Abstract

The freedom of thought (FoT) has recently gained attention in human rights scholarship, emerging as a key component in the human rights protection of the human mind. However, this newfound interest has exposed significant gaps in the protection offered by the FoT. While the underdevelopment of the FoT is mainly examined in relation to the mind’s vulnerability to emerging neurotechnologies, there are numerous other ways to interfere with the privacy, freedom, and integrity of the mind. Conversations, education, online marketing, and abusive indoctrination programs can all interfere with individual’s minds. These different forms of mind interventions (MIs) appear to pose varying degrees of threat to the FoT, particularly to the right not to have one’s thoughts impermissibly altered. Despite this, the theoretical exploration of the impact of different MIs on this aspect of FoT remains largely unexplored. This article explores the core of the right not to have one’s thoughts impermissibly altered. First, the current shortcomings in the conceptualisation of FoT will be outlined. Second, the article defines mind interventions to delineate the scope of the analysis. Third, it introduces a normative framework to identify Undue Mind Interventions (UMIs). To this end, a general maxim will be presented: a MI qualifies as an UMI when the agent intentionally undermines a subject's mental autonomy by bypassing, distorting, or disarming the mental abilities that enable it. The core elements of this maxim will be detailed. Finally, the impact of this normative assessment on the meaning of FoT will be discussed.