Durkheim's underdeveloped notion of fatalism is the keystone for a bridge between two conceptual categories central to Marxian and Durkheimian theory: alienation and anomie. Durkheim does not necessarily disagree with Marx that excessive regulation can be socially damaging but chooses to highlight the effects of under- regulation. A Durkheimian critique of overregulation becomes possible if we turn away from anomie and toward Durkheim's idea of fatalism-a concept that I will argue here is unexpectedly consistent with Marx's notion of alienation. We (...) can infer that Durkheim presents us with a notion of an "optimal" human condition that exists between anomie and fatalism. The structure of modern societies, it will be argued, is characterized not just by excessive control leading to alienation or by a lack of integrative restraint leading to anomie but also by active efforts to optimally regulate social life. (shrink)

I make a contribution to the sociology of epistemologies by examining the neuroscience literature on love from 2000 to 2016. I find that researchers make consequential assumptions concerning the production or generation of love, its temporality, its individual character, and appropriate control conditions. Next, I consider how to account for these assumptions’ being common in the literature. More generally, I’m interested in the ways in which epistemic communities construe, conceive of, and publicly represent and work with their objects of inquiry—and (...) what’s thereby assumed about them and about the world. I argue that these implicit or explicit assumptions are a distinct type of explanandum, whose distinctiveness sociology hasn’t adequately appreciated and taken advantage of. I think it should and I hope it will. (shrink)

Inferencialismus idealizuje proces získání významu v komunikaci. K tomu snadno najdeme protipříklady. Zcela zde chybí nějaká, zejména pojmová analýza a také nějaké rozhodovací (meta)pravidlo pro získání významu.

In this chapter we argue that some beliefs present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief, according to which it is constitutive of belief that it is aimed at truth. We draw on empirical literature which shows that subjects form beliefs about the real world when they read fictional narratives, even when those narratives are presented as fiction, and subjects are warned that the narratives may contain falsehoods. We consider Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma and a response to it (...) from Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen which appeals to weak truth regulation as a feature common to all belief. We argue that beliefs from fiction indicate that there is not a basic level of truth regulation common to all beliefs, and thus the teleologist’s dilemma remains. We consider two objections to our argument. First, that the attitudes gained through reading fiction are not beliefs, and thus teleologists are not required to account for them in their theory. We respond to this concern by defending a doxastic account of the attitudes gained from fiction. Second, that these beliefs are in fact appropriately truth-aimed, insofar as readers form beliefs upon what they take to be author testimony. We respond to this concern by suggesting that the conditions under which one can form justified beliefs upon testimony are not met in the cases we discuss. Lastly, we gesture towards a teleological account grounded in biological function, which is not vulnerable to our argument. We conclude that beliefs from fiction present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief. (shrink)

Multiple studies show that periodic reanalysis of genomic test results held by clinical laboratories delivers significant increases in overall diagnostic yield. However, while there is a widespread consensus that implementing routine reanalysis procedures is highly desirable, there is an equally widespread understanding that routine reanalysis of individual patient results is not presently feasible to perform for all patients. Instead, researchers, geneticists and ethicists are beginning to turn their attention to one part of reanalysis—reinterpretation of previously classified variants—as a means of (...) achieving similar ends to large-scale individual reanalysis but in a more sustainable manner. This has led some to ask whether the responsible implementation of genomics in healthcare requires that diagnostic laboratories routinely reinterpret their genomic variant classifications and reissue patient reports in the case of materially relevant changes. In this paper, we set out the nature and scope of any such obligation, and analyse some of the main ethical considerations pertaining to a putative duty to reinterpret. We discern and assess three potential outcomes of reinterpretation—upgrades, downgrades and regrades—in light of ongoing duties of care, systemic error risks and diagnostic equity. We argue against the existence of any general duty to reinterpret genomic variant classifications, yet we contend that a suitably restricted duty to reinterpret ought to be recognised, and that the responsible implementation of genomics into healthcare must take this into account. (shrink)

Living Nonviolently: Language for Resisting Violence proposes distinctions of language that effectively address issues of force, power, aggressiveness, violence and war. No other book provides such a consistent language for living nonviolently through examples drawn from nonhuman animals, human infancy, personal transactions, domestic politics, and international conflicts.

David Kaplan observed in Kaplan that the principle \\) cannot be verified at a world in a standard possible worlds model for a quantified bimodal propositional language. This raises a puzzle for certain interpretations of the operator Q: it seems that some proposition p is such that is not possible to query p, and p alone. On the other hand, Arthur Prior had observed in Prior that on pain of contradiction, ∀p is Q only if one true proposition is Q (...) and one false proposition is Q. The two observations are related: ∀p is elusive in that it is not possible for the proposition to be uniquely Q. Kaplan based his model-theoretic observation on Cantor’s theorem, but there is a less well-known link between this simple set-theoretic observation and Prior’s remark. We generalize the link to develop a heuristic designed to move from Cantor’s theorem to the observation that a variety of sentences of the bimodal language express propositions that cannot be Q uniquely. We highlight the analogy between some of these results and some set-theoretic antinomies and suggest that the phenomenon is richer than one may have anticipated. (shrink)

This paper takes a close look at the thought that mereological relations on material objects mirror, and are mirrored by, parallel mereological relations on their exact locations. This hypothesis is made more precise by means of a battery of principles from which more substantive consequences are derived. Mereological harmony turns out to entail, for example, that atomistic space is an inhospitable environment for material gunk or that Whiteheadian space is not a hospitable environment for unextended material atoms.

Gottlob Frege lehrte 44 Jahre in Jena als Dozent der Mathematik, aber bisher ist sehr wenig über seine beruflichen, philosophischen und persönlichen Umstände in dieser Zeit bekannt. Dieser Band stellt den Stand der Forschung auf diesem Gebiet vor: Er beginnt mit der Frage, wie Frege aus seiner Heimatstadt Wismar in Mecklenburg überhaupt nach Jena kam (durch Vermittlung des Mathematiklehrers Leo Sachse, später ein Beispielname in Freges Schriften), und setzt sich mit der Frage fort, wie er sich dort im Umfeld der (...) Universität etablierte (mit seinem Mathematikerkollegen J. Thomae und im Umkreis seines Lehrers und Förderers Ernst Abbe, des Gründers der Zeiss-Stiftung). Beleuchtet wird Freges Stellung in der Mathematik seiner Zeit, aber auch sein Verhältnis zu seinem philosophischen Kollegen R. Eucken, das mit zwei erstmals gedruckten Grußkarten Freges dokumentiert wird. Erstmals dargestellt wird auch, wie Frege zu seinem Adoptivsohn (und späteren Erben) Alfred kam und was er für ihn getan hat. Weitere Themen sind Freges Rezeption des Mathematikers Hankel; einige Mißverständnisse des Neukantianers Natorp bezüglich Freges Definition der Zahl; der Gegenstand der "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik", sowie die ursprüngliche Absicht, die Frege mit seiner berühmten Unterscheidung von Sinn und Bedeutung verfolgte. Der Band enthält zahlreiche bisher unbekannte Dokumente zu Freges Leben und Werk, darunter amtliche Schreiben Freges, zwei Schreiben an Eucken, drei Briefe Thomaes, in denen dieser über Frege berichtet, sowie einen Klappentext von 1903, der drei Schriften Freges anzeigt. Eine umfassende, kommentierte Forschungsbibliographie zu Frege und seinem Jenaer Umfeld beschließt den Band. Die Herausgeber lehren Philosophie an der Universität Jena. (shrink)

As it has historically been the case with many pandemics, the Covid-19 experience will induce many philosophers to reconsider the value of medical practice. This should be a good opportunity to critically scrutinize the way medical research and medical interventions are carried out. For much of its history, medicine has been very inefficient. But, even in its contemporary forms, a review of common protocols in medical research and medical interventions reveal many shortcomings, especially related to methodological flaws, and more importantly, (...) conflicts of interests due to profit incentives. In the face of these problems, we propose a program of “gentle medicine”. This term, originally formulated by philosopher Jacob Stegenga, describes a form of medicine in which physicians intervene less than they currently do. As part of this general program, we advance a series of reform recommendations that could be enacted both by medical staff in their everyday practice, but also by public health officials and policymakers. (shrink)

We give three counterexamples to the folklore claim that in an arbitrary theory, if a complete type p over a set B does not divide over $C\subseteq B$, then no extension of p to a complete type over $\operatorname {acl}(B)$ divides over C. Two of our examples are also the first known theories where all sets are extension bases for nonforking, but forking and dividing differ for complete types (answering a question of Adler). One example is an $\mathrm {NSOP}_1$ theory (...) with a complete type that forks, but does not divide, over a model (answering a question of d’Elbée). Moreover, dividing independence fails to imply M-independence in this example (which refutes another folklore claim). In addition to these counterexamples, we summarize various related properties of dividing that are still true. We also address consequences for previous literature, including an earlier unpublished result about forking and dividing in free amalgamation theories, and some claims about dividing in the theory of generic $K_{m,n}$ -free incidence structures. (shrink)

We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look (...) elsewhere. (shrink)

Busca-se neste artigo apresentar, ainda que de forma panorâmica, algumas inferências sobre o estatuto da Ética no primeiro Wittgenstein, a partir da noção de análise completa da proposição e com base na teoria pictórica exposta no Tractatus. Tais inferências terão como plano de fundo a exposição que Wittgenstein faz em sua Conferência sobre a Ética, de 1929, onde o filósofo parece sustentar uma relação intrínseca entre juízos de valor ético e a perspectiva da primeira pessoa.

L’assurance de mort qu’enveloppe notre condition d’êtres finis nous expose à la tentation d’adhérer à une doctrine de désespoir qui considère toute chose sous le signe du non-être. Il appartient à la pensée dialectique de préparer la commutation de cette systématique négative en une méta-prgblé- matique de l’être ; mais cette commutation elle-même ne peut être que l’oeuvre d’une liberté qui choisit de s’ouvrir au transcendant, dont elle reconnaît la sollicitation a tergo dans l’acte même par lequel elle le salue (...) et l’invoque. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to a vision for leadership in business based on a recovery of virtue. The vision for leadership articulated here draws principally on the writings of the classical philosopher Aristotle and of the contemporary philosopher Josef Pieper. Without discounting the ever-increasing complexity of modern business, this essay will attempt to reconstruct Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue and moral character, and argues for the philosopher’s relevance to modern management and corporate leadership. The paper concludes that the message of (...) virtue is a message of hope and attempts to find plain language to articulate its value to those engaged in business or concerned with the formulation of government policy. (shrink)

La condición del arte contemporáneo no puede sino pensarse enmarcada en el cambio cultural del “tardocapitalismo” en donde como identificación se revela un nuevo régimen de la imagen en el que la obra individual es desplazada por la muestra o exhibición como la unidad mínima de significación. Este desplazamiento resulta un cambio de paradigma que prefigura el rol determinante del curador –un productor de servicios y no de objetos u artefactos- que, como intentaremos desarrollar en este trabajo, en el ámbito (...) local y ante la falta de estímulos, se asume no tanto como gestión museística sino como iniciativa de una conciencia artística que produce a partir del trabajo del otro, pero sin dejar resto físico-a excepción de la redacción en un eventual catálogo- ni participar del precario régimen propietario. (shrink)

We show that if a first-order structure${\cal M}$, with universe ℤ, is an expansion of (ℤ,+,0) and a reduct of (ℤ,+,<,0), then${\cal M}$must be interdefinable with (ℤ,+,0) or (ℤ,+,<,0).