O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a natureza ontológica e epistemológica do conceito de informação, focalizando inicialmente a Filosofia e Ética da Informação (EI), propostas por Floridi (1999; 2002; 2004; 2011; 2016), cujo fundamento teórico servirá de suporte para reflexões acerca da inteligência artificial generativa (IAGen), mais especificamente, o ChatGPT. O conceito de informação será abordado a partir de três vertentes na perspectiva filosófico-interdisciplinar: (1) realismo informacional, (2) ecologia informacional e (3) semântica informacional, segundo Gonzalez, Nascimento & Haselager (2004). A (...) partir dessa abordagem, direcionamos nosso estudo para propostas de Floridi (2004), indicando os seus possíveis problemas. Procuraremos entender a Filosofia da Informação, a partir da perspectiva da Ética da Informação (EI), analisando como a EI pode contribuir para reflexões acerca do uso de IA generativa. Problematizamos a EI a fim de construir uma ponte com a Ética Intercultural da Informação (EII) proposta por Capurro (2010). (shrink)

Der bekannte Liturgiewissenschaftler, der nicht nur in der Abtei Grottaferrata, sondern auch als Dozent für Liturgiewissenschaft am Pont. Ateneo «Anselmianum» in Rom tätig und mit dem byzantinischen Ritus und den Handschriften Grottaferratas bestens vertraut ist, hat nun diese schöne Einführung in das Offizium Grottaferratas vorgelegt, die der italienischen Übersetzung vorangestellt wurde.

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

It is still a widespread assumption that metaphysics and ontology deal with roughly the same questions. They are supposed to be concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and to give an account of the meaning of 'existence' or 'being' in line with the broadest possible metaphysical assumptions. Against this, Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything. He argues that the concept of existence (...) is incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view. In the context of recent debates surrounding new realism and speculative realism, Gabriel also develops the outlines of a realist epistemological pluralism. His idea here is that there are different forms of knowledge that correspond to the plurality of fields of sense that must be acknowledged in order to avoid the trap of metaphysics. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: To Kalon as Effective Teleological Order The Visibility of the Fine Pleasure and Praise The Value of the Fine Conclusion Acknowledgments Notes References Further reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The Good Conceived as an End The Good as a Convergent End The Meaning of “Eudaimonia” Happiness vs. the Happy Life The Finality Criterion The Self‐sufficiency Criterion Inclusivism The Shape of the Happy Life Concluding Remarks Notes Bibliography.

Living Nonviolently: Language for Resisting Violence proposes distinctions of language that effectively address issues of force, power, aggressiveness, violence and war. No other book provides such a consistent language for living nonviolently through examples drawn from nonhuman animals, human infancy, personal transactions, domestic politics, and international conflicts.

v. 1. Reflection & mystery -- v. 2. Faith & reality.

When viewed as the most comprehensive theory of collections, set theory leaves no room for classes. But the vocabulary of classes, it is argued, provides us with compact and, sometimes, irreplaceable formulations of largecardinal hypotheses that are prominent in much very important and very interesting work in set theory. Fortunately, George Boolos has persuasively argued that plural quantification over the universe of all sets need not commit us to classes. This paper suggests that we retain the vocabulary of classes, but (...) explain that what appears to be singular reference to classes is, in fact, covert plural reference to sets. (shrink)

Philosophers often explain what could be the case in terms of what is, in fact, the case at one possible world or another. They may differ in what they take possible worlds to be or in their gloss of what is for something to be the case at a possible world. Still, they stand united by the threat of paradox. A family of paradoxes akin to the set-theoretic antinomies seem to allow one to derive a contradiction from apparently plausible principles. (...) Some of them concern the interaction between propositions and worlds, and they appear to afford the means to map classes of propositions into propositions – or, likewise, classes of worlds into worlds – in a one-to-one fashion that leads to contradiction. Yet another family of paradoxes threaten the view that whatever could exist does, in fact, exist, which is in line with modal realism, for example. This article aims to survey and identify the source of each family of paradoxes as well as to outline some responses to them. (shrink)

Our first encounter with Socrates in the Symposium is bizarre. Aristodemus, surprised to run into Socrates fully bathed and with his sandals on, asks him where he is going “to have made himself so beautiful (kalos)” (174a4, Rowe trans.). Socrates replies that he is on his way to see the lovely Agathon, and so that “he has beautified himself in these ways in order to go, a beauty to a beauty (kalos para kalon)” (174a7–8). Why does Socrates, who in just (...) a few moments will be lost in contemplation out on the front porch, care about being beautiful? His remark to Aristodemus is clearly in some sense ironic, but on the other hand, he really has taken unusual care with his physical appearance. Later, in his encomium to love, he will claim that beauty has this effect on lovers: the beauty of the beloved causes the lover to disdain his former way of life and “give birth” to beautiful “offspring.” Is the image of the squat and snub-nosed Socrates all freshly scrubbed and kitted out a comic foreshadowing, or a debunking, of his serious speech? Does Socrates really believe in the transformative power of beauty? (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

Bd. 1. A-B -- Bd. 2. C-F -- Bd. 3. G-Inn -- Bd. 4. Ins-Loc.

Our first encounter with Socrates in the Symposium is bizarre. Aristodemus, surprised to run into Socrates fully bathed and with his sandals on, asks him where he is going “to have made himself so beautiful (kalos)” (174a4, Rowe trans.). Socrates replies that he is on his way to see the lovely Agathon, and so that “he has beautified himself in these ways in order to go, a beauty to a beauty (kalos para kalon)” (174a7–8). Why does Socrates, who in just (...) a few moments will be lost in contemplation out on the front porch, care about being beautiful? His remark to Aristodemus is clearly in some sense ironic, but on the other hand, he really has taken unusual care with his physical appearance. Later, in his encomium to love, he will claim that beauty has this effect on lovers: the beauty of the beloved causes the lover to disdain his former way of life and “give birth” to beautiful “offspring.” Is the image of the squat and snub-nosed Socrates all freshly scrubbed and kitted out a comic foreshadowing, or a debunking, of his serious speech? Does Socrates really believe in the transformative power of beauty? (shrink)

It is acceptable to state that Foucault has always held a strong stand and a radical distance in front of Kant’s thoughts. Similarly, it is possible thinking that through the changes of Foucault’s thoughts, the sceptical outlook suffered changes in relation with Kantian philosophical critique. Consequently, as said by Jon Simmons in his Foucault and the Political “it is ironic that a writer with a reputation for anarchist, nihilistic, even apocalyptic opposition to rationality, humanism and the Enlightment turned to Kant (...) as a model for critique”. Despite the fact of trying to find a labelling reference for Foucault’s thought, that’s to say, where to put it?: modernity, post-modernity, anarchism, radical sceptical; the labelling duty would be very problematic; although the philosopher himself states that “if there is a need to label Foucault within the philosophical tradition, it is in Kant’s critical philosophical tradition and his stake (Foucault’s) would be named “a critique history of Western thought”. In fact, Foucault himself also writes that, “Every contemporary thought is, in certain way, neo-Kantian. In the same way, inquiries himself, “wasn’t Kant the one who said: one doesn’t learn philosophy, one learns how to philosophize?”. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Beauty and Goodness Patterns of Beautiful Poetry Human Excellence and the Standard of Poetic Beauty Moral Psychology Love of Beauty and Being Just Conclusion.

Busca-se neste artigo apresentar, ainda que de forma panorâmica, algumas inferências sobre o estatuto da Ética no primeiro Wittgenstein, a partir da noção de análise completa da proposição e com base na teoria pictórica exposta no Tractatus. Tais inferências terão como plano de fundo a exposição que Wittgenstein faz em sua Conferência sobre a Ética, de 1929, onde o filósofo parece sustentar uma relação intrínseca entre juízos de valor ético e a perspectiva da primeira pessoa.