No todas las imágenes se ven. Algunas pasan tiempo escondidas, aunque acechen. Otras se camuflan o se exponen desafiantes. A veces son visibles pero apenas se perciben. Al ser producto de miradas furtivas, casi siempre son precarias y desatienden cualquier exigencia de nitidez o encuadre. Se muestran en secreto y en instantes de peligro. Es entonces cuando mutan al impactar con los cuerpos que las sienten, a los que desbordan y con-mueven. Circulan en el tiempo y transmiten saberes y memorias (...) que, al desplegarse, modifican paradigmas y verdades hegemónicas. Infringen las leyes, siendo el reverso de censuras, amenazando, como imágenes siniestras, a la belleza y al orden social. Las imágenes que conforman los imaginarios clandestinos lo revuelven todo y son salvajes, indisciplinadas, polinizantes. Sin desvelarlas del todo, este libro propone un acercamiento a algunas de sus manifestaciones a través de nueve tramas entre distintos contextos y temporalidades. Desde una imagen de un anciano durante la Guerra Civil española hasta un antiguo centro de detención en Buenos Aires en el que hoy se practica tango militante; desde los vaivenes tras la muerte de Franco, que abrieron el tiempo del que salieron los huesos del pasado, hasta las decenas de miles de negativos de la revuelta uruguaya sepultados durante décadas en unas latas oxidadas; desde las imágenes en 16 mm tras la matanza del 3 de marzo de 1976 en Vitoria hasta las casas okupas en la Holanda de los 80, donde el celuloide salvó el tiempo y las distancias con las colectividades libertarias del valle del Cinca, en Aragón, pasando por una proyección de cine clandestino durante un invierno en una parroquia de Gijón. Imágenes que no. Aplastadas por la historia pero indelebles, y que son marcos que reactivan la mirada, que afectivizan nuestros sentidos en un mundo anestesiado, enfatizando la capacidad crítica y ética que tiene el ver más allá de lo visible. (shrink)

This book encompasses a profound meditation on the twentieth-century fortunes of historicism as a philosophical model. After a reconstruction of its decline (as a unified and compact philosophical "ism" and as the direct heir of idealism, especially in Italy) and of its persistence as a philosophical style, the volume then penetrates the frontier of the neo-historicisms, probing two of their European faces in the shape of José Ortega y Gasset and Theodor W. Adorno. It then goes on to develop various (...) Italian paths: from Fazio-Allmayer to Garin (and his school) from Dal Pra to Massolo, and up to Preti (was he really an "anti-historicist"?). In all these paths the centrality of historicism and its post-metaphysical aspect are clearly focused, as also in the case of the School of Naples, which now represents the most outstanding and significant heir to such critical (and open) neo-historicism. (shrink)

Fin troppo abituati a leggere il 1927 di Heidegger (Sein und Zeit) e di Marcel (JournalMéthaphysique) con gli occhi del dopo e delle filosofie dell’esistenza, non ci si accorgesempre di una lettura diversa già in corso con gli occhi del prima e di Io e Tu (1923) diBuber. Il comune racconto polemico e antisartriano rivendica l’Essere più che l’esistere,ma rischia di fermarsi alla vicinanza, dentro cui si prepara invece un racconto alternativoche imparenta Marcel più con il principio dialogico (Buber, 1954) (...) e il pensiero dell’altro(Lévinas,1975). «Accordo fondamentale» con Heidegger per lo Zuspruch des Seins e laVerità come apertura, «prossimità metafisica», sensibilità comune, influenze. Fanno peròda netto contrasto l’«accordo disaccordo» e le «differenze essenziali» di Marcel per leaperture bloccate, il filosofare astratto, il «disconoscimento dell’altro» (Ma relation avecHeidegger, 1957, 1979). E quel «credere di stare davanti al mistero» di Heidegger (Letterasull’umanismo, 1947) sembra una svista. (shrink)

Artaud affirmed that the cinema participates in the thought and posessess a peculiar and moving power that distinguishes and constitutes the force of the thought like an ideatorian act. This means the thought like the action by which it is possible to represent and be made clear essential forms ..

I argue in this paper that Descartes's goal with his doctrine of the continuous recreation of the world is to offer a unified and ultimate causal explanation for the possibility of motion and duration in the world, the permanence of created things, and the continuation of their motion and duration. This unified explanation seems to be the only one which, according to Descartes, satisfies the two basic requirements any ultímate cause should meet: the cause must be active and not being (...) in motion itself. God's recreations of the world is Descartes's solution to this search. I also show in this article, on the one hand, that this doctrine successfully overcomes, in particular, the four major conflicts which threaten its consistency, and, on the other, the new meaning which the laws of nature acquire under the doctrine of the continuous recreation of the world. /// En este artículo defiendo que la pretensión principal de Descartes al proponer la doctrina de la recreación continua del mundo es encontrar una explicación unificada y última de la posibilidad de movimiento y duración en el mundo, de la permanencia de las cosas creadas y de la continuación del movimiento. Esta explicación unificada es la única que, según Descartes, satisface los dos requisitos que parece buscar en la explicación causal última del movimiento: la causa debe ser activa y no debe estar ella misma en movimiento. Las recreaciones del mundo constituyen esa causa. Por una parte, también muestro cómo esta solución supera, en concreto, los cuatro conflictos mayores que amenazan su consistencia, y, por otra, el nuevo significado que las leyes de la naturaleza adquieren en consonancia con esta doctrina de la recreación continua del mundo. (shrink)

Infants initiate joint attentional exchanges by pointing relevant referents out to addressees. Over the second year of life, the functional meaning of the pointing gesture develops from declarative (sharing a referent) to informational (giving some information that is new to the addressee). This chapter analyzes this transition in the development of pointing based on experimental evidence about its production contexts and, in particular, of variables concerning the visibility of referents for infant and addressee. Further evidence is reported concerning the association (...) of pointing with vocalizations and visual checking towards the addressee in different temporal sequencing. It is argued that shared attention initiated by pointing plays a pivotal role in the intersection between social cognition and language development. (shrink)

Film emotions are genuine emotions whose formation and development is affected by conflictive factors. Whereas their arousal, similar to that of real-life emotions, is disproportionately strengthened by the cinematographic medium, their subsequent course is both weakened and interrupted. Their objects, which I view as members of our personal emotional world (not in terms of their supposed fictionality, as often assumed), are also proper intentional objects of emotions: our fear is about the shark on the screen, our pity about the main (...) character. This view allows also for an explanation of two of film emotions’ neglected features: (a) the viewer's emotional attachment and empathy toward film objects and (b) the long-lasting emotional impact films can have on viewers. (shrink)

This paper deals with Kripke-style semantics for many-valued logics. We introduce various types of Kripke semantics, and we connect them with algebraic semantics. As for modal logics, we relate the axioms of logics extending MTL to properties of the Kripke frames in which they are valid. We show that in the propositional case most logics are complete but not strongly complete with respect to the corresponding class of complete Kripke frames, whereas in the predicate case there are important many-valued logics (...) like BL, Ł and Π, which are not even complete with respect to the class of all predicate Kripke frames in which they are valid. Thus although very natural, Kripke semantics seems to be slightly less powerful than algebraic semantics. (shrink)

Biological and Neuroscientific Foundations of Philosophy is an authoritative text addressing both academicians and students, and proposes an integrated and holistic view of scientific study and presents a new paradigm by which to study philosophy. It highlights, in a systematic and sufficiently simple manner, the fundamental role of neuroscience, neuropsychology and biology within philosophical reflection.

O trabalho analisa as relações entre discurso_ _e ser estabelecidas de forma dialética por Platão em seu diálogo tardio _Sofista_. Os sofistas defendiam a impossibilidade de provar a falsidade ou veracidade dos discursos. Tais pensadores baseavam-se no interdito ontológico de Parmênides de Eleia, que preconizava, em linhas gerais, a existência de uma estrita correspondência entre tudo que pode ser dito e o ser, de forma que seria, assim, impossível, dizer algo que não é, ou seja, um não-ser. Contrariando tal perspectiva (...) e fazendo uso do método da _diaíresis _– em que os seres são caracterizados por suas diferenças mais fundamentais –, o _Sofista _se desenrola revisitando e revisando as teorias ontológicas de seu tempo, a fim de explorar uma nova forma de pensar a relação entre os seres. Platão assegura, com isso, a possibilidade de análise qualitativa do discurso predicativo e define, consequentemente, o erro como desarmonia entre o dizer e o ser. Para tamanha empreitada, o filósofo explica como se dá o entrelaçamento na relação de ser e não-ser, relação mediada pelas seguintes categorias fundamentais: ser, mesmo, outro, movimento e repouso. A partir disso, a dialética é finalmente constituída como a técnica correta de diferenciação entre os predicados possíveis de comunicação com cada sujeito. Graças aos resultados filosóficos dessa empreitada, iniciaram-se as reflexões que levaram Aristóteles a instrumentalizar as análises da linguagem. (shrink)

This note contains a correct proof of the fact that the set of all first-order formulas which are valid in all predicate Kripke frames for Hájek's many-valued logic BL is not arithmetical. The result was claimed in [5], but the proof given there was incorrect.