1. Prolegomena -- 2. [Without special title] -- 3. Opera theologica.

We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In (...) the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens. (shrink)

"Questo volume esamina la dottrina epicurea dei minimi che rappresenta un nodo cruciale della filosofia di Epicuro e un autentico punto di svolta rispetto all'atomismo di Leucippo e Democrito. Il libro è organizzato in tre capitoli dedicati rispettivamente: all'analisi filologica e teorica delle fonti primarie, alla ricostruzione del contesto storico-filosofico a cui la dottrina dei minimi verosimilmente fa riferimento, e, infine, all'approfondimento dello sviluppo della teoria dei minimi in ambito prevalentemente geometrico all'interno della scuola di Epicuro. L'esame critico delle fonti (...) antiche, anche attraverso l'attenta analisi della letteratura secondaria, conferma il ruolo decisivo giocato dai minimi nella scienza della natura epicurea. Si tratta della prima monografia interamente consacrata allo studio di questa significativa dottrina in tutta la sua ampiezza storica e teorica."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current analytical debate on time is full of attempts to adjudicate from a purely theoretical standpoint among competing temporal ontologies. Little attention has instead been devoted to the existential attitudes -- emotional or ethical -- that may lurk behind, or ensue from, the endorsement of one of them. Some interesting opinions have however been voiced regarding the two most prominent views in the arena, namely eternalism and presentism; it has been said that the former is nourished by a (...) fear of death, or more generally by a desire of preservation for whatever we find precious and valuable, and that the latter is fuelled by a propensity to reap whatever fruits the present brings, as enshrined in the carpe diem motto. This paper explores such a territory by focusing on the reality of past sentience, whether joyful or painful, and on the open future. The first part contrasts the reality of past sentience that comes with eternalism with the denial of this reality that follows from presentism, and argues that from an emotional, or perhaps even moral, standpoint the latter is preferable to the former. The second part clarifies why the eternalist must renounce the open future, whereas presentism is consistent with it, and considers how its rejection or acceptance, as the case may be, could be emotionally, or even morally, significant for our conception of ourselves as free agents. The conclusion offers a tentative proposal regarding which temporal ontology is superior from an existential perspective and some ruminations on the impact that all this may have on the theoretical side of the issue. (shrink)

Bu çalışma İslam’da i‘adetü’l-ma‘dûm (var olmayanın yeniden yaratılması) üzerine olan tartışmaların gelişimini, i‘adetü’l-ma‘dûm fikrini, bu fikrin reddedilmesi ve kabul edilmesinin arkasında yatan sebepleri ve mümkün olup olmadığı hakkındaki delilleri sunar. İade, yok edilmiş bir varlığı kimliğini koruyarak yeni- den yaratma eylemine dayanmaktadır. İbn Sînâ öncesi kelâmcıların çoğu iadenin imkânını kabul eder fakat bir aslî (ma‘dûmun sübûtu) ve bir de ferî meselede (belli varlık sınıflarının iade edilebilmesi) ihtilaf ederler. İadeyi kabul etmek kelâmcıların cismânî bir antropoloji ile yeniden dirilmenin imkânını uzlaştırmalarını sağlamıştır. (...) İbn Sînâ, iadenin imkânına karşı üç ana delilden oluşan etkili bir delil ortaya koymuştur: bu delil, (ma‘dûmun sâbit olmaması göz önüne alınacak olursa) sezgiden, iade edilen varlığın eşdeğer kopya- sından ayırt edilemezliğinden ve zamanın iadesinin yol açtığı çelişkilerden oluşur. İbn Sînâ öncesi düşünce ekollerinden sadece Eş‘arîler iadenin imkânını savunmuştur. Klasik sonrası dönemin tartışmaları İbn Sînâ ve mütekaddimûn kelâmcılar tarafından ana hatları çizilen cedelî bir asıl üzerine inşa edilmiş daha karmaşık formülasyonları (modal değişmezlik argümanı), itirazları, cevapları ve aynı zamanda hem iadeyi destekleyen (tasavvurî parçaların imkânı, hatırlama, varsayımsal imkân) hem de iadeye karşı olan (ara boşluk, illetlerin iadesi) bütünüyle yeni bazı argümanları öne sürer. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gaining momentum in the business world, but several issues continue to challenge managers in charge of sustainability. Supply chain management is one area in which CSR-related activities could potentially drive the process of sustainability within firms. This case presents the way that illycaffè, an Italian coffee producer, has approached CSR. Since 1991, the company has focused on developing a new relationship with Brazilian coffee producers based on networking translated into knowledge transfer—Brazilian producers became responsible for (...) their operations all along the supply line—and innovation translated into quality—one supplier talks about how illycaffè persuaded him he was capable of producing a Ferrari among coffees instead of a Fiat. These two factors not only drive the supplier relationship, but also serve as the drivers of illycaffè’s sustainability strategy. Lessons for managers relate to benefits for the business, for society and for stakeholders, and questions arise about how to replicate illycaffè’s success and create value through values. (shrink)

This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of view of instantaneous presentism, for the existence of events that take time, dynamic events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be (...) subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...) value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing. (shrink)

La experiencia de la pobreza llama a la economía a humanizarse y a la filosofía a pensar etimológicamente desde las “normas de la casa”. Se descubre, entonces, el sentido de las épocas y de las generaciones filosóficas, la razón de su fecundidad y de su pobreza, así como la relación entre estas y la justicia.

On peut trouver dans l’œuvre de Lévy-Bruhl des traces de la présence de Spinoza, en particulier de sa conception de la connaissance du troisième genre, ou « science intuitive ». Il apparaît que Lévy-Bruhl a travaillé à une « new science of metaphysics », aussi bien dans ses œuvres d’histoire de la philosophie que dans ses ouvrages ethnologiques.One may find in Lévy-Bruhl’s works traces of Spinoza’s presence, in particular of his conception of « knowledge of the third kind », i.e. (...) « intuitive science ». It thus appears that Lévy-Bruhl worked on a « new science of metaphysics » both in his historical researches and in his ethnological works. (shrink)

v. 1. Opere teoretiche.--v. 2. Opere morali.

Goldbach’s conjecture, if not read in number theory, but in a precise foundation theory of mathematics, that refers to the metaphysical ‘theory of the participation’ of Thomas Aquinas, poses a surprising analogy between the category of the quantity, within which the same arithmetic conjecture is formulated, and the transcendental/formal dimension. It says: every even number is ‘like’ a two, that is: it has the form-of-two. And that means: it is the composition of two units; not two equal arithmetic units, but (...) two different formal-transcendental units, which are, in arithmetic, two prime numbers. (shrink)

Antoine Arnauld, dit le Grand Arnauld, théologien janséniste, grammairien et logicien, a bien servi la philosophie : interlocuteur de Descartes ; correspondant de Leibniz, éditeur des Pensées de Pascal, il est l'un de ceux qui ont le plus contribué à légitimer le cartésianisme. Foucault et Chomsky se sont intéressés à sa Logique ou art de penser et à sa Grammaire générale et raisonnée de Port Royal, nées de la controverse qui a opposé Jansénistes, jésuites et Curie romaine au XVIIe siècle. (...) Sa théorie des idées, construite en opposition à celle de Malebranche, constitue une étape importante dans la constitution du problème de l'idéalité - qui trouvera son aboutissement chez Kant. Plusieurs raisons, par conséquent, de revenir sur une œuvre méconnue. On commence par rappeler le contexte dans lequel le jansénisme est né ; on situe ensuite Arnauld relativement à Descartes, au cartésianisme et à la philosophie en général ; on précise sa doctrine, principalement sa conception de l'homme déchu ; on détaille également sa morale. Après quoi, on restitue les grands thèmes de sa Logique et de sa Grammaire. On examine enfin la théorie des idées d'Arnauld et on fait le point sur son retour dans le champ des sciences cognitives. (shrink)

1. La formazione del pensiero filosofico dalle origini a Platone, VI-IV a.C. -- 2. Filosofia, cultura, scuole tra Aristotele e Augusto, IV-II secolo a.C. -- 3. Pensiero, culture e concezioni religiose, II secolo a.C.-II secolo d.C. -- 4. Cultura, filosofia, politica e religiosità, II-VI secolo d.C.