Class, race and gender are three of the most salient factors in society. They determine to an important extent the opportunities we have, e.g. to access public.

Although there is already an important discussion regarding social ontology (a first-order investigation about social entities, e.g., social objects, social events, social relations, and social categories), not much attention has been paid to social meta-ontology (a second-order inquiry concerning what it means and how to answer whether there are any such entities). With the intention to contribute towards bringing the latter into the philosophical spotlight, I submit here a brief survey of the meta-ontological issues about two specific kinds of social (...) entities, viz., social and institutional practices. After elaborating on Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology, I argue that it can be extended to account for the existence of those social entities. (shrink)

Proxy agency is the capacity of individuals and groups to act for other individuals or groups in specific social transactions. For example, a legal team acts as a proxy for a client in a courtroom, or the Prime Minister acts as a proxy for the UK Government when attending international meetings, etc. Although a very common social phenomenon, it has not yet received enough philosophical treatment. Currently, the most developed account of this capacity is Ludwig’s proxy agency in collective action. (...) Yet, his account relies on a deflationary, we-content approach to collective intentionality (á la Bratman). In this chapter, I argue that this approach is far too weak to explain proxy agency in institutional contexts—where the individuals and groups formally authorised to perform rule-guided group activities for the principal hold a strong, non-conditional we-commitment. In order to elucidate this feature, I provide an account of proxy agency based on a more robust, we-mode approach to collective intentionality (á la Tuomela). I suggest with this that, for institutional proxy agency to operate as expected, there must be appropriate conditions of sociality in place—which ultimately coheres with the larger project developed by Tuomela on social ontology. (shrink)

Raimo Tuomela, late Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Philosophy of Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, is widely regarded as one of the most important philosophers of our time. He published extensively on various topics within social philosophy; particularly, on social action, cooperation, group belief, group responsibility, group reasoning, social practices, and institutions. To celebrate his legacy, this volume engages with and delves deeply into his philosophy of sociality. By gathering original essays from a world-class line-up of social ontologists, (...) social action theorists, and social philosophers, this collection provides the first comprehensive and critical treatment of Tuomela's outstanding contribution to social ontology and collective intentionality. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to legal ontology, Kenneth Ehrenberg identifies a puzzle concerning _the basic validity rule_ of legal systems: If formal institutions require a codified foundational constitutive rule, then legal systems cannot be formal institutions, since their foundational constitutive rule is necessarily an uncodified basic validity rule. To solve this puzzle, Ehrenberg suggests taking this rule as ‘a foundational and self-identifying institutional fact’. Here, I challenge his solution and the very existence of this puzzle. By arguing, contra Ehrenberg, that (...) the basic validity rule is not the foundational constitutive rule of a legal system, but only the foundational constitutive rule of legal validity; that its codification in fact contributes towards the institutionalisation of a legal system; and that the true foundational constitutive rule of a legal system is the formal group structure of the higher-constitutional organisations, I submit an alternative account of the institutional nature of legal systems. (shrink)

Following Tuomela, I argue that institutions consist in institutional activities conducive to the realisation (or “satisfaction”) of institutional activity types. Since this realisation is carried out by institutional groups, our having an answer to 'what are institutional groups?' is a necessary step towards a better understanding of what institutions are and how we create them. In this chapter, I offer an answer to this question.

Contra recent, inflationary views, the paper submits a deflationary approach to legal ontology. It argues, in particular, that to answer ontological questions about legal entities, we only need conceptual analysis and empirical investigation. In developing this proposal, it follows Amie Thomasson’s ‘easy ontology’ and her strategy for answering whether ordinary objects exist. The purpose of this is to advance a theory that, on the one hand, does not fall prey to sceptical views about legal reality (viz., that ontological truths about (...) legal entities are established by metaphysical principles); and, on the other, is compatible with common-sense jurisprudence (viz., that there in fact exist legal entities, and they all have important practical implications). While this methodology is common to legal philosophers interested in elucidating the ‘artifactual nature’ of law, the paper departs from their projects by taking a step forward in connecting this deflationary approach to legal ontology with an expressivist account of legal discourse, thus providing enough resources to satisfy the general ambition of jurisprudence, viz., to establish the conditions for the analysis of legal reality and its normative character. (shrink)

We live in an institutional world, where our identity is significantly shaped by our membership in institutional groups (from sports clubs and condo boards to state and international organisations). As such, then, understanding what those groups are and how they affect our reality through their actions is imperative. To that end, some philosophers have taken on the task of elucidating ‘institutional agency' (the capacity of institutional groups to act). Most recently, for example, Michael Bratman has introduced a theory of institutional (...) agency, according to which an institutional group can act if the relevant participants act on an institutional intention (viz., a decision output that satisfies certain rationality constraints). Crucially, he develops this approach on the assumption that ‘planning agency' is the core capacity involved across various forms of human practical organization: individual, social, and institutional. However, this paper shows that while true that planning agency may be a basic element of individual and shared intentionality, it is not so relevant for institutional intentionality. In fact, contra Bratman’s intuitions, it argues that institutional agency is constructed out-of-group attitudes and actions, for which group agency, but not planning agency, is the core capacity. (shrink)

Amie L. Thomasson, the Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College, has gained international recognition as a leading figure within various areas of philosophy. She has recently been celebrated as one of the most influential living philosophers for her significant contributions to metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, and aesthetics. By engaging critically with her approach to metaphysics, modality, conceptual analysis, and the methodological issues concerning ontological questions about ordinary objects, social entities, and fictional characters, as well as (...) including a chapter from Thomasson herself where she makes explicit the internal connections which run through her body of work, this volume delivers the first thorough discussion of Thomasson’s philosophy. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In recent years, some prominent legal philosophers have argued both that law (as a legal system) is a certain kind of abstract artifact and that we can elucidate its nature by elucidating its artifactual properties (e.g., authorship, functionality, etc). In this chapter, I present an objection to their arguments and show that law is not an abstract artifact, but rather a composite, concrete entity. I do so by arguing that law is an institutional practice, the purpose of which is for (...) legal organisations to produce legal artifacts (e.g., laws, legal judgements, international treaties, etc) through the performance of legal activities. Based on this, I next provide an ontological analysis of these artifacts by elaborating on the conditions for their creation and maintenance. By distinguishing law as an institutional practice from legal artifacts as institutional objects created by legal organisations, I intend to advance a more precise ontological account of legal phenomena. (shrink)

This volume contains the proceedings of the Social Ontology, Normativity, and Philosophy of Law conference, which took place on May 30–31, 2019 at the University of Glasgow. At the invitation of the Social Ontology Research Group, a panel of prominent scholars shed light on a range of key topics within social ontology, normativity, and philosophy of law from an interdisciplinary perspective.

Amie L. Thomasson, currently appointed Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College and celebrated as one of the most influential living philosophers, has gained international recognition as a leading figure in metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, and aesthetics. Although her extensive body of work stretches far beyond the topic of this book, it is fair to say that her most notable contributions as well as controversial theses lie in her deflationary approach to ontology, which is why it (...) is the selected theme of this volume. (shrink)

What grounds the capacity of human agents to engage in individual, temporally extended activity (e.g. a philosopher writing a book), small-scale social interact.

How do we build up our institutional reality? What do we need in order to construct such things as universities, law firms, banks, retail stores, factories, leg.

What is a thing? What is an object? Tristan Garcia decisively overturns 100 years of Heideggerian orthodoxy about the supposedly derivative nature of objects to put forward a new theory of ontology that gives us deep insights into the world and our place in it."e.

Online Public Shaming is a form of norm enforcement that involves collectively imposing reputational costs on a person for having a certain kind of moral character. OPS actions aim to disqualify her from public discussion and certain normal human relations. We argue that this constitutes an informal collective punishment that it is presumptively wrong to impose on others. OPS functions as a form of ostracism that fails to show equal basic respect to its targets. Additionally, in seeking to mobilise unconstrained (...) collective power with potentially serious punitive consequences, OPS is incompatible with due process values. (shrink)

Truthlikeness is a property of a theory or a proposition that represents its closeness to the truth. According to Niiniluoto, truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws can be defined by the Minkowski metric. I present some counterexamples to the definition and argue that it fails because it considers truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws to be just a function of accuracy, but an accurate law can be wrong about the actual ‘structure’ or ‘behaviour’ of the system it intends to describe. I develop (...) a modification of Niiniluoto’s proposal that defines truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws according to two parameters: accuracy and nomicity. The presented proposal solves the counterexamples and defines a new way of understanding scientific progress. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of _immunity to error through misidentification_ (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, _episodic_ memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has (...) produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions. (shrink)

En principio, la poesía considerada como génesis del arte árabe, y, más tarde, la prosa de adab surgieron con la idea de ciencia que destacaba el dominio de la belleza, idea que se proyectaría después sobre la música. Por otra parte, la aportación griega al legado filosófico y científico árabe clásico, cuya sombra aparece reflejada sobre los primeros tratados de los filósofos y teóricos musicales, entre los que se encuentran al-Kindi (s. IX)y al-Farabi (s. X), germinó en la concepción de (...) un nuevo sentido sobre la "belleza". De esta forma, y desde un observatorio que tiene como punto de referencia el mundo clásico griego, los nuevos parámetros surgirían como consecuencia de su propia identidad e idiosincrasia, en los que el patrimonio poético y musical, unido al pensamiento religioso y filosófico, complementarían la taracea de un nuevo concepto, "estética musical". El estudio de la música medieval árabe revela que la armonía entre el contenido poético, lingüístico, rítmico y melódico caminaron en paralelo, produciéndose un equilibrio, una relación armónica, y, en definitiva cósmica que les llevó a acuñar un cierto ideal estético basado en la belleza y la emoción artística que despertaba como reflejo de una armonía entre cuerpo y alma, y que facilitaría la unión con lo infinito y la divinidad. (shrink)

Review of: José Ferreirós. 2016. Mathematical knowledge and the interplay of practices. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

La différence entre les êtres humains et les autres espèces n'est-elle vraiment qu'une différence de complexité? Ne ressemble-t-elle pas plutôt à ce que l'on nomme en linguistique une nuance? Car un terme proche d'un autre ne signifie pourtant pas la même chose que lui de manière plus complexe. Il suggère tout autre chose malgré des points de recoupement. Il convient de le démontrer en dénonçant une représentation trop caricaturale de l'être humain.

This is a review of Emma Borg's Pursuing Meaning.

This article critically examines the domination exerted by big digital companies on the current social, economic, and political context of modern societies, with a particular focus on the implications for the proper functioning of democracy. The objective of this article is to introduce and develop the concept of datafeudalism, expose its emergence for the proper functioning of modern societies and democracy, and to propose courses of action to reverse this situation. To achieve this purpose, firstly, the evolution from surveillance capitalism (...) to datafeudalism will be discussed. Secondly, the structures and operating logic of data feudalism will be analyzed. Thirdly, the harmful impacts of datafeudalism on the proper functioning of the democratic systems of the European Union will be examined. Finally, an attempt will be made to outline courses of action that will make it possible to reverse the situation of economic, social and political tyranny exercised by big digital companies through datafeudalism. (shrink)

From the thought of mid-twentieth century Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla, I develop an account of what I call ‘ethics of ethnic identity,’ which include: a) a set of norms of agency grounded in ethnic identity, or ethnic norms of agency—reasons for action and obligations that spring from a given ethnic identity, and b) a type of normativity governing these ethnic norms of agency. I argue that one of the theoretical advantages of this account is that it fares well with respect (...) to human flourishing, moral obligations, and freedom and autonomy. I also develop an account of ethics of ethnic identity from Christine Korsgaard’s account of the sources of normativity and use it as a sophisticated foil against which my elaborations of Portilla’s views can be fruitfully contrasted. (shrink)

The Second Sex can be read as a compelling philosophical exploration of masculinity. Beauvoir proposes to understand masculinity as a situation. It is an impasse as men are stuck in a position where they seek recognition from women, but they construct women in such a way that the recognition women can give them is incomplete and unsatisfying. This understanding of masculinity is crucial for Beauvoir’s emancipatory agenda and suggests that men have nonaltruistic reasons to take part in feminist movements.

Social network sites are a new communication channel to convey CSR information. They are interactive channels that let users participate, spread content and generate positive and negative electronic word-of-mouth about companies that can dramatically affect their reputation and future business. To identify the factors behind this behaviour, we designed a causal model to explain the intention to both comment on and share a negative corporate social responsibility news posted on Facebook. We included the following as explanatory variables: social consciousness, environmental (...) consciousness, information usefulness, corporate image and attitude towards sharing and commenting on CSR news. We surveyed 208 Facebook users who evaluated a fictitious news item about an environmental issue. We observed that social and environmental consciousness influences the usefulness of information and the attitude towards behaviour, which may explain the eWOM intention of the specific news. However, corporate image can cause people to refrain from generating eWOM and spreading the news on their friend social network. (shrink)

En este libro se recopilan escritos producidos por el profesor García Amado durante los últimos años. La temática es muy variada: teoría de la argumentación jurídica y de la decisión judicial, interpretación del Derecho, crítica del neoconstitucionalismo y examen de sus raíces doctrinales, debates a propósito de Kelsen y el positivismo, puesta en cuestión de la enseñanza del Derecho y de sus reformas actuales, reflexiones sobre tendencias del Derecho penal contemporáneo, balance de algunos autores y temas de la filosofía política (...) de nuestro tiempo, Derecho y cine, etc. Todo ello con el estilo habitual del autor polémico, provocativo y con cierta ironía e irreverancia. (shrink)