This article will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic instance of serious psychopathology – namely, the condition of being delusional – in light of the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy. This conception of personal autonomy aims at yielding value‐neutral judgements about freedom and self‐governance. I will argue that when viewed from the perspective of this specific conception of autonomy, delusions do not necessarily impair an agent's personal autonomy. In order to establish this claim, I will (...) probe the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental disease that is rationally incapacitating, to which the hierarchical theorist might appeal. I argue that, understood within the parameters set by the commitment to value neutrality, this idea fails to provide support for the claim that delusion necessarily impairs personal autonomy. One contribution this article makes to the effort of understanding how delusion impairs personal autonomy is to help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments inform our judgements of impaired personal autonomy in delusional agents. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Do People Defy Generalizations?Examining the Case Against Evidence-Based Medicine in PsychiatryGloria Ayob (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, psychiatry, action, contentEvidence-based medicine (EBM) in psychiatry presupposes that it is possible to track the causal efficacy of treatments for psychopathological conditions using scientific methods. One central aim of EBM is to ascertain the causally efficacious component of the treatment of a given condition. This is done by collecting data from randomized control trials, where (...) this data are of groups rather than of individuals (Bolton, 2008).EBM is felt by many to have significant limitations when applied in the field of psychiatric medicine, and these limitations are thought to arise owing to a particular fact about psychiatry, namely that the subject of psychiatry is the human person. For brevity, I will refer to this broad claim as the Unsuitability Intuition (UI), which can be stated as follows:The UI is the intuition that EBM is somehow unsuitable for dealing with people.The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I try to pinpoint the source(s) of anxiety about EBM, and therein to clarify the exact sense(s) in which EBM might be said to be unsuitable or problematic. Second, I evaluate the validity of these concerns, focusing on two broad interrelated questions: (1) Is it actually something about human persons that creates trouble for EBM in psychiatry, and if so, what is the nature of this trouble?; and (2) What assumptions about EBM are made such that EBM is problematic in light of the fact that the subject of psychiatry is the human person?As an empirical point, EBM in psychiatry is applied to two methods of treatment: psychotropic drugs, and more recently, cognitive–behavioral therapies. Each of these throws up slightly different issues in light of the two questions just identified. To accommodate relevant differences, I structure this paper as follows. Bearing in mind that the overall aim of the paper is to scrutinize the intuition that EBM is somehow unsuitable for dealing with people, I begin by exploring one common suggestion as to what underpins this intuition: The problem we are confronted with, in applying EBM to people, is the problem of applying generalizations to particular instances (Wifstad 2008). To anticipate, I argue that this worry concerns a problem that, in fact, applies to the scientific method in general. That is, it is not a [End Page 167] problem arising specifically from the fact that the subject of psychiatry is the human person. So if this is the worry about EBM, then as it stands, it does not satisfactorily explain the intuition that EBM is somehow unsuitable for dealing with people.Against this, the UI theorist might defend his intuition by attempting to specify the reasons why persons, unlike physical material, present a special challenge to the scientific method presupposed by EBM. One way of doing this is to point out that the determinants of human behavior cannot be captured by generalizations (and in particular, by causal generalizations). There are two ways of worrying about EBM here: On the first, the problem of EBM in psychiatry is a pragmatic worry that arises in view of the complexity of the determinants of human behavior and the limited capacity for observation. If this is the worry, though, it can be overcome to a greater or lesser extent within psychiatric practice. The second worry consists in the thought that humans pose a constitutive problem for EBM in psychiatry. However, I argue that this worry turns out to rest on assumptions about human behavior that are not unproblematic in themselves. Thus, UI is underpinned either by a pragmatic worry that can be overcome to some extent, or else it is underpinned by certain assumptions that are problematic, if not altogether wrong. This means that UI cannot be founded on a constitutive point about persons—at least, it does not seem to be, if it arises from a concern about applying generalizations to individual human beings.But there is a very different type of worry that might underpin UI, one that does not issue from considerations about the relation between the general and the particular. UI theorists could be worried about specific... (shrink)

Psychopathy is often used to settle disputes about the nature of moral judgment. The “trolley problem” is a familiar scenario in which psychopathy is used as a test case. Where a convergence in response to the trolley problem is registered between psychopathic subjects and non-psychopathic subjects, it is assumed that this convergence indicates that the capacity for making moral judgments is unimpaired in psychopathy. This, in turn, is taken to have implications for the dispute between motivation internalists and motivation externalists, (...) for instance. In what follows, we want to do two things: firstly, we set out to question the assumption that convergence is informative of the capacity for moral judgment in psychopathy. Next, we consider a distinct feature of psychopathy which we think provides strong grounds for holding that the capacity for moral judgment is seriously impaired in psychopathic subjects. The feature in question is the psychopathic subject’s inability to make sincere apologies. Our central claim will be this: convergence in response to trolley problems does not tell us very much about the psychopathic subject’s capacity to make moral judgments, but his inability to make sincere apologies does provide us with strong grounds for holding that this capacity is seriously impaired in psychopathy. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein's aim in the aspect-perception passages is to critically evaluate a specific hypothesis. The target hypothesis in these passages is the Gestalt psychologist Köhler's "isomorphism principle." According to this principle, there are neural correlates of conscious perceptual experience, and these neural correlates determine the content of our perceptual experiences. Wittgenstein's argument against the isomorphism principle comprises two steps. First, he diffuses the substantiveness of the principle by undermining an important assumption that underpins this principle, (...) namely, that there is a unitary concept of seeing. Next, Wittgenstein argues that some forms of aspect-perception involve recognitional capacities, the exercise of which is normatively constrained. The normative nature of aspect-perceiving plays a pivotal role in Wittgenstein's rejection of the isomorphism principle. Aside from the clear exegetical benefits gained from identifying the target hypothesis in the aspect-perception passages as the isomorphism principle, construing the remarks in the way suggested here is also philosophically interesting in its own right: it shows Wittgenstein engaging directly in the mind–body problem, construed as the problem of intentionality. (shrink)

This article will examine the claim that personal autonomy is impaired by a paradigmatic instance of serious psychopathology – namely, the condition of being delusional – in light of the hierarchical conception of personal autonomy. This conception of personal autonomy aims at yielding value‐neutral judgements about freedom and self‐governance. I will argue that when viewed from the perspective of this specific conception of autonomy, delusions do not necessarily impair an agent's personal autonomy. In order to establish this claim, I will (...) probe the general idea that delusional subjects are beset by a mental disease that is rationally incapacitating, to which the hierarchical theorist might appeal. I argue that, understood within the parameters set by the commitment to value neutrality, this idea fails to provide support for the claim that delusion necessarily impairs personal autonomy. One contribution this article makes to the effort of understanding how delusion impairs personal autonomy is to help us pinpoint the ways in which our value commitments inform our judgements of impaired personal autonomy in delusional agents. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate John Campbell's (2002) characterization of the sense of demonstrative terms and his account of why an object's location matters in our understanding of perceptually-based demonstrative terms. Campbell thinks that the senses of a demonstrative term are the different ways of consciously attending to an object. I will evaluate Campbell's account of sense by exploring and comparing two scenarios in which the actual location of a seen object is different from its perceived (...) location. I do this in order to motivate the following point: Campbell's characterization of the sense of a demonstrative term turns sense into a psychologistic notion. As a consequence of this, it is difficult to see how sense could underwrite reference. In short, I shall be arguing that Campbell's account of the ways of perceiving an object is simply inadequate as an account of the Fregean notion of sense, according to which the senses of a demonstrative term are the different ways of thinking about an object. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that persons diagnosed with a personality disorder ought to be held responsible for their actions because these actions are voluntary. Defending this claim, Hannah Pickard contends that exercising choice and control are definitive of voluntary action, and that the behaviors that are constitutive of PD are behaviors over which we have choice and control. Thus PD behaviors are voluntary, and on this basis, their agents can be held properly responsible for this type of behavior. In (...) what follows, I examine this claim with reference specifically to agents who display impulsive behavior, where this behavior is taken to be diagnostic of antisocial personality disorder... (shrink)

There is a Long-Standing concern that psychiatrists have the task of fitting a square peg into a round hole: the empirical generalizations upon which diagnoses are made have seemed too many to overlook something essential about the individual person who is the subject of the diagnosis. This concern prompted a World Psychiatric Association (WPA) workgroup to suggest that a personalized component should be added to patients’ diagnostic assessment (IDGA Workgroup 2003). One might have the following worry about the WPA workgroup’s (...) suggestion: if this personalized component is merely tagged on to the existing diagnostic framework, and diagnoses still rest primarily on empirical generalizations, which are left untouched .. (shrink)

Gloria Ayob Begins her commentary with the main metaphysical and ethical motivations for including the personal perspective in psychopathological assessments. The metaphysical motivation: human actions are performed for a reason. Thus, from the personal perspective, explaining human actions amounts to justifying them by appeal to individual’s reasons. However, does it follow from this peculiarity that “explanations of human behavior that appeal to empirical generalizations and those that consist in justifying an action by appeal to reasons are of entirely (...) different logical orders” (Ayob 2013, 127) as she contends? I do not think so for two main reasons. First, in both cases, genuine explanations involve factual .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence-Based Medicine and EvaluativismTim Thornton (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, psychiatry, values, causalThe rise of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in psychiatry has brought, in its train, a concentration on the validity of psychiatric taxonomy to augment the previous focus on reliability (in the medical sense of inter-subject agreement). This is not surprising. If EBM is to be a trustworthy guide to future events, such as patient recovery, it must be based on projectible predicates (...) (Goodman 1983). Not all the predicates that apparently fit past observations would produce true predictions for the future. Furthermore, there is reason to think that employing projectible predicates goes a long way to satisfy the (widespread if contested) aim of being based on a nomological science (Papineau 1986). Thus, the successful implementation of EBM within psychiatry requires the successful articulation of a valid psychiatric taxonomy.This connection helps to explain why fears about the application of EBM to psychiatry often turn on fears about the application of the criteriological model of diagnosis to individuals. In her commentary in this issue, Gloria Ayob has examined some of the arguments concerning the application of EBM to individuals. In this brief commentary, I examine a different potential source of disquiet focused on the underlying nature of psychiatric taxonomy.Dimensions for Psychiatric TaxonomyIn their recent paper, Peter Zachar and Kenneth Kendler suggest a number of different dimensions according to which rival conceptions of psychiatric taxonomy can be mapped. These include (1) causalism–descriptivism, (2) essentialism– nominalism, (3) objectivism–evaluativism, (4) internalism–externalism, (5) entities–agents, and (6) categories–continua (2007, 557). At the heart of the objectivism-evaluativism dimension is the question:Is deciding whether or not something is a psychiatric disorder a simple factual matterY (objectivism), or does it inevitably involve a value-laden judgment (evaluativism)?(Zachar and Kendler 2007, 558)Objectivists argue that the concept of disorder is a simple or plain factual matter by contrast with an evaluation. The apparently evaluative connotations of disorder, they argue, can either be reduced to, or explained away in, more basic terms, which are not themselves essentially evaluative. Thus, for example, the attempt to explain disorder in statistical terms is a form of objectivism. The more plausible attempt to explain disorder through the idea of a biological or proper function is also usually presented as a form of objectivism. (The most famous proponent of a biological approach, however, Jerome Wakefield, adds to an objectivist-aspiring core an explicit value in the form of harm [End Page 175] [Wakefield 1999].) Whether or not it can be successful as a form of objectivism, in addition to whether an analysis in biological terms is possible, depends on whether the account of function can fully discharge any initial evaluative or normative assumptions.There seems to be good evidence that current psychiatric taxonomy, at least, contains values. John Sadler, for example, makes a powerful case for this in his substantial work Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (2005). Sadler, furthermore, addresses in some detail a further set of questions concerning the kinds and nature of the values involved. I outline just one further question about the nature of values involved.Zachar and Kendler contrast the presence of values with objectivism. Objectivity has at least two relevant senses reflecting contrasts with two senses of subjectivity. It—objectivity—might mean requiring no special subject for the conception and framing of relevant judgments. (This mirrors primary, by contrast with secondary qualities, and Williams' idea of an absolute conception [Williams 1978]). Or, it might mean disciplining and providing a contrast between correctness and incorrectness, or truth and falsity, for the relevant judgments. This contrasts with subjective whimsy.Although it seems relatively straight forward that the conception and framing of value judgments requires that subjects have a particular kind of mind, that still leaves open the other issue. Are value judgments disciplined by anything or does the "truth" of a value judgment collapse back into its being sincerely made?Evaluativism in Psychiatric Taxonomy and EBMThis question relates to the application of EBM to psychiatry in this way. On a disciplined account, psychiatric taxonomy can aim to get right the mixture or, better, the compound of simple facts and values... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence-Based Medicine and EvaluativismTim Thornton (bio)KeywordsPhilosophy, psychiatry, values, causalThe rise of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in psychiatry has brought, in its train, a concentration on the validity of psychiatric taxonomy to augment the previous focus on reliability (in the medical sense of inter-subject agreement). This is not surprising. If EBM is to be a trustworthy guide to future events, such as patient recovery, it must be based on projectible predicates (...) (Goodman 1983). Not all the predicates that apparently fit past observations would produce true predictions for the future. Furthermore, there is reason to think that employing projectible predicates goes a long way to satisfy the (widespread if contested) aim of being based on a nomological science (Papineau 1986). Thus, the successful implementation of EBM within psychiatry requires the successful articulation of a valid psychiatric taxonomy.This connection helps to explain why fears about the application of EBM to psychiatry often turn on fears about the application of the criteriological model of diagnosis to individuals. In her commentary in this issue, Gloria Ayob has examined some of the arguments concerning the application of EBM to individuals. In this brief commentary, I examine a different potential source of disquiet focused on the underlying nature of psychiatric taxonomy.Dimensions for Psychiatric TaxonomyIn their recent paper, Peter Zachar and Kenneth Kendler suggest a number of different dimensions according to which rival conceptions of psychiatric taxonomy can be mapped. These include (1) causalism–descriptivism, (2) essentialism– nominalism, (3) objectivism–evaluativism, (4) internalism–externalism, (5) entities–agents, and (6) categories–continua (2007, 557). At the heart of the objectivism-evaluativism dimension is the question:Is deciding whether or not something is a psychiatric disorder a simple factual matterY (objectivism), or does it inevitably involve a value-laden judgment (evaluativism)?(Zachar and Kendler 2007, 558)Objectivists argue that the concept of disorder is a simple or plain factual matter by contrast with an evaluation. The apparently evaluative connotations of disorder, they argue, can either be reduced to, or explained away in, more basic terms, which are not themselves essentially evaluative. Thus, for example, the attempt to explain disorder in statistical terms is a form of objectivism. The more plausible attempt to explain disorder through the idea of a biological or proper function is also usually presented as a form of objectivism. (The most famous proponent of a biological approach, however, Jerome Wakefield, adds to an objectivist-aspiring core an explicit value in the form of harm [End Page 175] [Wakefield 1999].) Whether or not it can be successful as a form of objectivism, in addition to whether an analysis in biological terms is possible, depends on whether the account of function can fully discharge any initial evaluative or normative assumptions.There seems to be good evidence that current psychiatric taxonomy, at least, contains values. John Sadler, for example, makes a powerful case for this in his substantial work Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis (2005). Sadler, furthermore, addresses in some detail a further set of questions concerning the kinds and nature of the values involved. I outline just one further question about the nature of values involved.Zachar and Kendler contrast the presence of values with objectivism. Objectivity has at least two relevant senses reflecting contrasts with two senses of subjectivity. It—objectivity—might mean requiring no special subject for the conception and framing of relevant judgments. (This mirrors primary, by contrast with secondary qualities, and Williams' idea of an absolute conception [Williams 1978]). Or, it might mean disciplining and providing a contrast between correctness and incorrectness, or truth and falsity, for the relevant judgments. This contrasts with subjective whimsy.Although it seems relatively straight forward that the conception and framing of value judgments requires that subjects have a particular kind of mind, that still leaves open the other issue. Are value judgments disciplined by anything or does the "truth" of a value judgment collapse back into its being sincerely made?Evaluativism in Psychiatric Taxonomy and EBMThis question relates to the application of EBM to psychiatry in this way. On a disciplined account, psychiatric taxonomy can aim to get right the mixture or, better, the compound of simple facts and values... (shrink)

This book defines the relationship between the thought of Adam Smith and that of the ancients---Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and the Stoics. Vivenza offers a complete survey of all Smith's writings with the aim of illustrating how classical arguments shaped opinions and scholarship in the eighteenth century.

In this innovative book, Gloria Frost reconstructs and analyses Aquinas's theories on efficient causation and causal powers, focusing specifically on natural causal powers and efficient causation in nature. Frost presents each element of Aquinas's theories one by one, comparing them with other theories, as well as examining the philosophical and interpretive ambiguities in Aquinas's thought and proposing fresh solutions to conceptual difficulties. Her discussion includes explanations of Aquinas's technical scholastic terminology in jargon-free prose, as well as background on medieval (...) scientific views - including ordinary language explanations of the medieval physical theories which Aquinas assumed in formulating his views on causation and causal powers. The resulting volume is a rich exploration of a central philosophical topic in medieval philosophy and beyond, and will be valuable especially for scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas and on medieval natural philosophy. (shrink)

Language is both a biological and a cultural phenomenon. Our aim here is to discuss, in an evolutionary perspective, the articulation of these two aspects of language. For this, we draw on the general conceptual framework developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) while at the same time dissociating ourselves from her view of language.

Although there is widespread agreement that our epistemic dependence on other people's knowledge is a key ingredient of our cognitive life, the role of trust in this dependence is much more open to debate. Is trust in epistemic authority—or “epistemic trust” for short—an epistemological notion in any sense, or is it simply a bridge-concept that connects our epistemological concerns to moral issues? Should we depict it in terms of the more familiar sociological notion of trust as a basis for cooperation?

Both Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus were committed to the view that effects with a contingent modality exist in the created world. This is to say that there are things that could have been otherwise. This chapter explores their respective accounts of the ontological reason for why there are effects with a contingent modality. Leibniz considered Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views on this issue, concluding that they were in fundamental disagreement about the ‘root of contingency.’ This chapter first makes a (...) distinction between two different senses in which an object can have a contingent modality, one having to do with causation and the other with modes of existence. Then it applies this distinction to Aquinas’s and Scotus’s texts to show that their views on why there is contingency in creation are in fact quite similar. (shrink)

Language is both a biological and a cultural phenomenon. Our aim here is to discuss, in an evolutionary perspective, the articulation of these two aspects of language. For this, we draw on the general conceptual framework developed by Ruth Millikan (1984) while at the same time dissociating ourselves from her view of language.

This paper reconstructs and analyzes Thomas Aquinas’ intriguing views on transeunt causal activity, which have been the subject of an interpretive debate spanning from the fifteenth century up until the present. In his Physics commentary, Aquinas defends the Aristotelian positions that the actualization of an agent’s active potential is the motion that it causes in its patient and action and passion are the same motion. Yet, in other texts, Aquinas claims that action differs from passion and “action is in the (...) agent” as subject. This paper proposes a solution for how to reconcile Aquinas’ varying claims about what transeunt causal activity is in reality. In addition to advancing understanding of Aquinas’ views on causal activity, the paper also offers insights into more general topics in his thought, such as the relationship between actualities and accidents and the nature of extrinsic accidents. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice are cases of identity injustice in which hearers rely on stereotypes to assess the credibility of their interlocutors. I try here to broaden the analysis of that testimonial injustice by (...) indicating other mechanisms that bias our credibility assessments. In my perspective, the use of identity stereotypes is just one case among many biases in our credibility judgments. (shrink)

A compelling exploration of how reputation affects every aspect of contemporary life Reputation touches almost everything, guiding our behavior and choices in countless ways. But it is also shrouded in mystery. Why is it so powerful when the criteria by which people and things are defined as good or bad often appear to be arbitrary? Why do we care so much about how others see us that we may even do irrational and harmful things to try to influence their opinion? (...) In this engaging book, Gloria Origgi draws on philosophy, social psychology, sociology, economics, literature, and history to offer an illuminating account of an important yet oddly neglected subject. Origgi examines the influence of the Internet and social media, as well as the countless ranking systems that characterize modern society and contribute to the creation of formal and informal reputations in our social relations, in business, in politics, in academia, and even in wine. She highlights the importance of reputation to the effective functioning of the economy and e-commerce. Origgi also discusses the existential significance of our obsession with reputation, concluding that an awareness of the relationship between our reputation and our actions empowers us to better understand who we are and why we do what we do. Compellingly written and filled with surprising insights, Reputation pins down an elusive subject that affects everyone. (shrink)

BackgroundThe idea that individuals are responsible for their health has been the focus of debate in the theoretical literature and in its concrete application to healthcare policy in many countries. Controversies persist regarding the form, substance and fairness of allocating health responsibility to the individual, particularly in universal, need-based healthcare systems.ObjectiveTo examine how personal health responsibility has been framed and rationalised in Norwegian key policy documents on priority setting.MethodsDocuments issued or published by the Ministry of Health and Care Services between (...) 1987 and 2018 were thematically analysed. We developed a predefined conceptual framework that guided the analysis. The framework included: the subject and object of responsibility, the level of conceptual abstraction, temporality, normative justificatory arguments and objections to the application of personal health responsibility.ResultsAs an additional criterion, personal health responsibility has been interpreted as relevant if: the patient’s harmful behaviour is repeated after receiving treatment, and if the success of the treatment is conditional on the patient’s behavioural change. When discussed as a retrospective criterion, considerations of reciprocal fairness have been dominant. When discussed as a prospective criterion, the expected benefit of treatment justified its relevance.ConclusionPersonal health responsibility appears to challenge core values of equality, inclusion and solidarity in the Norwegian context and has been repeatedly rejected as a necessary criterion for priority setting. However, the responsibility criterion seems to have some relevance in particular priority setting decisions. (shrink)

The verb “to conjure” is a complex one, for it includes in its standard definition a great range of possible actions or operations, not all of them equivalent, or even compatible. In its most common usage, “to conjure” means to perform an act of magic or to invoke a supernatural force, by casting a spell, say, or performing a particular ritual or rite. But “to conjure” is also to influence, to beg, to command or constrain, to charm, to bewitch, to (...) move or convey, to imagine, to visualize, to call to mind, or to remember. —Rachael DeLue 2012, para 1.When we create with our Brown hands, feminine energy, and full spirits, we conjure. To exist, survive, and thrive in these bodies is a continuous act of conjuring. Our walks conjure. Our smiles conjure. Our tears conjure. Our laughs conjure. Our words conjure. Our artworks are conjurings. We, a Black/Filipina-American woman, a Dominican-American, and a Black-American woman, are guided by our solidarity with one another and all other Black and Brown female identifying persons whose raced and gendered subjectivities exist both inside and outside of colonization, white supremacy, and patriarchy. We bring to life our colored imaginations and curiosities, and share them with the world. We are united by our need for safety, autonomy as beings, dissolution of trauma, and desire to ask, “What would happen if I…?” Imaginative, curious Women of Color founded the underground railroad, guided captured Africans and Tainos to the mountains, ignited the Civil Rights Movement, organized laborers and immigrants, birthed the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, conceived the #MeToo Movement, and so much more. Like our kindred counterparts, we have an unrelenting urge to examine, question, wonder, desire, speak to, lead, be curious, and “conjure.” As practicing artists and art educators, our critical arts-based practices are grounded in intersectional feminisms like Womanism, Black Feminist Theory, and Chicana Feminist Theory, which allow us to do these very things. (shrink)

Abstract.Scientific perspectives often are perceived to challenge biblically based cosmologies and theologies. Arthur Peacocke, biochemist and theologian, recognized that this challenge actually represents an opportunity for Christian theology to reenvision and reinterpret its traditions in ways that take into account scientific theories of evolution. In the course of his career, Peacocke offered a new paradigm for the dialogue between theology and science. This paper explores his proposals, in particular his theories of language, the God‐world relation, and the nature of God, (...) and exemplifies the impact these proposals had on his theological insights. (shrink)

AI systems play an increasingly important role in shaping and regulating the lives of millions of human beings across the world. Calls for greater _transparency_ from such systems have been widespread. However, there is considerable ambiguity concerning what “transparency” actually means, and therefore, what greater transparency might entail. While, according to some debates, transparency requires _seeing through_ the artefact or device, widespread calls for transparency imply _seeing into_ different aspects of AI systems. These two notions are in apparent tension with (...) each other, and they are present in two lively but largely disconnected debates. In this paper, we aim to further analyse what these calls for transparency entail, and in so doing, clarify the sorts of transparency that we should want from AI systems. We do so by offering a taxonomy that classifies different notions of transparency. After a careful exploration of the different varieties of transparency, we show how this taxonomy can help us to navigate various domains of human–technology interactions, and more usefully discuss the relationship between technological transparency and human agency. We conclude by arguing that all of these different notions of transparency should be taken into account when designing more ethically adequate AI systems. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze the poem "Psychology of Composition" by João Cabral de Melo Neto, seeking to comprehend poetry and poetic creation through the phenomenon of language as understood by Martin Heidegger.

Lifestyle-induced diseases are becoming a burden on healthcare, actualizing the discussion on health responsibilities. Using data from the National Association for Heart and Lung Diseases ’s 2015 Health Survey, this study examined the public’s attitudes towards personal and social health responsibility in a Norwegian population. The questionnaires covered self-reported health and lifestyle, attitudes towards personal responsibility and the authorities’ responsibility for promoting health, resource-prioritisation and socio-demographic characteristics. Block-wise multiple linear regression assessed the association between attitudes towards health responsibilities and individual (...) lifestyle, political orientation and health condition. We found a moderate support for social responsibility across political views. Respondents reporting unhealthier eating habits, smokers and physically inactive were less supportive of health promotion policies. The idea that individuals are responsible for taking care of their health was widely accepted as an abstract ideal. Yet, only a third of the respondents agreed with introducing higher co-payments for treatment of ‘self-inflicted’ conditions and levels of support were patterned by health-related behaviour and left-right political orientation. Our study suggests that a significant support for social responsibility does not exclude a strong support for personal health responsibility. However, conditional access to healthcare based on personal lifestyle is still controversial. (shrink)

The Aesthetic Experience in Roman Ingarden’s thinking. In this article we study the ideas of the Polish philosopher, Roman Ingarden, as an essential key inthe discussion on literary reception. The notion of "aesthetic experience" is revised, especially in The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Ingarden begins aesthetic discussion, trying to answer two fundamental questions: How is the literary work structured? and Which procedure will lead to an understanding of the literary art work of art? These questions, besides serving (...) in his defense against psychologism and positivism of his time, also help him develop his two most popular works in Spanish: The Literary Work of Art and The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, in which the Polish philosopher clarifies the principles that of the Reception Theory. Nevertheless, the importance of the aesthetic experience in the linguistic and phenomenology dimensions of the literary text is only understood when we study both works. Ingarden, as his translator to Spanish, Gerald Nyenhuis recognizes, presupposes in his second book the first one where he performs a constant trip from ontology to phenomenology in the literary work of art. It is precisely in this search where he nails his concept of aesthetic experience that we study today in relation with other concepts, such as the aesthetic attitude, the pre-aesthetic knowledge, the role of the aesthetic values and the aesthetic object. (shrink)

In Worrying about China, Gloria Davies pursues this inquiry through a wide range of contemporary topics, including the changing fortunes of radicalism, the ...

In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards (...) make us more responsible communicators. (shrink)

Despite the frequent refrain concerning the paucity of attention paid to pneumatology in the theological discipline, a review of literature over the past fifty years reveals that pneumatology is an idea whose time has come. However, while writings on the Holy Spirit are manifold, systematically developed pneumatologies are not. In response to this reality, this essay explores four contextually constructed pneumatologies based in communities experiencing marginalisation, oppression, and exclusion: Latin American, womanist, Latinx, and black. These pneumatologies not only represent particular (...) ethnic, social, and racial contexts, but also express a particular hermeneutical perspective on the presence and action of the Holy Spirit, i.e., that of liberation. This perspective reflects the conviction that each genuine act of the Holy Spirit is essentially liberating—individually, socially, politically, ecclesially, and theologically. While other effects accompany this experience, liberation emerges at the heart of the encounter with Spirit. Exemplifying this in multiple ways are pneumatology as the irruption of the Spirit by liberation theologian José Comblin, pneumatology as the memory of the future by womanist Linda E. Thomas, the Holy Spirit as the improvisation of God by black theologian David Emmanuel Goatley, and the Spirit dwelling in convivencia by Latinx theologian Néstor Medina. (shrink)

Proceedings of a forum held in Austin, Tex., on Mother's Day, 1996.

La prevención en materia ambiental, como concepto y principio, es una opción eficaz para aplicar el principio ético de responsabilidad esbozado por Hans Jonas, que propugna por un tratamiento responsable del ambiente de cara a su preservación para las generaciones venideras. En este sentido, la prevención es también un mecanismo de gestión que le da a cada riesgo ambiental el tratamiento particular que se merece, dadas sus características, premura e incluso potencial impacto en lo social, económico y ambiental. Esta obra (...) es una apuesta por un debate multidisciplinar sobre algunos de los temas vigentes de la gestión del riesgo ambiental, desde la incertidumbre y el análisis económico, hasta la reparación del mismo como un mecanismo disuasivo en la óptica de la responsabilidad civil. (shrink)

El escrito pretende poner en diálogo la posición sobre qué sea el mal sostenida por san Agustín y lo que actualmente Hannah Arendt ha dado en llamar “la banalidad del mal” como un nuevo fenómeno de conducta normal del ser humano del siglo XX. Se busca marcar la relación que cabe entre el mal como aquello que no es una esencia y la idea de banalidad como algo que no tiene raíz, sino que es superficial. A partir de este diálogo, (...) nos adentraremos en los aspectos dilemáticos que tiene inclusive hoy, qué cosa sea el mal y cuál es su origen. (shrink)

According to the Extended knowledge dilemma, first formulated by Clark (Synthese 192:3757–3775, 2015) and subsequently reformulated by Carter et al. (in: Carter, Clark, Kallestrup, Palermos, Pritchard (eds) Extended epistemology, Oxford Univer- sity Press, Oxford, pp 331–351, 2018a), an agent’s interaction with a device can either give rise to knowledge or extended cognition, but not both at the same time. The dilemma rests on two substantive commitments: first, that knowledge by a subject requires that the subject be aware to some extent (...) of some features of that knowledge’s sources and, second, that cognitive processes can only be extended if the subject is mostly unaware of the external object. The overwhelming response to the dilemma by proponents of extended knowledge has been to reconcile the demands of knowl- edge with the requirement that genuine extended cognition must lack any conscious encountering of the external artifact that features in the putative extended cognitive process. My approach, thus far unexplored, will be the opposite: I show how extended cognition can be made compatible with a wide range of agential attitudes, including an active form of epistemic hygiene. Consequently, I open the door for a new way of vindicating the possibility of extended knowledge, and call into question some assumptions that lie at the core of extended cognition theory. (shrink)

El «mundo entero» vive un gran desasosiego al estar inmiscuido en la dominación de la Naturaleza sustentada en la gran inversión económica, desde el paradigma antropocéntrico neoliberal. El objetivo del presente trabajo es reconocer y abrazar epistemologías y metodologías alternativas, entre ellas validar las contribuciones de los pueblos indígenas (PI) como protagonistas de la sustentabilidad y soberanía alimentaria. La investigación es de corte documental y la reflexión personal de más de 20 años de labor junto a los PI en Mesoamérica (...) y los Andes. Valorar dichas contribuciones, es centrarse en sus acervos y corpus cognoscitivos, antes que sea tarde. Son los sabios guardianes de la sustentabilidad biocultural de la Naturaleza y la Vida. Se concluye principalmente que son quienes conocen las claves, llaves y secretos que dan respuesta al reto de estelarizar la sustentabilidad y seguridad alimentaria global, que tanto persigue la humanidad. La sociedad en general y en particular las instancias oficiales, formativas, políticas, corporativas, industriales, de extensión y académicas, deben distinguir a estos actores sociales que soportan hoy la seguridad alimentaria mundial. El hallazgo principal cual severa advertencia, es que al «desaparecer» estaríamos ante un fenómeno descomunal de inseguridad alimentaria mundial. (shrink)

This article enriches discussions about the metaphysics of normative facts with conceptual resources from social ontology that metaethics has neglected so far: the resources of Haslanger’s critical realism as social constructionism. By pointing out the viability of understanding reasons as socially constructed facts, the article shows how normative facts can be understood as features of mind-independent reality that are, however, not features of the universe independently of social practices. The move into social ontology allows us to understand normative facts as (...) mind-independent in a more substantial sense than deflationists do, by stressing individual mind-independence, while denying collective mind-independence – the subsistence independently of established human cultures. The new position can fruitfully mediate between realism, error theory and constructivism. Finally, the metaphysical nuances provided by social ontology pave the way for novel approaches to normative change and progress – thereby indicating pathways to normative theorising that many traditional metaethical positions lack. (shrink)

1966, the inaugural year of China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was also the thirtieth anniversary of Lu Xun’s death. Quotations from and praise of China’s best known and preeminent modern writer were in abundance that year and an official commemorative event, reportedly attended by more than seventy thousand people, was held in Beijing. The anniversary date presented the Maoist state with a prime opportunity for boosting the cultural and intellectual authority of their doctrinal assertions by association with Lu Xun. In (...) asking what Lu Xun was in 1966, I seek to bring to view the thingness of his afterlife (or afterlives) under CCP rule. This paper discusses how the Maoist treatment of Lu Xun turned him into a political icon, to add aesthetic value to Mao Zedong Thought. Insofar as aesthetics turns on what can be felt, heard, seen, sensed, touched, or imagined, aestheticization is generally accompanied by a certain process of reification. I thus consider the concrete instances by which people came to experience Lu Xun—such as selected quotations from Lu Xun, Chairman Mao’s formulations about Lu Xun, and images of the writer in poster art—focusing in particular on the widely publicized speeches presented at the official commemoration of his death in October 1966. Since the 1980s, these 1966 commemorations have been routinely disparaged in China as an aberration. To take the Maoist version of Lu Xun seriously as the careful construction of an aesthetic object is to do more than elucidate its ideological abuse of Lu Xun. By engaging productively with the Maoist craving for an ideal revolutionary comportment, we may yet catch a glimpse of the kind of world it took for Lu Xun to make sense as a Maoist icon. Without this Maoist intensity of feeling, there would not have been the post-Maoist preoccupation with recovering or defending, as it were, Lu Xun’s true or real form (if such a phenomenologically pure act is even possible). (shrink)

The end of the 20th century became a milestone for the progress of Neurosciences and their contribution to a better understanding of the physiological mechanisms involved in cognition, mood and human behavior. Because of this, it was possible not only to intervene some of the aforementioned aspects with therapeutic purposes, but more recently they became objects of study in researches with a more pragmatic nature, such as clinical researches involving persons with no mental or physical disorders, but who require to (...) prove remarkable abilities for executive functions, e.g., soldiers, pilots, students, among others. On the other hand, there is an ethical and scientific debate over the interest to evaluate certain psychotropic medications due to its possible sideeffects as cognitive enhancers in healthy subjects that, because of their social status, might be benefited in their social, academic or work life by developing a better mental performance. Therefore, the article aims to present from the perspective of Bioethics and Psychopharmacology some aspects of the research in Neurosciences that might throw light upon the scientific debate oriented towards the social significance of such clinical studies and their possible consequences for the future. (shrink)