Freedom of thought is a fundamental human right, enshrined in many human rights treaties. It might very well be the only human right without any practical application. The paper reconstructs scope and meaning of this forgotten right and proposes four principles for its interpretation. In the age of neuroscientific insights and interventions into mind and brain that afford to alter thoughts, the time for the law to define freedom of thought in a way that lives up (...) to its theoretical significance has come. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some of the most compelling contemporary ethical questions surround 21st Century neuroscientific technologies. Among these, neurocognitive intervention technologies allow an unprecedented ability to alter thought. Concerns exist about their impact on individual freedom, behavior and personhood. They could also distort society, eroding core values of dignity, equality, and diversity. Potent laws are needed to anchor regulation in this rising field. The article explores how the long-neglected human right of Freedom of Thought might protect the integrity (...) of the mind at the legal system’s highest level. Sample cases illustrate how it could be given effect ethically and legally to set boundaries for neurocognitive intervention. (shrink)

Freedom of thought is often explicitly protected in constitutions and human rights documents, and even more often employed as a rallying cry against state tyranny. It is not so clear, however, just what freedom of thought is, what it would be to threaten it, and how, if at all, it differs from basic liberty or freedom. This essay seeks to analyze the idea of freedom of thought, to pose some skeptical questions about its (...) alleged independent existence, and to ask, again with a skeptical mindset, what it is to protect it and why its protection should be so commonly valued. (shrink)

. Freedom of thought as freedom of expression: Hate crime sentencing enhancement and first amendment theory. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 29-42.

Freedom of thought has been lauded in political theory and celebrated in human rights discourse. But what kind of freedom is it? I propose that freedom of thought deserves status as a basic liberty, given the significance of thought to human life, the fundamental importance of freedom of thought in establishing and sustaining crucial rights and freedoms, and the value of being able to develop and experience one’s thoughts without undue influence from (...) others. (shrink)

This essay introduces basic issues that make up the topic of freedom of thought, including newly emerging issues raised by the current proliferation of Internet search algorithms.

This paper develops a novel conception of freedom of thought as the right to epistemic self-realization. The recognition of this right is characterized here as a modally robust normative status that I think one has as a potential knower in an epistemic community. It is a status that one cannot enjoy without a specific form of institutionalized intellectual respect and support. To explain and defend this conception of freedom of thought, it is contrasted here with more (...) traditionally “negative” conceptions of freedom of thought, in terms of not being interfered with. It is also contrasted here with a “positive” conception of freedom of thought derived from a recently prominent account of doxastic agency as grounded in the rational capacity to self-determine one's own response to reasons. In both cases, the crux of the argument in this paper is that a conception of freedom of thought as a right to epistemic self-realization makes better sense of why we fear the counter-liberatory forces of propaganda and regulated thinking, and also why we hold out hope for the liberating potential of education and critical engagement with expertise in the public sphere. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPatočka highlights the central role of Cartesianism in our tradition of thinking. Yet, today, brain scientists often claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism. In this paper, I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of human nature and sensory perception remain presuppositions of brain science, where perception is largely equated with thinking. Equating perception and thinking means that thinking is a determined process, which leads to an erosion of critique. Critique, and the freedom of thought it entails, is essential to (...) Descartes, Husserl and Patočka. I examine the differences, as well as the relationship, between Descartes method of doubt, Husserl’s phenomenological epochē and Patočka’s universalization of the epochē. I also show how Descartes’, Husserl’s and Patočka’s way into critique present different ways to understand self, things and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that Patočka presents a promising way to critique mechanistic understandings of thinking by rethinking both subject and object. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the human right to freedom of thought (RFoT). Scholars from various disciplines are currently debating the content and scope of this right. In his annual thematic report of 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief paid explicit and comprehensive attention to the RFoT, encouraging further clarification of the content and scope of the right. This paper aims to contribute to this end, setting (...) the stage for further research, by offering a multidisciplinary analysis of the RFoT’s scope, relation to other rights, practical significance and moral foundations. (shrink)

This article clarifies how the freedom of thought as a human right can be understood and promoted as a right of mental health service users, especially people with psychotic disorder, by using Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and Fulford’s and Fulford et al ’s values-based practice. According to Nussbaum, freedom of thought seems to primarily protect the capability to think, believe and feel. This capability can be promoted in the context of mental health services by values-based practice. (...) The article points out that both Nussbaum’s approach and values-based practice recognise that people’s values differ. The idea of involving different actors and service users in mental healthcare is also common in both Nussbaum’s approach and values-based practice. However, there are also differences in that values-based practice relies on a ‘good process’ in decision-making, whereas the capabilities approach is oriented towards a ‘right outcome’. However, since process and outcome are linked with each other, these two approaches do not necessarily conflict despite this difference. The article suggests that absolute rights are possible within the two approaches. It also recognises that the capabilities approach, values-based practice and human rights approach lean on liberal values and thus can be combined at least in liberal societies. (shrink)

Balancing citizens’ freedom thought, conscience and religion with the authority of the law which applies to all citizens alike presents an especial challenge for the governments of European nations with socially diverse and pluralistic populations. I address this problem from within the republican tradition represented by Machiavelli, Harrington and Madison. Republicans have historically focused on public debate as the means to identify a set of shared interests which the law should uphold in the interests of all. Within pluralistic (...) societies, however, a greater attention must be paid to the background social conditions that may disrupt the deliberative process and lead to factionalism and instability. This includes certain changes in perspectives by both religious and secular citizens. (shrink)

In this article I argue not only for the value of hermeneutics today but also, and especially, how the crucial gesture of hermeneutics is that of changing the subject for the sake of our today. Surveying briefly the main lines of hermeneutical positions along its history and critiques, and connecting these critiques to the discrepancy between theory and practice, between interpretation and the need to change the world, the article proposes that our reality today, reshaped through globalization and the virtual, (...) is performed as a hermeneutics of history. The challenge for today’s hermeneutics is to work out categories for understanding the present as on-going in a world that tends to capture and distort more and more the meaning of freedom of thought. In the final section, I propose a hermeneutics of the on-going, of gerundive time, partially under the inspiration of Paul Celan, as a response that develops the meaning of the freedom of thought. A defense of nearness and how to think in narrow nearness to the on-going is discussed. (shrink)

This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years’ time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future contexts? How (...) will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore conceptual relationships between philosophical developments to support freedom of speech in John Milton´s Areopagitica and Johann Gottlieb Fichte´s Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought. I intend to enhance the philosophical heritance collected and recreated by Fichte. This paper hypothesizes that both theories state that freedom of speech is a condition for the development of morality. In both cases, moral deliberation has a public character, given that moral judgment needs the consideration of (...) different viewpoints about the question at stake. Finally, in both cases, it is defended a republican concept of power, characterized by opposition to moral paternalism, as a form of despotism. (shrink)

Progress in neurotechnology and Artificial Intelligence (AI) provides unprecedented insights into the human brain. There are increasing possibilities to influence and measure brain activity. These developments raise multifaceted ethical and legal questions. The proponents of neurorights argue in favour of introducing new human rights to protect mental processes and brain data. This article discusses the necessity and advantages of introducing new human rights focusing on the proposed new human right to mental self-determination and the right to freedom of (...) class='Hi'>thought as enshrined in Art.18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Art. 9 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). I argue that the right to freedom of thought can be coherently interpreted as providing comprehensive protection of mental processes and brain data, thus offering a normative basis regarding the use of neurotechnologies. Besides, I claim that an evolving interpretation of the right to freedom of thought is more convincing than introducing a new human right to mental self-determination. (shrink)

It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of (...) experience) is essentially the same sort of spontaneity found in the practical use of reason. Accordingly, the faculties of understanding and practical reason both possess genuine autonomy. (shrink)

The freedom of thought (FoT) has recently gained attention in human rights scholarship, emerging as a key component in the human rights protection of the human mind. However, this newfound interest has exposed significant gaps in the protection offered by the FoT. While the underdevelopment of the FoT is mainly examined in relation to the mind’s vulnerability to emerging neurotechnologies, there are numerous other ways to interfere with the privacy, freedom, and integrity of the mind. Conversations, education, (...) online marketing, and abusive indoctrination programs can all interfere with individual’s minds. These different forms of mind interventions (MIs) appear to pose varying degrees of threat to the FoT, particularly to the right not to have one’s thoughts impermissibly altered. Despite this, the theoretical exploration of the impact of different MIs on this aspect of FoT remains largely unexplored. This article explores the core of the right not to have one’s thoughts impermissibly altered. First, the current shortcomings in the conceptualisation of FoT will be outlined. Second, the article defines mind interventions to delineate the scope of the analysis. Third, it introduces a normative framework to identify Undue Mind Interventions (UMIs). To this end, a general maxim will be presented: a MI qualifies as an UMI when the agent intentionally undermines a subject's mental autonomy by bypassing, distorting, or disarming the mental abilities that enable it. The core elements of this maxim will be detailed. Finally, the impact of this normative assessment on the meaning of FoT will be discussed. (shrink)

Spinoza felsefe tarihinde ve felsefi düşüncede daha çok monist ontolojisi ve panteist teolojisi ile dikkatleri çeken bir filozoftur. Ancak o aynı zamanda önemli bir ahlak ve siyaset teorisyenidir. Özellikle siyasal felsefesinde düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğüne ve din-devlet ilişkisine dair, çağının sınırlarını aşan özel ve özgün görüşlere sahip olduğu ve yaşadığı çağda önemli bir demokrasi ve düşünce özgürlüğü savunucusu olduğu söylenebilir. Ne var ki felsefesinde ontolojiye ve teolojiye dair görüşlerinin ön plana çıkarılması nedeniyle olsa gerek, onun ahlaka ve siyasete ilişkin görüşleri (...) biraz geri planda kalmış ve görmezlikten gelinmiş gibidir. İşte bu çalışmada Spinoza’nın hem düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğüne hem de din-devlet ilişkisine dair görüşleri, genel felsefesi bağlamında tartışılmaya çalışılmaktadır. (shrink)

This paper adopts Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s expressionism and pure semiotics to argue that Spinoza’s Ethics offers an alternative notion of freedom of speech that is based on the potentia of the individual. Its aim is to show how freedom of thought is connected to the problem of individuation that connects our mode of being with our power to speak and think. Rather than treating freedom of speech as an enlightened idea that is in opposition to, (...) for example, religious authority, or the suppression of human rights, this paper argues that freedom of speech should be understood by what Spinoza calls ‘an adequate idea’: an idea that explains the cause of its own production. What is to be considered is: who wants this freedom, in what situation, why, what is at stake? No freedom in itself is ever given. This paper argues for speech as an assembled body that is always in connection with other bodies. It is argued that to understand the power and value of the freedom of speech, we should study the praxis of the utterance as an assembled body, its causal dimensions, and its affective immanent relations with other bodies, and other modes of speaking. (shrink)

Is there a moral right to freedom of conscience? Should a legal right to freedom of conscience be established in each country on Earth? This essay argues for negative answers to both questions. The term freedom of conscience might refer to freedom of thought and the freedom of expression that sustains freedom of thought. In this sense we might affirm the right of each person to form individual opinions about the right and (...) the good, about what we owe one another by way of due consideration of others, and about what is worthy of pursuit in life, on the basis of free discussion of these matters. In the present discussion, these freedoms, important as they might be, are not under consideration. Let us assume freedom of thought and expression are secured. The status of freedom of conscience in the sense that is our concern in this discussion is still wide open. (shrink)

I offer a reading of the role of freedom in Descartes’ Meditations and other writings that sees freedom’s role in “assenting to ideas” as a matter of psychological possibility, and its role in acti...

Are citizens of contemporary technological society authors of their own lives? With Alasdair MacIntyre, Bruno Latour and Albert Borgmann, we discuss the shortcomings of traditional liberalism in terms of its ability to answer this question. MacIntyre argues that biological vulnerabilities and social interdependencies establish meaningful parameters within which reason and willing emerge. But MacIntyre ignores technologies as a third parameter. Latour defines humans as nodes in a socio-technical network, in which technologies are actors on par with humans. However, Latour adopts (...) a purely external perspective, ignoring human intentions, desires, and reasons. Borgmann argues that although freedom of choice is severely restricted, sometimes one can still resist the rule of technology. But Borgmann denies the pluralism of modern societies. Although all three schools have their shortcomings, combined, they provide us with a valuable palette of insights on human agency in a technological culture. (shrink)

The idea of freedom of the will seems to conflict with the principle of causal efficacy implicit in many theories of mind. The conflict is normally resolved within a compatibilist view whereby the desires and beliefs of the agent, replete with a respectable if yet to be elucidated causal pedigree, are taken to be the basis of individual freedom. The present view is an alternative which erects mental content on a framework of rule following and then argues that (...) rule‐following is conceptually distinct from causally produced activity. The normative aspect of rule‐following defies reduction to descriptive or dispositional terms. According to this view we cannot get beyond the agent as a self‐determining rational individual in formulating a theory of mind and action. The theory is neo‐Kantian in that it identifies rules or conceptions of laws as central in human thought. It, follows Wittgenstein's treatment of rule‐following and generates a plausible (but non‐causal) account of mental explanation and weakness of the will. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.4 (2002) 328-344 [Access article in PDF] Spaces of Invention:Dissension, Freedom, and Thought in Foucault Kendall R. Phillips Over the past two decades, invention has become an increasingly difficult concept to discuss. In an age when the free, rational actor has become not only de-centered but viewed as both impossible and undesirable by some social theorists, the traditional conception of invention, especially rhetorical invention, (...) becomes more tenuous. While some continue to promote a rational deliberative model of the human subject—Habermas is a prime example of this school of thought—the harsh and unrelenting critiques of poststructural and postmodern thinkers have cast these recovery efforts in a nostalgic and often negative light. Chief among these critics of the modern, humanist conception of human action is Michel Foucault. Within Foucault's perspective our utterances are governed by underlying rules of discourse formations, our actions are proscribed and authorized by relations of power, and our very conception of our self is circumscribed by technologies of subjectivity. Contained within these intertwined relations of knowledge, power, and subjectivity, the human subject takes on a very different meaning and even the concept of "human subject" is itself a product of these intertwined relations; a product that may, in time, disappear under new relations of discourse and governance.Despite the apparent centrality of a creative human subject to the study of rhetoric, Foucault has taken his place within the study of rhetoric. Of course, neither this incorporation of Foucault nor the observation of its peculiarity is particularly new. The incorporation of Foucault into rhetoric took its most dramatic turn in 1989 with Raymie McKerrow's "Critical Rhetoric" essay and the implications of this union of Foucault and rhetoric were forcefully raised by Barbara Biesecker in "Michel Foucault and the Question of Rhetoric" (1992). These two important essays made the relationship between Foucault and rhetoric most pressing: McKerrow by offering [End Page 328] a practical agenda for a Foucaultian rhetorical perspective and Biesecker by opening a space for reflection on this type of agenda. In the intervening decade, however, the incorporation of Foucault into rhetoric has outstripped the reflection on this incorporation and Foucault now sits as comfortably in the bibliographies of rhetorical scholars as Burke or McKeon or Perelman.The purpose of the present essay is to revisit this relationship between Foucault and rhetoric. I pursue this end not in order to critique McKerrow's project or to outstrip Biesecker's reflections, but in order to press the importance of their earlier arguments. The project of a Foucaultian rhetoric should be taken seriously, seriously enough to keep the peculiarity of this union in the forefront of our minds as we pursue it. My present effort furthers this end by seeking within Foucault a space for invention and, in so doing, asks the question: how might invention be rendered within a Foucaultian framework?My contention is that a space for invention exists within Foucault's studies of knowledge, power, and subjectivity and that this space can be demonstrated by considering the counterpoints to his tripartite understanding of the human condition. The limiting/enabling relations of knowledge/power/subjectivity are counterpointed by three terms that describe the conditions for invention: dissension, freedom, and thought. Before turning to the conditions for these spaces of invention and the unique shape of invention that emerges from them, I will briefly consider previous discussions of Foucault. Power, resistance, and invention Rhetoricians, to be clear, are not the first to be concerned with the apparent foreclosing of the possibility of invention within Foucault. Focusing mainly on dominating relations of power/knowledge/subjectivity, Foucault seems to leave little ground for the creation of new ways of acting, speaking, or being. However, what I call a concern for invention has generally not been expressed as such; rather, in rhetoric and in other fields, criticism of Foucault has been largely couched in terms of resistance. Edward Said (1986), for instance, contends that Foucault's work is "not finally as contestatory, or as oppositional as on the surface it seems to be" (152... (shrink)

Despite its obvious advantages, the disruptive development of neurotechnology can pose risks to fundamental freedoms. In the context of such concerns, proposals have emerged in recent years either to design human rights de novo or to update the existing ones. These new rights in the age of neurotechnology are now widely referred to as “neurorights.” In parallel, there is a considerable amount of ongoing academic work related to updating the right to freedom of thought in order to include (...) the protection of “freedom of thinking” (i.e., freedom of thought itself) and not only its social manifestations. Neurorights such as cognitive liberty, free will, mental freedom, and mental self-determination come into play here. Importantly, freedom of thought has often been considered a prerequisite for all the other fundamental freedoms and rights. In any case, just as other rights require additional legal instruments to guarantee their compliance, substantial neurorights will probably require specific complementary developments in procedural law. In relation to this, there is a long tradition of habeas corpus as an emergency remedy to enforce the rights of a citizen against illegal or arbitrary detention. More recently, the habeas data writ has been proposed and admitted in certain countries to guarantee a person’s ownership of their personal data. In this article, we propose to expand this procedural apparatus by incorporating a third habeas, which we call habeas cogitationem: a writ aimed primarily at enforcing the right to freedom of thinking (and, subsidiarily, the rest of neurorights) against direct, harmful interferences in a person’s thought process by both public and private perpetrators. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Hannah Arendt’s ideas concerning freedom and the political in the Greek polis. By outlining the structure of the notions of labour, work, and action in relation to thinking, responsibility, and necessity, it aims to explore the possibility of thinking about freedom in the context of contemporary society. Arendt’s phenomenological reflections on the nature of human beings and the significance of the political in Western society within the framework of the decline of Europe encompass a (...) broad spectrum of themes. It traces the origins of Western culture and exposes how the evolving dynamics of the private and public, thought and action, and the progress of science and technology have contributed to a way of thinking that has led to the emergence of totalitarianism. Keywords: freedom, work, labour, action, political, human being. (shrink)