Zarathustra initially describes churches as the stale caves of world-denying priests. However, following his encounter with the eternal return of the same, Zarathustra overcomes this resentful atheism. The pure sky that Zarathustra desires above all else, a sky emptied of the gods, is not visible again through the holes in ruined church roofs, but really thanks to these holes. The pure sky is an image of the world liberated from the teleological time of theistic providence, indeed even from the divine (...) necessity that pantheism attributes to the world. Yet for all that it is god-less, the pure sky is acknowledged to be a gift of the same metaphysical-Christian history of God that it only seems to negate: the sky’s pure eye peers through holes in church roofs. Zarathustra, though an “old atheist,” can now love “even churches.” I call this Zarathustra’s affirmative atheism. I also link affirmative atheism to the conception of eternal recurrence as a self-abolishing anti-teaching. In the eternal return, Zarathustra’s atheism is finally indistinguishable from a history of churches and therefore negates itself. But although it is not a new teaching, affirmative atheism points to something novel. This is an atheism that can no longer be taught in doctrines but must be lived as fate. (shrink)

In Heidegger’s lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology, finitude, not the infinite, is shown to be the site of ‘divine’ awareness of being. Heidegger uses the term ‘abandonment’ (Verlassenheit) to summarise the finitude that Hegel overlooked – abandonment being a theme that Heidegger had first developed in Sein und Zeit as Überlassenheit or ‘delivered over’. However, while abandonment counters the Hegelian absolute, where nothing is ever left out, it does not escape it, since the distress of finitude then becomes what is essential (...) or timeless. This realisation comes to Heidegger later, during his lectures on Nietzsche, where the notion of the abandonment of beings by Being (Seinsverlassenheit) conveys that, from the standpoint of Being, finitude is what is positively given in time rather than an essence that is recovered with the demise of the infinite. The ‘death of God’, in other words, thought from the side of Being rather than beings, is what first lets finitude be. Finally, I suggest that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which also exhibits affirmative rather than resentful atheism, develops the theme of abandonment in a very different register from Heidegger – as the end of every telos or work. Heidegger’s thought of abandonment, by contrast, remains tied to a task. (shrink)

Nihilism, for Nietzsche, is the nothing that results from the devaluation of the highest values. There is widespread agreement with Nietzsche’s claim that the apostle Paul was the great devaluer of the values of the ancient world, even to the extent of breaking the history of the world in two. Yet the mode of Paul’s devaluating nihilism is contested. Using Nietzsche’s three types of nihilist, I frame this debate over Paul as giving us, respectively, Paul the reactive nihilist (Nietzsche), Paul (...) the active nihilist (Taubes) and Paul the overman (Badiou). I then read Agamben’s messianic Paul as a way to avoid the problem of nihilism tout court, which the two earlier accounts, despite releasing Paul from Nietzsche’s charge of passive nihilism, do not. I finish by arguing that while Agamben’s construction of the Pauline messianic vocation does indeed break with Nietzsche’s categories of nihilism, nihilism remains necessary to a genealogy of both Paul’s and Agamben’s messianism. (shrink)

Calls to ?build civil society?, ?create active citizenship?, ?empower communities?, or ?widen political participation? are growing by the day. They are heard in academia, the private sector, among NGOs and increasingly in government. In short, the rhetoric of self?government, that ideal dear to republicans, is back on the political agenda. This time, however, it is increasingly tied to the category of civil society. Yet can the programme of ?more power to civil society? really achieve democratic autonomy in the way that (...) many neo?republicans want it to? This article pursues this question, first, by reconstructing an ideal?type model of republican civil society from the writings of Hannah Arendt and Vaclav Havel ? two influential theorists of self?organisation in civil society. Second, it asks, sceptically, where such a civil society will come from, whether it can be fully reconciled with modernity and how ? if at all ? it can meet the charge of voluntarism. These critical interrogations are followed by a further three, focusing on the problematic absence of the market in the republican account of civil society, its under?theorised ? even Utopian ? notion of power and, finally, its likely complicity in the ongoing exclusion of women from the public sphere. The article concludes by calling for a more ambitious, wide?ranging vision of republican autonomy than the narrow emphasis on civil society will allow. (shrink)

The question of nihilism is always a question of truth. It is a crisis of truth that causes the experience of the nothingness of existence. What elevated truth to this existential position? The answer is: philosophy. The philosophical will to truth opens the door to nihilism, since it both makes identifying truth the utmost aim and yet continually calls it into question. Baker develops the central insight that the crises of truth and of existence, or 'loss of world', that occur (...) within nihilistic thought are inseparable, in a wide-ranging study from antiquity to the present, from ancient Cynics, St Paul, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Agamben, and Badiou. Baker contends that since nihilism is always a question of the relation to the world occasioned by the philosophical will to truth, an answer to nihilism must be able to propose a new understanding of truth. (shrink)

The ethics of hospitality – the welcome of the foreigner – is implied in all moral debate in international relations ranging from questions of asylum to those of humanitarian intervention. Why then has there been so little reflection on hospitality in the study of international relations to date? Seeking to correct this striking omission, and making an important and original contribution to debates about ethics in international relations in the process, Baker outlines a theory of cosmopolitanism as hospitality which goes (...) beyond existing cosmopolitanisms. He argues that we must understand cosmopolitanism not as the pursuit of a world in which there are no more foreigners but as the welcome of the foreigner. However, though hospitality calls for a welcome, there is always a decision on the welcome to be made. Cosmopolitanism as hospitality is therefore always as much a politics as it is an ethics. Addressing issues of central concern for those who seek to understand our obligations to strangers, this book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, security studies, ethics, and political and international theory. (shrink)

Underlying Giorgio Agamben’s and Alain Badiou’s disagreement over the apostle Paul we find common cause: following Paul’s deactivation of law, both Agamben and Badiou see the fixed identities necessary to the naturalised nomos of State politics as transfigured by a politics of grace. This transfiguration is differently rendered as either the emergence of a universal subject (Badiou) or the opening up of existing subjectivities (Agamben), but both the messianic vocation in Agamben and the universal subject in Badiou allow subjective possibility (...) to that which is not in the present objectified order. Developing this theme of a basic emancipatory affinity, two moments of the political which exist in a difficult but necessary tension are identified: revolution and dissent. While revolution signals subjective possibility itself by determining that the truth of the event is for all, dissidence keeps that possibility alive by pointing to the human subject’s fundamental indeterminacy. (shrink)