Francis Robin Houssemayne Du Boulay, historian of England and Germany in the later Middle Ages, is remembered with admiration and affection by his colleagues as a fine scholar, and as a witty, charitable, and sometimes mercurial companion. Many professors of history and writers in Britain and the USA can testify to Boulay's inspiring gifts as a teacher. His unique historical vision, which is most powerfully communicated in his books on England in the later middle ages and Piers Plowman, offers (...) his readers a richly documented understanding of the lives and mentalities of medieval people, informed by sympathy and a deep charity. This is a valuable gift from a historian to a society in danger of losing its identity through forgetfulness of its past. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to counter a belief, still widely held in the secondary literature, that Anne Conway espoused a theory of monads. By exploring her views on the divisibility of both bodies and spirits, I argue that monads could not possibly exist in her system. In addition, by offering new evidence about the Latin translation of Conway's Principles and the possible authorship of its annotations, I argue that she never even suggested that there could be such things (...) as monads. Alongside this, I explore the theories of monads that did get developed by the philosophers closest to Conway—Henry More, Francis Mercury van Helmont, and Christian Knorr von Rosenroth—thereby further underlining Conway's originality and philosophical daring. (shrink)

Eileen O'Neill - Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 122-124 Sarah Hutton. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 271. Cloth, $75.00. In 1690 a Latin translation of a philosophical treatise, originally written in English by Anne Conway , was published anonymously. The English manuscript did not survive, but in 1692 the Latin version of Conway's text was translated into (...) English as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Conway was widely known by seventeenth-century philosophers and religious writers, including the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More; Descartes's correspondent, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia; Robert Boyle; physician and vitalist philosopher, Francis Mercury van Helmont; as well as numerous Quaker leaders. And her Principles were read with critical approbation by such figures as Leibniz. Further, Conway's text is probably the most anthologized of the writings of seventeenth-century women philosophers. It is curious, then, to discover a dearth of critical literature on the Principles. When Peter Loptson produced the first modern edition of the Principles , he attempted to interest contemporary philosophers in Conway's essentialist metaphysics. He did a superb job of elucidating Conway's position that: there are individual essences.. (shrink)

Anyone interested in Leibniz, the Kabbalah, the Cambridge Platonists, Gnosticism, Platonism, or seventeenth-century metaphysics will want to read Allison P. Coudert’s Leibniz and the Kabbalah. Coudert argues that core features of Leibniz’s mature philosophy were directly influenced by the Kabbalah in general and Francis Mercury van Helmont’s Lurianic Kabbalah in particular. This is a provocative thesis to which Coudert brings an impressive amount of scholarly detective work. Her argument in brief goes as follows: there are important differences between (...) the philosophy of Leibniz’s middle period and that of the late; some of the most distinctive features of the late philosophy are very similar to key aspects of the Lurianic Kabbalism of van Helmont, with whose works and ideas Leibniz became increasingly familiar after 1687; therefore, Leibniz’s late philosophy was significantly influenced by the thought of van Helmont. (shrink)

Princess Elisabeth and Anne Conway were contemporaries whose lives present many striking parallels. From their early interest in Descartes’ philosophy to their encounter with Van Helmont and the Quakers in their maturity, both were brought into contact with the same sets of ideas and forms of spirituality at similar points in their lives. Despite their common interest in philosophy, and their many mutual acquaintances, it is difficult to ascertain what either knew about the other, and whether either knew anything about (...) the other’s philosophy. This paper reviews the evidence for connections between them and their knowledge of one another. After outlining the parallels in their personal circumstances and the sources for their knowledge of each other, I discuss key intermediaries: Henry More, the Hartlib Circle, Francis Mercury van Helmont and the Quaker leaders Robert Barclay and George Keith. Although they were certainly aware of one another, the answer to the question of whether there was any philosophical inter-change between them remains especially elusive. (shrink)

"This book examines international collaboration through intercultural communication and an exchange of data, ideas, and information on a range of topics, including but not limited to ethics in academics, business, medicine, government, and leadership"--Provided by publisher.

This prize-winning book, first published in France in 1982 and now available in an English translation, investigates the question of human subjectivity.

Bhabha, Georges Didi-Huberman, David Morgan and Lee Siegel, as well as a series of focused contributions by Yve-Alain Bois, Wendy Doniger, Kenneth Frampton, Martin E. Marty, John Hallmark Neff, Annemarie Schimmel, and Helen Tworkov consider how rapture resonate's both in a cultural context and within the experience of a single human being.

[t. 1] Liste des questions, 1-500 -- t. 2. De la 501e à la 600e consideration.

Le philosophe parle de phenomenes et de noumenes. Pourquoi ne donnerait-il pas son attention a l'etre du livre, au bibliomene? Cette suggestion de Gaston Bachelard est ici reprise et prolongee. Voue aux fondations, le present ouvrage dresse une correspondance entre textualite et interrogativite, assez puissante pour indexer les modalites du pensable sur les grands types de textes, de la science a la theologie et a la poesie. L'auteur s'adresse a ceux qui ecrivent des textes. Comme a ceux qui s'interrogent sur (...) leur dimension essentielle pour la culture et sa transmission. L'intervention d'une philosophie du texte est opportune dans le concert des disciplines objectivantes. Elle introduit une idee neuve en philosophie: la positivite du texte. Il lui revient, comme naguere a la philosophie du langage, de conquerir le niveau fondamental du probleme et d'en redeployer les dimensions oubliees: le tournant textuel etend le pensable au textualisable, au lieu de le limiter au dicible. Il fait du texte un terme theoriquement marque pour la pensee elle-meme, plutot que discours, et interpretation, dont les concepts sont derives. Exigeante textualite: les conditions de la signifiance se retrouvent comme criteres de plenitude des grands textes ou de deficience des textes triviaux. Une logique de la typicalite prevoit des prototypes et des cas limites, des hybrides et des interfaces. La critique propose leur evaluation, diagnostique la troncature des sous-textes ou des non-textes. Elle differencie la pensee au sein du texte, le travail dans l'oeuvre, une proposition d'existence grace au livre, l'education meme du vivre par Le Livre. (shrink)

The central concern of Knowledge in a Social World is to restore the notion of Truth to the rightful place of glory that it had before the onslaught of those pragmatic, cultural-studying, social constructing, critical legalistic and feministic postmodernists (PoMo’s, for short). As G sees it, these PoMo’s have never put forward any “real” arguments for their veriphobia; and, well, how could they, since their position is committed to the “denial of Truth” and hence committed to denying that there is (...) any such thing as a valid or a sound argument. Instead, according to G, they have artfully inculcated various types of considerations so that a defender of Truth now must swim against the entire flow of academe to even stand a chance of making his or her voice heard. G finds six overlapping currents in this wash of anti-veritas ideas, listing them in his §1.3 and devoting a further section to each of them in turn (§1.4–§1.9). These currents spring up in various later parts of the book for further discussion, but even in these places G refers the reader back to the material in Chapter 1 as refuting them. (Insofar as a current that is not based on any consideration of Truth, validity, or soundness is susceptible of refutation.) I think it is fair to say that G does not really intend that his comments about the anti-veritas ideas will be taken as definitive by the veriphobes, but rather that he believes the strength of his positive account in the rest of the book (which accords Truth a central role) will sway all neutral readers into a belief of the usefulness of Truth in an account of social knowledge. Still, I think many readers…even veriphiles…will find the considerations that G brings against the six currents to be disappointingly short. I want to consider some of the currents in the stream of PoMo ideas. As I said, G’s six currents overlap at various points, and each of the currents has sub-flows. This means that we might put.... (shrink)