requires of it.

Many logics in the relevant family can be given a proof theory in the style of Belnap's display logic. However, as originally given, the proof theory is essentially more expressive than the logics they seek to model. In this paper, we consider a modified proof theory which more closely models relevant logics. In addition, we use this proof theory to show decidability for a large range of substructural logics.

Abstract 1 This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams? seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams? (...) challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams? important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort. (shrink)

Three decades ago, James Bogen and James Woodward argued against the possibility and usefulness of scientific explanations of data. They developed a picture of scientific reasoning where stable phenomena were identified via data without much input from theory. Rather than explain data, theories ‘save the phenomena’. In contrast, I argue that there are good reasons to explain data, and the practice of science reveals attempts to do so. I demonstrate that algorithms employed to address inverse problems in remote-sensing applications should (...) be understood as attempts to identify phenomena by explaining the data. Thus, this paper furthers understanding of data-to-phenomena reasoning in science, and demonstrates theory may play a more central role in phenomena identification than previously recognized. (shrink)

Some empirical findings seem to show that people value health benefits differently depending on the age of the beneficiary. Health economists and philosophers have offered justifications for these preferences on grounds of both efficiency and equity. In this paper, I examine the most prominent examples of both sorts of justification: the defence of age-weighting in the WHO's global burden of disease studies and the fair innings argument. I argue that neither sort of justification has been worked out in satisfactory form: (...) age should not be taken into account in the framework of the burden of disease measure, and on the most promising formulations of the fair innings argument, it turns out to be merely an indicator of some other factor. I conclude by describing the role of age in theories of justice of healthcare resource allocation. (shrink)

In a rare discussion of Gadamer's work, Davidson takes issue with Gadamer's claim that successful communication requires that interlocutors share a common language. While he is right to see a difference between his own views and Gadamer's on this point, Davidson appears to have misunderstood what motivates Gadamer's position, conflating it with that of his more familiar conventionalist interlocutors. This paper articulates Gadamer's view of the role of language in communicative understanding as an alternative to both Davidson's and that of (...) the conventionalist writers Davidson critiques. It is argued, first, that Gadamer employs a conception of what individuates a language, and thus of what it means for two speakers to “share” a language, that Davidson never considers. By emphasizing the role of “application” in the historical development of languages, Gadamer develops a view in which languages are distinguished not by their particular semantic or syntactic rules, but by subtle differences between the concepts they express. Second, it is argued that the instances of “asymmetrical” communication—communication between interlocutors who have different sets of concepts at their disposal—that motivate Gadamer's position pose a challenge to Davidson's account of interpretative charity. (shrink)

This dissertation is a critical examination of dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions. Dialetheism's proponents argue that adopting the view will allow us to solve hitherto unsolved problems, including the well-known logical paradoxes. ;Dialetheism faces three kinds of challenge. Challenges of the first kind put in doubt the intrinsic coherence of dialetheism. It can be claimed, for example, that it is incoherent for a claim to be both true and false; that claims known to be false cannot be (...) accepted; that claims known to be false cannot be rationally accepted; and that dialetheism entails the falsity of some of its own theoretical claims. The second kind of challenge concerns the use of paraconsistent logics, which dialetheists must adopt on pain of accepting the truth of every proposition. I examine a number of paraconsistent logics, and conclude that either they come at an unacceptably high price or they do not support the dialetheist project. ;I devote most attention to the third kind of challenge, according to which dialetheism fails to provide the promised solutions to the paradoxes and other previously intractable problems, and so we lose the major motivation for the theory. Proponents claim that dialetheism allows for the solution of numerous problems, particularly in metaphysics, law, and logic. In the case of metaphysics, it is claimed that dialetheism allows us to deal with puzzles involving change, vagueness, and motion. However, I argue that the proposed solution does not eliminate the old metaphysical problems, and in fact gives rise to new ones. In the case of law, it is claimed that dialetheism can allow us to deal with legal contradiction. I argue there are more plausible means of solving such conflicts. The strongest case for dialetheism is that it allows us to solve logical and semantic paradoxes of self-reference, some of which have endured for well over two thousand years. I construct a paradox that the dialetheist cannot accommodate, and which shows that dialetheism never provided a solution to the paradoxes at all, even in their more familiar forms. (shrink)

The two principal models of design in methodological circles in architecture—analysis/synthesis and conjecture/analysis—have their roots in philosophy of science, in different conceptions of scientific method. This paper explores the philosophical origins of these models and the reasons for rejecting analysis/synthesis in favour of conjecture/analysis, the latter being derived from Karl Popper’s view of scientific method. I discuss a fundamental problem with Popper’s view, however, and indicate a framework for conjecture/analysis to avoid this problem.

This is a new release of the original 1929 edition.

This paper presents the results of a survey of students majoring in STEM fields whose education contained a significant history, philosophy and sociology of science component. The survey was administered to students in a North American public 4-year university just prior to completing their HPS sequence. The survey assessed students’ attitudes towards HPS to gauge how those attitudes changed over the course of their college careers, and to identify the benefits and obstacles to studying HPS as a component of their (...) STEM education. The survey reveals that students generally found unexpected value in taking HPS within their STEM curriculum. It also reveals that framing HPS courses as a means of gaining communication skills necessary to be an influential scientist seems to resonate with students. However, students also identified several factors limiting engagement with HPS content, including the length and density of required readings and assessment via essays and papers. (shrink)

Cost-effectiveness analysis is the standard analytical tool for evaluating the aggregate health benefits of treatments, interventions, or health programs. It works by comparing the ratio of costs and benefits of different alternatives. The lower the ratio, the more effective the treatment, intervention, or program. The use of cost-effectiveness analysis can ensure that scarce health care resources are allocated in a way that maximizes the satisfaction of health needs. According to a common objection, however, the use of cost-effectiveness analysis for setting (...) priorities in the allocation of health care resources may lead to unfair discrimination against people with disabilities.The aim of the first part of this .. (shrink)

A philosophical exploration of the problematic nature of the disposable.

A B S T R AC T: In this paper I consider an interpretation of future contingents which motivates a unification of a Łukasiewicz-style logic with the more classical supervaluational semantics. This in turn motivates a new non-classical logic modelling what is “made true by history up until now. ” I give a simple Hilbert-style proof theory, and a soundness and completeness argument for the proof theory with respect to the intended models.

Charles Travis and Hans-Georg Gadamer both affirm radical contextualism, the view that natural language is ineliminably context-sensitive. However, they offer different accounts of the role linguistic meaning plays in determining the contents of utterances. I discuss the differences between Travis's and Gadamer's views of meaning and offer an argument in favour of the latter. I argue that Travis's view assumes a principled distinction between literal and figurative speech that is at odds with his wider contextualist commitments. By contrast, Gadamer's view, (...) on which meaning is ‘fundamentally metaphorical,’ makes no such assumption and thus avoids the difficulty. (shrink)

There is a strong intuition that for a change to occur, there must be a moment at which the change is taking place. It will be demonstrated that there are no such moments of change, since no state the changing thing could be in at any moment would suffice to make that moment a moment of change. A moment in which the changing thing is simply in the state changed from or the state changed to cannot be the moment of (...) change, since these states are respectively before and after the change; moreover, to select one of these moments over the other as the moment of change would be arbitrary. A moment in which the changing thing is neither in the state changed from nor in the state changed to cannot be the moment of change, since there are changes for which it is impossible for something to be in neither state. Finally, the moment of change cannot be a moment in which the changing thing is in both the state changed from and the state changed to, as suggested by Graham Priest and others. Even if, like proponents of this view, we are willing to accept the contradictions that the account entails, it is demonstrated that on such a model, every change would require an infinite number of other changes, every change would take an infinite amount of time, and some changes would occur without occurring at any time. Further, the model is grossly counterintuitive, with the exact nature of the counterintuitive element depending on what model of time and space one endorses. Finally, it is demonstrated that this model is incompatible with the Leibniz Continuity Condition. (shrink)

The problem with model-theoretic modal semantics is that it provides only the formal beginnings of an account of the semantics of modal languages. In the case of non-modal language, we bridge the gap between semantics and mere model theory, by claiming that a sentence is true just in case it is true in an intended model. Truth in a model is given by the model theory, and an intended model is a model which has as domain the actual objects of (...) discourse, and which relates these objects in an appropriate manner. However, the same strategy applied to the modal case seems to require an intended modal model whose domain includes mere possibilia. Building on recent work by Christopher Menzel (Synthese 85 (1990)), I give an account of model-theoretic semantics for modal languages which does not require mere possibilia or intensional entities of any kind. Menzel has offered a representational account of model-theoretic modal semantics that accords with actualist scruples, since it does not require possibilia. However, Menzel's view is in the company of other actualists who seek to eliminate possible worlds, but whose accounts tolerate other sorts of abstract, intensional entities, such as possible states of affairs. Menzel's account crucially depends on the existence of properties and relations in intension. I offer a purely extensional, representational account and prove that it does all the work that Menzel's account does. The result of this endeavor is an account of model theoretic semantics for modal languages requiring nothing but pure sets and the actual objects of discourse. Since ontologically beyond what is prima facie presupposed by the model theory itself. Thus, the result is truly an ontology-free model-theoretic semantics for modal languages. That is to say, getting genuine modal semantics out of the model theory is ontologically cost-free. Since my extensional account is demonstrably no less adequate, and yet is at the same time more ontologically frugal, it is certainly to be preferred. (shrink)

Assuming AD + DC, we characterize the self-dual boldface pointclasses which are strictly larger than the pointclasses contained in them: these are exactly the clopen sets, the collections of all sets of Wadge rank [Formula: see text], and those of Wadge rank [Formula: see text] when ξ is limit.

Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' PrefaceAcknowledgementsNotes on ContributorsHow Things Are Elsewhere; W. Schwarz Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic; B.Kooi Interpreting and Applying Proof Theories for Modal Logic; F.Poggiolesi & G.Restall The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge; D.Cohnitz On Probabilistically Closed Languages; H.Leitgeb Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty; B.Weatherson & D.Jehle Skepticism about Reasoning; S.Roush, K.Allen & I.HerbertLessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligations; C.D.Novaes How to Rule Out Things with Words: Strong Paraconsistency and the Algebra of Exclusion; (...) F.Berto Lessons from the Logic of Demonstratives; G.RussellThe Multitude View on Logic; M.Eklund Index. (shrink)