By examining how particular ecologies of fashion are connected to the formation of gender, class, and generational identities, this series establishes a new methodology for recording and understanding identity and its connection to style.

Although the topic of emotions was long ignored in British and American analytic philosophy and psychology, it remained a rich and exciting subject in Continental Philosophy. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche celebrated the passionate life. In phenomenology Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, and Paul Ricoeur all made major contributions. Heidegger pursued a highly original thesis concerning the vital role of moods in human life, notably angst and boredom. Jean‐Paul Sartre added the tantalizing thesis that (...) our emotions are strategies to help us cope with the difficulties in life. Max Scheler gave us the stunning expression, “the emotional a priori,” the idea that emotions are basic structures of human existence. In this essay, I want to expand on the contributions of the classic phenomenologists and existentialists and do more of what they were doing by way of an “original” project of phenomenological investigation. (This follows publication of the first two volumes of a three‐part study of the emotions, Not Passion's Slave and In Defense of Sentimentality, both published by Oxford University Press.). (shrink)

Existentialism, 2/e, offers an exceptional and accessible introduction to the richness and diversity of existentialist thought. Retaining the focus of the highly successful first edition, the second edition provides extensive material on the "big four" existentialists--Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre--while also including selections from twenty-four other authors. Giving readers a sense of the variety of existentialist thought around the world, this edition also adds new readings by such figures as Luis Borges, Viktor Frankl, Gabriel Garcia M'arquez, Keiji Nishitani, and (...) Rainer Maria Rilke. Existentialism, 2/e, also features: * New translations of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Buber * More extensive selections from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre * New selections by Hazel E. Barnes, Miguel de Unamuno, Joseph Heller, Philip Roth, and Colin Wilson * The Grand Inquisitor (from Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov) Ideal for undergraduate courses in existentialism and Continental philosophy, Existentialism, 2/e, is fascinating reading for anyone interested in the subject. (shrink)

Although the topic of emotions was long ignored in British and American analytic philosophy and psychology, it remained a rich and exciting subject in Continental Philosophy. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche celebrated the passionate life. In phenomenology Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, and Paul Ricoeur all made major contributions. Heidegger pursued a highly original thesis concerning the vital role of moods in human life, notably angst and boredom. Jean‐Paul Sartre added the tantalizing thesis that (...) our emotions are strategies to help us cope with the difficulties in life. Max Scheler gave us the stunning expression, “the emotional a priori,” the idea that emotions are basic structures of human existence. In this essay, I want to expand on the contributions of the classic phenomenologists and existentialists and do more of what they were doing by way of an “original” project of phenomenological investigation. (This follows publication of the first two volumes of a three‐part study of the emotions, Not Passion's Slave and In Defense of Sentimentality, both published by Oxford University Press.). (shrink)

This paper brings Gabriel Marcel and Emmanuel Levinas into dialogue through a consideration of the notion of the spirit of abstraction in Marcel and the notion of the infinitely different other in Levinas. We abstract meaning from Mona Lisa‘s smile from her physical portrait. It is appropriate to abstract from the baby‘s sound whether he or she seems to be happy or sad, but it is when we begin to abstract humans from their humanity that the spirit of abstraction (...) is engaged. My thesis is that the spirit of abstraction is a form of cognitively dislocated reason. This cognitive dislocation begins with the idea that people can be abstracted into characteristics and traits and that these traits can be assigned arbitrary superiority or inferiority e.g., big nosed people have superior intellects; small nosed people do not. Marcel suggests that the spirit of abstraction can turn persons into impersonal targets that are accorded fewer or reduced rights as if they were other than other human. The result can be that inferior persons are accorded one set of rights and superior persons are accorded another set of rights. A most drastic form of the spirit of abstraction occurred during the Holocaust, when the Nazis dehumanized the Jews. Drawing on the work of Robert Solomon, I suggest that if we begin to understand that reason and passion are interchangeable, we can stand back to reconsider attitudes that produce arbitrary abstractions. The spirit of abstraction is cognitively dissociated reason because it redirects someone from the self-evident notion that this other is human, to this other is other-than-human, and even less-than-human because of some arbitrary condition, e.g., being small nosed.ion is a necessary intellectual exercise to achieve what one intends—differentiating an edible mushroom from one that is poisonous by its color. The spirit of abstraction, on the other hand, is cognitively dislocated reason because it is a form of expediency that pre-categorizes persons without considering the individual who, for example, stands before me. What Marcel and Levinas ultimately ask us to do is to recognize this cognitively dislocated reason and turn the discourse from abstracting humans into categories deserving of different human rights toward a conversation that asks which human rights should apply to all humans. (shrink)

This article highlights the tension of sustaining tradition versus the need for change within theological education. Within denominations, there is the challenge of maintaining tradition while at the same time wanting to embrace change. If this is not managed properly, the tradition can become out of date when there is a focus on controlling through enforcing tradition and through indoctrination in education. This article presents the Church of the Nazarene, as a case study, where their theological education is tested against (...) an organic and indigenous framework highlighting the need for a contextual driven curriculum. There are various aspects within the tradition that are slow to adapt, where aspects of Western church polity and practices linger on thereby negatively impact the curriculum. However, if a contextual learning programme does not materialise students’ knowledge from the classroom will not match what they need to know once they reach the ministerial setting. This article examines pastoral training in the Church of Nazarene’s southern African region to emphasise the dichotomy between preserving tradition and the need to innovate in order to ensure its long-term viability.Contribution: This article reflects on the important balance of sustainability in a global church tradition, and it serves as a case study of issues commonly found in many denominations. It is about holding on to the core teachings that has stood the test of time but having the ability to be adaptative to the contextual needs of a region. Reasons are provided for the slow pace in change and ways to overcome this. This article contributes to the literature on the Church of Nazarene. (shrink)

This contribution provides clues as to why reconciliation in South Africa fits the broad definition of a wicked problem. Popularized by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, wicked problem refers to something that is either too difficult or nearly impossible to resolve. It is abundantly clear from the available literature that reconciliation is understood in very different ways. Not only is there a lack of conceptual clarity, but strategies aimed at working towards this ideal reveal or produce new problems as an (...) unintended consequence. Some strategies approach the discourse for the purpose of political expediency, while others are more interested in its theological properties. This tension is referenced as the dominant split between heaven and earth. Notwithstanding the complexity of the problem, this contribution alludes to the limitations of such approaches if those who propagate them insist that such views remain mutually exclusive. Building on the theology of Allan Aubrey Boesak and Curtiss Paul DeYoung, this contribution is an attempt to avoid the polarization of such views and highlight the fundamental asymmetry between divine and human action. This is underscored by the work of Christ through which God reconciled the world to himself and the ministry of reconciliation in society. In taking this approach, one avoids the tendency to provide superficial answers to a complex problem. (shrink)

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

I make a contribution to the sociology of epistemologies by examining the neuroscience literature on love from 2000 to 2016. I find that researchers make consequential assumptions concerning the production or generation of love, its temporality, its individual character, and appropriate control conditions. Next, I consider how to account for these assumptions’ being common in the literature. More generally, I’m interested in the ways in which epistemic communities construe, conceive of, and publicly represent and work with their objects of inquiry—and (...) what’s thereby assumed about them and about the world. I argue that these implicit or explicit assumptions are a distinct type of explanandum, whose distinctiveness sociology hasn’t adequately appreciated and taken advantage of. I think it should and I hope it will. (shrink)

The so-called Trolley Problem was first discussed by Philippa Foot in 1967 as a way to test moral intuitions regarding the doctrine of double effect, Kantian principles and utilitarianism. Ever since, a great number of philosophers and psychologists have come up with alternative scenarios to further test intuitions and the relevance of conventional moral doctrines. Given that physicians routinely face moral decisions regarding life and death, the Trolley Problem should be considered of great importance in medical ethics. In this article, (...) five “classic” trolley scenarios are discussed: the driver diverting the trolley, a bystander pulling a lever to divert the trolley, a fat man being thrown from a bridge to stop the trolley, a bystander pulling a lever to divert a trolley so that a fat man may be run over, and a bystander pulling a lever so that a fat man falls off from a bridge to stop the trolley. As these scenarios are discussed, relevant moral differences amongst them are addressed, and some of the applications in medical ethics are discussed. The article concludes that Trolley scenarios are not the ultimate criterion to make ethical decisions in difficult ethical challenges in medicine cases but they do serve as an initial intuitive guide. (shrink)

The Ultrapower Axiom is an abstract combinatorial principle inspired by the fine structure of canonical inner models of large cardinal axioms. In this paper, it is established that the Ultrapower A...

v. 1. Reflection & mystery -- v. 2. Faith & reality.

When viewed as the most comprehensive theory of collections, set theory leaves no room for classes. But the vocabulary of classes, it is argued, provides us with compact and, sometimes, irreplaceable formulations of largecardinal hypotheses that are prominent in much very important and very interesting work in set theory. Fortunately, George Boolos has persuasively argued that plural quantification over the universe of all sets need not commit us to classes. This paper suggests that we retain the vocabulary of classes, but (...) explain that what appears to be singular reference to classes is, in fact, covert plural reference to sets. (shrink)

Given the nature of the discipline, it might be assumed that clinical psychology is an ethical profession, within which effective ethical decision-making is integral. How then, does this ethical decision-making occur? This paper describes a systematic review of empirical research addressing this question. The paucity of evidence related to this question meant that the scope was broadened to include other professions who deliver talking therapies. This review could support reflective practice about what may be taken into account when making ethical (...) decisions and highlight areas for future research. Using academic search databases, original research articles were identified from peer-reviewed journals. Articles using qualitative ( n = 3), quantitative ( n = 8) and mixed methods ( n = 2) were included. Two theoretical models of aspects of ethical decision-making were identified. Areas of agreement and debate are described in relation to factors linked to the professional, which impacted ethical decision-making. Factors relating to ethical dilemmas, which impacted ethical decision-making, are discussed. Articles were appraised by two independent raters, using quality assessment criteria, which suggested areas of methodological strengths and weaknesses. Comparison and synthesis of results revealed that the research did not generally pertain to current clinical practice of talking therapies or the particular socio-political context of the UK healthcare system. There was limited research into ethical decision-making amongst specific professions, including clinical psychology. Generalisability was limited due to methodological issues, indicating avenues for future research. (shrink)

Part I of Frege’s Grundgesetze is devoted to the “exposition [Darlegung]” of his formal system.

The Igbo knowledge system articulated by Amaechi Udefi is insufficient to ensure knowledge progress as opposed to the system found in fallibilism theory. The reason is that there is a level of intellectual openness fallibilism theory guarantees that is not found in Udefi’s thought. This paper aims to do a comparative study of fallibilism theory and Udefi’s account of the Igbo knowledge system. The study also investigates to what extent each knowledge system can ensure knowledge growth and development. The significance (...) of this study is to highlight the importance of knowledge progress in the overall development of society. This paper argues that even though Udefi and Popper were reasoning from different cultural environments, Popper’s falsifiability theory is more open to knowledge progress than Udefi’s Igbo knowledge system. The expository, historical, comparative and evaluative methods were used. (shrink)

I will present a short overview of Hintikka’s main ideas in logic, starting with his early work on constituents and model sets, continuing with his contributions to epistemic logic, up to his later work in game-theoretical semantics and the Interrogative Model of Inquiry.

Gabriel Richardson Lear presents a bold new approach to one of the enduring debates about Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: the controversy about whether it coherently argues that the best life for humans is one devoted to a single activity, namely philosophical contemplation. Many scholars oppose this reading because the bulk of the Ethics is devoted to various moral virtues--courage and generosity, for example--that are not in any obvious way either manifestations of philosophical contemplation or subordinated to it. They argue that (...) Aristotle was inconsistent, and that we should not try to read the entire Ethics as an attempt to flesh out the notion that the best life aims at the "monistic good" of contemplation. In defending the unity and coherence of the Ethics, Lear argues that, in Aristotle's view, we may act for the sake of an end not just by instrumentally bringing it about but also by approximating it. She then argues that, for Aristotle, the excellent rational activity of moral virtue is an approximation of theoretical contemplation. Thus, the happiest person chooses moral virtue as an approximation of contemplation in practical life. Richardson Lear bolsters this interpretation by examining three moral virtues--courage, temperance, and greatness of soul--and the way they are fine. Elegantly written and rigorously argued, this is a major contribution to our understanding of a central issue in Aristotle's moral philosophy. (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible principles. (...) Some of them concern the interaction between propositions and worlds, and they appear to afford the means to map classes of propositions into propositions – or, likewise, classes of worlds into worlds – in a one-to-one fashion that leads to contradiction. Yet another family of paradoxes threaten the view that whatever could exist does, in fact, exist, which is in line with modal realism, for example. This article aims to survey and identify the source of each family of paradoxes as well as to outline some responses to them. (shrink)

Living Nonviolently: Language for Resisting Violence proposes distinctions of language that effectively address issues of force, power, aggressiveness, violence and war. No other book provides such a consistent language for living nonviolently through examples drawn from nonhuman animals, human infancy, personal transactions, domestic politics, and international conflicts.

David Kaplan observed in Kaplan that the principle \\) cannot be verified at a world in a standard possible worlds model for a quantified bimodal propositional language. This raises a puzzle for certain interpretations of the operator Q: it seems that some proposition p is such that is not possible to query p, and p alone. On the other hand, Arthur Prior had observed in Prior that on pain of contradiction, ∀p is Q only if one true proposition is Q (...) and one false proposition is Q. The two observations are related: ∀p is elusive in that it is not possible for the proposition to be uniquely Q. Kaplan based his model-theoretic observation on Cantor’s theorem, but there is a less well-known link between this simple set-theoretic observation and Prior’s remark. We generalize the link to develop a heuristic designed to move from Cantor’s theorem to the observation that a variety of sentences of the bimodal language express propositions that cannot be Q uniquely. We highlight the analogy between some of these results and some set-theoretic antinomies and suggest that the phenomenon is richer than one may have anticipated. (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Our first encounter with Socrates in the Symposium is bizarre. Aristodemus, surprised to run into Socrates fully bathed and with his sandals on, asks him where he is going “to have made himself so beautiful (kalos)” (174a4, Rowe trans.). Socrates replies that he is on his way to see the lovely Agathon, and so that “he has beautified himself in these ways in order to go, a beauty to a beauty (kalos para kalon)” (174a7–8). Why does Socrates, who in just (...) a few moments will be lost in contemplation out on the front porch, care about being beautiful? His remark to Aristodemus is clearly in some sense ironic, but on the other hand, he really has taken unusual care with his physical appearance. Later, in his encomium to love, he will claim that beauty has this effect on lovers: the beauty of the beloved causes the lover to disdain his former way of life and “give birth” to beautiful “offspring.” Is the image of the squat and snub-nosed Socrates all freshly scrubbed and kitted out a comic foreshadowing, or a debunking, of his serious speech? Does Socrates really believe in the transformative power of beauty? (shrink)

Between 1765 and 1767 Quesnay published Droit naturel and Despotisme de la Chine. I show that these texts are strongly related. I study their various versions and editions, some of which were previously poorly known, and attempt to evaluate their readership. I uncover a lost manuscript and neglected sources of Despotisme de la Chine which help to clarify various points about the text. It is shown that it was finished most probably well before the end of 1766. Its economic contents (...) are briefly described, whether they are similar to other writings of Quesnay or seem to alter his doctrine. It is suggested that Despotisme de la Chine was read by Adam Smith and that he took from it many lines on China found in Wealth of Nations. The paper ends with a proposal of a new edition of Droit naturel and Despotisme de la Chine. (shrink)