With the case of Belgium as a negative example, this paper will evaluate the legitimacy of using mentally incompetents as organ sources. The first section examines the underlying moral dilemma that results from the necessity of balancing the principle of respect for persons with the obligation to help people in desperate need. We argue for the rejection of a radical utilitarian approach but also question the appropriateness of a categorical prohibition. Section two aims to strike a fair balance between the (...) competing interests at stake and to define the conditions under which organ harvest from mentally incompetents might be morally acceptable. To this end, we morally assess the main requirements that have been put forward to allow organ removal from incompetent donors. We conclude that the current Belgian legislation is far too permissive and that national regulations that do not permit the harvest of non-regenerable organs from mentally incompetents in exceptional circumstances are too restrictive. On the basis of this discussion, we propose a number of guiding principles for decision-making in this area. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to examine the paradox that while Bourdieu appears to be highly favorable to Marx, there is a radical disagreement between their two theoretical systems. In Bourdieu’s writing, comments favorable to Marx outweigh criticism by a ratio of 4,5 to 1. Marxists, in contrast, come in for ten times more criticism than support. Bourdieu’s approval of Marx in fact concerns only what are secondary aspects, while the few critiques he addresses delineate a structural opposition (...) between the two authors. Bourdieu rejects the theory of surplus value, the Marxist theory of exploitation, and the communist project. Among other things, he draws up a critique of Marx’s analyses of the State, legitimation, social classes. Explanation for the paradox is to be sought in the strategy deployed by Bourdieu in the field of the social sciences. (shrink)

This article presents a gnostic division of truth and the world, or between theory and philosophy. In the course of the article the structure of decision is articulated in both political and theoretical senses. Against the agnosticism of philosophy, always an alibi given over to the functioning of the capitalist world where life is not worth living, this article presents a gnosis that requires creating and beginning with the proletarian subject akin to the way the French Maoist group Gauche prolétarienne (...) began by taking theory into the factories in the late 1960s. (shrink)

La philosophie est-elle un savoir? Y a-t-il des vérités philosophiques? Peut-on démontrer en philosophie? Deux tentations opposées sont ici dénoncées. L'une porte à présenter la philosophie comme une sorte de science éminente et dogmatique ; l'autre à la confondre avec l'exposé poétique et passionné de quelques états d'âme. L'auteur, au contraire, essaie d'établir que la philosophie, à travers sa diversité, constitue une véritable connaissance, irréductible à celle que fournit la science et n'y suppléant en aucun cas : une connaissance capable (...) de rigueur, quoique non démonstrative, une connaissance paradoxalement sans objets. (shrink)

The author tries to specify a philosophical attitude which could be considered a form of Positivism, but this does not necessarily mean that it coincides with the doctrine of Auguste Comte or with that of the Vienna Circle.In order to facilitate the exposition the author formulates eight theses whose abrupt character is merely a consequence of the manner of presentation and by no means a manifestation of dogmatism.Eachdatum presents itself as finite experience (1) which is organized with the help ofsymbols, (...) either on the level of perception or on the level of language (2). Inside the perception itself a reduction of experience which is essentially pragmatic first constitutes thephenomena (3). Theobject which is constituted by science on the basis of the phenomena is merely structural and always delimited (4). Its constitution is unceasingly revisable and it never corresponds to an alleged essence of reality.What is here called ‘dialectic’ never consists in a set of rules governing a movement of phenomena, objects, or ideas; it is a general, historical movement of experience itself, taken as a whole, and the specific movement of the symbolic statements which inform it. One should not confuse it with a kind of general logic, nor with a so-called science of totalities (5).Logic explains the rules of the symbolic systems (6), andscience is the mediate determination of objects by means of the symbolism, and is not an immediate determination of reality (7). It constructs coherent and effective models of phenomena.As far asphilosophy is concerned, it wishes to interpret experience as a totality, not-withstanding experience's finitude as datum (8). Thus it is radically distinguished from science in that philosophy does not intend to construct models, but to explain the meanings of the phenomena and, in general, of experience. That is why the category of truth taken in a rigorous sense does not apply to philosophy's statements. (shrink)

Given a 4-tuple of Boolean variables (a, b, c, d), logical proportions are modeled by a pair of equivalences relating similarity indicators ( \({a \wedge b}\) and \({\overline{a} \wedge \overline{b}}\) ), or dissimilarity indicators ( \({a \wedge \overline{b}}\) and \({\overline{a} \wedge b}\) ) pertaining to the pair (a, b), to the ones associated with the pair (c, d). There are 120 semantically distinct logical proportions. One of them models the analogical proportion which corresponds to a statement of the form “a (...) is to b as c is to d”. The paper inventories the whole set of logical proportions by dividing it into five subfamilies according to what they express, and then identifies the proportions that satisfy noticeable properties such as full identity (the pair of equivalences defining the proportion hold as true for the 4-tuple (a, a, a, a)), symmetry (if the proportion holds for (a, b, c, d), it also holds for (c, d, a, b)), or code independency (if the proportion holds for (a, b, c, d), it also holds for their negations \({{(\overline{a},\overline{b}, \overline{c}, \overline{d})}}\) ). It appears that only four proportions (including analogical proportion) are homogeneous in the sense that they use only one type of indicator (either similarity or dissimilarity) in their definition. Due to their specific patterns, they have a particular cognitive appeal, and as such are studied in greater details. Finally, the paper provides a discussion of the other existing works on analogical proportions. (shrink)

Let X be a non-reflexive Banach space such that X ∗ is separable. Let N be the set of all equivalent norms on X , equipped with the topology of uniform convergence on bounded subsets of X . We show that the subset Z of N consisting of Fréchet-differentiable norms whose dual norm is not strictly convex reduces any difference of analytic sets. It follows that Z is exactly a difference of analytic sets when N is equipped with the standard (...) Effros–Borel structure. Our main lemma elucidates the topological structure of the norm-attaining linear forms when the norm of X is locally uniformly rotund. (shrink)

L’auteur a déjà introduit les concepts de “contenu formel” et “dualité” dans des publications antérieures, avec l’intention d’éclairer les problèmes suscités par la fécondité de la pensée formelle. Cet article a pour objectif d’établir leur relation et articulation. Le terme “dualité” est emprunté aux mathématiques. Il désigne une catégorie fondamentale de la pensée objective, dans la mesure où il est défini comme un principe de détermination réciproque pour n’importe quel système d’objets et le système d’opérations auquel il est nécessairement associé. (...) Son caractère fundamental en tant que catégorie tient essentiellement au fait d’être une condition transcendentale pour n’importe quelle espèce de pensée symbolique objective. Par le principe de dualité, on peut établir de façon générale la signification de l’opposition du contenu et de la forme, et celle de la détermination des contenus par de simples formes, indépendemment de leur origine empirique. La forme logique est alors définie comme le “degré zéro” d’une telle opposition. Des exemples de production de contenus formels dans les processus scientifiques sont examinés et considérés comme des preuves d’une dialectique interne des concepts, principalement dans le domaine des mathématiques. Dans la conclusion, nous proposons l’examen de deux questions : 1) Est-il approprié de concevoir un niveau de pensée formelle plus profond que celui de la Logique, et comment pourrions-nous y accéder? 2) Comment des contenus purement formels peuvent-ils produire des connaissances applicables au monde empirique ? Ce problème n’est qu’une nouvelle formulation de la vieille énigme de la déduction transcendentale.The author has introduced the concepts of “formal content” and “duality” in previous papers, with a view to shedding light on the problems posed by the fecundity of formal thought. The present work is an attempt to show their relationship and articulation. The term “duality” has been borrowed from mathematics. It designates a fundamental category of objective thinking, in so far as it is defined as a principle of reciprocal determination for every system of objects and the system of operations to which it is necessarily associated. The fundamental character of duality as a category essentially lies in its being a transcendental condition for every symbolic kind of objective thought. Through the principle of duality, one can give its more general meaning to the opposition of content to form, and to the determination of contents by mere forms, independent of empirical import. Logical form is then defined as the “zero degree” of such an opposition. Examples of the production of formal contents in scientific processes are examined, and considered as evidence of an internal dialectics of concepts, principally in the field of mathematics. In the conclusion, two questions are proposed: 1) Is it appropriate to conceive of a level of formal thought, deeper than the level of Logics, and how could we try to approach it? 2) How do pure formal contents come to generate knowledge applicable to the empirical world? This problem is, under new guise, the old transcendental deduction enigma. (shrink)

Neste artigo, apresentamos o intuicionismo como uma atitude epistêmica geral, caracterizada pelo rigor de suas exigências de verificação não apenas na matemática e na lógica, mas em todo conhecimento cientifico.

Une copie vénitienne d'un bilan financier, dressé par la Secrète du royaume de Chypre pour l'année 1412-1413, vient démontrer les capacités de réaction des derniers Lusignan aux crises du XIVe s. Le compte examiné, en dépit de ses nombreuses lacunes, assure que Janus, suivant l'exemple de Jacques Ier, renforce l'exploitation directe du domaine de la couronne, fiscalise les fiefs, développe les recettes extraordinaires (dîme royale, mète du sel). Ainsi, durant la seconde décennie du XVe s., le royaume franc conserve des (...) revenus importants, comparables à ceux d'autres États de l'Occident médiéval. Le règne de Janus, au moins jusqu'en 1424, ne s'identifie pas à la période de déclin trop souvent décrite. (shrink)

The slow construction of the urban civilization: the socio-historic distances in the reading of an urban form.The post-Soviet city is generally envisioned as a city in transition, on a more or less direct course towards the market city. This observation recalls the reconstitution of the residential property stock through privatizations, the redefinition of the individual in countries shaped by collectivist references, the post-national reconstitution of the economy and the political structures (Dressier, Gatti, and Perez-Agote, 1999). L. Kogan's approach suggests that (...) we need a deeper analysis in the shaping of ‘urban civilization’ and the construction of urban policies, to change the way we look at the construction of urban permanence. (shrink)

Les textes de Benny Lévy restent méconnus, car l'image que l'on a de lui fait obstacle à leur lecture. Ecartant cette image, nous nous en tiendrons à sa manière si singulière de lire les textes, quels qu'ils fussent, de leur donner vie. Qu'un texte puisse, grâce à la voix qui le porte et le déplie, grâce au travail, acharné et patient, de la lecture qui en explore les articulations les plus manifestes mais aussi les plus secrètes, parler à chacun en (...) propre, l'atteindre en son point sensible : telle est la vie dont nous parlons, plus forte que la mort qui menace tous les textes. Car la voix risque de disparaître dans l'épaisseur même des lettres ; les textes réifiés de perdre leur pouvoir de dire. Re-susciter la voix au coeur de la lettre, faire retentir son grain, son souffle, son amplitude et ses nuances : telle doit être l'ambition d'une véritable lecture. Pour Benny Lévy, la pensée fut indissociable d'un tel travail de lecture, l'amenant à reprendre à neuf les textes, à en renouveler la compréhension. Cette puissance de lecture produisit dans son geste de pensée cinq exigences qui guideront notre réflexion : réformer la pensée, sortir du politique, penser l'universel autrement, faire retour au Nom, produire, enfin, des événements de lecture. (shrink)

L’idéalisme de Hegel doit-il être un objet d’investigation? On pourrait objecter que, comme toutes les étiquettes, celle d’idéalisme prête davantage à confusion qu’elle n’est éclairante. Car, en imposant des rapprochements superficiels avec d’autres auteurs pareillement qualifiés d’idéalistes (Platon, Berkeley, Fichte…), elle masquerait l’originalité du questionnement et du mode de penser propres à Hegel. On pourrait également rappeler l’allergie de Hegel aux attributs fixes et aux classific...

Understanding the role of simulation in conceptualization has become a priority for cognitive science. Barsalou makes a valuable contribution in that direction. The present commentary points to theoretical issues that need to be refined and elaborated in order to account for key aspects of meaning construction, such as negation, counterfactuals, quantification or analogy. Backstage cognition, with its elaborate bindings, blendings, and mappings, is more complex than Barsalou's discussion might suggest. Language does not directly carry meaning, but rather serves, along with (...) countless other situational elements, as a powerful instrument for prompting its construction. (shrink)

Bergson’s philosophy marked a turning point in Western understanding of time by differentiating quantitative time—apprehended by intelligence—from qualitative time—duration, embedded in consciousne...

In this supplement to a work co-authored with André Cresson, David Hume, sa vie, son œuvre, left untranslated until now, Deleuze lays the groundwork for what he will later develop as an “ethics without morality.” Contrary to morality, ethics engenders its general rule for action out of the immanence that grants it the power to affect and to be affected, that is, to increase or decrease its capacity to compose new empowering relations between beings, and between beings and the world. (...) The power to act is synonymous with the capacity to imaginatively create relations, in order to exist. In this way, the imagination reveals its ontological significance. Here we discern Deleuze’s Humean impulse encountering a fundamental Nietzscheanism. The translator’s introduction attempts to make explicit his specific philosophical motive, at this point only formative but, eventually, foundational for his later thought. (shrink)

In the field of cultural evolution it is generally assumed that the study of culture and cultural change would benefit enormously from being informed by evolutionary thinking. Recently, however, there has been much debate about what this “being informed” means. According to the standard view, an interesting analogy obtains between cultural and biological evolution. In the literature, however, the analogy is interpreted and used in at least three distinct, but interrelated ways. We provide a taxonomy in order to clarify these (...) different meanings. Subsequently, we discuss the alternatives model of cultural attraction theory and memetics, which both challenge basic assumptions of the standard view. Finally, we briefly summarize the contributions to the special issue on Darwin in the Humanities and the Social Sciences, which is the result of a collaborative project between scholars and scientists from the universities of Lille and Ghent. Furthermore, we explain how they add to the discussions about the integration of evolutionary thinking and the study of culture. (shrink)

L’objectif de l’article est de proposer une théorie de l’engagement psychologique dans le langage. C’est-à-dire de présenter une vue systématique de l’implication de la psyché des sujets parlants dans leur accomplissement d’actes de langage ou encore de ce à quoi ils sont assujettis sur le plan psychologique quand ils parlent. Cette théorie a la forme d’une série de thèses chacune relative à un trait spécifique de la performance langagière. Prenant appui sur la philosophie du langage de John Searle et Daniel (...) Vanderveken, elle est élaborée à partir d’une notion originale d’engagement à avoir des états mentaux.The aim of this article is to propose a theory of the psychological commitment in the language. In other words, it is to present a systematic view of how the mental states of the speakers are present in their performance of speech acts, of what are the psychological states to the possession of which the speakers are committed when they speak. This theory is based on several thesis, each of which is about a specific aspect of the performance of speech acts. It is proposed in the perspective of the philosophy of language of John Searle and Daniel Vanderveken on the basis of an original concept of commitment to have mental states. (shrink)

Après " le Temps et sa Flèche ", la deuxième rencontre " Physique et Interrogations Fondamentales ", dont le présent ouvrage rassemble les actes, était consacrée à une question, certes ancienne, mais que les développements des techniques de l'information posent avec une brûlante actualité, celle des rapports du virtuel et du réel. Les textes ici rassemblés témoignent du remarquable effort de clarté et d'accessibilité consenti par les auteurs. Par son existence même, ce livre met en évidence le fil conducteur qui (...) a traversé tous les débats de la rencontre, à savoir le puissant rôle heuristique du virtuel : Ce qu'il faut, c'est voir. Et voir c'est chercher à voir, derrière toutes les images, toutes les représentations, derrière toutes les visions, ce qui ne se laisse pas voir, mais qui se laisse chercher. ". (shrink)

Il n’est pas toujours évident de rappeler aujourd’hui que l’économie politique contemporaine est née d’une fusion, et non seulement d’évictions successives, entre le formalisme moderne, des conceptions non formalisées – et peut-être dûment impossibles à formaliser – mais rationnelles, et des intuitions dont le statut philosophique a été – et demeure – l’une des grandes questions traitées en théorie de la connaissance, telle que l’a en particulier illustrée la tradition allemande depuis Kant jusqu’à nous. Une des tentatives majeures pour donner (...) un statut à l’Anschauung dans la théorie économique a été conduite en Allemagne, puis en Suisse, par Edgar Salin (1892-1974) dont l’œuvre, fut inspirée par l’atmosphère régnant dans le cercle réuni autour du poète Stefan George dans l’Entre-deux guerres. Elle se présenta comme une conception alternative à celles de Popper et de Weber, tant quant à l’usage possible de l’intuition en regard du cadre de la rationalité scientifique qu’eu égard à l’architectonique et aux visées de l’économie politique. La présente étude restitue, d’une part, une brève généalogie du concept philosophique d’intuition et, d’autre part, constitue un des rares exposés en français de la doctrine développée par Salin, une pensée que le travail mené par les auteurs les a conduits à revaloriser dans l’optique d’épistémologie comparative qu’ils ont ici adoptée. (shrink)

Volume 45, Issue 3, August 2024, Page 378-380.

Pourquoi, alors qu'abondent sites de rencontre.

We investigate how a group of players might cooperate with each other within the setting of a non-cooperative game. We pursue two notions of partial cooperative equilibria that follow a modification of Nash’s best response rationality rather than a core-like approach. Partial cooperative Nash equilibrium treats non-cooperative players and the coalition of cooperators symmetrically, while the notion of partial cooperative leadership equilibrium assumes that the group of cooperators has a first-mover advantage. We prove existence theorems for both types of equilibria. (...) We look at three well-known applications under partial cooperation. In a game of voluntary provision of a public good we show that our two new equilibrium notions of partial cooperation coincide. In a modified Cournot oligopoly, we identify multiple equilibria of each type and show that a non-cooperator may have a higher payoff than a cooperator. In contrast, under partial cooperation in a symmetric Salop City game, a cooperator enjoys a higher return. (shrink)