En abril de 1961, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir y Frantz Fanon se reunieron en un café de Roma. La reunión, por lo menos tal como la registró Beauvoir, duró horas, hasta las dos de la mañana, hasta el momento en que el cuerpo de Sartre, de 56 años, sufrió fatiga. Sartre necesitaba descansar, instó Beauvoir. Fanon, con su cuerpo de 36 años muriendo de leucemia, se resintió de su insistencia: “No me gustan los hombres que acumulan sus recursos”. Él (...) quería aprovechar esa oportunidad de oro de hablar con Sartre durante semanas sin descanso si era necesario. Sin embargo, el agotamiento prevaleció, aunque la reunión legendaria consistió en una conversación sin parar durante casi tres días. Sartre, impresionado por el joven revolucionario, había acordado escribir el prefacio de Los condenados de la tierra, una obra que se supone compuesta durante diez semanas agotadoras, y él y el colectivo editorial también acordaron publicar el primer capítulo en la edición de junio de Les Temps Modernes. La salud de Fanon empeoró a medida que pasaba el año. Eventualmente fue a Bethesda, Maryland, para tratamiento a finales de noviembre, donde fue detenido por la CIA y se le negó el tratamiento. Murió el 6 de diciembre de neumonía. (shrink)

This entry explores two features of John Locke’s (1632-1704) theological commitments: the existence and nature of God; and, the nature of punishment in the afterlife. Locke argues for a cogitative and immaterial God. Locke also denies eternal damnation, or eternal punishment and torment in the afterlife. The goal of this entry is to not only showcase Locke’s often overlooked discussion of eternal damnation, but also to show how this discussion, and Locke’s treatment of God, link up with his groundbreaking and (...) influential discussion of persons and their persistence conditions. (shrink)

Some learning strategies that work well when computational considerations are abstracted away from become severely limiting when such considerations are taken into account. We illustrate this phenomenon for agents who attempt to extrapolate patterns in binary data streams chosen from among a countable family of possibilities. If computational constraints are ignored, then two strategies that will always work are learning by enumeration (enumerate the possibilities—in order of simplicity, say—then search for the one earliest in the ordering that agrees with your (...) data and use it to predict the next data point) and Bayesian learning. But there are many families of computable data streams that, although they can be successfully extrapolated by computable agents, cannot be handled by any computable learner by enumeration. And while there is a sense in which Bayesian learning is a fully general strategy for computable learners, the ability to mimic powerful learners comes at a price for Bayesians: they cannot, in general, become highly confident of their predictions in the limit of large data sets and they cannot, in general, use priors that incorporate all relevant background knowledge. (shrink)

John Locke (1632–1704) added the chapter in which he treats persons and their persistence conditions (Book 2, Chapter 27) to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 1694, only after being encouraged to do so by William Molyneux (1692–1693).[1] Nevertheless, Locke’s treatment of personal identity is one of the most discussed and debated aspects of his corpus. Locke’s discussion of persons received much attention from his contemporaries, ignited a heated debate over personal identity, and continues to influence (...) and inform the debate over persons and their persistence conditions. This entry aims to first get clear on the basics of Locke’s position, when it comes to persons and personal identity, before turning to areas of the text that continue to be debated by historians of philosophy working to make sense of Locke’s picture of persons today. It then canvases how Locke’s discussion of persons was received by his contemporaries, and concludes by briefly addressing how those working in metaphysics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have responded to Locke’s view—giving the reader a glimpse of Locke’s lasting impact and influence on the debate over personal identity. (shrink)

Berkeley’s two most obvious targets in Alciphron are Shaftesbury and Mandeville. However, as numerous commentators have pointed out, there is good reason to think Berkeley additionally targets Anthony Collins in this dialogue. In this paper, I bolster David Berman’s claim that “Collins looms large in the background” of Dialogue VII, and put some meat on the bones of Raymond Martin and John Barresi’s passing suggestion that there is a connection between the Clarke-Collins Correspondence, Alciphron, and the objection that Berkeley raises (...) regarding persons and their persistence conditions therein. Specifically, I argue that we have evidence that Berkeley’s objection to consciousness-based views of personal identity, as found in VII.8, is a response to a challenge that Collins raises to Clarke in “An Answer to Mr. Clarke’s Third Defense of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell.” This is significant not just because this objection is usually—and consistently—taken to be an objection to Locke, but also because Berkeley’s objection works against Collins’s theory of personal identity in a way that it doesn’t against Locke’s. (shrink)

This paper is about the concept of legitimacy in Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments. Ackerman's theory of the constitutional moment explains how constitutional change takes place outside of, and even in tension with, established channels of constitutional amendment. The main tool of legitimacy which Ackerman uses is popular sovereignty, to which he gives special features. Ackerman's particular conception of popular sovereignty I name hyperconsensus, and then I explore whether that is sufficient to justify deviations from Article V, as Ackerman claims. (...) I conclude, with many others, that the constitutional moment needs more justificatory work. I offer reciprocity as a corrective procedural requirement as found in Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy. Doing so enhances the normative attractiveness of dualist democracy. (shrink)

Like all previously published volumes of his lectures, the content of The Government of the Living defies brief summary. It shows us Foucault in 1980 mapping out a major new phase in his work in terms that complicate our existing understanding of his unfinished project. My review looks in turn at the two parts of the course: an unusually lengthy discussion of method and heuristics, followed by a tightly focused study of early Christian regimes of truth. I suggest that the (...) complex opening theoretical reflections in these lectures go well beyond mapping the course of the immediately following historical analysis. They need to be seen in coordination with other conceptual innovations introduced over the following years, putting a task that Foucault calls here a “history of the power of truth” on his agenda alongside, and in integral connection with the previously defined tasks of a history of governmentality and a history of the subject. A newly published discussion in Berkeley later in 1980 adds crucial context to these Paris lectures, spelling out the linkage of structures of subjectivation to governability and of penitential ascetics to pastoral power. Taken together, the later books and lectures can now be seen to establish a framework of what I suggest we can call “alethic” or “aletheological” analysis, analysing and mapping across the span of Western history the modes of engagement of life and truth, with a view to enabling a renewed analysis of the political present. (shrink)

Catharine Macaulay (1731 — 1791) is often construed as a historian, and moral and political philosopher chiefly concerned with the high privilege of reason. Accordingly, her Letters on Education (1790) are thought to advance her vision for how education must cultivate the rational capacities required to comprehend moral duty. In this paper, against scholarly consensus, I show that sympathy, not reason, makes possible the discovery of moral truths and inclines us to act in accordance with them. By attending to Macaulayan (...) sympathy, this paper not only advances a novel approach to her moral philosophy, it also identifies a hitherto underappreciated aspect of her engagement with Hume. For Macaulay, Humean sympathy accounts for how fellow feeling produces social bias and leads us to draw distinctions among people according to their social rank (Hist. 6:xii). For Macaulay, this is not a necessary feature of sympathy: it is symptomatic of a failure to see that sympathy must be cultivated to establish the “consistent system of feeling” needed to penetrate distinctions of social rank and species using an “equal eye of compassion” (Hist. 6: xii). Macaulay’s account of how sympathy must be cultivated so that this potential is realized is advanced in the Letters. (shrink)

Mary Astell (1666-1731) is often described as a Cartesian—and for good reason. Many of her philosophical positions align with Descartes’. Nonetheless, it is possible to overstress the similarities between Astell’s philosophy and Descartes’. This entry focuses on the ways their views diverge in order to get a fuller understanding of Astell’s epistemology. Her approach to meditation, the emphasis she places on social dimensions of inquiry, her commitment to cultivating intellectual virtues, and her insights concerning what we would now call “epistemic (...) injustice” are among the elements that distinguish her philosophy from Descartes’ and mark her as a significant early modern epistemologist. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 3, Page 259-287, Summer 2019.

Walter Benjamin’s work shows evidence of a sustained engagement with Kant and neo-Kantianism, particularly his thoughts on history and experience. I read Benjamin’s “Theses” and “Theologico-Political Fragment” against Kant’s “Idea for a Cosmopolitan History” to suggest that actual experience becomes an impossibility in the Kantian system because historical events always outrun the efforts of the Kantian apparatus to contain them. That Kant ignores these excesses indicates the theological basis of his system. Benjamin’s “messianism” can then be read as a thoroughgoing (...) materialist critique of the Kantian position and its consequences. (shrink)

Human life, society and law: fundamentals of the philosophy of the law, by Luis Recaséns Siches.- Phenomenology of the decision, by Carlos Cossio.- The eidetics and aporetics of the law, by Juan Llambías de Azevedo.- The philosophical-juridical problem of the validity of law, by Eduardo García Máynez.- Liberty as right and as power, by Eduardo García Máynez.

No crucial experiment demonstrates that four hue categories are needed to describe color appearance. Instead, converging lines of evidence suggest that the terms red, yellow, green, and blue are sufficient and precise enough for deriving color discrimination functions and for a useful model constraining relations between color appearance and neuronal responses. Such a model need not be based on linguistic universals. Until something better is available, this holds.

//static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn%3Acambridge.org%3Aid%3Aarticle%3AS003181910004081X/resource/na me/firstPage-S003181910004081Xa.jpg.