Philosophische Untersuchungen der mensch1ichen Freiheit hielten sich in den letzten J ahrzehnten zumeist in einem Rahmen, der durch die, sei es nachahmende sei es ablehnende, Orientierung an der empi rischen Naturwissenschaft festgelegt war. Innerhalb seiner bewegte sich das Nachdenken iiber die Freiheit in mehreren Richtungen, deren Ausgangspunkte kurz iiberblickt seien: Die allgemeine Psychologie hatte ihren Gegenstand an der Willens freiheit; sie analysierte deskriptiv und experimentell insbesondere das in Wahl, Entsch1uB, Zwecksetzung Erfahrene. Daneben standen die Bemiihungen um den Begriff der ethischen (...) Freiheit, um das Eigen tiimliche des, im Gegensatz zur Willkiir, einem als sittlich anerkannten Gesetz folgenden Willens zu bestimmen, wie um die Freiheit zu be greifen, die sich im BewuBtsein der Schuld, der Reue, der Verant wortung auftut. Zu anderen Freiheitsbegriffen wurden die historischen Geistes wissenschaften gefiihrt: im Leben der Individuen und der Volker, im Verlauf von Kulturen und Kulturzweigen tritt ein unableitbar Neues auf, - der Begrif£ des "Schopferischen" legte hier die Frage nach der Freiheit nahe. Aber auch fiir kontinuierliche Entwicklungs zusammenhange wurde der Freiheitsbegriff dort verwendet, wo sich ein historisches Objekt organisch, entelechieartig zu entfalten schien: als Freiheit galt das Determiniertsein durch ein immanentes Gesetz, das Hervorgehen des Mannigfaltigen aus der Einheit eines "Wesens". (shrink)

We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.

Kern describes how law was perceived in the middle ages. Law does not have to be issued by the state, but it has to be old and good.

Tae Wan Kim, John Hooker, and Thomas Donaldson make an attempt, in recent articles, to solve the alignment problem. As they define the alignment problem, it is the issue of how to give AI systems moral intelligence. They contend that one might program machines with a version of Kantian ethics cast in deontic modal logic. On their view, machines can be aligned with human values if such machines obey principles of universalization and autonomy, as well as a deontic utilitarian principle. (...) Programming machines to do so might be useful, in their view, for applications such as future autonomous vehicles. Their proposal draws both on traditional logic-based and contemporary connectionist approaches, to fuse factual information with normative principles. I will argue that this approach makes demands of machines that go beyond what is currently feasible, and may extend past the limits of the possible for AI. I also argue that a deontological ethics for machines should place greater stress on the formula of humanity of the Kantian categorical imperative. On this principle, one ought never treat a person as a mere means. Recognition of what makes a person a person requires ethical insight. Similar insight is needed to tell treatment as a means from treatment as a mere means. The resources in Kim, Hooker, and Donaldson’s approach is insufficient for this reason. Hesitation regarding deployment of autonomous machines is warranted in light of these alignment concerns. (shrink)

Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Sense, Reference, and Philosophy.

Subjectivism about reasons is the view that a person has a reason to perform act A if she has some motivation to do A, or would have motivation to do A in certain circumstances. In On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents a series of arguments against subjectivism about reasons. In Parfit’s view, if subjectivism were true, nothing would actually matter. Parfit contends that there are only two positions regarding reasons: objectivism and subjectivism. I will argue for an inclusive position on (...) reasons that is neither subjectivist nor objectivist. On this view of reasons, there are some reasons that are grounded in the motivations of individuals, and there are also reasons that are not grounded in such motivations. On the view I put forward, I contend, against Parfit, that even if there were no objective reasons, it would still be the case that some things matter. (shrink)

Communicative Understandings of Women's Leadership Development: From Ceilings of Glass to Labyrinth Paths, edited by Elesha L. Ruminski and Annette M. Holba, weaves the disciplines of communication studies, leadership studies, and women's studies to offer theoretical and practical reflection about women's leadership development in academic, organizational, and political contexts. This work claims a space for women's leadership studies and acknowledges the paradigmatic shift from discussing women's leadership using the glass ceiling to what Eagly and Carli identify as the labyrinth of (...) leadership. (shrink)

There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of the relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical theory. One group of philosophers contends that minimalism and expressivism are compatible, the other group contends that such theories are incompatible. Following Simon Blackburn (manuscript), I will call the former position ‘compatibilism’ and the latter position ‘incompatiblism.’ Even those compatibilist philosophers who hold that there is no conflict or tension between these two theories—minimalism and (...) expressivism—typically think that some revision of minimalism is required to accommodate expressivism. The claim that there is such an incompatibility, I will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of the historical roots of expressivism, the motivations behind the expressivist theory, and the essential commitments of expressivism. I will present an account of the expressivist theory that is clearly consistent with minimalism. (shrink)

R.C. Pradhan claims in Language, Reality, and Transcendence that, in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, “[i]n no case is Wittgenstein interested in the empirical facts regarding language, as for him philosophy does not undertake any scientific study of language” (Pradhan 2009, xiv). I consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s purportedly anti-scientific and anti-empirical approach to language in light of advances by philosophers and linguists in the latter half of the 20th century. I distinguish between various ways of understanding Wittgenstein’s stance against (...) scientism. Due to the success of more recent work on language, I argue that Wittgenstein’s critique, as interpreted by Pradhan in Language, Reality, and Transcendence, does not undermine the formal study of language. Nevertheless, I argue, the contention of Wittgenstein and Pradhan that language, through grammar (in Wittgenstein’s sense), serves a variety of functions still sheds light on the differences in meaning across different discourses. I argue that a synthesis of Wittgenstein’s pluralist theory of meaning with elements of a theoretical study of language offers the best comprehensive account of natural language. I will argue that this conception of language is consistent with elements of Pradhan’s interpretation. As Pradhan notes, “The aim here is not to project one kind of grammatical determination but keep options open for many such grammatical determinations such that the grammatical nuances are not papered over in the name of the unity of grammar” (Pradhan 2009, 28). (shrink)

There are two main ways to teach a course online: synchronously or asynchronously. In an asynchronous course, students can log on at their convenience and do the course work. In a synchronous course, there is a requirement that all students be online at specific times, to allow for a shared course environment. In this article, the author discusses the strengths and weaknesses of synchronous online learning for the teaching of undergraduate philosophy courses. The author discusses specific strategies and technologies he (...) uses in the teaching of online philosophy courses. In particular, the author discusses how he uses videoconferencing to create a classroom-like environment in an online class. (shrink)

It has been argued by several philosophers that a deflationary conception of truth, unlike more robust conceptions of truth, cannot properly account for the nature of moral discourse. This is due to what I will call the “quick route problem”: There is a quick route from any deflationary theory of truth and certain obvious features of moral practice to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. The standard responses to the quick route problem are either to urge accepting a conception (...) of truth more robust than deflationism (Boghossian 1990), or to revise deflationary accounts in order to block straightforward attribution of truth to moral utterances (Field 1994). I contend that neither of these standard responses is well-motivated, for it is a merit of deflationary accounts rather than a defect that such accounts present a quick route to moral truth. (shrink)

The metaphysical dispute between moral realists and antirealists is cast in terms of properties: the realist holds that moral properties exist, the antirealist denies this claim. There is a longstanding philosophical dispute over the nature of properties, and the obscurity of properties may make the realist/antirealist dispute even more obscure. In the spirit of deflationary theories of truth, we can turn to a deflationary theory of properties in order to clarify this issue. One might reasonably worry that such an account (...) of properties would not be capable of properly characterizing disputes regarding the existence or nonexistence of genuine moral properties. In this paper, I will show that, within this framework, the traditional disputes over the existence of moral properties can be characterized in a far clearer fashion than is usually the case. A deflationary account of properties, along with an explanatory hierarchy of properties, makes the dispute in ontology clear. (shrink)

The expressivist theory in metaethics has a historical lineage dating back to the work of the great philosopher David Hume. Among the major metaethical alternatives to expressivism are constructivist theories, theories that have an origin in the work of another great philosopher, Immanuel Kant. One of the best-known and most influential recent formulations of such a view is due to John Rawls. There has been a great deal of discussion of the relationship between expressivism and deflationary theories of truth. In (...) stark contrast, there has been very little discussion of the relationship between constructivist theories and deflationary theories of truth. I argue that Rawlsian constructivists should adopt a minimalist theory of truth. (shrink)

The Divine Right of Kings and the Right of Resistance in the Early Middle Ages. Kern demonstrates that the medieval ruler was dependent on God and on the people. Both are under God and under the law. Laws are not made but discovered. In order to be valid, a law does not have to be made by the state, but it has to be old and good. (Kern shows this also in his article 'Recht und Verfassung im Mittelalter'.) Neither the (...) ruler nor the people were 'sovereign' in the modern sense. Thus, 'Gottesgnadentum' (the divine right of kings) does not mean that the ruler can do and rule as he wants. (shrink)

Der auBere AnlaB zur Niederschrift dieses Buches war ein Schreiben des Springer-Verlages, Berlin. Darin wurde die Bitte ausgesprochen, bisher lediglich in Vortragen und Aufsatzen veroffentlichte Gedanken tiber wirtschaftliches Konstruieren weiter auszubauen und in einem Buche zusammenfassend darzulegen. Zu jener Zeit aber - es war kurz nach Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges - hatte ich mich innerlich be­ reits von Betrachtungen solcher Art losgelost. Es schien mir wichtiger und vor allem dringlicher, zunachst nach einer Sinngebung und tiber­ geordneten Zielsetzung fUr das technische (...) Schaffen zu suchen. Die Be­ miihungen, beiden Anliegen gerecht zu werden, fiihrten mich schlieB­ lich zu der Ueberzeugung, daB ein Buch, in dem die neuartige Kon­ struktionslehre in die groBen ethischen, wissenschaftlichen und wirt­ schaftlichenZusammenhange-eingeordnetist, einem allgemeinenBedtirfnis unserer Zeit entsprechen dfirfte. Und so ist aus dem doppelten Erleben der Technik als Mensch und als Ingenieur die Zweiteilung und in der Folge die gesamteDisposition diesesBuches entstanden, das in gewissem Sinne als Fortsetzung des Fachstudiums, zugleich aber auch als erste Einfiihrung in die mannigfachen Bezirke des wirklichen technischen Geschehens gedacht ist. Die Ausarbeitung hat sich, hauptsachlich bedingt durch die Kriegs-und Nachkriegsereignisse, tiber volle zwolf Jahre hin­ gezogen; doch hoffe ich, daB das unmittelbare Erleben dieser Zeit und die innere Auseinandersetzung mit ihren Problemen dem Buche irgendwie zugute gekommen sind. Ich habe vielen zu danken: Zunachst Herrn R. Bingel t, ehemaliger Vorsitzender des Vorstandes der Siemens-Schuckertwerke AG., Berlin, ffir seine Anteilnahme und verstandnisvolle Forderung; dann meinen nachsten Mitarbeitem, vor allem Herrn O. (shrink)

Max Weber's methodological writings offered a model of singular causal analysis that anticipated key elements of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of the social and cultural sciences. The model accurately portrayed crucial steps and dimensions of causal reasoning in these disciplines, outlining a dynamic and probabilistic conception of historical processes, counterfactual reasoning, and comparison as a substitute for counterfactual argument. Above all, Weber recognized the interpretation of human actions as a subcategory of causal analysis, in which the agents' visions of desired outcomes, (...) together with their beliefs about how to bring them about, cause them to act as they do. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)