We find a simple counterfactual acceptable, it is argued, to the extent that (i) our probability of the consequent under the thought experiment of counterfactually supposing the antecedent is high, (ii) provided the latter is on-topic with respect to the former. Counterfactual supposition is represented by Lewisian imaging. Topicality, by an algebra of subject matters. A topic-sensitive probabilistic logic is then provided, to reason about the acceptability of simple counterfactuals.

Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as “ex-concrete.” It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties.

The fitting attitude analysis of value states that for objects to have value is for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Good objects are the fitting targets of positive attitudes, while bad objects are the fitting targets of negative attitudes. The following paper presents an argument to the effect that value and the fittingness of attitudes differ in terms of their explanations. Whereas the fittingness of attitudes is explained, inter alia, by both the properties of attitudes and those (...) of their fitting targets, the explanation of value tends to have a different content. In particular, objects have value in virtue of the features that make them valuable, and these need not involve any attitudinal properties. If this is right, then there are reasons to doubt the claim that for objects to have value is just for them to be the fitting targets of attitudes. Insofar as value is a property, it appears to be distinct from the property of objects being the fitting targets of attitudes. (shrink)

According to a longstanding philosophical tradition dating back to Aristotle, certain proofs do not only certify the truth of their conclusion but also explain it. Lately, much effort is being devo...

The traditional approach to the analysis of knowledge sees it as a true belief meeting further conditions. I discuss an empirical challenge to this traditional approach, which I call the argument from development. Briefly, the argument is that belief cannot be conceptually prior to knowledge because children acquire the concept of knowledge first. Several prominent scientists and philosophers have argued that this latter claim is supported by many findings with infants and young children. Here, I defend the traditional approach by (...) raising three challenges to the argument from development: the competence-performance challenge, the double-standard challenge, and the underdetermination challenge. I conclude that the developmental data are fully compatible with children acquiring the concept of belief first. In closing, I also argue that further research is needed to investigate when children acquire a concept of knowledge. (shrink)

Russell’s type theory has been the standard property theory for years, relying on rigid type distinctions at the grammatical level to circumvent the paradoxes of predication. In recent years it has been convincingly argued by Bealer, Cochiarella, Turner and others that many linguistic and ontological data are best accounted for by using a type-free property theory. In the spirit of exploring alternatives and “to have as many opportunities as possible for theory comparison”, this paper presents another type-free property theory, to (...) be called P*, intended for applications in Montague-style natural language semantics and formal ontology. The theory is philosophically grounded on Gupta’s and Belnap’s revision theory of definitions and its basic idea is viewing predication (exemplification) as a ‘circular concept’ that can be captured by circular definitions. The paper has the following fourteen sections: (1) Introduction; (2) Formal type-free property theory; (3) Applying RTD [revision theory of definitions] to exemplification; (4) The system P*; (5) Some features of P*; (6) A comparison with Turner’s system; (7) Entailment and P*; (8) P* and natural language semantics; (9) Noun phrases; (10) The need for type-freedom in semantics; (11) Arithmetic in P*; (12) Arithmetic in PN*; (13) Complexity of P*; (14) Conclusion, and acknowledgments. (shrink)

In the creation of maps, scientific knowledge related to mathematics and physics combines with knowledge specific to graphic or artistic disciplines. Since all maps are artifacts whose aesthetic qualities convey information that simultaneously engages the fields of ontology, epistemology, and politics, they are objects of undeniable interest for philosophical inquiry. This introduction to the 5th issue of the Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts reviews the latest literature and key topics surrounding the relationship between philosophy, cartography (...) and mapmaking. (shrink)

Moving from a behavioral definition of intelligence, which describes it as the ability to adapt to the surrounding environment and deal effectively with new situations (Anastasi, 1986), this paper explains to what extent the performance obtained by ChatGPT in the linguistic domain can be considered as intelligent behavior and to what extent they cannot. It also explains in what sense the hypothesis of decoupling between cognitive and problem-solving abilities, proposed by Floridi (2017) and Floridi and Chiriatti (2020) should be interpreted. (...) The problem of symbolic grounding (Harnad, 1990) is then addressed to show the problematic relationship between ChatGPT and the natural environment, and thus the impossibility for it to understand the symbols it manipulates. To explain the reasons why ChatGPT does not succeed in this task, an investigation is carried out and a possible solution to the problem in the artificial domain is proposed by making a comparison with the natural ability of living beings to ground their own meanings from some basic cognitive-sensory aspects, which, it is explained, are directly related to the emergence of self-awareness in humans. Thus, the question is raised whether a possible and concrete solution to the Symbol Grounding Problem would involve in the artificial domain the development of cognitive abilities fully comparable to those of humans. Finally, I explain the difficulties that would have to be overcome before such a level could be reached, since human cognitive capacities are intimately linked to intersubjectivity and intercorporeality. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...) the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate. (shrink)

Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.

Dynamic events such as a rolling ball moving from one place to another involve change and time intervals and thus presumably successions of static events occurring one after the other, e.g., the ball’s being at a certain place and then at another place during the interval in question. When dynamic events are experienced they should count as present and thus as existent from a presentist point of view. But this seems to imply the existence of the static events involved in (...) them. This in turn seems to imply that there exist past and perhaps even future static events. Therefore, there is a problem for presentism. A possible way out for the presentist is proposed, based on allowing for time-indexed past-oriented and future-oriented properties. One may raise objections regarding the ontological status of these properties and the commitment to past and future objects and times that they seem to bring with them, but these objections can be put to rest. (shrink)

Due to its innovative content, Duns Scotus’ thought spread rapidly, thanks above all to the contribution of his pupils and disciples, who immediately undertook to edit his writings and to rework and disseminate his thought. In this process of dissemination of Scotism, a very important role was played by Antonius Andreae, a Spanish Franciscan and a Scotist. His importance is mainly historical. The widespread diffusion of Scotus’ metaphysical thought - at least in a first phase - is essentially linked to (...) his name: many authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will know Duns Scotus’ metaphysical thought through the mediation of his Questiones in xii libros Metaphisice. This paper examines Andreae’s discussion concerning the subject of metaphysics (Questiones, I, q. 1), trying to show in what sense and in what way he contributed to providing a simplified yet systematic formulation of some of Duns Scotus’ doctrines. (shrink)

Le présent volume sur Dionysos est issu d’un colloque qui a eu lieu à l’université de Varsovie en janvier 2019, dans le cadre du National Programme for the Development of Humanities financé par le ministère polonais de la Science et de l’Éducation supérieure. Il se concentre sur un aspect spécifique du dieu grec, celui de son rapport avec la politique et l’autorité. Dans une brève introduction (p. 1–5), Filip Doroszewski et Dariusz Karlowicz rappellent que, par-delà l’imaginaire nietzschéen d...

In _Friendship_, Francesco Alberoni differentiates friendship from other interpersonal relationships and shows that the friendship encounter embodies justice and thus resists dehumanizing societal trends. The ideals of friendship enjoin us to realize the republican virtues in everyday life.

1. Da Leibniz a Kant.--2. L'algebra della logica.

Né vers 1600 en Italie, l'opéra encourait les foudres de Marcello dès 1720. L'ouverture des salles au public, les nécessités commerciales et le vedettariat l'avaient éloigné des idéaux qui présidèrent à sa naissance. L'opuscule de Benedetto Marcello aborde, sur le ton de la dérision et de la satire, tous les aspects de l'opéra, du livret à la musique, en passant par les chanteurs, les compositeurs, les directeurs de théâtre, la mise en scène, etc. Le texte méritait une nouvelle traduction française (...) (la dernière datait de la fin du dix-neuvième siècle), plus précise et plus complète, car le savant compositeur de l'Estro poetico-armonico y déploie une verve irrésistible, proche de celle dont se servira Carlo Goldoni dans l'imprésario de Smyrne. Cette satire représente l'étincelle qui allait embraser le flambeau de la réforme par le biais du comte Francesco Algarotti (1712-1764) poète et écrivain. Son Essai sur l'Opéra en musique contient en effet tous les points importants sur lesquels Calzabigi et Gluck allaient asseoir leur reconstruction : choix du livret, rôle de la poésie et de la musique, rôle des chanteurs, du compositeur, moyens et contrôle artistiques des productions. La traduction française qu'un fit Chastellux en 1773, nonobstant sa finesse et son élégance, fait pourtant figure de " belle infidèle ". Force nous était donc d'élaborer là encore une nouvelle traduction de ce texte fondateur. A côté de ces deux grands titres, nous avons réuni un dossier important d'écrits émanant des acteurs de la réforme : Métastase, Angiolini, Calzabigi, Gluck et Du Roullet. (shrink)