We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then Cas information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. We explain (...) this intuition by making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several (generalized) iterated conditionals, which allow us to formalize different kinds of latent information. We verify that for these iterated conditionals the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of A. We also investigate the lower and upper bounds of the Affirmation of the Consequent inference. We conclude our study with some remarks on the supposed "independence" of two conditionals, and we interpret this property as uncorrelation between two random quantities. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Célèbre traducteur et commentateur de Hegel, historien de la philosophie contemporaine, passeur de textes et de concepts, professeur et directeur de travaux universitaires, Jean Hyppolite (1906 - 1968) fut un vrai " protecteur de la nouveauté " et, partant, une figure essentielle au développement de la philosophie française du XXe siècle. Ce livre rassemble, avec les contributions de certains de ses anciens élèves les plus éminents (Badiou, Balibar, Macherey) et de chercheurs étrangers, nombre de ses écrits - dont son premier (...) et son dernier essai - restés inédits ou devenus indisponibles. Un entretien de 1965 entre Jean Hyppolite et Alain Badiou complète le livre. (shrink)

Per non aver cercato nel cristianesimo il suo essere reale, ma una ristretta ideologia, si è tutto compromesso; si è imprigionato il dogma vivente nelle bende che lo fanno assomigliare a un morto, riducendo i teologi a guardiani di museo, e gli storici simili ad archeologi alla ricerca del più antico reperto. Si è condannata, così, la storia a diventare un'allegoria; e a un chiodo dipinto sul muro si appenderà sempre una catena dipinta». Siamo nel 1904, dalle parole di Maurice (...) Blondel emerge la preoccupazione per le forti tensioni che dividono il cattolicesimo. Per i più le bende della dottrina mummificata non devono essere sciolte, ma al massimo impegnarsi a ristrutturare il sepolcro. Egli cercherà una soluzione tra esegesi e teologia, per conciliare storia e dogma, che nella loro divaricazione riflettono la ricorrente tentazione di strappare il Verbo dalla carne. Dopo una severa analisi critica delle due principali teorie antagoniste, storicismo ed estrinsecismo, che in diverso modo convergono nel separare natura e soprannatura, indicherà una sintesi, una mediazione, attraverso il principio della Tradizione, proposto non come collegamento solo teorico alle radici, non «una catena dipinta», ma come fonte di progresso, pulsante vita. Il cristianesimo, allora, potrà manifestarsi «come metafisica in atto, tensione unitiva tra Dio e l'umanità, e non come religione di pergamene e scribi». Un testo che pur venendo dal passato, guadagna nel presente la sua evidente attualità. (shrink)

Este estudio analiza el problema de la relación entre metafísica e historia en la filosofía viquiana, y cómo ésta es capaz de reconducir el certum al verum. Plantea el autor cómo Vico mantiene unidos los modelos racionales, posibilitando un universalismo ético que permite conjugar la normatividad del juicio universal y la diferencia histórico-cultural de lo individual.PALABRAS CLAVE: Vico, ética, universalismo ético, identidad, diferencia, historicidad.The problematic relationship between metaphysics and history in Vichian philosophy is here analysed –and the way it transforms (...) certum into verum. The author considers Vico’s attempts to keep rational models together, allowing the appearance of an ethical universalism that combines universal judgment normativity and historical-cultural difference of the individual.Keywords: Vico, ethics, ethical universalism, identity, difference, historicity. (shrink)

" Presents a series of fifteen essays by professional philosophers that elaborate and extend Jacques Maritain's philosophy of nature"--Provided by publisher.

This dissertation examines Aquinas's teaching on the acts specific to temperance. According to a widespread interpretation of this teaching , the proper act of temperance is spontaneous, ordinate passion. Temperance thus not only causes someone to experience the right passions towards the right objects but does so antecedent to reason's command. Indeed, temperance is thought to have little if anything to do with reason's control of the passions. In an introductory chapter, I show that this understanding of temperance faces a (...) number of serious objections. In the next four chapters, I develop the thesis that the proper act of temperance is ordinate, consequent passion alone; the only relation temperance has to antecedent passion is simply to prevent it from ever being vehement, affecting only its intensity, not its ordination. ;I develop my thesis by examining Aquinas's teaching on the passions, which can only be consistently ordinate if commanded by reason ; reason's control of the passions, which can be consistent only if the sense appetite is habituated to obey reason alone, thus preventing it from being moved by any of the external or internal sense powers when they move antecedent to reason's command ; habit, which is not a principle of spontaneous action or passion, but is rather something we use only when we will . Temperance is thus a habit that gives reason nearly complete control of the passions, a moral virtue that is used only when we will and thus is exclusively a cause of ordinate, consequent passion . ;In the final chapter, observing that Aquinas is silent on the consistency with which the temperate person experiences spontaneous, ordinate passions, I attempt to fill this lacuna by developing the notions of "semi-virtue" and "semi-virtuous passion," building on Aquinas's teaching on the internal sense powers, especially the cogitative power. (shrink)

The hypothesis underlying this article is that any narrative of the emergence of modernity—as the one developed by Blumenberg, for example—that leaves behind the eschatological component is incomplete, since it removes from the tradition of modernity a great deal of the Protestant religious experience which shows deep obsession with the thought of the end of the world. Through a confrontation between Adorno and Bloch, the article argues that the notions of utopia and human liberation imply logically the idea of immortality. (...) For Adorno and Bloch the dream of immortality is the dream of matter; both of them believe that the act of human transcendence must cling on to the bodily stuff out of which we are made. Yet, whereas Bloch postulates the positive existence of a transcendent space, Adorno eschews any ontological commitment. The article argues in favour of Adorno's negative approach, showing that, after Auschwitz, what both philosophers take as the truth‐content of theology cannot be automatically transferred into dialectical materialism. (shrink)

IT IS ABOUT THE ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF NATURAL SLAVERY.

In the debate on the origin of modern natural rights, the French philosopher Michel Villey became famous for his counter current theses: that the origin of modern subjective rights was a “deformation” or “degeneration” of the ancient and medieval concept of law; that those responsible for this rupture were Ockham and his nominalist disciples, as well as the Scholastics of Salamanca; that these last ones betrayed the thought of Aquinas on the right adhering to the nominalist. These theses serve the (...) purpose of justifying Villey’s radical opposition to the subjective foundations of modern human rights. The reply of the historian of medieval law, the Englishman Brian Tierney, is that Villey’s conception of ancient and medieval law is too restricted; that already in Roman law there was a notion of subjective rights; that the origin of modern subjective rights does not depend only on Ockham’s nominalism, but was already present in the medieval canonists; that the scholastics of Salamanca did not betray the Thomist thought, but they brought it up to the challenges of the new times; and that the idea of ​​subjective natural rights does not depend on a particular ideology, but is compatible with different ideologies and worldviews. In revisiting this debate, our main interest concerns the conclusions that Villey draws from the entire long historical trajectory he has studied, and the criticism that Tierney makes of his radical opposition to human rights. Finally the debate gives rise to some more general considerations about the history of concepts and the distinction between the historical genesis of the ideas and their validity. (shrink)

Riprendendo quanto George Edward Moore scrive a proposito del concetto di “bene” (“good”), Hans Kelsen sostiene che il concetto di “dovere” (“Sollen”) sia un concetto semplice, un concetto ultimo, e in quanto tale né definibile, né analizzabile. Questa tesi di Kelsen sembra essere smentita dalle ricerche che sono state condotte parallelamente da Georg Henrik von Wright e Amedeo Giovanni Conte a partire dagli anni '80 del XX secolo. Von Wright e Conte hanno, infatti, distinto dal concetto di “dovere deontico” (“deontic (...) Ought”), il dovere par excellence, altre specie di dovere che essi considerano categorialmente irriducibili al concetto di dovere deontico come il “dovere tecnico” (“technical Ought”) e il “dovere anankastico”. È proprio all'indagine di queste due specie di dovere adeontico che è dedicato il libro Anankastico in deontica. (shrink)

Mainstream theories of decision making conceptualise uncertainty in terms of a well-defined probability distribution or weighting function. Following Knight, radical Keynesians consider subjective expected utility (SEU) theory and its variants as a restricted theory of decision-making applicable to situations of risk and, hence, of limited relevance to the understanding of crucial economic decisions under conditions of fundamental uncertainty in which probabilities are ill-defined, possibly non-existent. The objective of this paper is to outline a radical Keynesian theory of decision-making under uncertainty, (...) arguing that Keynes's suggestion to a two-dimensional probability-credence framework provides the basis for determining the limitations of mainstream approaches and points the way forward to the construction of a more general encompassing theory relevant to psychologists and economists outside of the Keynesian tradition. (shrink)