This article will reveal how local scientific determination and ambition, in the face of rejection by funders, navigated a path to success and to influence in national policy and international medicine. It will demonstrate that Birmingham, England's ‘second city’, was the key centre for cutting-edge biological psychiatry in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. The ambitions of Frederick Mott – doyen of biochemistry, neuropathology and neuropsychiatry, until now celebrated as a London figure – to revolutionize psychiatric treatment through (...) science, chimed with those of the City and University of Birmingham's Joint Board of Research for Mental Diseases. Under Mott's direction, shaped by place and inter-professional working, the board's collaborators included psychiatrist Thomas Chivers Graves and world-renowned physiologist J.S. Haldane. However, starved of external money and therefore fresh ideas, as well as oversight, the ‘groupthink’ that emerged created the classic UK focal sepsis theory which, it was widely believed, would yield a cure for mental illness – a cure that never materialized. By tracing the venture's growth, accomplishments and contemporary potential for biochemical, bacterial and therapeutic discoveries – as well as its links with scientist and key government adviser Solly Zuckerman – this article illustrates how ‘failure’ and its ahistorical assessment fundamentally obscure past importance, neglect the early promise offered by later unsuccessful science, and can even hide questionable research. (shrink)

The syntactic structures of natural languages reflect conceptual categories more directly than they reflect communicative categories. This fact supports the main premise of the target article, namely, that the most important event in language evolution was the development of a hierarchical conceptual structure.

O postulado prático da existência de Deus é problemático por várias razões: primeiro, Kant nega que ele proporciona qualquer cognição da natureza ou existência de Deus como um ser em si; segundo, ele salienta a natureza prática do postulado contribuindo para o desempenho de nossos deveres; e, terceiro, Kant parece mesmo algumas vezes indicar que nosso postulado de Deus não corresponde a nenhuma realidade, mas é um mero pensamento. No meu trabalho, eu sustento o argumento que o postulado de Kant (...) de Deus pode ser melhor entendido como um conceito sem extensão que serve para unificar vários outros conceitos e obrigações morais mas que ele próprio não tem referência. Eu sustento esse argumento apontando para a relação do postulado para o propósito da filosofia prática, em oposição à teórica e pelo exame da função regulativa da razão em geral e invocando a teologia construtivista contemporânea. A fim de mostrar este ponto eu primeiro analiso a natureza de um postulado comparando postulados a hipóteses transcendentais e crenças da Crítica da Razão Pura. Em segundo lugar, eu examino o uso que Kant faz do postulado da existência de Deus como sendo “imanente... para propósitos práticos” e “somente em referência à lei moral e em função dela” na Crítica da Razão Prática. Terceiro, eu procuro pela função que o postulado de Deus desempenha no Opus Postumum e em outros textos de 1790 para mostrar que Kant chegou mais e mais a argumentar pelo papel funcional ao invés do referencial desse postulado. Ao longo do trabalho, eu discuto a natureza da filosofia prática – direcionada ao uso livre das nossas vontades – como sendo distinta da filosofia teórica – dirigida ao conhecimento dos objetos. Eu mostro como essa solução pode fazer Kant um naturalista metafísico. Eu também entro em questões contemporâneas da teologia relacionadas com o papel humano na construção de sistemas conceituais para ajudá-los a fazer sentido ao mundo que eles experienciam no contexto de um mistério maior que desafia a conceitualização.Kant’s practical postulate for the existence of God is puzzling for several reasons: first, he denies that it provides any cognition of the existence or nature of God as a being in itself, second, Kant stresses the practical nature of the postulate as contributing to performance of our duties, and third, Kant even seems on occasion to indicate that our postulate of God does not correspond to any reality but is a merely a thought. In my paper I advance the argument that Kant’s postulate of God is best understood as an extensionless concept that serves to unify various other moral concepts and moral obligations but that has no referent itself. I make this argument by noting the relation of the postulate to the purpose of practical, as opposed to theoretical, philosophy, and by examination of the regulative role of reason in general, and by invoking contemporary constructivist theology. In order to show this point I first examine the nature of a postulate by comparing postulates to transcendental hypotheses and to beliefs from the Critique of Pure Reason. I second examine the use to which Kant puts the postulate of the existence of God as “immanent . . . for practical purposes” and “only in reference to the moral law and for the sake of it” in the Critique of Practical Reason. Third, I look at the role that the postulate of God plays in Kant’s Opus Postumum and other texts from the 1790s to show that Kant came more and more to argue that the postulates have this functional rather than referential role. Throughout the paper I discuss the nature of practical philosophy – directed toward the free use of our wills – as distingushed from theoretical philosophy – directed toward knowledge of objects. I note how this solution could make Kant a metaphysical naturalist. I also touch on contemporary issues in theology related to the role of human construction of systems of concepts to help them make sense of the world they experience in the context of a greater mystery that defies conceptualization. (shrink)

A guide to the major and minor figures who shaped Transcendentalism in New England, particularly between 1830 and the Civil War. While most of the entries are for American thinkers, international figures who advanced Transcendentalism in New England and who were alive until at least 1830 are also covered.

I contend that s. Haack's proposed definition of fallibilism is unsatisfactory being equivalent to the assertion that we can believe anything. I say that fallibilism is best conceived as the doctrine that all our theories are false.

The issues involved in decision making about the aggressiveness of future medical care for older persons are explored. They are related to population trends, the heterogeneity of older persons and a variety of factors involved in individual preferences. Case studies are presented to illustrate these points, as well as a review of pertinent literature. The argument is offered that, considering these many factors, a system of flexible, individualized care by informed patient preference, is more rational than the rationing of technological (...) services by age. (shrink)

Cet article est constitué de deux parties : la première concerne l’arrivée au Brésil en 1816, de Marie Joséphine Durocher (1809-1893), accompagnée de sa mère, et leur installation dans le nouveau pays en tant que « marchandes de modes » ; la seconde traite de la trajectoire professionnelle de Mme Durocher en tant que sage-femme. De fait, en 1834, elle devient la première sage-femme diplômée du pays, exerçant ce métier pendant plus de cinquante ans à Rio de Janeiro. L’approche biographique (...) nous permet de constater que derrière une image de femme d’exception, sa vie ressemble à celle d’autres femmes vivant dans les villes brésiliennes du XIXe siècle, notamment les couturières et modistes françaises qui traversent l’Atlantique pour « faire l’Amérique » et les sages-femmes françaises et brésilienne qui y exercent leur profession. (shrink)