Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in particular? Such questions belong to the ‘problem of the emergence of norms’, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ‘norms against violence’ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence (...) of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate ‘facts’ of ‘unjustified violence’. During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation over the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms prohibiting violence, allowing punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers, and prescribing collective intervention against an aggressor to neutralize the threat represented. These findings prompt me to hypothesize that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latters’ internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for this emergence. Thus, emotions allow us to answer the questions: ‘Why do norms emerge?’ and ‘Why do they have their specific forms?’ In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations. (shrink)

On a souvent dit que la bioéthique émergea au confluent des sciences de la santé, de la théologie, de la philosophie et du droit. Or, pour poursuivre son évolution, la bioéthique se doit d’adopter une position critique vis-à-vis de cet héritage, notamment en ce qui concerne le droit.

At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...) in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness. (shrink)

Geron recently announced that it had begun enrolling patients in the world's first-in-human clinical trial involving cells derived from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). This trial raises important questions regarding the future of hESC-based therapies, especially in spinal cord injury (SCI) patients. We address some safety and efficacy concerns with this research, as well as the ethics of fair subject selection. We consider other populations that might be better for this research: chronic complete SCI patients for a safety trial, subacute (...) incomplete SCI patients for an efficacy trial, and perhaps primary progressive multiple sclerosis (MS) patients for a combined safety and efficacy trial. (shrink)

(2005). Between Critique And Metaphysics. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the french tradition issue editor: andrew aitken, pp. 39-57.

This is a translation from the Russian of Nikolai Lossky’s review of Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932). The review was published in the Parisian émigré journal Новый Град (Cité nouvelle) in 1932. In this review, Lossky criticizes Bergson for leaving some key problems of the philosophy of religion unresolved, namely that of God’s relation to the world (theism vs. pantheism), that of immortality, as well as that of evil. He also criticizes Bergson’s (...) “extreme biologism” in his explanation of morality, which, in his view, subjectivizes the objects of religion. For Lossky, the symbolic images of the Christian religion are not subjective “fabulations,” but real symbols through which God reveals himself to us. Likewise, according to Lossky, true morality cannot be explained in terms of biological adaptation, but must rely on the foundation of an objective, i.e., Platonic, axiological sphere. (Frédéric Tremblay). (shrink)

The article is a lightly edited transcript of a digital roundtable discussion. The participants were invited based on their prior work on critical realism and epistemology. The roundtable discussion includes introductory statements on judgemental rationality by Jamie Morgan, Ruth Groff, Dorothea Schoppek, Leigh Price, and Frédéric Vandenberghe, followed by a discussion between the participants on a variety of topics related to judgemental rationality. The discussion demonstrates a variety of opinions and perspectives, as well as the clashing of opinions in a (...) respectful manner. The roundtable provides interesting discussion points about Bhaskar's approach to judgemental rationality, how we adjudicate between different meta-theories (such as between that of Bhaskar and Harré), and what role should normative values have in theoretical adjudication. (shrink)

La Seconde Guerre mondiale venait à peine de s'achever quand le hasard fit de Frédéric de Towarnicki le premier visiteur de Heidegger dans l'Allemagne ne cendres, verrouillée de toute part. Quel " coup de dés " l'avait donc conduit dans Fribourg en ruine, à la recherche de ce philosophe dont on ne savait rien depuis des années? Le récit insolite, parfois drôle, de ses rencontres avec Heidegger dans sa maison de Zähringen ou sur les routes de la Forêt-Noire est suivi (...) de vingt-trois conversations avec Jean Beaufret qui fut, durant plus de trente ans, l'ami et l'interlocuteur du penseur le plus audacieux et le plus attaqué de notre temps. La passion qui anime ce livre pourrait bien, au-delà des polémiques, révéler au lecteur la surprenante simplicité à laquelle aboutissent les méditations de Heidegger. (shrink)

Before the Darwinian revolution species were thought to be universals. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to propose new definitions. The twentieth-century German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann defined 'species' as an individual system of processes and a process of life of a higher-order. To provide a clear understanding of Hartmann's conception of species, I first present his method of definition. Then I look at Hartmann's Philosophie der Natur (1950) to present his concepts of "organism" and "species." And I end the (...) paper by pointing out two possible systematic inconsistencies. (shrink)

Pylyshyn argues against representations with pictorial properties that would be superimposed on a scene. We present evidence against this view, and a new method to depict pictorial properties. We propose a continuum between the top-down generation of internal signals (imagery) and the bottom-up signals from the outside world. Along the continuum, superstitious perceptions provide a method to tackle representational issues.

Many criticisms have been made of optimization theory (Laville, 1999a). These objections may be explained by the fact that human rationality is bounded – that decisions are constrained by cognitive limitations (Simon, 1982). In the present paper, I will show that if rationality is bounded, then we must study the processes of decision. My thesis is that cognitive limitations lead to procedural rationality. Although this assertion has already been sustained implicitly by Simon (1959) and explicitly by Mongin (1986), it has (...) not been argued in sufficient depth. (shrink)

Interpretation of the development of merleau-ponty's attitude toward phenomenological reflection. first, ``the phenomenology of perception'' is shown to be a critique of the transcendental idealism of husserl's works prior to the ``crisis''. second, ``the visible and the invisible'' is shown to be an imminent critique of the ``lifeworld phenomenology'' of the ``crisis'' and of ``the phenomenology of perception'', leading to the view that phenomenological reflection, like reflective philosophy in general, must be superseded by a new approach which would articulate our (...) truly immediate relation with the world. (shrink)

Résumé — Le but de cet article est de montrer que le cœur de la pensée de Simone Weil réside moins dans une philosophie de la nécessité comme telle que dans une philosophie de la rencontre de la nécessité et de l’âme humaine, et de ses effets, du malheur à l’amour, en passant par la vérité. Présente d’emblée, cette pensée connaît cependant deux étapes, comme si l’accent passait de la nécessité à ses effets, étapes que l’on étudie à travers deux (...) textes précis commentés comme les classiques qu’ils devraient être dans la philosophie du XXe siècle en France. C’est aussi par là que Simone Weil rejoint les principaux de ses contemporains, parmi lesquels Camus et Cavaillès, et ainsi le cœur du moment de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en philosophie comme ailleurs.— This paper intends to show how the core of Simone Weil’s thought is to be found less in a philosophy of necessity as such, than in a philosophy of the encounter between necessity and human soul, and the effects of that encounter, from woe to love, and including truth. However constant, this thought evolves through a difference of accent, as if the stress went from necessity to its effect ; this difference is here studied through the reading of two major writings, which deserve to be considered as XXth Century philosophical classics. It is also through this central thought that Simone Weil meets with such major contemporary philosophical figures as Camus and Cavaillès, and thus with what should be called the moment of the Second World War, in philosophy as elsewhere. (shrink)

The use of the human microbiome as a subject of study for forensic purposes raises a number of issues, ranging from a challenge to our traditional concept of identity to respect for privacy and the type of consent to be obtained when a microbiome sample is taken. The particular nature of this study requires the joint work of a multidisciplinary team made up of specialists in ethics, forensic science, law, microbiology, philosophy and political science.

Today, the demand for transparency is omnipresent. In particular, transparency is considered a prerequisite for good governance, for political participation and democracy. On closer inspection, however, transparency proves to be ambivalent. For complete transparency has not yet been achieved anywhere. Moreover, measures to increase transparency can have the opposite effect and stir up mis-trust. Historians are just beginning to discover this topic. The volume aims at elucidating the opportunities and the restrictions of transparency in historical research. It assembles contributions covering (...) European history since the 19th century. The contributors focus on political and cultural history, but include also economic and media history as well as the history of ideas. They analyse publicly debated demands and efforts for transparency, conceived as the access to information or its disclosure. (shrink)

Collingwood's theory of presuppositions has never been taken very seriously. But critics have completely overlooked its significance as a theory or model of inquiry intimately tied to certain aspects of discourse in a context of investigation. Viewed this way, Collingwood's theory is on very strong ground, especially when it is reconstructed with the aid of a formal language. The reconstruction shows what is essential to the theory and what is not, allowing us to disregard those of Collingwood's extravagant claims which (...) have frustrated an understanding of his theory's real strength. The reconstruction also provides a general framework within which recent discussion of presuppositions can be unified. (shrink)

New 'states of violence' are changing how we think about war and peace, as terrorists attacks, insurgencies, precision missiles, and a belief that conflict can avoid casualties all demonstrate a shift of focus from the state to the individual.