Theories of verisimilitude have routinely been classified into two rival camps—the content approach and the likeness approach—and these appear to be motivated by very different sets of data and principles. The question thus naturally arises as to whether these approaches can be fruitfully combined. Recently Zwart and Franssen (Synthese 158(1):75–92, 2007) have offered precise analyses of the content and likeness approaches, and shown that given these analyses any attempt to meld content and likeness orderings violates some basic desiderata. Unfortunately their (...) characterizations of the approaches do not embrace the paradigm examples of those approaches. I offer somewhat different characterizations of these two approaches, as well as of the consequence approach (Schurz and Weingartner (Synthese 172(3):415–436, 2010) which happily embrace their respective paradigms. Finally I prove that the three approaches are indeed compatible, but only just, and that the cost of combining them is too high. Any account which combines the strictures of what I call the strong likeness approach with the demands of either the content or the consequence approach suffers from precisely the same defect as Popper’s—namely, it entails the trivialization of truthlikeness. The downside of eschewing the strong likeness constraints and embracing the content constraints alone is the underdetermination of the concept of truthlikeness. (shrink)

Why should a Bayesian bother performing an experiment, one the result of which might well upset his own favored credence function? The Ramsey-Good theorem provides a decision theoretic answer. Provided you base your decision on expected utility, and the the experiment is cost-free, performing the experiment and then choosing has at least as much expected utility as choosing without further ado. Furthermore, doing the experiment is strictly preferable just in case at least one possible outcome of the experiment could alter (...) your choice of options. That is, you should pursue the information just in case it could make a difference to what you do. The problem remains, however, why one should do an experiment when nothing of much practical consequence hangs in the balance. One possibility here is to invoke the pure cognitive utility of states. It is shown that one constraint on cognitive value (what I call cogency) guarantees the value of learning: from a cognitive point of view you are justified in performing an experiment if the outcome of the experiment could make a different to what you think. A bonus of the basic framework is that it provides a new decision theoretic argument for the rationality of conditionalization. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction_ is a lively and accessible introduction to one of philosophy's most active and important areas of research.

In recent years, two schools of thought have emerged with regard to the Cambrian “explosion”. One argues that it was very quick, with phyla tumbling into existence in a virtual geological instant. The other view has a more relaxed temporal perspective. It looks to slow aeons of cryptic metazoan history, which led to a final breakthrough in the Cambrian, not in evolution but of fossilization potential. Yet both views have serious difficulties. Now, in a recent issue of Biological Reviews, (...) class='Hi'>Graham Budd and Sören Jensen(1) argue for a third way. In an intriguing blend of functional morphology, the fossil record and cladistic thinking, they suggest that the assembly of metazoan bodyplans took place in a surprisingly straightforward manner. BioEssays 22:1053–1056, 2000. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Given the dominance of the United States' constitutional tradition, the modern world has inherited a widespread conservatism that holds constitutional 'reform' to be risky and change to mean decline. This attitude has ancient roots. Atavism in politics may be traced to movements that draw (however remotely) upon the legacy of the presocratic philosopher, Parmenides, who promoted a monist view of the world and graphically represented a radical rejection of all change as mere illusion. As one of the forerunners of the (...) immeasurably influential Plato and Aristotle, he helped to shape a philosophical worldview in which the ultimate reality was locked in a realm of disembodied and unchanging Forms. Despite his 'new modes and orders', archaism is apparent in Machiavelli's constitutional inheritance from Polybius, who sought to arrest change through a blending of the 'given' forms of government. This mixed constitution is inherently not conducive to democratic development. (shrink)

What is the 'philosophy of sport'? What does one do to count as a practitioner in the philosophy of sport? What conception of philosophy underpins the answer to those questions? In this important new book, leading sport philosopher Graham McFee draws on a lifetime's philosophical inquiry to reconceptualise the field of study. The book covers important topics such as Olympism, the symbolisation of argument, and epistemology and aesthetics in sport research; and concludes with a section of 'applied' sport philosophy (...) by looking at rules and officiating. Using a Wittgensteinian framework, and employing a rich array of sporting examples throughout, McFee challenges the assumptions of traditional analytic philosophy regarding the completeness required of concepts and the exceptionlessness required of philosophical claims, providing the reader with a new set of tools with which to approach this challenging subject. On Sport and the Philosophy of Sport is fascinating and important reading for any serious students or researchers of sport philosophy. (shrink)

Greek ethics is almost universally taken to be teleological and eudaimonistic. Socrates is understood to be the founder of Greek ethics and hence the figure who instituted the eudaimonistic teleological model. The author wishes to argue to the contrary that Socrates is best taken as a duty theorist or deontologist, for whom teleological considerations are irrelevant, or, more precisely, come in only tangentially. Taking as evidence of Socrates’ position Plato’s Socratic or early dialogues, he examines a moral deliberation Socrates makes (...) in the Crito, showing its commitment to duty over interest; and examine Socrates’ program of moral improvement as expressed in the Apology, in which moral goodness is said to take precedence over personal welfare. Finally, he undertakes to show how the views expressed in the Crito and Apology might fit into a larger theoretical framework in which virtue and duty have a value independent of happiness. (shrink)

The fifth of the five volumes in our History of Western Philosophy of Religion. This volume deals with Western philosophy of religion in the twentieth century. It contains chapters on: James; Bergson; Whitehead; Hartshorne; Dewey; Russell; Scheler; Buber; Maritain; Jaspers; Tillich; Barth; Wittgenstein; Heidegger; Levinas; Weil; Ayer; Alston; Hick; Daly; Derrida; Plantinga; and Swinburne.

This illuminating guide covers the most interesting and important aspects of Rawls' work in a stimulating manner, highlighting the foundations that underlie his conception of Justice, and explaining the rationale for his famous starting point, The Veil of Ignorance. Also detailing the criticisms that have met his arguments, this study will prove essential reading for students, scholars, and interested readers alike.

In this article we present a number of axiomatic theories of truth which are conservative extensions of arithmetic. We isolate a set of ten natural principles of truth and prove that every consistent permutation of them forms a theory conservative over Peano arithmetic.

In this article, we argue for the need to further incorporate the study of metaphor with the newest tendencies within cognitive science. We do so by presenting an ecological view of cognition as a skull-and-body-transcending activity that is deeply entangled with the environment. Grounded in empirical examples we present and examine four claims fleshing out this ecological perspective on cognition and metaphor: (a) metaphor is a product of an organism-environment-system, rather than merely a product of an inner mental process, (b) (...) metaphoric meaning is relational. It emerges from projections of structure between a living organism and its perceived or imagined environment, (c) underlying metaphor is the notion of metaphoricity, which is a scalar value involving a doubleness in experience, and (d) metaphoricity relies on experiential affordances that can be directly perceived or felt in the environment. Overall, we propose that metaphor should be understood and thought about in terms of affordances rather than mental ability. Studying metaphor as affordances is to focus on metaphor as part of our active doings that equally involve cognitive, social, and linguistic dimensions. Within an ecological framework, there is no contradiction between studying the details of linguistic, multimodal, and embodied behavior in situational contexts while considering the cognitive dimensions of this behavior too since cognition is re-conceptualized as constituted by actions in an environment. (shrink)

A new concept of cognition also implies a novel approach to the study of metaphor. This insight is the starting point of this article presenting two innovations to comprehending and analyzing metaphor, one theoretical and one in terms of methodology. On a theoretical level we argue for a new orientation to metaphor and metaphoricity based on enactive cognition and distributed language and cognition. In recent years enactive and distributed cognition have been developing a new concept of cognition as an inter-bodily (...) and ecologically afforded achievement, and in light of this theoretical development we propose an approach to metaphor as a multi-body, multi-party, and multi-timescale phenomenon. On a methodological level we demonstrate a new way of analyzing metaphoricity in multimodal social interaction based on in-depth video analyses of two real life examples in which we introduce metaphorical identification criteria focusing on doubleness in meaning, affordances for co-action, co-ordination, and co-exper.. (shrink)

Value is either additive or else it is subject to organic unity. In general we have organic unity where a complex whole is not simply the sum of its parts. Value exhibits organic unity if the value of a complex, whether a complex state or complex quality, is greater or less than the sum of the values of its components or parts. Whether or not value is additive might be thought to be of purely metaphysical interest, but it is also (...) connected with important aspects of evaluative reasoning. Additivity is closely connected with principles of bare difference and separability which are often tacitly assumed in value theory. The author spells out these principles and trace their connections with additivity and organic unity. The author then develops an unpleasant paradox of additivity. Additivity apparently entails nihilism: that nothing is more valuable than anything else. Additivity involves a kind of axiological atomism -- that complexes decompose into components or factors; that these factors possess value independently of their role in valuable complexes; and that the factors do not interact in their production of overall value. In order to avoid the paradox it seems as though the factors have to be akin to the metaphysically privileged states of logical atomism -- a doctrine that does not enjoy widespread support. The paradox poses a problem not only for the notions of organic unity and additivity, but also for the closely related bare-difference principles which lie at the heart of value theory and of its application. The author proposes a way of eliminating the paradox, and thereby saving additivity and separability, without presupposing an unpalatable variant of logical atomism. The author closes with the proposal to treat principles of additivity as regulative ideals in our search for intrinsic values. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen attacks on philosophy as an irrelevant field of inquiry when compared with science. In this book, Graham McFee defends the claims of philosophy against attempts to minimize either philosophy’s possibility or its importance by deploying a contrast with what Wittgenstein characterized as the “dazzling ideal” of science. This ‘dazzling ideal’ incorporates both the imagined completeness of scientific explanation—whereby completing its project would leave nothing unexplained—and the exceptionless character of the associated conception of causality. On such (...) a scientistic world-view, what need is there for philosophy? In his defense of philosophy, McFee shows that rejecting such scientism is not automatically anti-scientific, and that it permits granting to natural science its own truth-generating power. Further, McFee argues for contextualism in the project of philosophy, and sets aside the pervasive requirement for exceptionless generalizations while relating his account to interconnections between the concepts of person, substance, agency, and causation. (shrink)

Based on specific documentary evidence, historian Lionel Jensen reveals how 16th- and 17th-century Western missionaries used translations of the ancient RU ...

That death is not a welfare issue appears to be a widespread view among animal welfare researchers. This paper demonstrates that this view is based on a mistaken assumption about harm, which is coupled to ‘welfare’ being conceived as ‘welfare at a time’. Assessments of welfare at a time ignore issues of longevity. In order to assess the welfare issue of death, it is necessary to structure welfare assessment as comparisons of possible lives of the animals. The paper also demonstrates (...) that excluding the welfare issues of being deprived of life from the ethical assessment of killing distorts the ethical considerations. (shrink)

In this impassioned polemic, radical environmental philosopher Derrick Jensen debunks the near-universal belief in a hierarchy of nature and the superiority of humans. Vast and underappreciated complexities of nonhuman life are explored in detail--from the cultures of pigs and prairie dogs, to the creative use of tools by elephants and fish, to the acumen of caterpillars and fungi. The paralysis of the scientific establishment on moral and ethical issues is confronted and a radical new framework for assessing the intelligence (...) and sentience of nonhuman life is put forth. Jensen attacks mainstream environmental journalism, which too often limits discussions to how ecological changes affect humans or the economy--with little or no regard for nonhuman life. With his signature compassionate logic, he argues that when we separate ourselves from the rest of nature, we in fact orient ourselves against nature, taking an unjust and, in the long run, impossible position. Jensen expresses profound disdain for the human industrial complex and its ecological excesses, contending that it is based on the systematic exploitation of the earth. Page by page, Jensen, who has been called the philosopher-poet of the environmental movement, demonstrates his deep appreciation of the natural world in all its intimacy, and sounds an urgent call for its liberation from human domination. (shrink)

Altered state theories of hypnosis posit that a qualitatively distinct state of mental processing, which emerges in those with high hypnotic susceptibility following a hypnotic induction, enables the generation of anomalous experiences in response to specific hypnotic suggestions. If so then such a state should be observable as a discrete pattern of changes to functional connectivity (shared information) between brain regions following a hypnotic induction in high but not low hypnotically susceptible participants. Twenty-eight channel EEG was recorded from 12 high (...) susceptible (highs) and 11 low susceptible (lows) participants with their eyes closed prior to and following a standard hypnotic induction. The EEG was used to provide a measure of functional connectivity using both coherence (COH) and the imaginary component of coherence (iCOH), which is insensitive to the effects of volume conduction. COH and iCOH were calculated between all electrode pairs for the frequency bands: delta (0.1–3.9Hz), theta (4–7.9Hz) alpha (8–12.9Hz), beta1 (13–19.9Hz), beta2 (20–29.9Hz) and gamma (30–45Hz). The results showed that there was an increase in theta iCOH from the pre-hypnosis to hypnosis condition in highs but not lows with a large proportion of significant links being focused on a central-parietal hub. There was also a decrease in beta1 iCOH from the pre-hypnosis to hypnosis condition with a focus on a fronto-central and an occipital hub that was greater in high compared to low susceptibles. There were no significant differences for COH or for spectral band amplitude in any frequency band. The results are interpreted as indicating that the hypnotic induction elicited a qualitative change in the organization of specific control systems within the brain for high as compared to low susceptible participants. This change in the functional organization of neural networks is a plausible indicator of the much theorized “hypnotic-state”. (shrink)

This volume puts leading pragmatists in the philosophy of language, including Robert Brandom, in contact with scholars concerned with what pragmatism has come to mean for the law. Each contribution uses the resources of pragmatism to tackle fundamental problems in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of law, and social and political philosophy. In many chapters, the version of pragmatism deployed proves a fruitful approach to its subject matter; in others, shortcomings of the specific brand of pragmatism are revealed. The (...) result is a clearer understanding of what pragmatism has meant and can mean across these tightly related philosophical areas. The book, then, is itself pragmatism in action: it seeks to clarify its unifying concept by examining the practices that centrally involve it. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the understanding of Heidegger and a rare attempt to bridge the schism between traditions of analytic and Continental philosophy. Cristina Lafont applies the core methodology of analytic philosophy, language analysis, to Heidegger's work providing both a clearer exegesis and a powerful critique of his approach to the subject of language. In Part One, she explores the Heideggerean conception of language in depth. In Part Two, she draws on recent work from theorists of direct (...) reference to reveal the limitations of Heidegger's views and to show how language shapes our understanding of the world without making learning impossible. The book first appeared in German but has been substantially revised for the English edition. (shrink)