David Harvey : On peut difficilement imaginer vérification plus spectaculaire de ce que tu prédis depuis très longtemps dans tes théories que l’actuelle crise du système financier mondial. Y a-t-il des aspects de la crise qui t’ont surpris? Giovanni Arrighi : Ma prédiction était très simple. Dans The Long Twentieth Century, je qualifiais de crise annonciatrice d’un régime d’accumulation le début de la financiarisation et je faisais remarquer qu’après un certain temps – en général environ un demi-siècle – la (...) crise terminale suivait. L’hypothèse fondamentale est que toutes ces expansions financières ne pouvaient pas tenir parce qu’elles amenaient à la spéculation plus de capital qu’il n’était possible d’en gérer – en d’autres termes, ces expansions financières avaient tendance à créer des bulles de différentes sortes. Je prévoyais que cette expansion financière mènerait à une crise terminale parce que, aujourd’hui comme dans le passé, les bulles ne peuvent pas tenir. (shrink)

Relativists make room for the possibility of “faultless disagreement” by positing the existence of subjective propositions, i.e. propositions true from some points of view and not others. We discuss whether the adoption of this position with respect to a certain domain of discourse is compatible with a realist attitude towards the matters arising in that domain. At first glance, the combination of relativism and realism leads to an unattractive metaphysical picture on which reality comprises incoherent facts. We will sketch the (...) contours of a realist-relativist position called “subjectivism”, which avoids this result by giving up the assumption that the points of view of different subjects are all metaphysically “on a par”. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it’s not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to (...) avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

The field of psychiatry has long struggled with developing models of practice; most underemphasize the interpersonal aspects of clinical practice. This essay is unique in putting intersubjectivity front and centre. It is an attempt to provide a clinical method to re-establish the fragile dialogue of the soul with oneself and with others.

Negli ultimi anni di vita Giovanni Gentile aveva in progetto una Storia della Filosofia che abbracciasse tutta la materia dalle origini ai giorni nostri. La morte tragica nel 1944 non gli permise di portare a compimento l'opera, che si ferma a Platone: ritrovata tra le sue carte, è stata ricostruita e pubblicata postuma. Pur incompleta, rappresenta un'accurata panoramica del pensiero greco antico, a partire dai filosofi naturalisti fino ai presocratici e ai capisaldi Socrate e Platone, tramite una scrittura appassionata, (...) al tempo stesso accessibile e ricca di dettagli. (shrink)

Il sense comune nella storia della filosofia -- Il contenuto del senso comune in Jacques Maritain -- Maritain vs le dottrine che rifiutano il senso comune -- Senso comune e filosofia -- Appendice I. Senso comune e fede nella Rivelazione -- Appendice II. Sulla conoscenza dell'essere. L'"esistenzialismo di" J. Maritain.

Prolusione: A servizio dell'uomo, di G. Urbani.--L'uomo nella filosofia, di P. Prini.--L'uomo nella sociologia, di A. Grumelli.--L'uomo nella psicologia, di L. Ancona.--L'uomo nell'arte, di P. Bruzzichelli.--L'uomo nella teologia, di D. Grasso.--L'uomo nella Chiesa, di F. Weber.

This essay is unique in putting intersubjectivity front and center. It is an attempt to provide a clinical method to re-establish the fragile dialogue of the soul with oneself and with others. Throughout, the book builds on the assumption that to be human means to be in dialogue. It uses dialogue as a unitary concept to address three essential issues for clinical practice: 'What is a human being?', 'What is mental pathology'?, and 'What is care?'. To be human - it (...) is argued - means to be in dialogue with oneself and with other persons. Thus, mental pathology is the interruption of this dialogue - of the person with the alterity that inhabits them, and with the alterity incarnated in other persons. Therefore, therapy is a dialogue with a method whose aim is to re-enact one's interrupted dialogue with alterity. Lost in Dialogue provides a method to approximate the Other, to understand its experiences, actions, and in general, understand the world in which it lives. (shrink)

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart tried to show that ‘a variety of colour (...) sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn, two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade ‘Hume's dilemma’ about the existence and immateriality of the soul. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and psychology could be introduced by resuming freely two episodes occurred to the first two recognized exponents of the respective disciplines, Talete and Freud. The fall of Talete in the well and the astonishment of Freud in front of the picture of the Monna Lisa can symbolize the characteristic of surprise, but also of encounter-clash of the philosophy and the psychology with an unexpected reality, reassumed in both with the smile, the smile of the servant Tracia (...) and the smile of the Gioconda: two smiles that show the presence of a greater wealth of the knowledge which they inaugurated. These two smiles can highlight the tasks of instruction and criticism to which philosophy and psychology refer reciprocally: to be aware of the risk of reductivism, the conceit to enclose the complexity of man and life in a banal formula, a risk always existing and fascinating, in order to face the effort of undertaking more complex and multiple ways, open to the mystery of existence. (shrink)